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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the ideology and 'mentality' of the Seljuqs of Rum 
4 73-64111081-1243. It focuses on this little-known branch of the Seljuqs, whose rule 
in Anatolia lasted considerably longer than the Great Seljuq state further east. This 
study uses the few available Rum Seljuq primary sources in Persian and Arabic, as 
well as contemporary oriental Christian chronicles; it also draws on the evidence of 
coins and monumental inscriptions, where possible. 
Chapter one discusses the background of the Great Seljuqs, how they came 
into the Islamic world, bringing with them their centuries-old nomadic lifestyle and 
modes of thinking. This Chapter also analyses the way in which these Turkish 
nomadic chiefs were presented as Muslim rulers by the Arabic and Persian religious 
scholars and bureaucrats who served them. Chapter two discusses how the earliest 
Seljuq leaders in Anatolia from 4 73-500/1081-1107 conformed to traditional patterns 
of nomadic rule, and the period of interregnum and transition (500-551/1107-1156) 
during which the Seljuqs in Anatolia were dominated by the rival Turkish 
Danishmendid principality. 
Chapter three shows how the Rum Seljuq principality in Anatolia was 
transformed by the beginning of the thirteenth century into the Rum Seljuq sultanate. 
In chapter four the discussion focuses on the apogee of the dynasty under the rule of 
Kay Kawfis I (608-61611211-1220) and Kay Qubadh I (616-634/1220-1237) where it 
may be argued that these two Seljuq sultans could justifiably be viewed as model 
Perso-Islamic rulers, although elements from their Turkish nomadic past remained. 
The appendix contains an analysis of the crucial relationship between the Rutn 
Seluqs and their Byzantine neighbours during the period ( 4 73-57611 081-1180), 
arguing that a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq 
sultans and the Comneni emperors during these years. 
The thesis shows how ideology rather than mere military success helped to 
shape this important dynasty into a fully- fledged sultanate. 
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Introduction 
The Seljuqs arose in the fifth/eleventh century from nomadic chieftains to 
Muslim sultans ruling over the eastern and central Islamic lands as well as parts of 
the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia. While the main line of the Seljuq family 
established the Great Seljuq Empire ruling over Persia and Irak, several subordinate 
lines ruled over Kirman, Syria and most importantly Anatolia, which became the 
Rum Seljuq sultanate and outlived the main line for several decades. The Seljuqs 
were not the first Turks to enter the Muslim world, but they were the first Turkish 
leaders who, at the head of their followers and above all, as free people entered the 
Muslim world from its borders. Long before the Seljuqs, Turks had been brought into 
the Muslim world as reliable military slaves (1namluk) and the Turkish Ghaznavid 
dynasty had sprung from Sebiiktigin, one of the mamluk of the Samanid rulers of 
Khurasan. While the Ghaznavids took power from inside the Samanid State which 
had shaped their consciousness about leadership, the Seljuqs entered the Muslim 
World from outside as chieftains of tribally organised nomadic bands. 
Thus the Great Seljuqs represent the first truly Turkish dynasty ruling over 
Muslim lands. The appearance of the Seljuqs marks significant changes not only in 
Muslim history but also in Byzantine/Christian history. Their incursion into the 
central Islamic lands and Byzantine Anatolia instigated an increased movement of 
nomads into these lands. In 43111040 the grandsons of Seljuq, Tugrul Bey and c;agn 
Bey defeated the Ghaznavid ruler Mas~ud at the famous battle of Dandanqan and in 
the same year took Nishapur, the capital of Ghaznavid Khurasan. c;agn Bey stayed in 
the east where he established Marw as his base and was succeeded by his son Alp 
Arslan when he died in 452/1060. Tugrul Bey at the same time expanded westwards 
and took Baghdad from the Shi'i Buyids in 44711055, thus freeing the Abbasid 
caliph al-Qa ~I m from Shi 'i tutelage. The caliph in turn proclaimed Tugrul Bey as 
sultan and thus the Great Seljuq sultanate ruling over Iran and Iraq was founded. 
When in 45511063 Tugrul Bey died leaving no heirs behind, his nephew Alp Arslan 
succeeded him as sultan ruling over a united Seljuq realm. 
With the foundation of the Great Seljuq sultanate, imperial rule with a 
standing slave (ghuliim) army and Persian bureaucracy and monarchic traditions was 
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established. The architect behind the new government was Ni?am al-Mulk, arguably 
the greatest Seljuq vizier, who served under Alp Arslan and his son and successor 
Malik Shah. Ni?am al-Mulk was a member of the Persian bureaucracy of K.hurasan 
who changed from Ghaznavid into Great Seljuq service. This bureaucracy had 
developed the Perso-Islamic concepts of government and kingship under the 
Ghaznavids and they refined it further under the Great Seljuqs. It was also Ni?am al-
Mulk who formulated these concepts in his Book of Government (Siyiisat-niima) 
composed by order of the Great Seljuq sultan Malikshah. The official Great Seljuq 
ideology was based on a synthesis of Islamic religious ideals and ancient Persian 
ideals; it presented the Seljuqs as the military guardians of Sunni Islam which they 
had to defend against outsiders, especially against the Shi 'i Fatimid rivals of the 
Abbasid caliphs in Cairo. 
The new concept of government elevated the Seljuq leaders to the status of 
autocratic kings and was thus not accepted by their family members and Turkmen 
followers. According to the older Turkic conceptions of leadership, power was the 
shared property of the ruling family. The supreme leader was chosen according to the 
idea of seniorate among the members of the charismatic clan. Moreover his powers 
were limited and he was regarded as the primus inter pares whose main duty was to 
lead his followers to pasture and plunder. It is thus not surprising that several 
rebellions were launched against the Great Seljuq sultans. One year after the 
accession of Alp Arslan his uncle Kutalmt~ b. Arslan Isra ~n rebelled claiming the 
supreme leadership of the Seljuq family as he was its senior member. Kutaln11~ was 
defeated and killed and his sons taken captive. 
In order to pre-empt rebellions the Great Seljuqs encouraged their Turkn1en 
followers, the force of their military success, together with rebellious family 
members to carry their raids for plunder westwards into Byzantium, Georgia, and 
Armenia and seek pasture there. The remarkable victory of the Great Seljuq sultan 
Alp Arslan over the Byzantine emperor Romanus Diogenes at the famous battle of 
Manzikert in 463/1071 left the the borders of the Byzantine empire undefended. The 
gates of Anatolia were thus wide open to nomadic Turkmen groups and all kinds of 
fugitives who wanted to escape the control of the central government of the Great 
Seljuq empire. Sulayman, the son of Kutalmt~, escaped Great Seljuq captivity after 
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Alp Arslan's death in 465/1073 and came with his Turkmen followers to Anatolia. 
Aided by the internal strife following the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert Sulayman 
seized Nicaea (iznik) in western Anatolia and established a principality. This Seljuq 
principality in Anatolia was to become the Rum Seljuq sultanate centered in !conium 
(Konya). This rebellious branch of the Seljuq family had fallen from grace and had 
lost its dynastic rights. Hence, the descendants of Kutalmt~ b. Arslan Isratil, in a 
sense started all over again as chiefs of nomadic Turkmen bands in Anatolia and 
established their own Perso-Islamic dynasty ruling over former Christian Byzantine 
territory. Moreover the foundation of the Rum-Seljuq Sultanate is the most visible 
and lasting effect of the coming of the Seljuqs into the Middle East as it presents the 
predecessor of the modern Repuplic of Turkey. 
Thus one should expect that modern western scholarly interest in Seljuq 
history would be great, but this is not the case. Comprehensive histories of the 
Seljuqs in general or the Rum Seljuqs in particular do not exist. What can be found 
about Seljuq history are mainly chapters in general works about Islamic and Persian 
history. Among these it is worth mentioning in particular W. Barthold's Turkestan 
Down to the Mongol lnvasion, 1 Edmund Bosworth's The Ghaznavids2, Ann K.S. 
Lambton's Theo1y and Practice in Medieval Persian Governn1ent3 and The 
Can1bridge Histo1y of Iran edited by J.A. Boyle.4 The second edition of the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam delivers the most up-to-date and profound information about 
Seljuq history in its articles. The first work devoted solely to the Rum Seljuqs was 
written by the Russian scholar Vladimir Gordlevski and published in Moscow in 
1941. His book entitled Gosudarstvo Seldzhukidov Maloi Azii5 is not beneficial for 
the present study as it is not only outdated but more in1portantly because he the 
author's communist views are projected onto medieval history uncritically. To give 
but one example the author presents the Rum Seljuq sultans as feudal lords. Thus this 
work is not very fruitful for the present study. The French scholar Claude Cahen 
1 Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion, 3rd ed., London 1968, (hereafter cited as Barthold, 
Turkestan ). 
2 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids. Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040, Edinburgh 
1963, (hereafter cited as Bosworth, Ghaznavids). 
3 London 1980. Idem., The Formation of Turkey, Essex 2001, (Engl. tr. of the French edition of Pre-
Ottoman Turkey), (hereafter cited as Cahen, Formation). 
4 The Saljuq and Mongol periods, (Volume 5), Cambridge 1968. 
5 Here the Turkish translation of this work will be used. Gordlevski, Anadolu Selr;uklu Devleti, tr. 
Azer Yaran, Ankara 1988. 
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wrote several articles about the Great Seljuqs and Rum Seljuqs and also devoted a 
book to the Rum-Seljuqs entitled Pre-Ottoman Turkey. 6 This work described by the 
author as "a provisional synthesis" suffers from many unanswered questions.7 The 
study of Speros Vryonis Jr. entitled, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia 
Minor and the Process of lslamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth 
Centu1y8 concentrates on the Islamization and Turkification of Byzantine Anatolia. 
Tamara Talbot Rice also wrote a book about the Seljuqs, which is written in a 
popular manner and merely gives an uncritical narrative of the main events.9 More 
recently Gary Leiser10 has edited and published a series of essays on Rum Seljuq 
history and Carole Hillenbrand has published her book on the battle of Manzikert. 11 
By far the largest contribution to Seljuq history is made by Turkish scholars; 
their work has been neglected by western scholars who, except for a small minority, 
do not know modem Turkish. Here is not the place to discuss all such Turkish works 
but it is important to note that the Turkish scholars were mainly committed to an 
ideological view of history. 12 They wrote their works in resistance to the attitude of 
Arab, Persian and western scholars according to which the Turks were only 
barbarians who brought about the decline of Islamic civilisation. 13 The first Turkish 
scholar working on Seljuq history was M. Fuad Kopriilii, who is regarded as the 
founder of modem Turkish historiography. The main research interest of Kopriilii, 
however, was literary history. Among his works important for the present study is his 
article about the local sources for the Rum-Seljuqs. 14 A cornplete history of the Rmn 
Seljuqs in eight volumes was attempted by M. H. Y1nan9 but only one volutne 
appeared. 15 
6 C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and hist01y c. 
1071-1330, London 1968, (hereafter cited as Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey). 
7 Ibid., p.xvii, Cahen had planned another work which did not appear. 
8 Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London 1971, (hereafter cited as Vryonis, Decline). 
9 Rice, Die Seldschuken, Koln 1963. 
10 Leiser, ed, Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, Paris 2005, (hereafter cited as Leiser, Seldjoukides). 
11 C. Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol. The Battle of Manzikert, Edinburgh 2007, 
(hereafter cited as C. Hillenbrand, Manzikert). 
12 Martin Strohmeier discusses in his work the Turkish historians and their view on Seljuq history in 
detail. Seldschukishe Geschichte und Tiirkische Geschichtswissenschaft. Die Seldschuken im Urteil 
moderner Tiirkischer Historiker, Berlin 1984; there is also Aziz Ba~an's thesis which was completed 
recently. 
13 Cf., EI2, Saldjukids, ( Bosworth), 937. 
14 Kopriilli, 'Anadolu Sel<;uk1ulan tarihinin yerli kaynaklan ', in: Belleten 7 ( 1943), 379-522. 
15 Yman<;, Tiirkiye Tarihi Selr;uklular devri. Anadolunun fethi, Istanbul 1934. 
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Among the next generation of Turkish historians of Seljuq history, Osman 
Turan takes an important place as his editions made the sources for the Rum Seljuqs 
accessible. 16 Faruk Si.imer's main interest lay in pre-Seljuq history, the Oghuz clans. 
Mehmet Koymen, who worked on the Great Seljuqs, attempted a two-volume work 
about them, but only the second volume dealing with the period of the Great Seljuq 
sultan Sancar was published. 17 Among Kafesoglu's works his article on the Seljuqs 
in the is Him Ansiklopedisi should be mentioned. 18 The following generation was 
more concerned with the Seljuq subordinate lines. Erdogan Mer9il wrote about the 
Seljuqs of Kirman 19 and Ali Sevim about the Seljuqs of Syria and Palestine. 20 A joint 
effort by Ali Sevim and Ya~ar Yi.icel deals with the Rum Seljuqs in the framework of 
the history of Turkey. 21 Their book is a chronologically organized narrative history 
of the Rum Seljuqs and the authors take on the nationalistic view of their 
predecessors. The majority of the current generation of Turkish historians remains 
commited to the nationalistic view of history and they continue to write narrative 
history.22 
All in all the Turkish works, as well as the main body of western works, are 
narrative histories. 23 A complete narrative of the events is of course the essential first 
step as Cahen rightly points out in his work Pre-Ottoman Turkey, in which he writes 
that: "Much of the text will consist of what is now somewhat disparagingly called 
'narrative history'. His defence for narrative history however is not convincing: 
16 Turan's book on the Rum Seljuqs is to date used by Turkish historians as the basis for their works 
on the Seljuqs. 0. Turan, Selr;uklular Zamanmda Tiirkiye. Siyasi Tarih Alp Arslan 'dan Osman 
Gazi ye (1 071-1318), Istanbul 1971, (hereafter cited as Turan, Selr;uklular). 
17 Koymen, Biiyiik Selr;uklu imparatorlugu tarihi 11. lkinci imparatorluk devri, Ankara 1954. 
18 This article serving nationalistic ideas was criticized by Western scholars and led to a controversy 
between Kafesoglu and Turan. It is remarkable that this article has been republished in 1972 by the 
Turkish Ministry of Culture in form of a simplified book and written in more modern Turkish in order 
to be better accesible to the younger generation. Gary Leiser has translated this article and the critique 
and counter-critique of Kafesoglu and Turan into English. A Hist01y of the Seljuks. Ibrahim 
Kafesoglu 's Inte1pretation and the Resulting Controversy, Southern Illinois 1988. 
19 Mer9il, Kirman Selr;uklulan, Istanbul 1980. 
20 Sevim, Suriye ve Filistin Selr;uklulan Tarihi, Ankara 1983. 
21 Yuccl, Tiirkiye Tarihi. Fetih, Selr;uklu ve Beylikler donemi, Ankara 1989. 
22 There arc some scholars such as Kenan <;etin who have departed from writing just narrative history. 
<;etin, Selr;uklu Miiesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, Erzurum 1992, (hereafter cited as <;etin, 
Miiesseseleri). Yet, Turkish scholars seem reluctant to adopt new methods and concepts developed in 
the West. 
23 The interesting work of Anne Broadbridge which looks at the ideology of the Mamluks and the 
Mongols in the context of their diplomatic exchange shows how fruitful the application of the history 
of ideology can be. A.F. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology in Islamic and Mongol Worlds, 
Cambridge 2008. 
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"Masters are masters, and moreover they have had the· support of the solid 
framework provided by their predecessors who established 'narrative' history; pupils 
are not necessarily all masters and they no longer always have the framework behind 
them. History is total, that is to say it combines together inextricably both 'events' 
and 'structures', and we have no theoretical right to separate them."24 To date, 
modem western historians as well as modem Turkish historians of the Seljuqs have 
mainly concentrated their efforts on political history and have attributed the 
extraordinary Seljuq success story to their military superiority, their religious 
fervour, and the political genius of their vizier Ni?am al-Mulk. The rise of the 
descendants of Sulayman b. Kutalmt~ from a principality in Anatolia to the Rum 
Seljuq state is seen as the result of the great Muslim victory at Manzikert against 
Byzantium and continuation of the ghazw or jihad against the Christian power led by 
the Seljuqs and Turkmen.25 For modem Turkish historians the battle of Manzikert in 
46311071 marks the birth of Turkey. Rum Seljuq history is seen in the light of the 
modem Turkish ideology that the Turks led by the Seljuqs aimed to found a Turkish 
homeland. 26 
Neither of these approaches to Seljuq history explains the transformation of 
the Seljuqs of Anatolia from leaders of nomadic bands to Perso-Islamic rulers. How 
were the Seljuqs in Antolia able to develop from rulers of a stnall principality to 
sultans ruling over almost the whole of Anatolia? What were the factors which made 
the foundation of this state possible? To date historians have sought to explain this 
with political, economic, and demographic factors. 27 Even though these factors are 
24 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, xviii. 
25 Paul Wittek argued in his works that the Muslim idea of the Byzantine territory as dar al-harb 
contributed to the Islamization of Anatolia. Cf. Wittek, ·von der byzantinischen zur tiirkischen 
Toponymie', in: Byzantion 10 (1935), 11-64, (hereafter cited as Wittek, Toponymie); idem., Das 
Fiirstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13-15Jh., Amsterdam 1967. This 
idea to base the Turkish conquest of Anatolia by the Seljuqs and later Ottomans on jihad has been 
disputed for example by Lindner who argues that the ideology of the holy war was not behind the 
Ottoman conquest. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, Indiana 1983. 
26 The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk and his ideologues formulated an ideology~ 
refered to as the Kemalist ideology which used the battle of Manzikert as "the myth of national 
identity" for the new Nation State. For a discussion of the myth of Manzikert and the use of Rum 
Seljuq history by Atatiirk and modern Turkish historians for nationalistic ends see the discussion of 
Carole Hillenbrand. Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 196-220. 
27 Khazanov has taken a different approach in his book on nomads and the state and he points out that 
the development of the Seljuq state, which according to him is a second-type nomad state was 
completed with the Rum-Seljuq sultanate and their successors the Ottoman State. See for this, 
Khazanov, Nomads and the outside world, 232 and 267. 
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important they do not suffice to explain the emergence of the Rum Seljuq state. It has 
so far not been recognised that ideology plays an important role in the formation of a 
state. Claessen and Oosten point out aptly: "There must exist an ideology, which 
explains and justifies a hierarchical administrative organization and socio-political 
inequality. If such an ideology does not exist, or emerges the formation of state 
becomes difficult, or even outright impossible. "28 
The present study aims to analyse the ideology and mentality of the Rum 
Seljuq family beginning with the rule of Sulayman ( 4 73-4 78/1081-1 086) and ending 
with the rule of Kay Khusraw II ( 634-644/123 7 -1246). It will be shown that during 
this period the transformation of the Rum Seljuqs from nomadic leaders to sultans 
took place over four distinctive phases, parallel to which the ideology and mentality 
evolved. For a better understanding of the evolution of the state ideology the analysis 
will start with a discussion of the Great Seljuq ideology. As Claessen and Skalnik 
have stated, "a readily adaptable ideological background, be it religious, juridical or 
kinship, is a necessary condition for the emergence of the state."29 For the foundation 
of the Rum Seljuq ideology the Great Seljuq model and the dynastic connection to 
them plays an important role. The first chapter will thus give an outline of the state 
ideology formulated for the Great Seljuqs. 
The second chapter discusses Kutalmt~, the rebellious ancestor of the Rum 
Seljuqs and the foundation of the Seljuq principality in Nicaea by his son Sulayman 
and grandson Kthv Arslan I. In addition it looks at the reigns of Shahanshah and 
Mas ~ud which represent a period of transition for the Seljuqs in Anatolia. This period 
is marked by important internal and external developments. First, the Seljuqs were 
forced to retreat to inner Anatolia, following the conquest of N icaea by the armies of 
the First Crusade in 1097. Second, the internal strife among the Seljuqs led to the 
growth of power of their main Muslim rivals in Anatolia, the Danishmendids. 
The third chapter focuses on the reigns of K1l19 Arslan II and his two sons 
and successors, Kay Khusraw I and Sulayman Shah II. The first part of this chapter 
will argue why Kthv Arslan II is the real founder of the Rum Seljuq state and which 
factors played here a role here. First, the decline of the Great Seljuq Empire and the 
28 Claessen/ Oosten, ( eds.), Ideology and the Formation of Early States, Leiden/New York/Koln 1996, 
5. 
29 Claessen/ Skalnik, (eds.), The Study of the State, The Hague 1981, 479. 
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rise of its successor states and especially the states of Nur al-Din and Saladin whose 
power over Syria and Mesopotamia closed the way to the east for the Rum Seljuqs 
and thus confined them to inner Anatolia. Second, following the disintegration of the 
Great Seljuq sultanate the title of sultan was assumed by several rulers. In contrast to 
the Great Seljuq sultans who could claim to be supreme sultans of Sunni Islam the 
Rum Seljuq sultans had to compete with the successor states of the Great Seljuqs. As 
a result of these factors the Seljuqs in Anatolia established their own dynasty called 
the Rum Seljuq sultantate. 
When K1h9 Arslan II abdicated at the end of his reign he divided his realm 
among his many sons according to the old Turkish steppe tradition, which regarded 
rule as the right of the family and internal strife ensued. Several external 
developments prevented the interference of their most powerful neighbours and thus 
the disintegration of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. These were on the one hand the 
decline of the Ayyubid state following the death of Saladin in 589/1193 and on the 
other the extinction of the Byzantine Empire following the conquest of 
Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. The second part of the third chapter 
focuses on the reigns of Kay Khusraw I and Sulayman Shah II who laid down the 
foundation for the apogee of the Rum Seljuq state. This part will thus discuss if the 
rise of the Rum Seljuq state to the strongest power in the region led to the re-
formulation of the official state ideology. 
The fourth chapter analyses the reigns of Kay Kawus I (1211-1219), Kay 
Kubadh I (1219-123 7), and Kay Khusraw li (123 7 -1246). The reigns of these sultans 
represents the apogee of the Rum Seljuq state. Under these rulers the Run1 Seljuq 
towns, especially Konya, were expanded into itnportant Muslim centres. On the other 
hand the names chosen by these sultans indicate that they tried to connect themselves 
to the ideal Iranian kings as presented in the Shahname of Firdawsi. Therefore the 
questions which will be tackled here are: was the Rum Seljuq state developed into a 
centralised autocratic state during this period and can we thus regard these sultans as 
truly Perso-Islamic rulers? How far can this be derived from the ideology formulated 
under these rulers? 
The appendix contains an analysis of the crucial relationship between the 
Run1 Seluqs and their Byzantine neighbours during the period ( 4 73-576/1 081-1180), 
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arguing that a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq 
sultans and the Comneni emperors during these years. 
Methodology 
The methodology employed here is thus historical as a comprehensive 
understanding of the ideology and mentality is only possible when set in the 
historical context. For this reason outlines of the Rum Seljuq history will be given in 
each chapter. It should be noted at the outset, however, that it is not the aim of this 
work to give a detailed chronological account of Rum Seljuq history. For the purpose 
of this work, it is more important to discuss the material the medieval authors chose 
to edit. Hence, we are more interested in the partiality of their accounts and in the 
ways in which they portray the Rum Seljuq sultans. Therefore the method of Hans-
Wemer Goetz called by him "Vorstellungsgeschichte" will be employed for the 
interpretation of the sources. 30 
At the same time the concept of the history of mentality developed by the 
French historical school of Annales, or Selbstverstiindnis (self-image) the term used 
by German historians studying noble families31 has delivered good results. 32 These 
methods, however, have not been applied to Muslim history in general or Seljuq 
history in particular. 33 It should be noted at the outset, however, that the work with 
the concept of the history of mentality carries implications with it. First it should be 
highlighted that the historians as so often is the case do not agree on terminology. 
30 Goetz, rvorstellungsgeschichte: Menschliche Vorstellungen und Meinungen als Dimension der 
Vergangenheit', in: Archiv fiir Kulturgeschichte 61 (1979), 255/256. 
31 It is clear that Schmid's concept of self-image of noble families should be employed with respect to 
the differences between Christian and Islamic Middle Ages. Important elements of the Christian 
Middle Ages as the nobility, the church, the theory of the Grace of the Lord and feudalism do not exist 
in the Muslim world. 
32 Cf. K. Schmid, 'Welfisches Selbstverstandnis', in: Gebetsgedenken und adliges Selbstverstiindnis 
im Mittelalter. Ausgewiihlte Beitriige. Festgabe zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag, Sigmaringen 1983, 
424-453; Oexle, rAdliges Selbstverstandnis und seine Verkniipfung mit dem liturgischen Gedenken-
das Beispiel der Welfen', in: Zeitschrift jlir Geschichte des Oberrheins 134 NF 95 (1986), 47-75.; 
Althoff, 'Anlasse zur schriftlichen Fixierung adligen Selbstverstandnisses', in: Zeitschrift for die 
Geschichte des Oberrheins 134 NF 95 (1986), 34-46. 
33 Humphreys writes: "There is no general survey of ideology as such in the Seljukid period; that is, 
we have no broad study devoted not only to the political ideas of that age, but also to rhetoric, 
symbolism, and propaganda." R.S. Humphreys, Islamic Hist01y. A Framework for Inquiry, 
London!New York 1991, 159, (hereafter cited as Humphreys, Islamic History). 
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The term mentality does not only carry different meanings in different languages. It 
also causes dispute among historians using the same language. In German, the term 
self-image34 and in English the term attitudes35 are used instead of the term 
mentality. Another subject of controversy is the question of how to distinguish 
between mentality and ideology, or to distinguish them at all because both terms are 
often seen as "the two sides of the same coin,"36 which are difficult to isolate.37 
Mentality is understood here as the way of thought of a specific group, in this case 
the Seljuqs, in its specific time and place. Ideology is "a body of ideas characteristic 
of a particular social group"38 and self-image is the way that a group regards itself. 
Thus mentality will be assumed in this work as the generic term for ideology and 
self-image, because it would not be productive for the present study to separate them. 
Secondly, it is clear that mentality, ideology, and self-image can never be 
taken directly from the sources, especially in the case of Seljuq history, as their 
history is written by Arab and Persian officials or religious scholars in their own 
languages. We possess no texts written in Turkish in Anatolia during this period of 
inquiry. Thus all our literary sources are second-hand accounts about the Seljuqs and 
they deliver us first and foremost the view of Arab and Persian authors on the Seljuqs 
and their own mentality. Therefore we need to examine them with a critical eye in 
order to reconstruct the mentality of the Seljuqs. Furthermore, these authors cannot 
be described as court historians in the strict sense of the word since though all three 
authors lived in Anatolia and were partisans of the Rum Seljuq dynasty, they did not 
write their works under the supervision of the Rum Seljuq sultans. 39 This is 
34 Michael Borgolte illustrates in his esay "SelbstversHindnis" und "MentaliHit" that the term 
SelbstversUinis is in Germany often used instead of the term MentaliHit used in France but that both 
terms do not the same meaning. Borgolte, 'SelbstversHindnis und MentaliUiten. Bewul3tsein, Verhalten 
und Handeln mittelalterlicher Menschen im Verstandnis modemer Historiker', in: Archiv fiir 
Kulturgeschichte 79 ( 1997), 190. 
35 Cf. Gerd Tellenbach, 'Mentalitat', in: idem., Ausgewiihlte Abhandlungen und Aufsiitze, vol. 1., 
Stuttgart 1998, 82-104, 83. 
36 J. Black/D.M. Macraild, Studying Hist01y, London 1997, 151. 
37 Tellenbach states that mentality is psychologically and historically closely connected with 
behaviour on the one hand and ideas, theories, ideologies, and ethical teachings on the other so that it 
is almost impossible to study them separately. Cf. Tellenbach, 'Mentalitat', 86. 
38 Eagleton, Ideology. An introduction, London 1991, 1. From the many definitons Eagelton lists here 
this is the most suitable. In this first chapter of his book he shows that there is a wide range of 
definitions. 
39 Muhammad b. Ali RawandT dedicated his work Riihat al-sudiir wa-iiyat al-sunlr dar ta 'riJkh-i iil-i 
Sa/jzlq to the Rum Seljuq sultan Kay Khusraw I but the author sought the support of the Rum Seljuq 
sultan only because the Great Seljuq sultanate had perished. The work is a dynastic history of the 
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surprising, as there were past and contemporary examples of court historians, such as 
Bayhaqi who wrote for the Ghaznavid sultan Mas~ud and Muhammad ~Imad al-Din 
al-Isfahani who wrote for Saladin. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the earliest 
extant history of the Seljuqs was composed by ~Imad al-Din for Saladin. 
Nevertheless, the Rum Seljuq author Ibn Bibi can be regarded as a court 
historian though he served under the protectorate of the Mongols. Ibn Bibi's parents 
served under the great Rum seljuq sultan Ala al-Din Kay Qubadh I and he represents 
the most prominent formulator of Rum Seljuq ideology. His work is strictly speaking 
not a chronicle and it contains Mirrors for Princes overtones. It is written in the 
tradition of the Siyiisat-niima of the Great Seljuq vizier Ni?am al-Mulk. Ibn Bibi 
remarks that this famous work was read by the greatest of the Rum Seljuq sultans, 
~Ala al-Din Kay Qubadh I40 . We also have a work written in the tradition of the 
Siyasat-niima by the Rum Seljuq author Ahmad b. Sa'd b. Mahdi b. ~Abd al-Samad 
al-~Uthman which was presented to ~Ala al-Din Kay Qubadh in 1227.41 These 
Mirrors for Princes do not contain factual data but aim to "show the nature of true 
kingship" to the present and future rulers by using anecdotes especially about 
exemplary Persian kings.42 Despite being stylised presentations of kingship these 
mirrors contain useful information on the ideology and mentality of the Rum Seljuqs. 
It is significant and revealing when and why they were introduced to Anatolia and 
they will be analysed in connection with the Rum Seljuq sultans under whom they 
appeared. linportant to note also is that all Rum Seljuq authors adhered to the official 
Perso-Islamic idea of kingship reflecting the views of the Sunni ulama and that we 
do not have any sources representing independent perspectives. Nevertheless, there 
are some divergences of the ideas and theories of rulership formulated by the Rum 
Great Scljuqs "with strong Mirror for Princes overtones" into which the author incorporated eulogies 
for his Rum Seljuq patron; cf. C. Hillenbrand, 'Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources 
1025-1204 ', in: Byzantines and Crusaders 1024-1204, ed. M. Whitby, London 2007, (hereafter cited 
as C. Hillenbrand, Non-Greek Sources); See also 1. Meisami Scott, Persian Historiography. To the 
End of the Twe(fth Centwy, Edinburgh 1999, 237-256, (hereafter cited as Meisami, Persian 
Historiography); Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 256. 
4° Cf. H umphreys, Islamic HistOIJ', 162. 
41 This work is still in unpublished manuscript form (Si.ileymaniye Library, A~ir Efendi division ms. 
no 316) but has been translated into Turkish by H.H. Adahoglu, Zencani Sultana Ogiitler. Alaeddin 
Keykiibat 'a Sunulan Siyasetname, Istanbul 2005; i. Fazhoglu, 'Sultan I. 'Alauddin Keykubad'a 
sunulan siyasetname: el-Letaifu '1-'alaiyye fi'l-fedaili'-seniyye', in: Divan jlmi Ara§trrmalar 1 (1997), 
225-239. 
42 C. Hillenbrand, 'Some reflections on Seljuq historiography', in: Eastern Approaches to Byzantium, 
ed. A. Eastmond, Hampshire 2001, 75. (hereafter cited as C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography) 
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Seljuq and other Muslim sources, which can help us to establish the particularities of 
the Rum Seljuq ideology. There are also several Byzantine sources which will be 
used though they are written from the point of view of the opponents of the Rum 
Seljuqs they are of great value as they are the only sources which contain some 
information on the beginning of their history. 
In addition to these literary texts, coins and monumental inscriptions will be 
analysed as these give us evidence which is not only important because it 
complements the literary sources but also because it is in contrast to literary evidence 
contemporary and direct evidence.43 They are the visual formulation of the ideology 
and mentality of the sultans as they were consciously chosen tools of propaganda 
aimed at a wider audience since the phrases used here were generally known and 
could be read by any marginally literate person. Generally, monumental inscriptions 
include the name of the ruler, his titles, verses from the Quran, as well as, epithets 
and slogans describing the ruler. Moreover, the architectural artefact itself conveys a 
message since monuments religious as well as secular ones were devices which 
indicated sovereign power and thus the time and circumstances in which they appear 
is relevant for the assessment of ideology. Epigraphic evidence too should be treated 
with caution, as Carole Hillenbrand writes there is "the danger of attributing too 
much historical value to inscriptions and to their highly stylised modes of 
expression."44 Keeping in mind, however that propaganda was a way to legititnise 
and stabilise the sultan's position and that it cannot be taken as direct expression of 
ideology and mentality we can still extract important information from coins and 
epigraphy. 
The literary sources, the Rum Seljuq sources as well as other Muslim sources, 
and the Byzantine sources have all been covered by Turkish and western historian for 
the political history of the Rum Seljuqs. But hitherto we have neither a systematic 
and comprehensive examination of these literary sources nor one for the epigraphic 
evidence. This is especially surprising as the epigraphy of several Rum Seljuq towns 
43 As Humphreys states: "Modem scholars have been slow to investigate the ideological elements in 
the art and architecture of medieval Islam, but there are some useful essays." Cf. Humphreys, Islamic 
HistOI)', 152. 
44 C. Hillenbrand, 'Jihad Propaganda in Syria from the Time of the First Crusade Until the death of 
Zengi: The evidence of Monumental Inscriptions', in: The Frankish Wars and their Influence on 
Palestine, K. Athamina/ R. Heacock, eds., Birzeit University Press 1994, 62; Humphreys, Islamic 
Histmy, 165. 
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has been collected early on and the Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie arabe45 
published between 1936 and 1939 includes most of the Rum Seljuq epigraphy. 
Several works on Seljuq art and architecture exist, but the ideological dimension of 
the monuments and their epigraphy has so far been somewhat neglected.46 
Sources 
Seljuq historiography is part of the "middle period historiography" in which a 
new Persian Muslim historiography emerged besides the Arabic Muslim 
historiography.47 The term "Seljuq historiography" covers both the historiography of 
the Great Seljuqs as well as the historiography of the Rum-Seljuqs because the 
former, "provided the principal inspiration" for the latter.48 
The Arabic as well as the Persian historiography exists in the form of three 
genres: universal histories, regional histories and dynastic histories. While the 
unive1sal histories and regional histories in Arabic are unpretentious in style and 
annalistic in format the dynastic histories are much more filled with rhetorical 
ornaments and exemplary tales.49 The Persian historiographical tradition of "Mirrors 
for Princes" or Fiirstenspiegel also has a didactic orientation. Through the time of the 
Samanids and the Ghaznavids, a neo-Sassanian culture flourished, and in showing 
the good old times, these Persian authors wanted to show conten1porary and future 
rulers the nature of true kingship. Both historiographical traditions en1phasize 
religion and in the case of the Persian works we find the old Sasanian criteria of good 
rule combined with Islamic thought. According to these ideas, kings were chosen by 
God and obliged to religion. Thus the description of the Seljuqs given in both the 
Arabic and Persian works is mainly stereotypical and we need to examine them 
45 Combe/Sauvaget/Wiet, eds., Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie arabe, 16 vols, Cairo 1931-
1964; vol. 8-11, Cairo 1936-39, (hereafter cited as RCEA). 
46 Humphreys uses the early Great Seljuq history as a case study to discuss ideology and propaganda 
but this is only a brief survey. Cf. Humphreys, Islamic Hist01y, 148-168. 
47 Cf. Humphreys, Islamic HisfOJ)', 129. 
48 C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 73. 
49 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 79; Humphreys, Islamic Hist01y, 129. 
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carefully to extract information from them with which we can draw the picture of the 
Seljuq mentality. 
For the early history of the Seljuqs, the work of the Ghaznavid historian Abu 
al-Fadl Baihaqi (385-470/995-1077) is important, even though only a fragment of his 
Ghaznavid history covering the reign of Sultan Mas~iid (421-433/1030-1041) is 
extent. 5° Baihaqi, who served the Ghaznavids, was the descendant of a Khurasanian 
landholding family and a member of the indigenous Persian social elite and thus a 
representative of the Middle Islamic type. He can thus be seen as a model example 
because many members of Khurasans Persian social elite later entered the service of 
the Seljuqs. The Ta 'rikhh-i Mas 'iidi of Baihaqi, composed around 1 060, is one of the 
most important monuments of early new Persian prose. 51 Baihaqi was a prominent 
and well-connected bureaucrat and was therefore able to deliver reliable insightful 
information. He states himself: "I ... have placed upon myself the obligation that 
whatever I write should be from my own experience or from the true account of a 
reliable person"52 . Baihaqi was committed to the neo-Sasanian and Muslim ideals of 
rulership and thus to the Perso-Islamic concept of rule. Humphreys sun1marizes 
Baihaqi's political thought as follows: "An autocratic political system could maintain 
itself only insofar as the ruler was able on instil awe and terror in the hearts of his 
courtiers and officials. Autocracy was based on submission and deference, and 
without fear, deference would soon evaporate."53 And in Baihaqi's own words: 
"Know that the Lord Most High has given one power to the prophets and another 
power to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the people of the eatth that they 
should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way 
laid down by God. "54 This definition of the ideal kingship is the tnodel by which 
Baihaqi and later chroniclers measure the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs. 
The anonymous Maliknama takes an important place within the Seljuq 
histories. This work has been lost but parts are preserved in later works such as Ibn 
al-Athir, Bar Hebraeus, Mirkhwand, and the Akhbar al-dawla al-Saldjukiyya. It is 
50 The work originally comprised thirty volumes with the title Mujalladat. Cf. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 
10. 
51 Cf. Humphreys, Islamic HistOJ)', 137. 
52 Meisami, Persian Historiography, 81. 
53 Humphreys, Islamic J-listOJy, 141. 
54 As cited by Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 63. 
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most likely the first record of Seljuq history by a contemporary author and was 
probably written for Alp Arslan shortly after the death of his father <;agn Bey in 
45111059.55 
The Siyasatnama of the Seljuq vizier Ni?am al-Mulk is not only the most 
important Persian source for the Seljuqs but also "the chief source for the study of 
the political structure of the Eastern Muslim states."56 Hasan ibn ~Ali ibn Ishaq Tiisi 
( 408-45211018-1 060) who was later called by the honorific title Ni?am al-Mulk came 
from the bureaucratic class of Khurasan. His father ~ Ali ibn Ishaq was the Ghaznavid 
revenue agent of Tus who left Khurasan after it was taken by the Seljuqs and went to 
Ghazna. Here Ni?am al-Mulk worked in the Ghaznavid administration and later 
returned to Khurasan to enter the service of the Seljuq <;agn Beg who held Khurasan 
at that time. After <;agn's death in 45111059, Nizam al-Mulk served his son Alp 
Arslan, who after the death of his uncle Sultan Tughril Bey 45511063, succeeded as 
Seljuq sultan. Ni?am al-Mulk managed to oust Tugrul's vizier ~Atnid al-Mulk 
Kunduri from his position and to become Seljuq vizier instead. He remained in this 
post under Alp Arslan' s son and successor Malik Shah 465-8511073-92 and thus not 
only dominated the Seljuq Empire for nearly thirty years but moreover can be seen as 
the founder of the empire. 
Thus Ni?am al-Mulk was able to define the structure of the Seljuq rule and 
administration and his aim "was to model the new state as closely as possible on that 
of the Ghaznavids, in which he had been born and brought up. "57 The concept he had 
in mind was the Perso-Islamic concept of rulership and not different from Baihaqi's 
concept. Moreover, this concept persisted until Rum-Seljuq times and Ni?am al-
Mulk's work is acknowledged by Ibn Bibi who writes that the Rum Seljuq sultan 
Kay Qubadh read his book.58 However, we should approach this work with caution 
as it represents the view of Ni?am al-Mulk himself and not of his Seljuq masters. 
Nevertheless we depend on this work and when used critically we can extract 
information about the Seljuq ideas of rule and statecraft. The Seljuq sultan Malik 
55 Cf. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 2I9. 
56 Barthold, Turkestan, 25. 
57 EI2, Nizam al-Mulk, (Bowen/ Bosworth), 7I. 
58 H.W. Duda, Die Seltschukengeschichte des Jbn Bib/, Kopenhagen I959, I 00-I 0 I, (hereafter cited as 
lbn BThi, Duda). 
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Shah himself ordered the composition of the work as it is stated in the prologue of 
the book: 
"The Fortunate Sultan Malikshah (may Allah illumine his proof) in the year 479 gave orders 
to several of the nobles, elders and wise men, instructing each one of them to give thought to 
the condition of the country, ... The Sultan liked none of their compositions except that of 
the wazir Nizam al-Mulk ... ".59 
Ni?am al-Mulk finished his book consisting of thirty-nine chapters in 1091 
and added eleven chapters in the following year. The composition of Ni?am al-Mulk 
belongs to the "Mirrors for Princes" genre and thus aims to give advice by using 
historical anecdotes. The supplementary eleven chapters deal with the heretic 
lsma 'ilis, who were regarded as the greatest danger and threat to the empire. 
According to Bosworth Ni?am al-Mulk's Siyasatniima "is in a sense a survey of what 
he had failed to accomplish."60 Luther however states that "the Book of Government 
is a record of what the Saljuqs were failing to do as rulers."61 Judging by the tone of 
the book and the results of Ni?am al-Mulk politics he was neither able to establish 
his ideals of rulership nor to teach them to the Seljuqs. He failed in both because he 
could only assure his ideal of true kingship for his lifetime because he was not able 
or more probably did not wish to assimilate the Seljuqs to the Perso-Islatnic concept. 
Presumably Ni?am al-Mulk did not encourage his masters to give the princes a good 
education and even the sons of Sultan Malik Shah remained illiterate. Ni?an1 al-Mulk 
bore the title atabeg (tutor) apparently just as an honorary title. 62 Surprisingly, 
however, this question was never raised and discussed any detail. 
The first dynastic histories for the Great Seljuqs, the Seljuqniima of Zahir al-
Din Nishapiiri (d. 582/1187) and the Rahat al-sudiir of Muhammad b. Ali Rawandi 
were written at the end of the Great Seljuq period. The second one depends mostly 
59 H. Burke, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings The Siyasat-nama or Siyar al-Muliik of 
Nizam al-Mulk, London1960, 1 and 2. 
60 EI2, Nizam al-Mulk, (Bowen/ Bosworth), 72. 
61 K.A. Luther, The histmy of the Seljuq Turks, from the Jiimi' al-tawiirlkh (an !/khan id adaptation of 
~ahlr ai-Din Nishiipiirl}, London 2001, (hereafter cited as Pseudo Nishapuri, Luther), 6. 
62 According to Bosworth Nizam al-Mulk was the first person to receive the atabeg title. The title was 
given to him after he secured the succession of Malik Shah. Cf. EI2, Nizam al-Mulk, (Bowen/ 
Bosworth), 70. 
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on the former as Rawandi himself acknowledges. 63 Rawandi also delivers us the only 
details we know about the life of Nishapiirl, according to which Nishapiirl was a 
relative of Rawandi and was employed by the Seljuqs as tutor for princes Mas~iid 
and Arslan. 64 
Nishapiiri wrote the Seljuqnama around 57011175 because his narrative stops 
with the early months of the reign of Tugrul the last Great Seljuq sultan65 . He starts 
his record with the appearance of the Seljuqs in Khurasan and leads it up to his own 
time where the Great Seljuq Sultanat was already in decline. Luther characterizes the 
Seljuqnama "as a book of counsel and a kind of a political tract for royalty, as well as 
a source of historical information."66 Nishapiiri's main aim was not to deliver 
historical facts but to take a retrospective view of the glorious past of the empire and 
to show temporary sultans the right principles of kingship. 67 "His dilemma was that 
of the highly educated Persian bureaucrat attempting to come to terms with the 
Turkish presence."68 Nevertheless Nishapiiri is not against the Seljuqs and accepts 
them as a ruling dynasty and, like the authors mentioned above, tries to squeeze them 
into the frame of the Perso-Islamic concept. 69 In his view they fulfil the important 
condition of a noble lineage in contrast with the Ghaznavids who do not qualify in 
his opinion. He emphasizes the importance for a king to have good advisers by his 
side and in this way speaks for Persian administrators like Ni?am al-Mulk. 
Rawandi served at the court ofTugrul Ill b. Arslan (571-59011176-1194), the 
last Great Seljuq sultan and saw his death and the collapse of the Great Seljuq 
Empire. Thus he dedicated his work, which he completed around 60111204 to the 
Rum Seljuq sultan, Kay Khusraw I. The only infom1ation we have about his life is 
from his own work, according to which, he was the member of a family of scholars 
from Rawand and was a calligrapher and gilder who served at the court of the last 
Seljuq sultan Tugrul in Hamadan 70• Like Nishapiiri, from whom Rawandi took most 
of his tnaterial, history is not the prime aim and in this case the search for historical 
63 Cf. Meisami, Persian Historiography, 229. 
64 Cf. Pseudo NishapiirT, Luther, 6. 
65 Pseudo Nishapiin, Luther, 6. 
66 Pseudo NTshapiirT, Luther, 12. 
67 Cf. Pseudo NTshapiirT, Luther, 9. 
68 C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 76. 
69 Cf. Pseudo Nishapiiri, Luther, 8. 
70 EI2, Rawandi, (Hillenbrand), 460. 
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facts is even less productive. 71 The Rii/:zat al-$udur is thus a "compilation"72 and "it 
omits important events, adds episodes which sometimes defy credibility, is packed 
with quotations of all sorts, and contains a number of chapters on non-historical 
topics which form a sort of appendix to the history."73 
Rawandi shares the views of Nishapilri and his matn atm is to show the 
sultan, in this case the Rum-Seljuq sultan, how to rule in accordance with the Perso-
Islamic ideals and to strengthen by this way his sultanate: 74 
"so that the victorious Sultan Ghiyath al-Din may read them; that they may be viewed 
kindly and become honoured by his most noble regard and receive his praise and approval; 
and that he may contemplate how, from all those excellent endeavours, and from that wealth 
and pelf, treasure stores and buried hoards, precious gems, horses and weapons, nothing has 
remained except the good deeds [of those kings]." 75 
Noteworthy is that the pro-Seljuq Rawandi lamenting the fall of the Great 
Seljuq dawla regards the Rum Seljuq sultanate as the continuation of it and 
addressing Ghiyath al-Din Kayhusraw writes: 
"heir to the Saljiiq dawlat ('May God help him to revive these customs, to put down the 
enmity between Hanafis and Shafi 'Is ... and to repair the endowments and madras as (built 
by) his ancestors, who attained rule because of their zeal for the faith and their patronage of 
the 'ulama."76 
The Arabic chronicle Nu$rat al-fatra, the result of the work of three authors, 
is the oldest history of the Great Seljuqs. The original work was the Nu$ rat al-:fatra 
of ~Imad al-Din al-I~fahani (519/1125-597/1201), a history of the Seljuqs which 
starts with their stay in Bukhara and is carried do\vn to 579/1183 when the author 
completed his work. 77 ~Imad ai-Din ai-I~fahan1 incorporated in his composition the 
71 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, p.77. 
72 RawandT himself described his work as such. Cf. Meisami, Persian historiography, 239. 
73 Meisami, Persian historiography, 238. 
74 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Seljq historiography, 78. 
75 Meisami, Persian historiography, 242. 
76 Meisami, Persian historiography, 242. 
77 Here the Turkish translation of the abridgement of the Nu$rat al-fatra of'lmad al-DTn al-I~flihanT by 
al-BundarT called Zubdat al-nu$ra wa nukhbat will be used. K. Burslan, Irak ve Horasan Selr;uklulan 
Tarihi, !mad al-Din al-Katib al-Jsfahanin 'nin al-Bondari tarafindan ihtisar edilen Zubdat al-Nusra ve 
Nuhbat a! 'Usra adlr Kitabmm terciimesi, Istanbul, 1943, (hereafter cited as al-Bundari, Zubdat, 
Burslan). 
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memoirs of the Seljuq vizier Aniishirwan bin Khalid (d. 1138/9) written in Persian 
and covering the time I 072-1134 after translating them into Arabic. In 62311226 al-
Bundari made an abridgment of this composition and gave it the title Zubdat an-
nu$ra wa nukhbat a!- 'usra (Cream of the book Help and Selection from the book 
Refuge). Al-I$fahani work survives in this abridged form which "is simpler in style 
but faithful in substance,"78 but even in this edition "the book is very difficult to read, 
owing to the number of rhetorical figures, rare words, and turns of phraseology with 
which it is garnished, but it possess great importance as the fullest source (and for the 
history of events after 520 also the oldest) for the history of the Saljiiq history."79 
Aniishirwan (d 1138/39) was the vizier of the Abbasid caliph al-Mustarshid 
before he went to hold the same office for the Great Seljuq sultan Mas~iid80 . 
According to ~Imad al-Din al-I$fahani, Aniishirwan did not hold this office for long 
and could not bring about changes, which was not his fault but was due to the 
disordered state of affairs. 81 Aniishirwan is another example of the Persian men of 
the pen who helped the Seljuqs to run the administration of their Empire. Isfahani 
takes the side of the Persian men of the pen and indicates that the Seljuq Empire 
declined because these men were not given the opportunity to put it in order. 
Aniishirwan and al-I$fahani thus share the view of the previous authors that the 
Persian elite was very important for the functioning of the Seljuq Empire. On the 
other hand Isfahani also reveals the shortcomings of Anushirwan and writes that his 
book is an act of revenge against the officials of his time and a lamentation of his 
misfortune. 82 
~Imad al-Din al-I$fahani also belonged to the Persian elite but was not in the 
service of the Seljuqs like Aniishirwan. He served in Syria Niir al-Din as kiitib and 
after an interlude gained Saladin' s favour by sending him a poem after he had 
invaded Syria and had taken Hims (652/1175). From then on he accompanied 
78 Cahen, 'The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period', in: Historians of the Middle East, Lewis/ Holt, 
(eds.), London 1952, 68, (hereafter cited as Cahen, Historiography). 
79 Barthold, Turkestan, 28. 
8° Cf. al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, xxiii. 
81 Cf. al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, 167. 
82 Cf. al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, 2. 
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Saladin on all his expeditions and gave up servtce after the death of Saladin 
(58911193) to devote himself to literary pursuits83 . ~Imad al-DTn al-I$fahanT wrote 
several works of importance including the Nu$rat al-fatra but he is better known for 
his history of Saladin and the conquest of Jerusalem. One might expect that the view 
of ~Imad al-DTn al-I$fahanT on Seljuq history is balanced because he was not in their 
service and wrote with a certain distance. This, however, is not necessarily the case. 
Al-I$fahanT had lived on Seljuq territory before he had to leave for Syria, and many 
of his relatives were still in Seljuq service and delivered him inside information84. 
Al-BundarT the third author to work on the Nu$rat al-fatra, was also a Persian 
scholar from Is fah an and like al-I$fahanT, he had moved to Syria where he served the 
Ayyubid prince Malik Mua??am to whom he dedicated his work. We do not possess 
more details about his life but as for his view on the Seljuqs, we can expect a similar 
view to that ~lmad al-DTn al-I$fahanT, so that we can assume that he did not change 
the latter's work. 
The only dynastic history of the Seljuqs in Arabic is the Akhbiir al-dawlat al-
Saljiikiyya. 85 The authorship and the exact circumstances of its emergence are still a 
controversy among scholars. The Akhbar is probably an abridged form of the Zubdat 
al-tawiirzkh written by Sadr al-Din Abu'l Hasan Ali b. Nasir al-Husayni, a native of 
Nishapur. 86 The author gives a complete history of the Great Seljuqs and though the 
material about the early Seljuq history is compact, the detailed account about the last 
period of the Great Seljuqs makes a contemporary author probable. 87 References at 
the end of the work verify that it was composed in 62211225 but the narrative ends 
with the death of the last Great Seljuq sultan Tugrul in 59011193. For the period of 
485/1092-547/1152 ~Imad al-DTn al-I$fahanT's Nu$rat al-fatra was nearly the only 
83 Cf. EI2, Imad al-Oin, (Masse), 1157. 
84al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, xxviii. 
85 M. Iqbal edited this work under the title Akhbar al-dawlat ai-Saljiikiyya but in the text itself it is 
named Zubdat al-tawarlkh. Cf. Q. Ayaz, An unexploited source for the history of the Saljiiqs: A 
translation of and critical commentary on the Akhbar a/-Dawlat ai-Saljiiqiyya, 2 vols., unpubl. PhD 
thesis Edinburgh 1985, here vol.1, (hereafter cited as Akhbar, Ayaz). 
86 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq Historiography, 79 fn. 27. Q1bla Ayaz comes to this conclusion in the 
introduction of his translation ofthe Akhbar. 
87 Cf. Akhbar, Ayaz, 16. 
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source for the Akhbiir where al-I$fahanT is acknowledged as a source but otherwise, it 
is an independent source. 88 
The Akhbiir shares the pro-Seljuq view of the other sources and although we 
do not know details of the life of the author, we can assume that he also belonged to 
the group of learned men. The author either lived through the last period of the Great 
Seljuqs or shortly after it in a time where the memory of this time was still alive. 
The Arabic universal history of Izz al-DTn Abu '1 Hasan Ali Ibn al-AthTr 
(555/1160-630/1233) entitled al-Kiimilji'l tar'fkh must be mentioned here though it 
is not a Seljuq history it is "the most coherent account of the Great Seljuq sultans."89 
Moreover it deals with the subordinate lines of the Seljuqs including the Rum Seljuqs 
and thus makes this source even more valuable for the present work. Born in Jazirat 
al-Umar (modem Cizre) north of Mosul, Ibn al-AthTr spent most of his life in his 
hometown and Mosul with some breaks to Baghdad. Ibn al-AthTr wrote the Kiin1il 
after the decline of the Great Seljuq Empire but he made use of a wide range of 
earlier sources, of which many including the Malikniin1a are lost. 90 Modem scholars 
criticize Ibn al-AthTr for not naming his sources but emphasize at the same time the 
great importance of his work to the Muslim history. "His work is by no means a 
simple chronicle of external events; so far as the framework of his composition 
allows Ibn al-AthTr gives us a fair conception of the ideas and tendencies prevailing 
at different periods, and of the true character of historical figures ... "91 As we are 
more concerned with the ideas of the Seljuqs than with a correct reproduction of 
events, the al-Kamil is valuable even though it is not possible to assess which sources 
the author had at his disposal. 
Another important universal history written in Arabic is the Mir 'at al-Zan1iin 
of Sibt Ibn al-JawzT Yilsuf b. Kizoglu (58111185-65411256). He was the son of a 
former Turkish slave and the daughter of the famous preacher and historian Ibn al-
88 Cf. Cahen, 1-!istoriography, 69. 
89 C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 79. 
9° For lbn al-Athir's sources for the Great Seljuq Period cf. D.S. Richards, The Annals of the Saljuq 
Turks. Selections from al-Kiimil fi'l- Ta 'r'ikh of 'lzz al-D'in Jbn al-Ath'ir, London 2002, 6-7, (hereafter 
cited as lbn al-AthTr, Richards, Annals). 
91 Barthold, Turkestan, 2. 
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JawzT, who raised him after his father's death, and under whose name he was known 
as Sibt Ibn al-JawzT.92 In 1201 when his grandfather died, Sibt Ibn al-JawzT left 
Baghdad for Damascus where he served the Ayyubids. 
Sibt Ibn al-JawzT's work is valuable for his contemporary narrative and for 
preserving two important works from Baghdad from the 1Oth and 11th century in his 
work, the history of Hilal al-Sabi of which only a small part has come down to us, 
and the lost continuation of this work until the year 4 7911086 by Hilal al-Sabi' son 
Ghars al-Ni'ma Muhammad. In this way an account of the early history of the 
Seljuqs written in Baghdad has survived and delivers good insights because Ghars al-
Ni 'ma served in the divan of the caliph and gives us some idea of Turkish 
traditions. 93 
Mul)ammad b. AmTr-khwandshah b. Mal)mud MTrkhwand's (836-7/1433-34-
903/1498) Persian universal history with the title Rawr;lat al-$afo 'fi szrat al-anbiyii' 
wa 'l muliik wa '1-khulafo' is valuable although written much later. The work is 
divided in seven volun1es, starting with the creation and going down to the author's 
lifetime, and incorporates in its fourth volume the history of the Great Seljuqs as well 
as brief histories of the Seljuqs of Kirman and the Rum-Seljuqs. 94 MTrkhwand used 
for his compilation many Arabic and Persian works which he names either in the 
preface or in the text but "it is difficult to say whether he had in his hands all the 
books that he mentions."95 However, herein lays the value of this con1position for our 
work because MTrkhwand acknowledges the lost Maliknama as one of his sources. 
Among the regional histories the works of Kamal al-Din Abu 'I Kasim ibn al-
AdTm (588/1192 - 660/1262) written in Arabic are of some value for the history of 
the Seljuqs. Ibn al-~A dim was the son of a wealthy Arab family of which some 
members held important offices. He served in Aleppo as a vizier to the Ayyubids 
until the city was taken by the Mongols 658/1260 and went then to Cairo. Of the 
works of Ibn al-~AdTm which survived, the Bughyat al-talab fi ta 'rikh Ha! ab written 
92 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Non-Greek Sources, 317. 
93 Cf. A. Sevim, Mir'atli'z-Zeman fi Tarihi'l-Ayan, Ankara 1968, vi, (hereafter cited as, Sibt Ibn al-
JawzT, Sevim) 
94 The work was completed after the death of Mirkwand around 1502 by his grandson Khwandamir, 
who also completed the khatima an epilogue on geography attached to the work. Cf. EI2, MTrkhwand, 
(Beveridge/Manz), 127. 
95 Barthold, Turkestan, 57. 
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before 1242/43 is the most important.96 Of the original forty volumes, only ten 
survived. This work is a biographical dictionary of important personalities connected 
with Aleppo and includes some data on the Seljuqs. 
Ibn al- ~Aditn 's, Zubdat al-halab ji ta 'rikh Halab is a history of Aleppo which 
begins with the early times and goes down to 1243. Ibn al-~Adim preserves in his 
work a great number of lost sources. He collected on his journeys manuscripts and 
had thus an extended library to hand. 97 
The Dfwiin Lughiit a!-Turk of Mahmiid al-Kashghari composed in Baghdad 
in the years 454-76/1075-94 should be mentioned here although it is a lexicon and 
not a chronicle. Al-Kashghari, was the member of a noble Turkish family of the 
Kashghar region and travelled through many Turkish lands before he settled in 
Baghdad. 98 Here he came in contact with Arab and Persian scholars and noticing 
their interest in Turkish, he wrote two works of which one is lost and the other is the 
Dfwiin, a Turkish-Arabic lexicon. This work deals mainly with the Qarluq dialect 
used by the Karakhanids but also deals with the dialects of the Ghuzz/Oguz, the tribe 
of the Seljuqs, and the Ktp<;aks. The work of al-Kashghari is not only important 
because it is the only work written by a Turk, but also because it is "not simply a 
dictionary but an anthology of ancient Turkish poetry and folklore."99 
For the history of the Rum Seljuqs we do not possess as many sources as for 
the Great Seljuqs, but the al-Awiin1ir a!- 'Alii 'iyya of Ibn BThi al-ijusayn b. 
Mul}ammad written in Persian we possess is an extraordinary source for the Rum-
Seljuq history. The only information we possess about the author's life are the details 
he gives us in his work. According to this, he was known as Ibn al-BThi al-Munajjima 
(son of the noble woman astrologer). This was the title of his mother whose real 
name he does not tell us. That Ibn Bib I is known under the title of his mother shows 
that she held an important position. Indeed that Ibn BThi parents came into Rum-
Seljuq service was the result of her knowledge of astrology. She was a descendant of 
96 Cf. A. Sevim, Kamiil ai-Din Ibn a/- 'Ad/m Bugyat at-Talab ji Tiirih Ha/ab. Selruklularla 1/gili 
Halterciimeler, 17, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-'AdTm, Sevim). 
97 Cf. lbn al- • AdTm, Sevim, 10. 
98 Cf. £12, Al-KashgharT, (Hazai), 699. 
99 Humphreys, Islamic HistOIJl, 15. 
28 
Nishapur's elite and stood with her husband in the service of the Khwarazmshahs 
after whose defeat by the Mongols they went into the service of the Ayyubids and to 
Damascus. The Rum Seljuq sultan Kay Qubadh, who had heard of al-Bibi al-
Munajjima's talent asked the Ayyubid to send the family to him and from than on 
( 62 9-63 011231-3 2) they served this sui tan. 
Ibn BThi's composition includes the history of the Rum Seljuq sultanate from 
1192 to 1280 and was completed in 1281. 100 He was instructed to write a history of 
the Rum Seljuqs from their appearance in Asia Minor onwards. 101 He states in the 
prologue of his work that he did not know enough about this early period and that the 
documentary sources were difficult to understand and the tales of the storytellers 
contradictory. 102 He concludes that one should leave what one is incapable of and do 
what one is capable of. 103 He was obviously reluctant to write a full history of the 
Rum Seljuqs and was more interested in writing about times he knew from his own 
experience or of which he had heard from contemporaries. Thus Ibn BThi's 
composition can be categorized as memoirs and it is of great value for the present 
study even though the author does not name his sources and, as Oztiirk criticizes, 
does not name important personalities, and fails to include some important incidents 
or documents them inaccurately and makes chronological mistakes. 104 Ibn Bibi gives 
valuable information about the political system, the society, the administration, the 
economy and the cultural situation of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. 105 
Ibn BThi, like the authors we have discussed above, aimed to show off his 
rhetorical skills and his work includes many insertions such as poems, quotations 
from the Quran and Hadiths and speeches. Because of that, his composition was 
already epitomised during his lifetime around 1284/85 by a scholar from his own 
circle who is unknown to us. 106 Noteworthy is that the epitomizer, when stating the 
reasons for the new edition, informs us by whom such works were read and writes 
100 lbn BTh'i, Duda, 6; A more recent discussion of lbn BTh'i and his work is given by C. Melville, The 
Early Persian Historiography of Anatolia', in: HistOI)' and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central 
Asia and the Middle East, ed. J. Pfeiffer/ S.A. Quinn/ E. Tucker, Wiesbaden 2006, 137-144, (hereafter 
cited as Melville, Early Persian Historiography). 
101 M. Oztiirk, El Evamiru '/-Ala 'iye ji '1-Umuri'/-A/a 'iye (Selr;uk Name), 2 vols., Ankara 1996, 28, 
(hereafter cited as lbn BTh'i, Ozttirk) 
102 Cf. Ibn BTh'i, Ozttirk, Bibi, 29. Ibn BThl, Duda, 1. 
103 Ibn B'ib'i, Ozttirk, 29. 
104 Cf. Ibn BTh'i, Ozttirk, 4. 
105 lbn BTh'i, Duda, Bibi, I. 
106 Cf. Ibn BTh'i, Duda, 1 0-11. 
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that the ,,)1_,:...1 ~4 (the union/circle of the friends/brothers) had made complaints 
about the books length. 107 This suggests that these works were mainly composed for 
the interested intellectual elite 108. 
There are two other works written in Persian for the history of the Rum 
Seljuqs from a later period, which though also of lesser value, should be noted here. 
The Musamarat al-akhbar wa musayarat al-akhyiir of KarTm al-DTn Aksarayi 
written in 72311323 for <;oban the Mongol governor of Anatolia. 109 We know only a 
few details of Aksarayi's life which he mentions in his work. From his name we can 
assume that he was a native of the town Aksaray but it is not clear if he was Persian 
or Turkish. 110 He served probably only half-heartedly in the diwan of the Mongol 
overlords because he was accused of helping the rebellious Turkish emirs and it 
seems that he could not overcome the fact of the decline of the Rum Seljuq 
Sultanate. 
The work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is about the different 
types of calendars and the importance of chronology. The second chapter gives a 
short history of Islam, beginning with the prophet Mul)ammad. The third chapter 
gives a brief history of the Seljuqs. 111 The fourth and longest chapter provides the 
history of the Mongol supremacy over the Rum Seljuq sultanate of which the author 
was a contemporary. 112 For the period of 68111282-723/1323 this is the only source 
for the history of Anatolia. 113 Thus this work is valuable for the present study for it 
completes Ibn BTbi's work and delivers the last period of Rum Seljuq history and 
gives us the chance to see which traces they left and how they were regarded after 
their decline. Aksarayi 's work is further proof that the Perso-Islamic concept of 
rulership was transported to Anatolia for he seems to have been committed to this 
concept he is also pro-Seljuq and regards the Rum Seljuq Sultanate as the legitimate 
successor to the Great Seljuq Empire. 
107 Cf. Ibn BThi, Duda, 16 and footnote don the same page. 
108 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 75. 
109 Cf. Me1ville, Early Persian Historiography, 145-150. 
11° Cf. F. I~Iltan, Die Se/tschuken-Geschichte des Akserayf, Leipzig 1943, 16, (hereafter cited as 
Aksarayi, I~Iltan). l~1ltan argues that Aksarayi must have been Turkish because the Tiirkish element 
was without doubt the main element in the Rum Seljuq state. 
111 Cf. Aksarayi, I~Iltan, 9. 
112 Cf. Aksarayi, I~Iltan, 18. 
113 Cf. Aksarayi, I~Iltan, 9-10. 
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The other source, written by an anonymous citizen of Konya 114, delivers only a brief 
history of the Seljuqs starting with their early history and going down to the year 
765/1364. 
Beside the Muslim sources, there are some Christian sources which we have 
to consider. Especially the Rum Seljuqs attracted the interest of Christian writers for 
their sultanate was built on former Byzantine territory. Among these sources 
acquainted with Seljuq history, the universal history of Gerlghor Abu '1-Faradj or Bar 
Hebraeus (1225/26- 1286) and the Alexiad of Anna Comnena (1083-1153-55) are 
the most important. 
Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al- tibri), who became well-known under this nickname 
because of his father's Jewish descent was born in Melitene (Malatya), which was 
under Rum Seljuq rule, later lived in other Muslim towns such as Antioch (Antakya), 
where he studied medicine, rhetoric and theology, and Aleppo, where he held the 
office of the Metropolitan of the city. Later he was appointed head of the Jacobite 
church and travelled widely and visited also Baghdad. 115 Bar Hebraeus knew Syriac, 
Hebrew and Arabic and was a tolerant and open personality, not only interested in 
Christian history but also in Muslim history. His universal history which he 
translated himself into Arabic under the title Ta 'rzkh mukhta$ar al-duwal, is although 
not free of mistakes, valuable in respect of the sources he used for the Seljuq history. 
"He was acquainted with the Maliknama and Baghdad! sources which relate hitn 
partially to Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (and thus perhaps to Ghars al-Ni'ma) for the Great 
Seljuqs; for subsequent events such of his work as is not drawn fron1 Michael the 
Syrian appears to come from Ibn al-Athlr." 116 More important is that Bar Hebraeus 
not only lived on Rum Seljuq territory but also was in contact with them. 
114 Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 57; cf. Melville, Early Persian Historiograpy, 150-153. 
115 Cf., EI2, Ibn Al-Ibri, (Segal), 804. 
116 Cahen, Historiography, 78. 
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I. From nomadic chieftains to Muslim rulers 
1.1. The Seljuq tradition of origin 
The tradition of origin is the base of the self-image of a dynasty and Schmid rightly 
points out that it is the very element which produces the dynasty. Schmid suggests 
that the medieval tradition reveals a process which shows that the tradition of origin 
gradually developed into the self-image of the Welfs. 117 
At the time when the Seljuqs entered the Muslim world we find two trends of 
linking new dynasties to the past. On the one hand, the linking to the Arab past and 
the family of the Prophet which seemed to promise the best legitimation and prestige 
and on the other, the attachment to the Persian epic past. Here a comparison between 
the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs, both of Turkish nomadic descent, makes sense. 
Sebtiktegin, the founder of the former, was a military slave of the Samanids for 
whom, after he had overthrown his old masters, a genealogy was created which 
linked the Ghaznavid house to the Persian heroic past 118• The Ghaznavids searched 
for attachment to the Persian past, whereas the Qarakhanids and Seljuqs did not, 
because they had not spent a formative period under a Persian dynasty. "Hence it was 
only natural that they should seek to derive their charisma of rule from the heroic 
Turkish past, and not from the indigenous traditions of their newly-acquired Iranian 
territories, where they for a long time felt aliens, as indeed they were." 119 According 
to Bosworth, the reason for this was that the Seljuqs, in contrast to the Ghaznavids 
with their professional standing army, were dependent on their nomad Turkish 
followers. This argument is convincing but needs further study because the 
Ghaznavids were not as much assimilated to Persian rulership and culture as is often 
claimed. Bosworth himself states: "On the other hand, Mahmild of Ghazna was 
praised for his Turkish lineage; some oft- quoted verses of Bad!' az-Zaman al-
Hamadhani say that "The house of Bahram [se. the Samanids] has become subject to 
117 Schmid, 'Welfisches Selbstverstandnis', in: idem., Gebetsgedenken und adliges Selbsverstand-nis 
im Mittelalter, Sigmaringen 1983,434. 
118 Cf. Bosworth, 'The Heritage ofRulership in early Islamic Iran', in: idem. The Medieval HistOIJ' of 
Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, London 1977, VII. 61. 
119 Ibid., 62. 
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the son of the Khaqan [se. Mal)mild]", but it is true that this emphasis on the Sultan's 
Turkishness comes from the early years of the dynasty." 120 
It is, however, difficult to trace from the sources the Turkish elements still 
alive in the Ghaznavid and Seljuq empires and modern scholars take the view of the 
Persian sources and state that the Seljuqs were also soon Persianized. The 
information about the origin of the Seljuqs is more or less identical and goes back to 
one and the same source, the lost Malikniima. The account of the Akhbiir reads as 
follows: 
"(The name) Yuqaq in Turkish means an iron bow. Yuqaq was a perspicacious man who was 
endowed with good judgement and competence. The king of the Turks had placed the reins 
of his government in his hands and he was illuminated by the light of his judgement and 
resourcefulness. The name of the king of the Turks was Yabghu. It happened one day that he 
(Yabghu) mobilised his soldiers in order to set out towards the countries of Islam. Amir 
Yuqaq stopped him from doing this but the king of the Turks would not listen. So Yuqaq 
behaved very arrogantly and slapped the king of the Turks on the face." 121 
Ibn al-Athir gives a similar report and writes: 
"Duqaq, the meaning of which is 'iron bow', a brave man and a man of good sense and 
organisational skill, was leader of the Oghuz Turks. They turned to him for guidance, 
accepted his every word and never went beyond his orders. It happened one day that the ruler 
of the Turks, who was called Yabghu, assembled his troops, intending to attack Islamic 
territory. Duqaq forbade him to do so, and a long argument ensued between them. The ruler 
of the Turks used rough language to Duqaq who struck him and split his head open." 122 
The report of Bar Hebraeus resembles the reports above. Starting Seljuq 
history with Duqaq, he writes that Seljuq left the land of Turan for the land of Persia 
because the wife of the King of the Khazars incited him against Seljuq, whose 
behaviour became too overbearing. 123 
Abil'l-~Ala Ibn Hassill, who wrote a short composition for Tugrul glorifying 
his ancestors, connects the Seljuqs to the Khazars and writes that Seljuq b. Duqaq 
120 Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 40. 
121 Akhbiir, Ayaz, 52. 
122 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Annals, 31. Mirkhwand also puts the Seljuqs near to the Khazars, a well 
known power at that time. J.A. Vullers, Mirchond's Geschichte der Seldschuken, Giessen 1837, 1-2, 
(hereafter cited as Mirkhwand, Vullers). In Ibn al-Adim's account Seljuq b. Duqaq belonged also to 
the Khazars; cf. Ibn al-Adim, Sevim, 28. 
123 E.A.W. Budge, The chronography of Greg01y Abu 'I Faraj, the Hebrew physician, commonly 
known as Bar Hebraeus, (vol.1 tr.), London 1932, 195, (hereafter cited as Bar Hebraeus, Budge). 
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attacked the King of the Khazars with the sword. He concludes the episode 
emphasising that only a free powerful person would have been able to do that and 
that therefore the Seljuq state started with Seljuq. 124 Ibn Hassiil also links the Seljuqs 
to Afrasiyab and thus the Persian epic tradition 125 but it is not clear if the Seljuqs 
regarded themselves as 'Al-i Afrasiyab'. 
All these accounts about the origin of the Seljuqs emphasize three elements, 
noble lineage, ruler qualities and religion, and they describe the Seljuqs as the 
"House of Seljuq". Our authors start their narrative with Duqaq, not a historical 
figure; in order to stress the nobility of the Seljuqs they portray the historical 
ancestor Seljuq as an important personality who dared to oppose the leader of the 
Turks. According to Mirkhwand, Bar Hebraeus and Ibn Hassiil, this leader was the 
King of the Khazars, but the historical events later on prove the important position of 
Seljuq wrong. It was not until the time of his grandsons that the Seljuqs gained 
power. Even then they were no more than leaders of nomadic bands and did not have 
characteristics of a ruler, which our authors already attribute to Seljuq. A connection 
between the Seljuqs and the Khazars did not exist either and is used to link the 
Seljuqs, who were "at a particularly low social and cultural level, with a powerful 
and well-known group like the Khazars of South Russia." 126 
Our authors try to present the Selj uqs as good Muslims. According to the 
Akhbar, Duqaq (Tukak) opposed the Yabghu because he wanted to raid Muslim 
territory, "but this is clearly a later touch designed to show that the Seljuq fan1ily 
were already moved by the divine light before their fom1al adhesion to Islam."127 
According to Barthold "the moral ideas of nomads are dependent to a greater degree 
than those of civilized peoples on religion. It is quite natural that the first Saljuqids 
and Qara-Khanids were better Muslims than Mal)miid and Mas~iid, just as Saint 
Vladimir was a better Christian than the Byzantine Emperors." Hence the Islam of 
the Seljuqs was rather nominal than reasoned and strengthened. The sources do not 
provide the real motives of the Seljuqs in assuming the new religion and their 
understanding of it, giving only the common phrases of the time. 
124 S. Yaltkaya, Ibni Hassul 'tin Tiirkler Hakkmda bir Eseri, in: Belleten 13 (1940), 265, (hereafter 
cited as Ibn Hassiil, Yaltkaya, 265. 
125 Ibn-Hassiil, Yaltkaya, 257. 
126 Bosworth, Heritage of Rulership, 62. 
127 Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 219. 
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Nevertheless, the idea of a noble lineage must have been not totally alien to 
the Seljuqs, though they probably were not that noble. The leaders in nomadic 
societies also had an aura of nobility around them, and were members of a noble 
family. Our sources describe the Seljuqs as the "House of Seljuq" and it seems that 
this was also their own view, at least at the time when the Malikniima was composed. 
It is not clear if their tribe was important to them nor if they saw themselves within 
the tribe. According to Kashghari, the Seljuqs belonged to the noble Qiniq tribe: 
"oyuz A tribe of the Turks; the Turkman. They consist of twenty-two branches, each of 
which has a distinctive brand ... on its animals by which it is known from the others. The 
chief of them is: QINIQ qiniq to which our present sultans belong; ... " 128 
The Seljuq histories also state that they belonged to this tribe but later it is not 
mentioned again. "It was learned thus from historians and authors, that Saljuq b. 
Luqman was from the Saljuq family of the Qiniq tribe. He was descended from 
Tuqshurmish, the son of Karakju Khwaja, who was tent-frame maker for the rulers of 
the Turks. Tughril Sultan was from the clan of Qiniq." 129 The Akhbiir names the 
Qiniq at the beginning of its narrative. "He went through the quarters and tents of 
this tribe which was known as Qiniq." 130 
Thus we can assutne that the Seljuqs were regarded by their followers and the 
sedentary Persian and Arabs and by themselves as a family of leaders and that this 
changed after their instalment in Khurasan. They then regarded themselves as the 
"House of Seljuq", instructed by their Persian officials. It would be fruitful to find 
out how the sedentary Muslim society understood 'house' OH) and how the nomadic 
incomers such as the Seljuqs understood it. 131 The Ghaznavids, for exatnple, are 
regarded in our sources as the "House of Sebtiktegin" and not Ghaznavids, which is 
an invention of modern historians. 
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129 Pseudo Nishapiin, Luther, 29. 
130 Akhbar, Ayaz, 54. 
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1.2. The ideology behind the Seljuq success 
We have seen above that the authors of the Seljuq histories try to make us believe 
that the Seljuqs were of noble origin and already politically sophisticated when they 
entered the Muslim world. Our sources start the Seljuq history with the mythical 
ancestor Dukak and do not go further back. We do not have any evidence to assume 
that the Seljuqs had a memory of earlier Turkish empires such as the Gok Tiirk 
empire of the 8th century. 132 
There is no evidence in our sources of a memory about these past empires. 
The account of the Seljuq origin of the Maliknama, as it is quoted by lbn al-Athir, 
the Akhbiir, Bar Hebraeus and MTrkhwand, contain no information of this kind and 
we can expect that it would have emerged if there had been such a memory, because 
it would have contributed to the glorification of the Seljuqs' origin. We have 
mentioned above that the Seljuqs depended on oral tales to pass their history to the 
next generation and it is thus very unlikely that the memory reached further down 
than a few generations. 
Supposing that there was a memory of past empires, it would not have 
equipped them to deal with the tasks setting up a Muslim dynasty. Even the cultural 
and political state of the 1Oth century Oguz confederation of which the Seljuqs were 
part was not sufficient in this respect. The Oguz confederation had a nominal head, 
the Yabghu, which was not the highest rank among the steppe people as there was 
the more highly regarded title of Qaghan. Both the Yabghu and the Qaghan were 
only heads of loose confederations of different Turkish tribes. According to our 
sources, Seljuq held the office of Suba$Z (military commander), before he fled with 
his followers to land on the lower Syr Darya. Within the Oguz confederation, the 
office of Subashi was important and Seljuq most probably opposed the Yabghu and 
had to leave, which indicates that he was ambitious. Later, the descendants of the 
Yabghu became the bitter enemies of the Seljuqs and it seems that the Seljuq family 
assumed the Yabghu title in opposition to them. It seems, however, that the Seljuqs 
132 'The chronological and geographical gap is too wide for any continuity to be traced, and the 
problems faced by the Seljuqs as they installed themselves in the ancient lands of Perso-Muslim 
civilisation were very different from those of earlier tribal chieftains assembling vast but ephemeral 
steppe empires." Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 266. 
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were later not interested in their old homelands and did not assume the Qaghan title, 
which was held by the Qarakhanids, who interestingly were content with 
Transoxania and did not go further into Muslim territory. This might be evidence that 
the later Seljuqs aimed towards a monarchy but this disinterest might also be born 
out of necessity, because the Qarakhanids held that position. 
However, it is very unlikely that Seljuq was moved by the divine light when 
he left for Jand, as implied by our sources, or had a grand plan of conquest in order 
to domain the world, as suggested by Osman Turan. In his book Tiirk Cihan 
Hakimiyeti MejkUresi Tarihi and his article The ideal of world domination among the 
medieval Turks 133 he argues that there was a specific Turkish concept of world 
domination which, born out of steppe traditions, continued from the early Turkish 
empire of the Hioung-nu down to the Ottoman Empire. Certainly some elements of 
the steppe life remained untill the end of Seljuq history, as we will see in the 
following chapters, but the assumption of such a continuation is unsafe in many ways 
and, as Humphreys states, Turan's "thesis [is] a doubtful one." 134 Firstly it is based 
on the controversial thesis that a "nation" has a specific character lasting throughout 
their history. Secondly, the very different formation and structure of steppe empires 
is not taken into account. Thirdly it is not taken into account that in illiterate societies 
the memory of the past cannot reach that far back. The evidence Turan presents for 
his view lacks Quellenkritik and is not convincing. 
A dream which Seljuq, although a Muslim at that time, let a Turkish shaman 
interpret seems to point to the direction of world domination, but the way they later 
come to power and the course of the events does not point out a pre-planned Seljuq 
concept of world domination. "One night he had a dream that he was urinating a fire 
whose sparks cast light in both the eastern and western parts of the earth. He asked 
the interpreter of dreams who told him that he would give birth to maliks who would 
rule all over the world." 135 The phrase "sultan of the world," which seems to support 
such a view is only a topos, and is used for nearly all other Muslim dynasties as well 
as the Seljuqs. Ibn Hassiil in a passage of his epistle for Tugrul connects the Seljuqs 
to the Persian epic past and states that Faridun ruled over the world and then divided 
133 2 vols., istanbul (Turan Ne~riyat Yurdu), 1969; 'The ideal of world domination among the 
medieval Turks', in: Studia lslamica IV (1956), 77-90. 
134 Humphreys, Islamic Hist01y, 166. 
135 Akhbar, Ayaz, 54. 
37 
this rule among his three sons named Iraj, Salm, and Tur suggesting that the latter is 
the Seljuqs' predecessor. 136 At a different place, however, Ibn Hassul states that the 
Sasannians ruled over the world. 137 
It is thus better to assume that the Seljuqs, when they entered the Muslim 
world, had no specific ideology or concept of rule and no political ties, and 
Khazanov's statement seems convincing when he writes that the Seljuq invasion 
"was neither premeditated, nor thought out and planned in advance. It was a chain 
reaction of events and the unexpected weakness of the Middle Eastern states which 
led to the creation of the Saljuq Empire." 138 It must be noted however that neither 
Khazanov nor other modern scholars who give similar statements deliver 
explanations for them. The nature of the Seljuq sources makes it very difficult to 
extract the ideas of the Seljuqs, for the authors are silent about them. Nonetheless, we 
should and can only proceed from these sources. Surely we need to ask the right 
questions and we need to make speculations, but we have to accept that we cannot 
find answers for all our questions which does not necesarily n1ean, that speculations 
can be tnrned into conclusions. 
The Perso-Islamic concept of rule, however, cannot have been part of the 
Seljuq ideas and they definitely did not aim to set up a dynasty as we will see below. 
Only later did their attitude towards power change, but at this stage they were 
nomadic chieftains and war leaders and their only function was to lead their 
followers towards plunder and pasture. They were probably one of the leading 
families among their people but they were leaders in war who otherwise at the most 
were regarded as primus inter pares. 
The Muslim Empire, once united and led by one caliphate, had disintegrated 
into the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, the Sunni Umayyad caliphate in 
Cordoba and the Shi 'ite Fa timid caliphate in Cairo. Moreover the teritories of the 
Abbasid caliphate itself were divided between local rulers, the Shi'i Buyids (932-
1 062) ruling over Iran then Iraq and occupying Baghdad, and the Samanids (874-
1 005), a dynasty of Persian origin, ruling over Transoxania and Khurasan. These 
local rulers, though only employing modest titles for themselves, such as the Amir 
136 Ibn Hassiil, Yaltkaya, 256. 
137 Ibn Hassiil, Yaltkaya, 258. 
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title, ruled quasi-independently from the Abbasid caliphate and recognised it only as 
a moral authority, for it was important for the legitimization of rule. 
Transoxania, the most eastern Islamic teritory, was under pressure from 
Turkish people, the Qarakhanids, and the Samanid Amirs, unable to resist them, were 
defeated in 999 and had to leave Transoxania. The Samanid state was also weakened 
within by the Turkish military slaves Alptigin and Sebiiktegin. The latter profiting 
from its decline took it over and the Ghaznavids (977 -1186) or better the House of 
Sebiiktegin emerged. 
This disintegrated state of the Muslim world in general and its eastern part in 
particular opened for the Seljuqs, to some extent, the way when they appeared at its 
eastern border after the Qarakhnaids. For it presented them with good opportunity to 
hire out their military service to the different parties fighting each other, which in 
turn enabled them to extend their power. The information about the early history of 
the Seljuqs as given by the Seljuq sources is sparse and confused and suggests that 
the authors did not knew much about their early time and that their role at this time 
was not that important. Nevertheless they present us the early Seljuqs as rulers in 
their own right as Ibn al-Athir reports: 
"Saljuq heard a report of this, and with all his following and those who obeyed him migrated 
from the infidel lands to the abode of Islam. He received the blessing of true faith and the 
society of Muslims, and his position became more and more exalted and his power and the 
people's loyalty to him grew. He lived in the region of Jand and from there he continually 
raided the pagan Turks. The ruler used to take tribute from the Muslims of those areas. 
Saljuq drove out his officials and the region passed fully to the Muslims. 
Harun ibn Ilek Khan had seized part of the outlying territories of one of the Samanid rulers 
who sent to Saljuq asking for his aid. He sent his son, Arslan, with a company of his 
followers to help the Samanid. Through them the later defeated Harun and recovered his lost 
territory. Arslan then returned to his father. 
Saljuq died in Jand when he was 107 years old, and was buried there. His children, amongst 
whom were Arslan, Mikha'il and Musa, remained there."139 
Ibn al-Athir describes the events in favour of the Seljuqs and presents Seljuq 
as a ruler with a residence, yet his narrative includes hints showing that the Seljuqs 
were only recognized as military auxiliaries by the local rulers. tlmad al-Din al 
I~fahani states that the rulers did not chase the Seljuqs away so that they could make 
139 Ibn al-Athlr, Richards, Annals, 31; Cf. Mlrkhwand, Vullers, 5-6. 
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use of them when needed. 140 The pseudo-Nishapurl also pratses the Seljuqs as 
"worthy of principality" but reveals that they moved further because they needed 
new land for their animals: 
"On account of their prevalence and inadequacy of grazing lands, they came from Turkestan 
to the province of Transoxania. In the winter their place was Niir of Bukhara, and their 
summer quarters were Sughd of Samarqand."141 
The Seljuqs were successful as military auxiliaries, which increased the 
number of their followers and thus their military strength. It is typical of the structure 
of nomadic societies that different tribes follow successful leaders. 142 However, it 
does not seem that their actions were pre-planed and that they took consciously a 
specific direction. The need of new grazing land and the changes of the alliances in 
the region determined their moves: 
"Saljuq was a man known for his good character, blessed with renown. He had five sons, all 
of them lords, namely, Isr~i'Il, Mlk~rn, Musa Yabghu, Yusuf, and Yunus, each one worthy of 
a principality and deserving dominion. Each day their following and their companions were 
on the ascendent and increase . . . Saljuq died. His sons became the leaders of the people. 
When Ma~miid, son of Sabuktagln, made peace with the Ilak Khan, the ruler of Turkestan 
and Samarkand, and Ma}J.miid came to the banks of the Ox us, and they met with one another, 
concluded pacts and treatises, and the boundaries of their respective dominions were settled, 
the Ilak Khan began to fear the Saljuqs"143 • 
The suggestion "each one worthy of a principality and deserving dominion" 
should not be interpreted as evidence that it was the aim of the Seljuqs to gain 
territorial power at this stage of their history. They were stil1 tribally organized and 
had no clearly defined leadership. Although our authors designate one or the other of 
the family member as the supreme leader, their confusion indicates that the Seljuq 
family members were equal in status and that they led their bands separately acting 
only from time to time together. The author says on the one hand "His sons became 
the leaders of the people" and on the other hand "When the message and the 
140 al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, 2-3. 
141 Pseudo-NTshapiirT, Luther, 29. 
142 Cf. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 226. 
143 Pseudo NTshapiirT, Luther, 29. 
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ambassadors reached them, Isra'Il, who was their leader, resolved to go to the Sultan 
with ten thousand chosen men and worthy horsemen." 144 
~Imad al-DTn al I~fahanT describes MTka'Il b. Seljuq as the leader and most 
respected eldest member and shows that the Seljuqs understood leadership as 
ownership of the family and that their moves were defined by grazing land for their 
animals. 145 
The Akhbar although referring to the Seljuqs as AmTrs, describes the member 
who according to it was the leader as "the chief of this tribe, AmTr Mika'Il", and 
speaks of quarters and tents, thus giving us another clue about their nomadic way of 
life: 
"Amir Saljuq died in Jand, leaving (his) sons behind him; They were Amir MTidi'Il, Atnir 
M us a and AmTr Yabghu Arslan who was called Isra 'Il. These Amirs lived in a part of 
Transoxiana called Nfu Bukhara. 
Amir Mika'Il b. Saljuq was in the service(?) of sultan GhazT Yamin al-Dawla Abu'l-Qasim 
Mahmud b. Sebiik-Tegin, may Allah cover him with His forgiveness. It happened that sultan 
Yamin al-Dawla crossed the river Oxus on his way to Bukhara to assist Qadir Khan. He went 
through the quarters and tents of this tribe which was known as Qiniq. He saw how 
numerous their population was and that they had a lot of cattle. (As) he was afraid of 
opposition from them and feared that they would harm him, he summoned the chief of this 
tribe, AmTr Mika'Il b. Saljuq and ordered him to take his family and tribe to the province of 
Khurasan. But AmTr MTka'Il was reluctant to move" 146• 
In this passage Mika'Il is designated as the leader of all Seljuqs and on the 
other hand Arslan Isra'Il is described as "a great leader of theirs". It is most likely 
that MTka'Il is named as the leader because his sons became later successful leaders 
and in accordance with his understanding of kingship our author tries to construct a 
line of rulers going down from father to son. Ibn al-AthTr recognizes Arslan Isra'Il as 
the leader of the Seljuqs and reports for the year 420 (I 029): 
"In this year Yamin al-Dawla ["The right hand of the State", the honorific title of Mahmud 
of Ghazna, son of Sabuktegin] dealt severely with the Oghuz Turks and scattered them 
throughout his lands, because they had caused trouble there. These were the followers of 
144 Pseudo Nishapiiri, Luther, 29-30. 
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Arslan ibn Saljuq the Turk, [also called Isdi'Tl] who had been m the desert around 
Bukhara" 147• 
Interestingly, later in his narrative he describes him not as leader but as the 
uncle of Dawud (~agn) and Tugrul thus reflecting a transfer of power in the Seljuq 
family and he suggests also that the Seljuqs did not act as a united body, while 
Arslan Isra 'Il took part in the inner Qarakhanid struggle his nephews Tugrul and 
~agn Bey remained in Bukhara: 
"When the Samanid dynasty came to an end and Ilek Khan ruled in Bukhara, Arslan ibn 
Saljuq, the uncle of Da 'ud and Tughril Beg, gained a high position in Transoxania. Alitegin, 
the brother of Ilek Khan, was imprisoned by Arslan Khan. He fled came to Bukhara and 
gained possession of the city. Upon his reaching an agreement with Arslan ibn Saljuq, they 
together held the city and became very powerful. Ilek, the brother of Arslan Khan, attacked 
them but they defeated him in battle and remained in Bukhara." 148 
Tugrul and ~agn certainly did not hold an important position at this time 
because they only bore the title Bey, but our sources tacitly draw attention to them 
following their later success. Despite the fact that Arslan Isdi'Il is identified as the 
leader and endowed with the Yabghu title, his sons seem not to have had a strong 
position within the family. It is not clear what they did exactly after the 
imprisonment and death of their father. According to pseudo Nishapuri, Qutlumush 
(Kutalm1~) went back to Bukhara to join his "paternal uncles" thus not Tugrul and 
~agn who were his cousins. 149 We know that the followers of Arslan Isra'Il did not 
join the other Seljuqs but asked Sultan Mahmud for pennission to settle on the 
northern fringes of Khurasan and that they were later described as Iraqi Turkmen. 
It is clear that each member of the Seljuq family led his group of followers 
separately and one of them had no control over the others. The remaining questions 
are, why did not Kutalmi~ lead these groups after the death of his father and why did 
he afterwards have only a subordinate position, even though his father seems to have 
played an important role? The success factor might have been one reason. Arslan 
Isra'Il failed because he was not successful and was caught by Sultan Mabmud which 
then led to the disintegration of his followers, on whom Kutalm1~ was not able to 
147 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Annals, 13. 
148 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Annals, 32. 
149 Cf. Pseudo NTshapilrT, Luther, 33. 
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impose his authority. This, on the other hand, proves that the bands were only bound 
loosely to their Seljuq leaders who were seen as leaders in war. Only when they were 
able to lead the bands to successful booty they could then their power over them. 
Tugrul and (:agn were successful in the path they took as we will see below and 
were thus regarded as better leaders. 
Thus military success was an important factor in the definition of the status of 
the Seljuq leaders since they did not inherit a title, which gave them automatically 
power over their nomadic followers. Our sources describe some of the Seljuqs as 
Yabghu, which, as it seems, was originally the title of the leader of the Turks, but it 
is not even clear which of the Seljuq family members was entitled to bear it, what it 
meant to them and which power exactly it gave to its holder. After the death of 
Arslan Isra'Il his brother Miisa seems to have held the title yabghu. 150 This would 
mean that Miisa as the next eldest would have succeeded but Ibn al-Athir states that 
Yiisuf, the son of Miisa held this title, which interestingly was allotted to him by the 
Qarakhanid Alitegin. Ibn al-Athir describes the episode as follows: 
"He sent to Yusuf ibn Musa ibn Saljuq, the cousin of Tughril Beg Muhammad and Chaghri 
Beg Da 'ud, and promised him good treatment, did his utmost to win him over and eventually 
asked him to visit him, which he did. Alitegin entrusted to him the headship of all Turks who 
were within the lands he ruled and assigned him numerous grants of land and gave him the 
title Emir Inanj Yabghu." 151 
Ibn al-Athir names, however, one of the sons of Mika'Il as Yabghu, assuming that 
this was a name and not a title: 
"Mikha 'il raided some territory of the infidel Turks, and in a battle, in which he personally 
engaged in combat, he met a martyr's death 'on the path of God'. He left the following 
children, Payghu, Tughril Beg Muhammad and <;agn Beg Da 'ud. Their clans obeyed them 
and submitted to their commands and prohibitions." 152 
According to Rashid al-Din Nishapuri Mika'Il had two sons called (:agn and 
Tugrul, "who became respected leaders of their tribe and kinsmen." 153 It seems thus 
15° Cf. Pseudo NTshapiirT, Luther, 40. 
151 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Annals, 34; Cf. MTrkhwand, Vullers, 16-17. 
152Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Annals, 32. The Akhbar also names one of the sons ofMTka'Tl, Yabghu. Cf. 
Akhbar, Ayaz, 56. 
153 Pseudo NTshapiirT, Luther, 34. 
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that either Arslan Isra'Tl either assumed the title Yabghu in opposition to the real 
yabghu or that it was bestowed on him by a Qarakhanid. Kutalmt~ rebelled after the 
death of Tugrul Bey claiming supreme leadership of the family and hence the the 
sultanate: "The sultanate comes to us, and our father, who was best and eldest of the 
tribe was killed in these circumstances."154 Most probably these are the words of our 
author but noteworthy is the mix up in it. It claims that Arslan Isra'Tl was the "best" 
meaning the most experienced leader and eldest and describes him as leader of a 
"tribe" thus suggesting that the Seljuqs were a united body in the form of a tribe led 
by one leader who fought for kingship and that thus the sultanate belongs to 
Kutalmt~. 
We have shown above that Arslan Isra 'Il might have been the eldest but he 
was not successful and his followers were a separate group and his struggle was not 
for kingship. The authors themselves describe the Seljuqs as "leaders" in the 
passages cited above. That Kutalmt~ was able to mobilize troups for a rebellion 
proves that the Seljuq followers were not led by one leader and that most of them did 
not accept supreme leadership and we have no reason to assume that the Seljuqs 
regarded themselves in a different way. There is no evidence in the sources that the 
early Seljuqs regarded themselves in a different way. Tugrul and <;agn were 
successful as military auxiliaries but at this time they seem not to have had the aim to 
set up a dynasty. Nevertheless Tugrul later became sultan and the next section will 
discuss the factors which led to that. 
1.3. (:agrt Bey and Tugrul Bey 
The Seljuq leaders Tugrul and <;agn were driven by necessity to go further 
westwards into Muslim teritory, for surrounded by enemies they had no other choice. 
On one side of the Ox us were the Qarakhanids and one of those Alitigin, with whom 
their uncle Arslan Isra 'Tl had been allied, turned against them and wanted to drive 
them away. lbn al-Athir writes interpreting the Seljuq situation in 42111030 after the 
154 Pseudo NTshapiirT, Luther, 45. 
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battle with Alitigin: "They were driven by necessity to cross over into Khurasan." 155 
On the other side of the Ox us was the Khwarazmshah, Shah Malik, an old enemy of 
the Seljuqs and the Ghaznavids who not necessarily welcomed them. According to 
the Akhbiir Shah Malik besieged the Khwarazmshah who then fled to the Seljuqs. 
"Then he (Shah Malik) made for Khwarazm and Isma 'Il b. Khwarazm-Shah received 
him. They confronted each other in battle .... Then Isma 'Il ran away and took refuge 
with the Saljuq Amirs"156• Ibn al-Athir notes that the Khwarazmshah Hariin b. 
Altunta~ offered the Seljuqs his alliance but then set their old enemy Shah Malik 
against them so that they asked the Ghaznavid Sultan Mastud for help. They wanted 
security and would in return "attack the group that was causing disturbance in his 
territory, to drive them out and fight them, and to be his greatest helpers against them 
and against others." 157 The Seljuqs recognised the Ghaznavid sultan and offered their 
service as millitary auxiliaries but the sultan sent his army against them and left 
himself for India: 
"The scattered remnants of his army returned to Sultan Mas'ud when he was in Nishapur, 
and he was sorry he had spurned their offer of allegiance. He realised that awe of them had 
taken a firm hold on the hearts of his soldiers and that because of this defeat [he had 
suffered] the Saljuqs would be more ambitious and would dare to meet his royal troops in 
pitched battle, whereas before they had been greatly afraid."158 
While the Seljuqs at the beginning of the struggle regarded their military 
strength as inferior to the sultan's army and fought with their steppe hit and run tactic 
this changed with their success over the army of Sultan Mastud. According to the 
Akhbiir, Tugrul Bey told his brother <:;agn Bey after their victory over the Ghaznavid 
sultan at Balkh: 
"Today no peace nor apology can be facilitated with the sultan after blood had been shed and 
hatred is so deep-rooted in the hearts (of men). We have horsemen for whom the lands are 
small and the sultan has an army whose safety lies in running away." 159 
155 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Annals, 34. 
156 Akhbar, Ayaz, 59. 
157 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Annals, 35. 
158 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Annals, 35. lbn al-Athir's interpretation is convincing because it finds 
confirmation by the Ghaznavid source Baihaqi. Cf. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 242. 
159 Akhbiir, Ayaz, 66. 
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It is not surprising that with growing military success their ambitions grew 
but their attitude towards power had yet not changed. It seems that their main aim 
was not conquest, followed by political domain, but plunder and grazing land. Even 
the pro-Seljuq authors do not skate round this fact: 
"After the defeat of the Amir of Khurasan the Saljuqs spread out in the province of 
Khurasan, and during this period of weakness, the Turkomans put their hands to tyranny, 
highway robbery, upheaval and discord, making the district of Khurasan disturbed and 
disordered." 160 
Interestingly the author changes the subject writing "the Saljuqs spread out" 
but "the Turkomans put their hands on tyranny," attributing the misdeeds to the 
followers of the Seljuqs. The pseudo-Nishapuri and ~rmad al-Din al I~fahani, most 
probably in an attempt to clear the name of Tugrul, the later sultan, write that 
Chaghri wanted to plunder and that Tugrul prevented him and the Turkmen followers 
from doing so: 
"On the day of the festival they mounted up to plunder Nishapur. Tughrul Beg said, "It is the 
day of the festival. It is not fitting to make people miserable". Chagri Beg quarrelled with 
this and drew his dagger, saying, "If you let me plunder ... if not, r ll kill myself'. Tughril 
was conciliatory and satisfied him with payment of a share of forty thousand dinars." 161 
It is very unlikely that Tugrul made such a statement full of Arabic words and 
religious explanation. Anyhow these passages show that the Seljuqs were after the 
riches they could get from the territories and not after the domination of them. 
I. 4. The Turkmen followers of the Seljuqs 
Another aspect emerges in the accounts of the plunder raids. The sources 
separate the Seljuq family members from their followers attributing the misdeeds to 
the second and portraying the first especially Tugrul Bey, as ruler-like. The Seljuq 
followers are in the passages concerning the early history of the Seljuqs characterised 
as the tribe, kinsmen, and Oguz but they are later described as Turkomans and 
160 Pseudo NTshapurT, Luther, 35. 
161 Pseudo NTshapurT, Luther, 41. Cf. al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, 4, 5. 
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disregarded by our authors. The geographer al-Idrisi distinguishes between the 
Turkish leaders and their followers stating: "Their princes are warlike, provident, 
firm, just, and are distinguished by excellent qualities; the nation is cruel, wild, 
coarse, and ignorant." 162 
The Arab and Persian authors, living a settled way of life view the nomadic 
Turks who are feared but praised as military people free of decadence. 163 Ibn Hassul, 
the former Buyid bureaucrat, writes in his epistle for Tugrul Bey that the Turks as 
lion-like and proud people, who are not willing to work in the household like slaves 
but have "single minded desire to acchieve military command." 164 
lbn Hassul thus seeks the favour of Tugrul by glorifying all Turks, which 
suggest that Tugrul did not distinguish between himself and his kinsmen and 
followers. It is evident that the epistle must have been written in a way to please 
Tugrul because the author states in his work that it would be later translated for 
Tugrul by al-Kunduri. 165 lbn Hassul gives us thus the important information that 
Tugrul's vizier al-Kunduri spoke Turkish. It can thus be deduced that the first 
Seljuqs did not regard themselves as despotic rulers but as chiefs of their followers, 
sharing the same way of life with them. A passage in the work of tlmad al-Din al-
I~fahani points also in this direction: 
"They (the Seljuqs) are utterly destitute (mula$a 'likiin) despite the vastness of their 
territories. They do not care whether they die or perish. Access to their routes with swords 
and arrows is difficult. They have horsemen who do not fear death (?), as if they are not 
human beings."166 
Interestingly, describing their military strength, he indicates that they fought 
out of poverty. Baihaqi's description of Tugrul's appearance \vhen he entered 
Nishapur is another piece of evidence that the Seljuqs were not different from their 
followers even in their outlook. "He himself had a strung bow over his arm, with 
162 Al-Idrisi as cited by Barthold, Turkestan, 305. 
163 Cf. Bosworth, Barbarian Incursions, in: ibid., The medieval history of Iran Afghanistan and 
Central Asia, XXIII, p.6-7. The view of the Romans on the Teutons for example is not much different. 
164 Ibid., 7; see also Ibn Hassiil, Yaltkaya, 260. 
165 Ibn Hassiil, Yaltkaya, 262. 
166 al-BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, 62. 
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three wooden arrows fastened at his waist, and was fully armed. He wore a mulham 
tunic, a head-dress ofTawwazi cloth and felt boots." 167 
1.5. The Seljuqs and Khurasan 
The effect of the plunder raids on the people and especially on the leading 
figures of Khurasan was in a way supportive for the Seljuqs. Khurasan with its 
capital Nishapur was a strategically important province of the Muslim world and had 
several times played a decisive role in the Islamic history. 168 The leading circles of 
Khurasan had already aided the Ghaznavids against the Samanids in order to 
preserve their special interests. 
"The Ghaznavid connection had not been at the outset wholly an imposition by force 
majeure, for as the Samanids declined and then fell, the regime of Sebiiktegin and Mahmiid 
had been supported by the landowners, merchants and notables of Khurasan as politically 
and economically useful. However, Mas 'iid found it difficult to reconcile the claims of 
Khurasan with the temptations of expansion in India, and his military prestige was waning as 
the strength of the Turkmens grew. The loyalty of the people ofKhurasan inevitably suffered 
when the Sultan became patently unable to provide protection; hence towards the end of his 
reign the tacit contract between the Ghaznavid dynasty and the people of Khurasan 
crumbled."169 
It goes without saying that our sources do not explain the changes in power 
with political and economical factors. They interpret them in accordance with the 
Muslim and Persian theory of rulership, according to which a dynasty or ruler was 
replaced when the rulers did not fulfill their duties. (Imad al-Din al I~fahani writes: 
"Every empire enjoys respect and after every brightnes there is darkness. Every age 
has a nation and every era has a king." 170 
The pro-Seljuq sources as well as the Ghaznavid source Baihaqi make clear 
that Sultan Mas(ud did not fulfill his duties as ruler as he did not defend Khurasan 
adequately. Sultan Mas(ud had reacted too late against the Seljuqs and he tried to 
167 BaihaqT as cited by Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 256; Barthold, Turkestan, 306. 
168 Bosworth's chapters "Khurasan under Ghaznavid rule" and "The social structure of Nishapur" 
deliver a good survey for Khurasan role at that time. p. 145-202. 
169 Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 258. 
170 Akhbar, Ayaz, 64. 
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take higher taxes from the Khurasanians, which caused more antipathy because Suri, 
the governor for Khurasan, had already taken all what they had. 171 The Akhbar 
describes the situation of the capital as follows: 
"So Sti-Bashi passed through Nishapiir, but he did not find any provisions there for a day and 
a night. So he returned to Dihistan and left behind a certain person in Nishapilr who was 
called hajib Pakriib. He was the one who swept Khurasan clean with the broom of his 
confiscations and did not leave anyone with even a tenth portion of the crop."172 
Ibn al-Athir also points out the effects of the Seljuq-Ghazanavid conflict in 
Khurasan: "On account of the long stay in Khurasan of Subashi and his troops and of 
the Saljuqs too, the land was devastated and much blood shed, and supplies and 
provisions became short, especially for the regular army." 173 Mastud's army even 
started to behave like the barbarians, as they also begun to plunder on their way. 174 
These caused even more aversion against the Ghaznavid administration and several 
towns of Khurasan started negotations with the Seljuqs as the better solution. 
According to the Akhbar the notables of Marw approached the Seljuqs: "Then the 
faqihs of Marw sought asylum from the Saljuqs." 175 A passage in the work of the 
pseudo-Nishapuri also suggests that the cities surrendered peacefully to the Seljuqs. 
After their victory over the Ghaznavids at Dandanqan the Seljuqs wrote in a letter to 
the caliph: 
"The authors of evil innovations were finding occasion for advantage and mischief, and the 
notables and well-known ones of Khurasan asked us to undertake to give them aid and 
assistance and protect them." 176 
These are most probably the words chosen by Khurasani notables, who most 
probably advised the Seljuqs to write a letter to the Abbasid caliph and to seek his 
recognition. However, when Khurasan fell to the Seljuqs, they were somewhat 
suddenly set in a different position. They were approached by the Khurasani notables 
as the protecting power of it but for their followers they remained chieftains with the 
171 Cf. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 87. 
172 Akhbar, Ayaz, 61. 
173 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Annals, 37. 
174 Cf. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 266. 
175 Akhbar, Ayaz, 62. 
176 Pseudo Nishapiiri, Luther, 39. 
49 
only function to lead them towards plunder and pasture. It is not clear how far the 
Seljuqs themselves were conscious about the new status and the dual position 
resulting from it and if they regarded themselves differently. Our sources are written 
in favour of the two brothers ~agn Bey and Tugrul Bey and try to mould especially 
the latter in their ideal of the Muslim ruler because he became sultan later. It is thus 
unclear if the first Seljuqs were conscious about their new role as rulers in Khurasan 
and if they were aware of the responsibilities, which came with it. Actually we can 
only proceed on the assumption that they had leadership qualities on the grounds of 
their later success. 
Be that as it may, the Perso-Islamic concept of kingship was not only totally 
allien to their followers but also new and incomprehensible to Tugrul and ~agn. 
Although our sources regard the former as the supreme leader it is better to assume 
that the success in Khurasan did not bring sudden changes and the two brothers, were 
equal in status 177• We should note that they both still bore the same Turkish title Bey 
(chief, master) and the principle of autocratic rule was alien to them. Nonetheless, 
their qualities should not be underestimated and it seems certain that they were the 
most ambitious among their family members. 
The information in our sources is contradictory but it should be noted that the 
Malikniima was written for the son of ~agn Bey which suggests that he was not less 
ambitious than his brother Tugrul. However, we can expect that our sources, which 
used the Malikniima favour ~agn Bey. The Akhbiir claims that in Marw the khutba 
was read in the name of Chaghri Bey but states on the other hand that ~agn declared 
his brother Tugrul sultan: 
"So they (the faqThs) read the khutba in the name of Chagri Beg at Marw on the first Friday 
of Rajah in the year 428 ... The notables of Nishapur received him and he rested there for a 
short time. He gave Toghril Beg the laqab of Sultan al-Mutazzam Rukn al-Dunya wa'l-Din 
Abii Talib." 178 
177 Cf. Bullict, 'Numismatic Evidence for the Relationship between Tughril Beg and Chaghri Beg', in: 
Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and History, D. K. Kouymijian, (ed.), Beirut 
1974, 294-95. Bulliet concludes that Tugrul and <;agr1 must have been equal in status. 
178 Akhbar, Ayaz, 63. 
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The assumption of this title is clearly anticipated, as the following narrative 
of the Akhbiir informs us that the Seljuq family members fought at different front 
lines against sultan Maseud. They were apparently regarded by Maseud as separate 
leaders as the Akhbiir states that "envoys" were sent out. "Malik Chagrl Bey 
encamped at Shink al-e Abbadi. So the sultan came out to meet him, but malik Chagri 
Bey retreated to Sarakhs. Sultan Toghrll and Yabghu (also) joined him (there). Then 
the sultan sent them envoys on his behalf requesting them to make peace with 
him."179 It seems strange that sultan Maseud approached Yabghu as the leader of the 
Seljuqs: "So AmTr Yabghu came to the presence of the sultan who bestowed upon 
him robes of honour which were dazzling to the eyes." 180 
Moreover, the Akhbiir gives us the following episode from the end of the 
Battle of Dandanqan: 
"And when the calamities of (this) revolution (inqiUib) had passed, he (ChagrT Beg) entered 
the tent of sultan Mas'ud b. Mahmud b. Sebiik-Tegin and sat down on his throne. He shared 
out the booty among his army and donated the kharaj of one year in his domains (wilayas). 
(Moreover) he built villages and set prisoners free." 181 
It is clear that there was no supreme leadership among the Seljuq family 
members and that they still acted in accordance with the steppe tradition, which 
understood power as the possesion of the family. Pseudo NTshapurT remarks that all 
the members of the Seljuq family assembled and agreed to support each other. 182 The 
division of the conquered territories following their victory over the Ghaznavids 
reveals this: 
"When they sent the letter, they divided the government, and each of the chiefs was named 
to a region. Chaghri Beg, the elder brother, made Marw the capital and made most of 
Khurasan his special preserve. Musa Y abghu was named to the government of Bust and the 
eastern lands, and the regions of Heart, Isfizar, Sistan and Khan NashTn to the extent he 
could manage to hold them. Qawurd, the elder son of ChaghrT Beg, went to the province of 
Tabas, the districts of Kirman and the environs of QUhistan. Tughril Beg came toward Iraq. 
IbrahTm Inal, who was his brother on his mother's side, his nephew, the Amir YaqutT, and his 
cousin Qutlumush b. Isra'Il accompanied him. When they conquered the city of Rayy and 
the fortress of Tabarak fell into their hands, he made that place his capital. They sent IbrahTm 
Inal to Hamadan and YaqutT to the town of Abhar and to Zanjan and the districts of 
179 Akhbar, Ayaz, 65. 
180 Akhbar ,Ayaz, 65-66. 
181 Akhbar, Ayaz, 67-68. According to pseudo Nishapuri it was Tugrul, who made this symbolic 
move. Cf. Pseudo Nishapuri, Luther, 3 7. 
182 Pseudo Nishapuri, Luther, 39. 
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Azerbaijan, and Qutlumush to the province of Jurjan and Damghan and the Rest of the 
province Qumis. And Alp Arslan b. ChaghrT Beg, his nephew, was with him." 183 
This account suggests that Tugrul led this meeting but it seems that the 
decisions were taken by all family members and that not domains of territories but 
spheres of interest were fixed. Tugrul later became sultan as a result of this 
agreement reached by the Seljuq family as a whole and not because he was a better 
leader than <;agn or he had the aim to set up a sultanate. That <;agn Bey took as his 
share the politically, strategically, and economically important province Khurasan 
speaks for him and it should be also noted that his son later succeeded Tugrul, who 
had no offspring. It seems however to far reaching when the sources assert that <;agn 
made Marw to his capital and Tugrul Rayy. At this stage they could only have had a 
rudimentary court and it is more likely that these towns functioned as main bases at 
this stage and not as capitals. Their attitude towards cities is not clear as they still 
lived a nomadic way of life. Lambton argues that the Seljuqs were already familiar 
with the settled way of life but merely argues that the Seljuqs must have been more 
than leaders of a nomadic tribal group and familiar with urban life because "only the 
Saljuqs among the Ghuzz succeeded in establishing an empire." 184 
According to our sources, Tugrul took direction for Iraq firstly to make more 
conquests and secondly because the Abbasid caliph al-Qaim invited him. It is not 
possible to ascertain the real motives of Tugrul but it seems rather unlikely that he 
realised the new possibilities which lay now before him. That Tugrul and <;agn 
gained power over Khurasan must have changed their consciousness but we cannot 
infer from this that they became totally aware of the new form of power which would 
enable them to become Muslim rulers. 
At this juncture another important factor came into play. The military success 
tn Khurasan did not change the status of the first Seljuq leaders from chiefs of 
nomads to territorial rulers but also brought them in contact with the Persian notables 
and administrators. It was this group, which would direct them to make the best use 
of their new status. For an understanding of the Seljuq mentality, ideology and self-
183 Pseudo Nishapuri, Luther, 40. The Akhbiir gives a similar account of this episode. Cf. Akhbar, 
Ayaz, 74-75. 
184 Lambton, 'Aspects of Seljuq-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia', in: eadem. The01y and Practice in 
Medieval Persian Government, IX, 111. 
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image we thus need to take the vtews of these Persian men of the pen into 
consideration. These Persian men of the pen played an important role for the 
transformation of the Seljuqs from nomadic chieftains to Muslim sultans ruling over 
sedentary subjects. With the instalment of the Seljuqs in Nishapur a partnership 
between the Seljuqs and the Persian men of the pen started which would remain 
effective down to the Rum Seljuqs. Most of the administrators of the Seljuqs 
including those employed by the Rum Seljuqs came from Khurasan and thus were a 
factor of continuity from the Great Seljuq empire to the Rum Seljuq sultanate. 
II. The first Seljuqs in Anatolia: rebels or sultans? 
The situation of the first Rum Seljuq leaders was not very different from the 
situation of the first Great Seljuq leaders in the eastern frontiers of the Muslim world. 
Kutalmt~' sons Sulayman and Man$iir were kept under surveillance and only after 
the death of the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan did they escape and come to the 
western frontier of the Great Seljuq realm. 185 Hence they came to the western 
frontiers of the Great Seljuq realm as refugees where they hired out their military 
services to the Byzantine factions competing for the throne in Constantinople. 186 
Almost by chance Sulayman came in 473/1081 into the possession ofNicaea (iznik), 
which he made his residence and established a principality. But he was merely the 
military overlord ofNicaea and its environs. Despite the breakdown of the Byzantine 
frontier defence great parts of Anatolia were still under the control of the Byzantine 
Empire and the population remained predominantly Christian (Greek and 
Armenian). 187 There was no Muslim administration in place which Sulayman could 
take over like the first Great Seljuqs did in Khurasan to establish a Muslim state. It is 
also unlikely that Sulayman as the son of a rebel and a fugitive should have had any 
high ranking administrators or ulama in his retinue. Nevertheless, modem historians, 
185 Attaliates and Bar Hebraeus confirm that Kutalm1~' sons fled Great Seljuq captivity to Byzantine 
territory, though Bar Hebraeus confuses Kutlalm1~ with his son. Attaliates, Historia, 226; Bar 
Hebracus, Budge, 226. 
186 Cf. G. Ostrogorsky, The Hist01J' of the Byzantine State, tr. 1. Hussey, Oxford 1956, 307-308. 
Sulayman was employed by Nicephorus Botaniates during his rebellion against Michael Ducas VII in 
1078. Two years later in 1080 Sulayman supported the rebel Nicephorus Mellisenus in Nicaea. 
187 Cf. P. Wittek, Toponymie, 11-16. 
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and especially Turkish historians, take over the ex post facto view of the medieval 
authors, who describe Sulayman as the founder of the Rum Seljuq state and the first 
sultan of this state. 188 It has been noted that Sulayman fled Great Seljuq captivity but 
little attention has been paid to the fact that he was the son of a rebel who fled to 
Anatolia and later died in conflict with the Great Seljuqs like his father Kutalmt~. 
This chapter will discuss the following questions. How did the rebellious 
ancestors of the Rum Seljuqs define their status within the Seljuq family? Did they 
employ an ideology of protest in opposition to the Perso-Islamic ideology of 
kingship adopted by their Great Seljuq cousins? 
It should be noted beforehand that the nature of our sources makes it difficult 
to find answers to these questions. As already noted, there is no contemporary 
evidence, material or literary extant from the time of Sulayman and his t¥.ro 
successors. The first Rum Seljuq copper coins appear under his grandson Mas~iid I 
(510-55111107-1117), the first silver coins under the fifth Rum Seljuq ruler, Kthv 
Arslan II (1156-1192), and the first gold coins under the latter's successor. 189 The 
extant Rum Seljuq and other Muslim chronicles have almost all been written by 
Persian and Arab authors living in later periods in the second half of the 13th and 
14th centuries. The most important Rum Seljuq author lbn Bibi who begins his work 
at the end of the reign of Kthv Arslan II states that he could not find any works 
relating to the history of the first Rum Seljuq rulers. Other medieval Muslim authors 
describe the rebellion of Kutalmt~, the ancestor of the Rum Seljuqs, and then go over 
to Sulayman's conquest of Antioch but, other than that, they ignore the Rum Seljuqs. 
Anatolia was outside their sphere of interest and thus they only mention the Seljuqs 
of Anatolia when their eastward expansion brought them into Mesopotamia and 
Syria and thus within their sphere of interest. Besides at the time when these authors 
were composing their works, Kutalmtf descendants had established themselves as 
legitimate Perso-Islamic rulers in Anatolia. Thus these authors were faced with the 
dilemma of rehabilitating this rebellious branch of the Seljuq family. 
188 Cf. J. Laurent, 'Byzance et les origins du Soultanat Roum', in: Melanges Diehl I (1930), 177 .. ; P. 
Wittek, 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', in: Byzantion 11 (1936), 285.; idem., 'Le 
Sultan de Rum', in: Annuaire de I 'Jnstitut de philologie et d'histoire orientates et slaves 6 (1938), 
361.; C. Cahen, 'La premiere penetration turque en Asie Mineure', in: Byzantion 18 (1948), 5. 
189 Tevhid, Islamiyye katalogu, no 8205; I. Artuk/C. Artuk, Is/ami Sikkeler, no 1 060; J.C. Hinrichs, 
'Sultan und Kalif auf Miinzen der Seltschuken Anatoliens', in: G. Leiser (ed.), Les Seldjoukides 
d'Anatolie, Paris 2006, 339. 
54 
11.1. Kutalmt~ b. Arslan Isra'Il b. Seljuq 
First, the accounts of Kutalmt~' rebellion and the result it had for his son 
Sulayman and his descendants will be analysed in detail. Among the Arabic authors 
writing on the Great Seljuqs it is worth quoting the whole account given by Ibn al-
Athlr because, on the one hand, his universal history incorporates the "most coherent 
account of the Great Seljuq sultans." 190 On the other hand the work of Ibn al-Athlr 
contains more references to the Rum Seljuq sultans than any other work written in 
Arabic or Persian on Great Seljuq history. At the same time being a Syrian author 
writing for the Zengid dynasty, the Rum Seljuqs' eastern neighbours and rivals, he 
was better informed about this dynasty than other authors. lbn al-Athlr writes: 
"Alp Arslan heard that Shihab al-Dawla Qutalmish, also one of the Saljuq family, who is the 
ancestor of the princes who are in our present day the lords of Konya, Kaysari, Aqsaray, and 
Malatya, had rebelled against him, gathered large forces and marched to Rayy to seize 
control. Alp Arslan equipped a great army and sent them by the desert route to Rayy, which 
they reached before Qutalmish. 
Alp Arslan left Nishapur on 1 Muharram of this year [25 December 1 063]. When he reached 
Damghan he sent to Qutalmish deploring his action and ordering him not to carry out his 
plan but to abandon it. He himself would observe the ties of kinship towards him. Qutalmish 
gave him the reply of one mistakenly confident in the forces he had gathered. He sacked the 
villages around Rayy and flooded the Valley of Salt, which was a marchy area. It became 
impossible to cross it. Nizam al-Mulk said to [Alp Arslan], 'I have prepared an army for you 
out of Khurasan which will support you and not abandon you, and which to protect you, will 
shoot arrows that do not miss. These are the ulema and the ascetics. By liberality towards 
them I have made them some of your greatest helpers'. 
The sultan drew near to Qutalmish. Nizam al-Mulk armed himself and arranged the 
squadrons. Both armies formed their battle lines. Qutalmish was knowledgeable in astrology. 
He halted and made his observations, and into saw that his star on that day was associated 
with evil influences. Taking this into consideration, he saw no [hope of] victory. His plan 
was to temporize. However, Alp Arslan found a route through the water and waded through 
the flood. The army followed him, and he and they emerged safely. They were now in 
contact with Qutalmish and battle was joined. Qutalmish's army did not stand firm against 
the sultan's, but fled immediately. He set out, defeated, towards the castle of Kurdkuh, one 
of his fortresses and strong-points. Death or capture overwhelmed his army. The sultan 
would have killed the prisoners, but Nizam al-Mulk interceded for them, so he pardoned and 
freed them. 
When the dust had settled and the army made camp, Qutalmish was found dead, lying 
stretched on the ground, although no one knew how he had died. It is said that he died of 
terror, but God knows best. The sultan wept for his death, and held a session to mourn his 
loss, which he felt keenly." 191 
19° C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 79. 
191 lbn al-Athir, Richards, Annals, 151-152; Sibt lbn al-Jawzi presents these events with a different 
chronology. Cf. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, Sevim, 110-111; al-Bundari's account is brief and he does not 
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Alp Arslan is presented here as the rightful heir as he is victorious which is 
regarded as a sign that God had chosen him to rule. Kutalmt~ on the other hand is 
defeated and therefore his claim to the throne is regarded as illegitimate. The most 
important point in lbn al-Athir's account is his assumption that these two members of 
the Seljuq family Alp Arslan and Kutalm1~ represented two different types of 
rulership. Alp Arslan with his professional army and the support of the Sunni ulama 
and administrators represented the new Seljuq centralised Perso-lslamic state192• 
Kutalm1~ on the other hand represented the old Turkish tradition of decentralised 
rulership with its principle of collective sovereignty and seniorate according to which 
the eldest member of the ruling family was to hold supreme control. Ibn al-Athir 
presents Alp Arslan as the ruler who had all important elements of the Perso-Islamic 
state at his disposal, a very capable vizier in the person of Nizam al-Mulk, a 
professional army, and the support of the ulama. Kutalm1~ on the other hand is styled 
as a nomadic chief who "sacked the villages around Rayy" and planned his war 
strategy according to astrological observations. Kutalm1~ did not have a great vizier 
at his side and could not count on the support of the ulama, and he depended on 
Turkmen bands and did not have a standing army. Moreover, in his concluding 
sentences, lbn al-Athir reaffirms his suggestion that the Rum Seljuq branch of the 
Seljuq family had not assimilated into the new Perso-lslamic system but had kept 
alive ancient, non-Muslim traditions: 
"It is remarkable that this Qutalmish understood astrology and had tnastered it 
notwithstanding that he was a Turk. Besides this he knew other Turkish lore. His sons after 
him continued to seek this learning of the ancients and to attract its practioners. This was a 
blot that stained their reputation for religion."193 
mention the ancestors of Kutalm1~, the Seljuqs of Rum at all. He writes that Kutalm1~ hoped to gain 
the sultanate not knowing that this would be his ruin and that he died in the ensuing war between him 
and Alp Arslan. He adds that Alp Arslan killed many Tiirkmen and confiscated their wealth. Cf. al-
BundarT, Zubdat, Burslan, 27; RawandT in his work Rahat al-sudiir, which he dedicated to the Rum 
Seljuq sultan Kay Khusraw I, chooses to omit the rebellion of his benefactor's ancestor Kutalm1~. He 
writes that Alp Arslan ascended the throne after he had put aside Sulayman, Tughrul 's little son but 
who in fact was Alp Arslan's younger brother who had been proclaimed sultan on the instigation of 
Tughrul's vizier al-KundurT. Cf. RawandT, Riihat al-sudur, Burslan, 114. 
192 Cf. Bosworth, 'The Internal Structure ofthe Saljuq Empire (A.D. 1000-1217)', in: CHI, vol. V, 58. 
193 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Annals, 152. 
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These remarks made by lbn al-Athir must be evaluated in the context in 
which they were written. These suspicions about Kutalmt~ and his descendants were 
probably part of the religious propaganda used in the ideological warfare between the 
Zengids and the Rum Seljuqs. Nevertheless, the notion that Kutalmt~ represented the 
traditionalist branch of the Seljuq family is confirmed by al-Husayni. He too 
emphasizes the role played by Nizam al-Mulk but gives a more detailed account of 
the course of the war between the two sides. Al-Husayni gives a favourable 
description of Alp Arslan' s army but refers to Kutalmt~' army with disregard and 
describes the Turkmen bands employed by him as "rabble troops like scattered 
locusts." Moreover, al-Husayni seems to imply that Kutalmt~ acted like a Turkmen 
chief when he writes that he "devastated all the villages of Rayy and gave his 
soldiers a free hand in doing so." 194 Al-Husayni concludes his report stating that Alp 
Arslan wanted to kill the captives and that they were freed after Nizam al-Mulk 
asked the sultan to show mercy. The author refers to Kutalmt~ as the forefather of the 
maliks of Rum but does not specify if they were among the captives. He remarks 
latter in his narrative that Malik Shah "captured Konya, Aqsarayi, Kayseri and all the 
other towns and appointed malik Rukn al-Din Sulayman b. Qutlumush b. Isra'Il b. 
Saljuq over them. Then he conquered Antioch and entrusted it to him."195 
Among the sources on the Great Seljuqs written in Persian, the Saljiiqniima 
written by pseudo-Nishapuri is the most important as it was the Urtext for subsequent 
Seljuq histories written in Persian and also pre-dates all Arabic sources on the 
Seljuqs. 196 Rashid al-Din in his adaptation of Nishapuri gives the following account 
of the struggle between Alp Arslan and Kutalmt~: 
"The sultanate comes to us, and our father, who was best and eldest of the tribe was killed in 
these circumstances." He brought an army and took the city of Rayy under siege. Suddenly 
he heard the news of the approach of Alp Arslan. He was afraid that, if he waited until his 
arrival, he would not be able to repel the enemy from two different directions. He went as far 
as Isfarayin. There his meeting with Alp Arslan took place and a great battle and much 
slaughter ensued. Finally Qutlumush's horse slipped, and it appeared right to Alp Arslan. He 
was killed, and Alp Arslan wanted to kill all who were of his kinship and following. He 
ordered them to execute his son, Sulayman Shah, although he was small. The Vizier Nizam 
al-Mulk did not believe it was the right thing to do. He said, "Killing kinsmen may be an 
error and inasupicious". Alp Arslan sent them to the border of the realm with the injunction 
194 Akhbar, Ayaz, 93. 
195 Akhbar, Ayaz, 153. 
196 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 76; eadem., Non-Greek Sources, 322. 
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that they settle on the borders of Islam and that they be relieved of the insignia of the ami rate 
and the rank of malik, so that they be submissive and needy. Then they appointed Diyar Bakr 
and Ruha for him, and Sulayman Shah is the father of the Sultans of Riim." 197 
It is remarkable that the author begins his account with an alleged statement 
made by Kutalmt~ according to which he demanded the Seljuq throne because his 
father Arslan Isra 'Il had been the "eldest of the tribe" and had died in that function. 
The rebel based his claim to the Great Seljuq throne on the ancient Turkish tribal 
tradition of seniorate according to which the eldest member of the chosen family was 
to lead the tribe. The author reveals that Kutalmt~ the ancestor of the Rum Seljuq 
dynasty was a rebel. On the other hand he knows Kutalmt~' son Sulayman is 'the 
father of the sultans of Rum' and makes somewhat contradictory statements to 
rehabilitate his descendants. He states that the Great Seljuq sultan following the 
advice of Nizam al-Mulk did not kill Kutalmt~' descendants but deprived them of 
their dynastic rights and titles and send them to the borders. 198 The author ends his 
report stating that Diyarbaktr and al-Ruha were assigned to Sulayman. This would 
mean that he was reinstated as Seljuq prince and governor of these frontier regions of 
the Great Seljuq Empire. It is important to observe, however, that the author does not 
expound ghazw and jihad against the Christian Byzantines. On the contrary, he 
stresses that the rebel's descendants were sent to the frontier so that they would not 
be able to regain their dynastic rights, as they would be "submissive and needy." The 
Great Seljuq authors are biased towards the Great Seljuqs and want to show that the 
Great Seljuq sultan was the legitimate and superior ruler who delegated power to 
other family members. All authors portray Kutaln11~ as a rebel and they recognise 
that he represented a different type of government but they do not elaborate this 
point. They construct a form of events which conforms to their understanding of 
history and their concept of kingship. Hence they claim that Sulayman was reinstated 
by the Great Seljuq sultan and that his descendants became sultans ruling over 
Anatolia. 
197 Pseudo NishapurT, Luther, 45-46. The Akhbiir concludes his report of Kutalm1~' rebellion with the 
indication that Alp Arslan fulfilled his duty towards his uncle: "His coffin was brought to the tomb of 
sultan Rukn al-DTn Toghril in Rayy." Akhbiir, Ayaz, 95. 
19
H The Great Seljuq sultans sought to divert their nomadic followers away from their state towards the 
frontiers where they could continue their plunder raids. This policy might have been initiated by their 
vizier Nizam al-Mulk. 
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To sum up: a close examination of the accounts of Kutalmt~' rebellion shows 
that the medieval authors agree that the Rum Seljuq dynasty represented the 
rebellious branch of the Seljuq family and that they lost their dynastic rights. At the 
same time all authors claim that Kutalmt~' descendants were reinstated as Seljuq 
princes by their Great Seljuq cousins and allotted with frontier regions. By inventing 
a story of official bestowment our authors are side-stepping the question of rival 
ideologies based on other traditions than their ideal of Perso-lslamic kingship. It goes 
without saying that the medieval authors do not discuss the rebellion in the light of 
an ideology of protest but as the struggle between two throne pretenders. We can 
however find some clues in their accounts which reveal the real circumstances of the 
first Rum Seljuqs and give us some idea of the ideological challenges they faced. 
11.2. Sulayman I b. Kutalm1~ (473-478/1081-1086) 
The Rum Seljuq writers composed their works in Persian and they did not use any of 
the Arabic sources quoted above but it is evident that Aksarayi derived his 
information on the rise of the Seljuqs from the Saljuqnama of N1shapur1. 199 
"When Kutalm1~ heard of sultan Tugrul's death he started a struggle for the succession of the 
sultanate. The sultanate belongs to us because our father died on this path. He was also the 
eldest of the Seljuq family .... [Alp Arslan] wanted all his relatives who had taken Kutalmt~' 
side to be killed. The still young son of Kutalmt~ was among these. He gave a ferman that all 
rebels should be killed. However, Nizam al-Mulk, who at that time was the vizier and was 
known for his good actions and administration, did not agree with this affair .... Nizam al-
Mulk considering that as long as they would be placed at the borders of the empire and were 
deprived of the titles of kingship (shah) and emirate they would be forced to live in distress 
would not be able to do any harm and thus found it reasonable that they were placed in the 
area of Diyarbaku in a place between Birecik and Urfa [Edessa]. He sent Sulayman Shah 
together with his tribe there. Here they lived for sometime in great need."200 
It was the general practice for medieval Muslim authors to copy their sources 
almost verbatim but it is curious that Aksarayi did not choose here to re-construct the 
story of Kutalmt~' rebellion. The Rum Seljuq author seems to agree that the ancestor 
199 Cf. Melville, Early Persian Historiography, 148. 
200 N. Genc;:osman/ F. N. Uzluk, Selr;uki Devletleri Tarihi, Ankara 1943, 110-111, (hereafter cited as 
Aksarayi, Genc;:osman); The Iranian author Mirkhwand in his universal history repeats this 
information in a similar fashion with the difference that Alp Arslan agreeing to Nizam al-Mulk's 
advice ordered Sulayman to conquer Syria. Cf. Mirkhwand, Vullers, 232-233. 
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of the Rum Seljuq dynasty was a rebel and that his son was deprived of his dynastic 
rights and send with "his tribe" to the frontier so that he would not be able to threaten 
the Great Seljuq power. Aksarayi underlines this statement finishing his report that 
they lived in "great need" but does not specify their situation there. The Rum Seljuq 
author seems to have had not more information at his disposal than his source 
Nishapilri with which he could furnish his narrative on the first Rum Seljuq ruler. 
The most striking point is that he does not even mention that Sulayman had become 
the lord of the western Anatolian town iznik (Nicaea). It seems that this first episode 
of Rum Seljuq history was not remembered any more at the time of Aqsarayh. 
Otherwise there is no reason why he does not exploit the ideological potential the 
conquest of a Byzantine town so close to Constantinople. The next information 
Aksarayi gives on Sulayman is an account of his conquest of Antakya (Antioch) 
from its Christian ruler. 
"He immediately sent an envoy to Malik Shah to inform him that Antioch had been taken 
and that coins were struck in Malik Shah's name and that in the khutba his name was 
mentioned. Sulayman Shah also added that he would keep the town occupied until its final 
allotment would have been determined by a most high decree. He called himself neither 
malik nor emir. "201 
Aksarayi writes that Sulayman reported his conquest immediately to Malik 
Shah and underlines that he did neither assume the title "malik nor emir" in his 
correspondence. He thus claims that Sulayman did not take any title as the Great 
Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan had dispossessed him of this right. At the same time the 
author suggests that Sulayman used his conquest of Antakya as a chance to gain the 
favour of Malik Shah the son and successor of Alp Arslan. Aksarayi 's main concern 
is to legitimise Sulayman' s rule by presenting the conquest of Antakya as the event 
which led to the reconciliation of the two branches of the Seljuq family. He does not 
celebrate the re-conquest of Antayka as jihad or ghazw but continues his report 
stating that Sulayman's conquest brought him into conflict with Malik Shah's brother 
Tutu~ and that he was killed during the ensuing warfare. He claims that Malik Shah 
had in the meantime granted Antakya and Aleppo to Sulayman and that he 
reproached his brother Tutu~ for the death of the former?02 
201 Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 114-115; Aksarayi, I~1ltan, 33. 
202 Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 114-115. 
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The anonymous Rum Seljuq author writing in the second half of the 14th 
century and thus the latest in date of the three Rum Seljuq chronicles gives a short 
but similar version of Kutalmt~' rebellion. He begins his account on Alp Arslan 
stating: 
"When Alp Arslan became sultan his uncle's son Kutalm1~ heard this news while he was in 
Kuhta and arose against him. The Turkmen soldiers joined him. They moved against Ray. 
When the warfare between them started Kutalm1~' army was defeated and he tried to escape 
but fell from his horse and died. "203 
In contrast to Aksarayi, the anonymous author omits any reason for why 
Kutalmt~ claimed the Great Seljuq throne. He mentions however that the Turkmen 
took the side of Kutalmt~ and that fortune was not with him. From this it can be 
surmised that he agrees that Kutalmt~ was the rebel who was supported by the unruly 
Turkmen bands and Alp Arslan was the legitimate heir to the throne. Like Aksarayi, 
the anonymous author claims that the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan officially 
allotted territories to Sulayman, who thus became his submissive suzerain. But he 
adds a different element to legitimise the latter success of the Rum Seljuq branch. He 
incorporates into his account Sulayman 's conquests in western Anatolia including 
iznik and presents them as the result of religious warfare. 
"When Malik Shah ascended the throne the caliphate was held by al-Mustazhir. Sayf al-
Dawla Sadaqa b. Mazyad the ruler of Syria was killed by the sultan at a place between 
Baghdad and Vasit. This occurred on 19 Rajah 471/1079. Sultan Alp Arslan had given Syria 
to his uncle's son Sulayman Shah b. Kutalmt~. Syria and Diyarbaklr were under his rule. The 
emirs of Syria made an alliance and wanted to kill him. 
Sulayman Shah when he heard this took up fight against them. Five were killed during this 
quarrel. When this news reached Alp Arslan he killed many of those and swore to leave the 
remaining. But the Syrians again started to work against him in secret. Sulayman Shah, 
making precautions against the multitude of the soldiers of the allied Syrian emirs, prepared 
for war against Rum. Unexpected good luck showed itself and helped him. The Turkmen of 
Khurasan, begun to take his side. First he came to Antakya [Antioch]. However, because he 
could not conquer this place he headed towards Rum. Firstly he took Konya [Iconium] then 
he took the Martava Gustadan, Kavala fortress from Romanus Makri. In a short period of 
time he took many fortresses in that region and made them the possession of the Muslim 
community. He took the treasures of the Roman ruler by force of the sword. The heart of the 
unbelievers filled with fear of him. Because of his courage he took the lands from Kegonye 
to iznik [Nicaea]. No army could oppose him. He brought tribute from the lands of the 
203 F. N. Uzluk, Anadolu Selr;uklulan Devleti Tarihi. Ill. Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineure par 
un anonyme, Ankara 1952, 7, (hereafter cited as Anonymous, Uzluk) 
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unbelievers to Konya. The Roman rebels came and put their faces on the ground before 
1 . ,204 1lm. 
It is difficult to assess why the author chose to begin his narrative about 
Sulayman and the Rum Seljuqs with information on the Mazyadid Sayf al-Dawla. 
The latter is described as the lord of Syria who was a rival of the Great Seljuq sultan 
and is mentioned by the author also in connection with the Great Seljuq sultan 
Muhammad I Tapar b. Malik Shah (r. 498-511/11 05-1118) earlier in the narrative?05 
Leaving aside the chronological and factual mistakes the author makes important is 
his suggestion that the Great Seljuq sultan gave Sulayman the rule over Syria 
because its Arab lord Sayf al-Dawla had revolted against the sultan. But he then 
continues his narrative stating that Alp Arslan allotted Syria and Diyarbaktr to 
Sulayman. The author claims that Sulayman then conquered Byzantine territory as 
far as iznik as a result of his war against the unbelievers and that he made them his 
tributaries. The anonymous author seems to have had a source at his disposal 
containing information on iznik but he does not elaborate on how Sulayman 
conquered the Byzantine territories. He presents Sulayman 's conquests in Anatolia as 
driven by religious zeal but he does not use the term jihad. lbn Bibi is the only author 
who designates Sulayman as ghazi. He states that the Rum Seljuq dignitaries gave 
sultan K1l19 Arslan II the following reply after he had ordered them to recognise his 
youngest son Kay Khusraw as his successor: 
"It is not outside the knowledge of the padishah, who is known for his greatness and who 
has made to his principle to listen that, our ancestors, the great sultan Malik Shah ... after he 
chose them and gave with a farman the command for the conquest of the lands of Rum to 
your ancestor ghazi pasha prince Sulayman they ... mounted their excellent horses ... With 
their sharp swords and their flying arrows they wounded the enemy so that with their blood 
the earth turned into a tulip garden. A long time passed since instead of the crosses and 
churches, mihrab and minbar were built. "206 
The description of Sulayman as ghazi should not be overemphasised as it is 
clearly a retrospective view to legitimise the rule of latter Rum Seljuq rulers. 
204 Anonymous, Uzluk, 23-24. 
205 Cf. Anonymous, Uzluk, 14-15. The author ends his report on sultan Muhammad Tapar's reign 
stating that in the year 1108 during the warfare between Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa b. Mazyad and the 
sultan the former was killed. Following this he writes the sultan "send his uncle's son Sulayman Shah 
b. Kutalm1~ b. Isra'il b. Seljuq and his son to Syria the land ofSayfal-Dawla Sadaka b. Mazyad." 
206 Ibn BTbT, Ozttirk, 37-38. 
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According to his own testimony Ibn Blbi did not have any information on the early 
Rum Seljuqs and he does not even mention in retrospect the great victory of Kth9 
Arslan II over the Christian Byzantine emperor at Myriokephalon. In fact the passage 
quoted above is the only instance where lbn Blbi makes a comment on early Rum 
Seljuq history. Ibn Brbi writes that Alp Arlsan's son and successor Malik Shah 
bestowed the rule of Anatolia on Sulayman and gave him the command for further 
conquests. For lbn Brbi, as for the previous authors, it is important that Sulayman 
received his lands by official decree of the Great Seljuq sultan. Consequently 
Sulayman is portrayed as Seljuq prince and a subordinate of the Great Seljuk sultan. 
All Muslim authors designate Sulayman as malik (prince) and not as sultan. In fact 
only the Byzantine authors designate Sulayman as sultan. "Sulayman, who 
commanded all the east, was actually encamped in the vicinity of Nicaea. His 
sultanate was in that city (we would call it his palace)."207 But the Byzantines wanted 
to build up an anti sultan against the powerful Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shah. 
Sulayman could have not received any kind of legitimisation from the Abbasid 
caliph since he was under the protection of the Great Seljuqs?08 Besides, Tutu~ the 
brother of the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shah who had been officially installed with 
Syria carried only the title malik and when he died in 488/1095 his territories were 
divided between his two sons, Ri<)wan at Aleppo and Dukak at Damascus continued 
to hold the status of maliks.209 It is possible that Sulayman assumed the title sultan 
himself but we have no verifiable evidence for this. It seems unlikely that Sulayman 
had a palace in iznik as Anna Comnena writes. He was the military overlord of the 
town and probably had a rudimentary court? 10 The course of events suggests that his 
aim was not to establish himself in the western Anatolia but that he was anxious to 
207 E.R.A. Sewter, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, · Harmondsworth 1969, 129, (hereafter cited as 
Anna, Sewter); J.-B. Chabot, Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Paris 1899-1914, (vol Ill.), 175, 
(hereafter cited as Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill). 
20
!l Cf. Cahen, Formation, 136; Turan accepts that the caliph was under the tutelage ofMalik Shah and 
could have not recognised Sulayman as sultan. Nevertheless, he suggests that the Great Seljuq sultan 
could have recognised him in order to pre-empt a possible recognition of Sulayman by the Fatimid 
caliph, his rival. Turan, Selr;uklular, 63. 
209 Cf. P .M. Holt, Age of the C111sades. The Near East from the eleventh centwy to 1517, London/ 
New York 1986, 67, (hereafter cited as Holt, C111sades) 
210 Jorga quoting Greek authors writes that Sulayman did not reside within the town but in a 'palace' 
surrounded by gardens outside the town. He argues that contrary to Anna Comnena's comment 
Sulayman did not establish a state and that he was called sultan because he was a member of the 
Seljuq family. N. Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanishen Reiches, Gotha 1908-1913, vol. 1, 77. 
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keep a connection with the east. He probably did not feel secure enough in western 
Anatolia and wanted to be near the centre of Great Seljuq power. 211 
In any case the conquest of western Anatolia by Sulayman did not leave a 
lasting memory in the Rum Seljuq state. All Muslim authors quoted above had no 
information on the first period of Rum Seljuq history and they invented a similar 
history to rehabilitate the descendants of the rebel Kutalm1~. The portray Sulayman 
as a vassal Seljuq prince who received territories in eastern Anatolia on the border of 
the Great Seljuq state. Yet, Sulayman is not portrayed as leader of jihad against the 
Christian neighbours of the Great Seljuq state. 
11.3. KI119 Arslan I ( 485-500/ 1092-11 07) 
K1h9 Arslan I is regarded by modem western and Turkish historians as the 
second sultan of the Rum Seljuq dynasty and as the fighter of ghazii against the 
Byzantines and the Crusaders. 212 The career of the second Seljuq leader is, however, 
in its general outlines a repetition of the career of his father Sulayman. Like his 
father he came to Anatolia as a fugitive escaping Great Seljuq captivity, after the 
death of sultan Malik Shah in 48511092, he directed his military efforts mainly 
eastwards towards Syria and Great Seljuq Iran, and he died in the east following his 
rebellion against the Great Seljuq sultan Muhan1mad Tapar b. Malik Shah. 
The death of Malik Shah was followed by a bitter succession struggle lasting 
twelve years until Muhammad Tapar b. Malik Shah secured the throne in 498/1105 
211 Cahen suggests that "he realized that to keep his new-found power he was too much at risk in the 
west, and must maintain his relations with the Turcomans of eastern Anatolia." Cahen, Formation, 9; 
Holt, Cn1sades, 169. 
212 The Turkish historian I~m Demirkent in the foreword of her book on Klh<; Arslan I summarizes his 
achievements as follows: 
"His reign, filled with heroic deeds, was spent from the beginning to the end in struggles he endured 
for the sake of his country and nation .... with his victories against the formidable Crusader armies 
which had come to Anatolia with the aim to uprooting the Turks and driving them out of Anatolia he 
managed to see to it that the state he had established continued, and the existence of the Turkish 
nation in Anatolia was secured". Unfortunately Demirkent does not discuss Klh<; Arslan I's reign 
critically but gives only a brief chronological account with military exploits at its centre. I. Demirkent, 
Tiirkiye Sel9uklu Hzlkiimdan Sultan I. Krh9 Arslan, Ankara 1996, ix. 
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and remained sole ruler until his death in 51111118.213 Sulayman 's son K1h9 Arslan I, 
who had fled to Anatolia, and other Turkish leaders, used this as an opportunity to 
consolidate their power in Anatolia. Tiirkmen chiefs, who had infiltrated Anatolia 
with their bands in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert, established themselves as 
territorial rulers in north-east Anatolia. Hence several principalities took shape in 
eastern Anatolia; the Saltukids in Erzurum, the Mengiicekids in Erzincan, the Shah 
Armanids of Sokmen 's line in Akhlat (west of Lake Van), the Artukids in Diyarbaktr 
and the Danishmendids in Ankara, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, and Kayseri? 14 And 
farther east in northern Syria the Great Seljuq military commanders, taking 
advantage of the Great Seljuq internecine strife, emancipated themselves from their 
Great Seljuq masters and assumed independent rule. These eastern Anatolian and 
Syrian principalities, situated between K1h9 Arslan I's principality in Nicaea and the 
Great Seljuq territories, could cut off for him the routes leading there? 15 The most 
important of Kthy Arslan' s rivals in Anatolia was his immediate neighbour 
Danishmend, who controlled the important land route through Anatolia from Ankara 
to Kayseri. 216 Holt concluded in his book on the Crusades that: "The Danishmendids 
were first and last heads of a ghazi state, while the Seljukids quickly established an 
213 On the internal warfare following Malik Shah's death and the reign of Muhammad Tapar cf. M.F. 
Sanaullah, The Decline of The Saljuqid Empire, 82-132; Bosworth, The Iranian World (A.D. 1000-
1217), 102-118; A. Ozaydm, Selr;uklu Tarihi Sultan Muhammad Tapar devri, (498-5111105-1118), 
Ankara 1990. 
214 The history of these principalities remains obscure, as most of them did not leave behind their own 
histories and were not of great interest for the medieval Muslim authors writing outside Asia Minor 
and the Rum Seljuq authors ignore them. Among these dynasties the Danishmendids present the most 
important dynasty as they were the main rivals of the Rum Seljuqs. The only work dealing exclusively 
with Danishmendid history is the Danishmendniima which is an epic romance about the exploits of 
the eponymous founder of the dynasty and thus cannot be used as a source for historical facts. 
Nevertheless, it is useful for the present work as it reflects the ideological concept employed by this 
principality to legitimise their rule. This work compiled by Mawlana lbn • Ala' in 64311245 survives 
in a 141h century adaptation. Irene Melikoff edited and translated the Danishmendniima into French 
and also discussed Danishmend's reign. I. Melikoff, La Geste de Melik Dani~mend, 2 vols., Paris 
1960. More recently Necati Demir has edited and given a philological discussion of the 
Diinishmendniima. N. Demir, Ddni~mend-Ndme, Ankara 2004. However, modern western historians 
as well as Turkish historians have not shown great interest in the history of these smaller dynasties 
ruling in Anatolia during the Rum Seljuq period and many aspects of their history remain unexplored. 
Turan, Selr;uklular, 112-147; A. Sevim/ Y. Yiicel, Tiirkiye Tarihi Fetih, Ser;uklular ve Beylikler 
Donemi, Ankara 1989, 208-211; For the eastern Anatolian principalities cf. F. Siimer, Selr;uklular 
Devrinde Dogu Anadoluda Tiirk Beylikleri, Ankara 1990. 
215 Cf. EI2, Kilidj Arslan I (Cahen). 
216 Cahen states rightly that "the important factor was not, strictly speaking, a matter of territories, but 
of routes of penetration which everyone tried to extend, and of fortified places which controlled 
them". Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 83-84; EI2, Saldjzlkids (Bosworth), 948. 
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Islamic monarchy on the pattern of the Great Seljukid sultanate."217 Here it will be 
argued that Kt he; Arslan 's circumstances were not very different from those of his 
Danishmendid rival. Both Turkish leaders had assumed power as warlords as a result 
of their personal enterprise and without any official authorization and had to find 
ways to legitimise their seizure of power. Kt he; Arslan 's career has to be evaluated in 
the context of these rivalries. An important question to raise here is which 
ideological concepts Kthc; Arslan used to legitimise his rule and to defend his 
position against his main rivals, Danishmend and the Great Seljuq sultan. 
The death of Sulayman was followed by an interregnum of about six years 
during which Sulayman's lieutenant Abu'l-Qasim, whom he had left in charge in 
Iznik and other Turkish chiefs, filled the vacuum of power left behind in Anatolia. 
The earliest account about the arrival of the sons of Sulayman in Anatolia is given by 
the Byzantine author Anna Comnena: 
" ... The Sultan of Chorasan who was murdered by Chasioi had previously held the two sons 
of the great Sulayman; after his death they ran away from Chorasan and soon arrived in 
Nicaea. At the sight of them the people of Nicaea ran riot with joy and Poulchases gladly 
handed over the city to them, as if it were a family inheritance."218 
According to this passage, Kthc; Arslan and his brother, whose name is not 
given here, escaped Great Seljuq captivity when Malik Shah died and came directly 
to Nicaea where the officers of their father "gladly handed over the city". Anna 
Comnena suggests that the Turkish officers voluntarily handed over the town "to 
them as if it were a family inheritance". It is difficult to determine the exact reasons 
behind the alleged easy take-over of Nicaea by Sulayman 's sons based on this 
description of events alone but two explanations are possible here.219 Firstly, their 
military forces were probably stronger, as they seem to have been accompanied by 
Tiirkmen bands, which joined them during their journey back from Great Seljuq 
captivity to Anatolia. The Turkish officer holding the town had thus no other choice 
217 Holt, Cn1sades, 169; Cahen shares this view stating that, "Danishrnend was purely a Turcoman 
chief'. He concedes, however, that: "The contrast must not be exaggerated, for Kilij Arslan and his 
immediate successors, whatever their outlook may have been had no source of strength other than 
Turcoman". Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 89; Vryonis, Decline, 115. 
218 Anna, Sewter, 210. 
219 Cahen does not explain why Nicaea was handed over to Klh9 Arslan and writes: "He was 
somehow able to get himself acknowledged by most of his father's former officers and to establish 
himself in Nicaea." Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 81. 
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than to resign. 220 Anna Comnena's note that Kthc; Arslan forced the governor of the 
town out of his post and appointed someone else confirms that Kt he; Arslan used his 
military strength to take his father's residence. Secondly, the Tiirkrnen bands already 
in the town supported Kt he; Arslan I because he was a descendant of Arslan Isra 'Il b. 
Seljuq and thus a member of the branch of the Seljuq family which they regarded as 
their rightful leaders. Anna Comnena's comment that "the people of Nicaea ran riot 
with joy" implies that probably the inhabitants, who must have been mainly Greek, 
also regarded Kt he; Arslan as the rightful ruler of the town. What is important to keep 
in mind is that as a member of the Seljuq family Kthc; Arslan was thus regarded of 
noble lineage in contrast to the Turkish chiefs of humble origin. This gave him an 
ideological and political advantage which made it easier for him to win the loyalty of 
the Tiirkrnen bands. 
It seems, however, that the concept of noble lineage was not sufficient to 
legitimise Kthc; Arslan's assumption of power. The Rum Seljuq authors omit the 
period of the interregnum from their narratives and claim that after Sulayman' s death 
rule in Anatolia was transferred without a break to his son Kthc; Arslan. Aksarayh 
hesitates to present Sulayman's son as an independent ruler and repeats the claim of 
official recognition and writes: 
"Sulayman Shah had two sons K1h9 Arslan and Kalan Arslan. Malik Shah gave the rule 
over that region to K1h9 Arslan and sent him gifts."221 
The fact that the Rum Seljuq sources, writing after the decline of the Great 
Seljuq sultanate legitimise the rule of the Rum Seljuqs by claiming that they were 
officially bestowed with independent rule by their Great Seljuq cousins shows on one 
hand that the Great Seljuq sultanate, albeit weakened, was still regarded as the sole 
220 Turan writes that according to Sibt b. al-JawzT, KI119 Arslan was accompanied by an army ofyabgu 
Turkmen when he came to Anatolia. Cf. Turan, Selr;uklu/ar, 96. This indicates that there were still 
groups of Turkmen followers of Arslan Isra 'Il living in the Great Seljuq realm who were loyal to this 
branch of the Seljuq family. Yabgu was the title that originally designated the military leader of the 
Oghuz people but was used later by some Muslim authors to designate those Tiirkmen groups who 
represented the followers of the Rum Seljuq ancestor, Arslan Isra'Tl b. Seljuq, who had held the title 
yabgu. For the use of the title yabgu cf. Turan, Selr;uklular Tarihi ve Tiirk jsfiim Medeniyeti, Ankara 
1965, 120-123; Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 210, 217-222. 
221 0. Turan, Mi'isiimeret iii-Ahbiir Mogollar zamamnda Ti'irkiye Selr;uklulan Tarihi, Ankara 1944, 21, 
(hereafter cited as Aksarayi, ed. Turan); Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 116; Aksarayi, I~Iltan, 34; M. Oztiirk, 
Kerimi'iddin Mahmud-i Aksarayi Miisiimeretii '1-Ahbiir, Ankara 2000, 15, (hereafter cited as Aksarayi, 
Oztiirk) 
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Seljuq sultanate. On the other hand it shows that the only way for the Rum Seljuqs to 
legitimise their rule was to forge a legitimate connection to the main branch of the 
Seljuq dynasty. The anonymous chronicler places Sulayman already at Konya and 
writes, that Sulayman arranged his succession before he went on his eastern 
campatgn. 
"He [Sulayman] had appointed his son K1hy Arslan as his successor before he left Konya. 
K1hy Arslan became a great padishah. All emirs of Rum obeyed him. "222 
The conflicting claims made by these authors illustrate their difficulties in 
legitimising Kth<;; Arslan 's rule in Anatolia. The earlier author Aksarayi is cautious 
and claims that Kth<;; Arslan was appointed by the Great Seljuq sultan as governor 
over the lands previously held by his father. The anonymous author writing later 
claims that Kth<;; Arslan was appointed by his father Sulayman as his successor and 
thereby implies that the Rum Seljuq sultanate had been established by the latter as a 
dynastic succession. It is suspicious however, that the author does not refer to Kth<;; 
Arslan as sultan but as pCidishiih, a term used to describe the ruler in his time.223 The 
Turkish leaders are described as emirs thus it is implied that they were military 
commanders and subordinate to Kth<;; Arslan. In reality Kth<;; Arslan took over the 
leadership of what was not more than an infant principality and his power did not 
extend beyond Nicaea and its environs.224 Hence Kth<;; Arslan was not in a position to 
take the title sultan or demand the submission of his rivals in Anatolia, who could 
counter that their loyalty was with the Great Seljuq sultan. Indeed, they seem to have 
sought to legitimise their seizure of power in Anatolia by connecting themselves to 
the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan. They claimed that their ancestors were Alp 
Arslan' s military commanders, who were present at the battle of Manzikert and were 
afterwards appointed to remain in Anatolia and to conquer the Christian territories on 
behalf of the Great Seljuq sultan. 225 
"'Then the sultan, together with the commanders Artuq, Saltuq, Mengi.iciik, Dani~mend, 
<;avh and <;avuldur, was equipped ready for battle with fifteen thousand cavalry and five 
222 N. Jalali, Tiirix-e Al-e Saljuq dar Anii!oli, Tehran 1999, 79, (hereafter cited as Anonymous, ed. 
Jalali); Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. 
223 Cf. EI2, Piidishiih (Bosworth). 
224 M. Kesik, Tiirkiye Sel9uklu Develeti Tarihi Sultan I. Mesud Donemi (1116-1155), Ankara 2003, 5. 
225 Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 83. 
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thousand veteran infantry. On Wednesday the sultan mounted a small hill with his above 
mentioned commanders ... Malik Muhammad Dani~mend placed his head on the ground and 
said: 'A thought about faith in God in respect of Islam has occurred to this slave .... Today is 
Wednesday. To attain good fortune, let us turn back today ... On Friday morning, after 
"Come to salvation", let us go with the assembly helped [by God] to the field ofbattle."226 
It is not credible that Danishmend was present at the battle of Manzikert and 
that he established the principality with the permission of the sultan shortly after the 
battle?27 The fact, however, that Danishmend features prominently in the account of 
a 14th century Iranian historian suggests that the Danishmendid propaganda of ghaza 
had been successful. Most probably, the chaos following the battle of Manzikert and 
the breakdown of Byzantiutn's eastern border as the Byzantines had reduced the 
Armenian rulers of that region facilitated the incursion of Turkmen bands and made 
it easier for Danishmend to take Cappadocia. 228 Danishmend was a Tiirkmen chief 
whose origin was obscure and his successors were in need to find other ways to 
legitimise their rule. A good ideological tool which presented itself was ghaza. In the 
Danishmendnama a genealogy for Danishmend is constructed which links him to the 
epic hero Sayyid Battal who was famous for leading the frontier warfare against the 
Byzantines. 229 According to this tradition, the eponymous founder of the dynasty had 
226 RashTd al-DTn as translated by C. Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 90-92; cf. Pseudo NTshapurT, Luther, 49; 
cf. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 169, 172. Michael the Syrian also places Sulayman at the battle of 
Manzikert. 
227 Matthew of Edesssa designates Danishmend as "the Persian emir". But his descriptions are not 
reliable. A.E. Dostourian, Armenia and the Cn1sades. Tenth to Twelfth Centuries. The Chronicle of 
Matthew of Edessa, New York/ London 1993, 176, (hereafter cited as Matthew of Edessa, 
Dostourian); Cahen merely states that "it is difficult to believe that a chief of Turcomans could be 
other than a Turcoman himself'. Cahen, Formation, 11; We cannot ascertain the origin of 
Danishmend but it is certain is that he was respected by his followers as a wise man and that he 
therefore had received this title. Ibn al-AthTr writes that, "GumushtakTn ibn al-Danishmand Taylli, 
who was only called lbn al-Danishmand because his father had been a 'teacher' of the Turkomans" 
and gives us also the personal name Taylli. D.S. Richards, The Chronicle of Jbn al-Athlr for the 
Cn1sading Period from al-Kiimil fi'l-ta 'rlkh, Part 1 The Years 491-541/1097-1146 The Coming of the 
Franks and The Muslim Response, 2006, 32, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Crusading 
Period!). 
2211 Michael the Syrian writes that in 1085 Danishmend invaded Cappadocia: "A cette epoque, en l 'an 
1396, un emir des Turcs, nomme Tanousman {Mohammed Quoumistekin ad-Danismend}, envahit le 
pays de Cappadoce et regna sur Sebaste, Cesaree et les autres endroits de la contree septentrionale". 
Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 173. 
229 "And BaWil Ghazi's son 'All had a son named Sultan Tlirasan and Emir 'Omar had a daughter, 
they had given her to Mizrab's son 'All, and she gave birth to a child, they name him Malik Ahmed, 
he was determined, intelligent and mature. They gave him the honorific Danishmend". I. Melikoff, 
Diini~mend, Il, 9; Demir, Diini~mend-Niime, 61; In the last part of the Danishmendnama the 
Danishmendids are also connected to the Rum Seljuqs claiming that Danishmend's son (Malik Amir 
Ghazi) was married to a sister of Sulayman who gave birth to a son called Yaghi Basan. N. Demir, 
Dani~mend-Name, 272-273; For the Danishmendid genealogy cf. Bosworth, New Islamic Dynasties, 
215. 
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received the epithet Danishmend (wise/learned) because he was intelligent and 
always made every endeavour to educate himself. 230 The Danishmendid conquests in 
Anatolia were thus justified as the continuation of the Muslim tradition of ghazii 
against Byzantium. 
The first historically reliable information on Danishmend is for the year 
I 096-1 097 when he appears on the scene during Kthy Arslan' s siege of Malatya on 
the eve of the First Crusade. 231 Important to note here is that the claim that he had 
been commissioned by Alp Arslan to fight in the frontier regions against the 
Byzantines implies that the Danishmendids regarded the Great Seljuqs as their 
overlords and not the Rum Seljuqs, even though the anonymous chronicler claims 
that all Anatolian emirs submitted to Kthy Arslan?32 
Aksarayi is evidently partial towards Kthy Arslan and does not attempt to 
legitimise Danishmend's assumption of power. At the end of his report of the battle 
of Manzikert he states that Alp Arslan sent his sons to Rum and he himself went 
back to his land and only in passing he notes. "At that time Malik Danishmend had 
taken Niksar, Tokat, Sivas, and Elbistan."233 There is no mention of how 
Danishmend came to Anatolia and no connection to Alp Arslan is made but the 
author designates him as malik (prince), a title which Danishmend's successor 
received from the Great Seljuq sultan. It is surprising that Aksarayi remains silent 
about Danismend's low-born origin and does not choose to exploit this fact 
ideologically. This might be explained by the format of Aksarayi's chronicle which 
is brief and not elaborative but he devotes more space to Kthy Arslan 's rule than any 
other of the Rum Seljuq sultans. He devotes a long passage to Kthy Arslan but he 
devotes only a few lines to the other Rum Seljuq sultans even to (Ala' al-D'in Kay 
Qubadh I (616-634/ 1220-1237), the most famous of them. It is also relevant to 
observe that the author puts the conflict between the 'Christian enemy' and Kthy 
Arslan into the foreground of his account. Kthy Arslan is given centre stage and 
23° Cf. I. Melikoff, Diini~mend, II, 9. Cahen suggests that the name Danishmend "recalls the prestige 
of a 'wise man', the islamization of the ancient baba or shaman of their Central Asian ancestors." 
Cahen, ?re-Ottoman Turkey, 83. 
231 Cf. Anna Comnena, Alexiad, Sewter, 21 0; EI2, Diinishmendids (Melikoff). 
232 Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. Turan argues that K1h9 Arslan was regarded as an overlord by the other 
Turkish leaders but that those had become independent after the death of his father and therefore the 
former's power was in the beginning of his reign restricted to iznik. Turan, Selr;uklular, 97. 
233 Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 17; Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 113; Aksarayi, Oztiirk, 13. 
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though Danishmend is mentioned by name among the Muslim leaders who support 
him, he is discredited. 
"At the time when K1h9 Arslan b. Sulayman Shah moved from summer to winter pastures in 
the region of Diyarbalar, Urfa, Birecik and on the banks of the Euphrates, the Roman 
emperor attacked the Muslim countries with an army of 120 thousand soldiers and excellent 
battle machinery. He first attacked Niksar, Sivas, Tokat, and Elbistan the lands of Malik 
Danishmend who ruled over that region. At this time Malik Danishmend, sent envoys to the 
Muslim territories of Mardin, MayyafiiriqTn, Amid, Harput, Erzincan, and Divrigi urging the 
rulers, that: 'A great army of the enemy is approaching Muslim lands and if we do not stand 
united against these unbelievers disorder will break out which cannot be halted and a fire 
will break out which will damage all Muslims and destroy and bum everything'. 
In the same way Danishmend sent also an envoy to K1h9 Asian: 'If he would help him in this 
situation they would be victorious against the unbelievers and promised him that he would 
leave him one fifth of the spoils which could be gained and he would give him large tribute 
and give him his daughter to wife and cede Elbistan to him as her dowry'. 
K1h9 Arslan agreed to this request and with other maliks and emirs of the region collected a 
40.000 men strong army and, with the thought of defending the Muslims, set off for war 
against the infidel. Both armies came face to face near Sivas and God granted the Muslims 
victory .... After this victory, Malik Danishmand sent K1h9 Arslan 100.000 dirham, but 
hesitated to hand over Elbistan .... Kth9 Arslan was offended by Danishmand's action and 
sent the money back with the message: 'I came to rescue Muslim lands and not receive a 
reward. I do not need your money." Then he returned to his lands"'.234 
KtlW Arslan, who is not referred to as sultan here, is described as a peaceful 
leader, who moved from "summer to winter pastures" within his territories. The 
Byzantine emperor is the agitator in this story who attacks Muslim territory and, as 
Aksarayt situates K1h9 Arslan in eastern Anatolia for the reason already discussed, 
the lands of Danishmend become his first target. Hence it is Danishmend who 
requests the support of his Muslim neighbours, among them K1h9 Arslan, against the 
Christian enemy. The enemy who invaded Muslim held territory were the armies of 
the First Crusade who in 1097 on their way to the Holy Land besieged K1h9 Arslan's 
residence Nicaea. At that time K1h9 Arslan was in eastern Anatolia where he had laid 
siege to Malatya. 235 K1h9 Arslan left Malatya, when he received the news that his 
residence was threatened but he arrived too late and had to leave Nicaea to its fate. 236 
The Crusaders handed over Nicaea to the Byzantine emperor who subsequently re-
conquered western Anatolia and thus forced the Seljuqs to retreat to central Anatolia. 
It was thus K1h9 Arslan I who asked Danishmend for help against the Crusader 
234 Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 27-28; Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 124-125, Aksarayi, l~Iltan, 38; Aksarayi, 
Oztiirk, 20-21. 
235 Cf. Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 163 and 165-166. 
236 Cf. Turan, Sel9uklular, 99-1 00; Runciman, C11Jsades I, 178-179; Cahen, Formation, 12. 
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armies and both sides joined forces for the battle of Eski~ehir (Dorylaeum) against 
them in 1 097.237 
Aksarayi 's version of events is very confused and he makes no distinction 
between the Christian enemies coming from the west. The Crusader armies seem to 
have been regarded as part of the Byzantine army and not a distinctive group. 
Apparently the Crusades did not leave any lasting memory in Anatolia as they did in 
Syria and Palestine where Crusader states were established. For the Rum Seljuq 
author the Byzantine empire presented the Christian enemy and opponent of the Rum 
Seljuq rulers and his goal is not to give historically accurate information but to 
present K1h9 Arslan as champion of Islam. It is interesting, however, that Aksarayi 
chooses to include details of the agreement concluded by Danishmend and Kth9 
Arslan and writes that the latter was promised money and a marriage alliance as well 
as Elbistan by the former in exchange for his help. This suggests that the alliance was 
not merely based on K1h9 Arslan 's religious solidarity. Moreover, he states that Kth9 
Arslan returned the money sent to him by Danishmend because the latter did not 
fulfil all his promises as he kept Elbistan. At the same time, however, Aksarayi 
claims that K1h9 Arslan organised the support of the Muslim rulers in eastern 
Anatolia and that he helped the Muslims to victory. 
Aksarayi then gives the reply K1h9 Arslan allegedly sent to Danishmend, 
stating that he returned the latter's money because he was not interested in material 
gain but in the security of Islam. Curiously the author admits that Kth9 Arslan was 
annoyed because Danishmend did not fulfil his part of the agreement. But, on the 
other hand, he constructs his story in a way which is intended to prove that the Rum 
Seljuq ruler is the better champion of Islam. Later in his narrative Aksarayi 
strengthens his claim by presenting K1h9 Arslan as the leader of the Muslim rulers in 
Anatolia. The Byzantine emperor is again presented as the aggressor who attacks 
Muslim lands: 
"Again the Roman Emperor with a force he had been collecting for a long time attacked 
<;ankln [Gangra] and Ankara [Ancyra]. At that time these two towns belonged to the 
Muslims and in each of them was a malik from the family of Alp Arslan. The emperor laid 
siege to both those towns. The Muslims were thus hard pressed and they sent messengers to 
the maliks of the region. The maliks of the region gathered around K.Il19 Arslan to serve him. 
From there they went against the unbelievers. The emperor had already taken <;anlu.n and had 
237 Turan, Sel9uklular, 101-1 02; Runciman, Crusades I, 185-187; Holt, Crusades, 169. 
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made great pillages and massacres When the army of the Muslims arrived. K1h9 Arslan was victorious 
at the battle he fought together with the army of Islam and the army of the unbelievers was defeated. 
K1h9 Arslan marched on Ankara after he took <;anktn. "238 
The author writes that the maliks of the region supported Kthc; Arslan but 
does not give any names. Kt he; Arslan is presented as the supreme ruler of the region 
and the princes of the region are just mere subordinates who support him against the 
Byzantines. He is the one who leads the army of Islam against the Christian enemy 
and the real champion of Islam who defends the Muslims and their territories. 
Aksarayi notes that the towns recaptured from the Christian Byzantines were Muslim 
towns held by princes from Alp Arslan's line and alludes thereby to the noble lineage 
of Kthc; Arslan. The latter is thus put in line with Great Seljuq rulers going back to 
Alp Arslan, the great victor who defeated the Byzantine emperor Romanos Diogenes 
at Manzikert and took him captive. It is curious that Aksarayi, who does not even 
mention the battle of Myriokephalon, the most important Rum Seljuq victory over 
the Byzantines under Kthc; Arslan's grandson Kthc; Arslan II, lays here much 
emphasis on the struggle against the 'infidel'. 
It can therefore be suggested that Aksarayi begins his chapter on the Rum 
Seljuqs with Kthc; Arslan and presents him as the champion of Islam in order to 
legitimise their usurpation of power. This explains why he omits Nicaea from his 
narrative and places Kthc; Arslan in eastern Anatolia, the territories allegedly granted 
to his father by the Great Seljuq sultan. The establishment of the Rum Seljuq 
sultanate is thus not the result of the incursion of Rum Seljuq rebels and Turkmen 
bands into Anatolia but the result of Kthc; Arslan's struggle against the Christian 
Byzantine expansionist policies.239 It is also possible that Aksarayi portrays Kthc; 
238 Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 28; Aksarayi, Ozttirk, 21-22; Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 125. The anonymous 
Rum Seljuq author presents K1h9 Arslan as the rightful ruler in the region, who is killed by the emirs 
ruling in Mesopotamia. Thereby he justifies his eastern campaign and glosses over the conflict 
between the two branches of the Seljuq family: "Klh9 Arslan became a great ruler. All Anatolian 
emirs obeyed him. At the beginning of his reign, he took Elbistan and then he conquered Malatya and 
Tiflis. He crossed the Euphrates and marched towards Syria. He took Simsat came to Diyarbakir and 
took Mayyafiiriqin and Mardin. Emir lnal, the ruler of that region, received the news that Klh9 
Arslan 's fame spread over the world and that he went out of Rum and took territories of the whole 
world and that he now wanted to take Mosul. The emirs were incapable of war and wanted K1h9 
Arslan dead." Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. 
239 Ahmad of N igde an Anatolian author writing in the first half of the 14th century goes even further 
to erase the rebellious past of the Rum Seljuqs. He constructs a new genealogy and omitting Kutalmt~ 
claims that Sulayman, the founder of the sultanate was the son of the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad 
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Arslan as the real champion of Islam because of the strength of his Danishmendid 
rival. Kthv Arslan had been weakened by the loss of his residence Nicaea and other 
territories as the Byzantine emperor re-conquered western Anatolian towns and the 
coastal regions in the wake of the First Crusade. Forced to retreat into inner Anatolia, 
Kthv Arslan took residence in Konya (!conium) and he was cut off by the Franks and 
Armenians from the Malatya route leading to the east. Danishmend on the other hand 
had not suffered any losses and, exploiting his opponent's weakness, took possession 
of Malatya in 1100. Gabriel, the Armenian governor of the town, appealed to 
Bohemond the Crusader prince of Antioch for help but Danishmend defeated them 
and took Bohemond captive and took him to his residence Niksar (Neocaesareia).240 
Danishmend thus gained some prominence as the opponent of the Christian 
enemy.241 
It is thus possible that in the episode quoted above Aksarayi again rewrites 
history to cut out Danishmend from the picture and to enhance Kthv Arslan' s 
standing as a warrior against the Christian Byzantine enemy. The attack on Ankara 
and ~anktn was undertaken by Crusader armies of the Crusade of 11 0 1. The pleas 
sent by the Crusaders in the east who had conquered 1 erusalem in 1 099 for help to 
defend the town led to the coming of another wave of Crusaders into Anatolia.242 
Having learnt in Constantinople that Bohemond had been taken captive, part of the 
leadership decided to take a different route from the one the armies of the Crusade in 
1097 had taken and to go into Danishmendid territory with the intention to reach 
Niksar and free Bohemond. On their way, the first forces of this Crusade took 
Ankara and handed it over to the Byzantines then they turned towards ~anktn, which 
they were not able to take. They then devastated ~anktn' s environs and continued 
their way to Niksar but were routed en route by Danishmend and his allies. Another 
group of Crusaders who had meanwhile entered Anatolia and was also defeated by 
Tapar b. Malik Shah. Cf. A.C.S. Peacock, Ahmad ofNigde's al-Walad al-Shafiq and the Seljuk past, 
in: Anatolian Studies, 54 (2004), 101-102. 
24° Cf. Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, tr. Tritton, 74; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 236-237. 
241 He was the first Muslim ruler who defeated an army of Frankish knights. Cf. Runciman, Cn1sades, 
11, 13-14. 
242 For the developments leading to the Crusade of 11 0 1 see Cate, The Crusade of 1101, in: A History 
ofthe Cn1sades, K. Setton (ed.), Philadelphia 1955, 343-347. 
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Kt he; Arslan and his allies. 243 Muslim authors outside of Anatolia celebrate 
Danishmend's exploits against the Crusaders. Ibn al-Athir does not even mention 
Kt he; Arslan 's involvement and presents Danishmend as the sole victor. 244 
"Its ruler had written to Bohemond and asked him to come. He came to his aid with 5,000 
men. lbn al-Danishmand met them in battle and Bohemond was defeated and taken prisoner. 
Seven Frankish counts came by sea and aimed to free Bohemond. They came to a castle 
called Ankara, which they took, killing the Muslims there. They then proceeded to another 
castle in which was Isma'Il ibn al-Danishmand. They put it under siege but lbn al-
Danishmand assembled a large force and confronted the Franks. He laid an ambush and 
engaged them. The ambushes came forth and not a single one of the 300,000 Franks escaped, 
apart from 3,000 who fled by night and escaped wounded. 
lbn al-Danishmand went to Malatya and seized it, taking its lord captive. Later the Frankish 
army marched against him from Antioch. He met and broke them. These events occurred 
within just a few months. "245 
In any case Danishmend was strengthened and he was finally able to take 
Malatya, as lbn al-Athir indicates at the end of his report. Consequently, 
Danishmend's seizure of Malatya led to open conflict between him and Kth<; Arslan 
and the latter probably used the question of the ransom of Bohemond as a pretext to 
interfere in his rival's affairs. Hence the real concern for both sides was to gain 
control over eastern Anatolia and not to lead jihad. Their long lasting conflict over 
the strategically important town Malatya, which both sides in turn tried to bring 
under their control, reveals that they were not driven by religious zeal but power 
politics. The question of the conditions for Bohemond's release reveals that all 
parties ignored confessional and ideological divisions for political ends if necessary. 
Danishmend did not accept the offer of ransom for Bohemond from the Byzantine 
243 For a concise account of the advance of the armies of this Crusade through Anatolia see Cate, The 
Crusade of 1101, 354-361. 
244 Ibn al-Qalanisi on the other hand recognises that K1h9 Arslan supported Danishmend. His account, 
however, is confused as he blends three events into one and writes that in November 1100 K1h9 
Arslan and Danishmend defeated the Franks. H.A.R. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, 
London 1932, 49-50, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-Qalanisi, Gibb ). Bar Hebraeus also mixes up these 
events but he does not mention the coalition between Danishmend and Kth9 Arslan; Anna Comnena, 
Sewter, 356. Anna Comnena's report of this events is very brief and she writes that the Turks defeated 
the Franks but she does not specify which Turkish rulers were involved and their alliance. Matthew of 
Edessa, Dostourian, 185-186 
245 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Cn1sading Period, I, 32. Later on in his narrative Ibn al-Athir includes that 
a battle had taken place between Raymond of St. Gilles and K1l19 Arslan without noting that this took 
place during the warfare between the Franks and the Danishrnendid-Seljuq alliance. "[Raymond] St. 
Gilles (God curse him!) had met Qilij Arslan ibn Sulayman ibn Qutlimish, the lord of Konya, when 
the former led 100,000 warriors and the latter was at the head of a small band. They fought and the 
Franks were defeated. Many were killed and many were taken captive. Qilij Arslan returned with 
booty and a victory which he had not reckoned on." ibid. 59. 
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emperor Alexius who was an enemy of Bohemond but an ally of the Rum Seljuqs. 
He agreed to ransom Bohemond to Baldwin of Edessa in exchange for an alliance 
against Kth<; Arslan. It has been suggested by some historians that it came to dispute 
between Kth<; Arslan and Danishmend because the former regarded the latter as his 
subordinate and thus thought that he was entitled to a share of it.246 It might well be 
that Kth<; Arslan as a member of the Seljuq family regarded himself as higher in rank 
than Danishmend but we have no evidence that he demanded the submission of the 
latter. Moreover, Aksarayi reveals in one passage that in real political practice 
Danishmend was the stronger party. He writes that Kth<; Arslan: 
"did not stand back when an opportunity presented itself. When he received the news that 
Malik Danishmend had fallen ill he raised an army and occupied Elbistan and Zubaytra and 
moved against Malatya. When Danishmend recovered from his illness he decided to make 
war on K1h9 Arslan. Klh9 Arslan as soon as he heard that Danishmend was moving against 
him realised that he would not stand a chance against him and he retreated to his lands. "247 
Aksarayi admits that Kth<; Arslan was only able to mount an attack on 
Danishmend when he received news of his rival's illness. However, as soon as he 
was informed of a possible counter-attack he withdrew because he was knew that he 
"would not stand a chance." Kth<; Arslan could demand to be of higher rank but the 
reality was that the Danishmendid principality was stronger. Nevertheless, Kth<; 
Arslan did not give up his plan to control the eastern Anatolia and in 1102-03 he 
seized Armenian held town Mara~ (Germanicea) which lay on the route to 
Malatya. 248 As a consequence the conflict between Kth<; Arslan and Danishmend 
ended in open warfare during which the former defeated the latter. When 
Danishmend died in 49711104, Kth<; Arslan immediately seized Malatya and from 
there he tried to expand his authority further into the east. It is obvious that his main 
goal was to obtain control over eastern Anatolia and Syria in order to maintain the 
246 Turan, without giving any evidence, concludes that K1h9 Arslan as sultan of Anatolia and because 
of his own enterprises regarding Malatya was affected by Danishmend's conquest and that this led to a 
break in the relations between the two sides. Cf. Turan, Selr;tlklular, 142-143; Cahen states that Klhv 
Arslan "no doubt regarded Dani~mend as his subordinate, claimed a part of the ransom." Cahen, 
Formation, 13; Runciman goes further and states that K1h9 Arslan, "as official overlord of the 
Anatolian Turks, demanded half of any ransom." Runciman, Cn1sades, 11, 38. 
247 Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 28; Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 124-125; Aksarayi, l~1ltan, 38; Aksarayi, Oztlirk, 
21. 
248 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Gibb, 59. 
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connection with the Great Seljuq territories. Aksarayi links the information that the 
Great Seljuq state fell weak to his record of K1h9 Arslan 's success over Byzantium 
and writes: 
"He also took Ankara. From there he went to Konya [Iconium], he freed the town and sat 
there on the throne of the sultanate. At this time the state of the Seljuq dynasty in Iraq had 
become very weak, as we have related before, strife for the throne had started between the 
brothers and the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad was worried about these state of affairs. The 
caliph sent an envoy to Kth<; Arslan, that if he would come to Baghdad after he had secured 
Anatolia he would help him and even promised to give him the sultanate of the Seljuq 
dynasty in Iran. Kth<; Arslan, led on by these promises, collected an army, and took the road 
to Baghdad. "249 
Aksarayi asserts that K1h9 Arslan's success over the Byzantine enemy 
justifies his assumption of the title sultan. Consequently, the establishment of the 
Rum Seljuq sultanate in Konya is emancipated from Great Seljuq recognition and 
based on K1h9 Arslan's exploits of ghazii. At the same time our author seems to infer 
that K1h9 Arslan was the only remaining capable member of the Seljuq family and 
was thus obliged to secure the Great Seljuq dynasty from extinction. The caliph in 
Baghdad, concerned about the weakened state of the Great Seljuq empire, invites 
K1h9 Arslan to take over the remains of the empire. K1h9 Arslan is thus presented as 
the founder of a new dynasty in Konya and on the other hand he is the rightful heir to 
the Great Seljuq empire. 
K1h9 Arslan 's expedition to Baghdad is halted by the Great Seljuq official 
whom Aksarayh calls Jawli Sa'iir around Diyarbaktr in eastern Anatolia. This is 
further justification for K1h9 Arslan' s bid for the throne. Aksarayi writes that 
instigated by Jawli and because of the sultan's (K1h9 Arslan) harshness and 
arrogance his emirs deserted him and drowned him in the river Khabur. 250 In order to 
conceal the internal Seljuq conflict and the fact that K1h9 Arslan's assumption of the 
sultan title was a rebellious act, the Rum Seljuq author omits the Great Seljuq sultan 
Muhammad Tapar from his account. K1h9 Arslan's defeat is ascribed to the treachery 
of his own men and the powerful Great Seljuq emir. The author underlines the 
249 Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 28; Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 125; Aksarayi, I~lltan, 38; Aksarayi, Oztiirk, 21. 
MTrkhwand gives a similar account of this episode: "Towards the end of his reign [Kilw Arslan I] 
Sultan Mas'iid became the King of Iraq and because the caliph in Baghdad was angry with Mas'iid, he 
sent an envoy to Rum to grant him the rule over Iraq". MTrkhwand, Vullers, 233-234. 
250 Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 29; Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 125-126; Aksarayi, I~1ltan, 39; Aksarayi, Ozti.irk, 
22. 
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weakness of the Great Seljuq emptre as the retgns of the state are held by this 
powerful emir and not the Great Seljuq sultan himself. Thereby Aksarayi underlines 
his claim that Kthv Arslan was the rightful heir to the Great Seljuq throne~ 
Yet, Muhammad Tapar regarded himself as supreme ruler and tried to assert 
his power, albeit without great success, over his emirs (local governors) as well as 
the Turkish warlords, who during the internal strife had assumed power for 
themselves. Several of the Great Seljuq governors in Syria and northern 
Mesopotamia resisted submission to the sultan's authority. 251 Their disobedience 
intensified the divisions of power in northern Syria and Mesopotamia and provided 
Kthv Arslan with the opportunity to gain a foothold in the region. As usual in these 
cases the emirs found a solution in supporting a throne pretender whom they hoped 
they could influence in order to keep their status as semi-independent rulers. Kthv 
Arslan exploited this to interfere in the affairs of his Great Seljuq cousin but he did 
not have a legal claim to the sultanate as the Rum Seljuq sources want to make us 
believe. The authors writing on the Great Seljuqs omit from their narratives that 
Mul)ammad Tapar was unable to control his emirs and that he was challenged by 
Kthv Arslan. They present Mul)ammad Tapar as the last ruler ·who united the Great 
Seljuq empire and was dedicated to the war against the heretic batinis (Assassins).252 
lbn al-Athir however reveals the real political circumstances at the time of Kthv 
Arslan' s eastern enterprise: 
"We have previously told that Jokermish's men wrote to Emir Sadaqa, QasTm al-Dawla al-
BursuqT and Prince Qilij ArsHin ibn Sulayman ibn Qutlumish al-SaljuqT, the ruler of 
Anatolia, summoning each one with the promise to surrender the city to him. Sadaqa refused 
and decided to stay loyal to the sultan. Qilij Arslan, however, marched with his troops and 
when JawulT Saqao heard that he had arrived at Nisibis, he withdrew from Mosul. ... The 
people of Mosul and Jokermish's men sent to Qilij Arslan, when he was at Nisibis, and 
asked him to take certain oaths, which he did. He then made them swear to be obedient and 
251 As Carole Hillenbrand rightly states, the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad was not the strong sultan 
the sources want us make believe and he was not able to impose his authority over his emirs. C. 
Hill en brand, The Career of Najm al-Oin il-GhazT, in: Der Islam 58 ( 1981 ), 250-292, see especially 
263-64. El-Azhari gives in his book 'The Saljuqs of Syria' an account of the events in Syria and 
Mesopotamia under the Seljuqs and the atabegs who took power over from them but his work is not 
critical and he does not include any information on the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and the 
Syrian rulers. T.A. El-Azhari, The Saljiiqs of Syria During the Cn1sades 463-549 A.H.I 1070-1154 
A.D., Berlin 1997. 
252 Cf. NTshapliri, Saljuz"'iqnama, ed. Morton, 44-53; Pseudo NishaplirT, Luther, 73-80; al-Bundari, 
Zubdat, Burslan, 88-116; Al-HusaynT, Akhbar, tr. Ayaz, II, 250-258; RawandT, Rahat al-sudz"'ir, Ate~, 
148-161. 
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loyal and set out with them for Mosul, which he took over on 25 Raj ab [22 March 11 07] and 
resided in al-Mu'riqa. Jokermish's son and his men came out to meet him and were given 
robes of honour. Qilij ArsHin took his scat on the throne and dropped Sultan Muharnmad's 
name from the khutbah and added his own after the caliph's. He was generous to the troops 
but took the citadel from Qizoghlu, Jokermish 's mamluke, and placed a castellan of his own 
there. He abolished the duties that had been wickedly introduced and acted with justice and 
conciliation towards the populace. He proclaimed, 'Whoever informs on anyone I shall put 
to death,' so there were no false accusations made against anyone. He confirmed Abii 
Muharnmad 'Abd Allah ibn al-Qasim ibn al-ShahraziirT in the office of cadi for Mosul and 
appointed as headman Abii'l-Barakat Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn KhamTs, who was the 
father of our teacher"253 . 
The most striking point of this account is that Ibn al-Athir attributes to Kth9 
Arslan the characteristics of a legitimate Muslim ruler. He points out that he "acted 
with justice" and filled the important government posts with capable officials. It is 
important that lbn al-Athir as an author who is not necessarily favourable towards the 
Rum Seljuqs recognises Kthc; Arslan's qualities as a ruler. However, because Kthc; 
Arslan was not successful, ultimately lbn al-Athir designates him as a rebel: 
"When Qilij Arslan saw that his army was defeated, he understood that, if he were taken, he 
would be treated as an implacable enemy, especially as he had challenged the sultan in his 
lands and for the title of sultan. He therefore urged his mount into the River Khabiir and shot 
some arrows to defend himself from JawulT's men. His horse carried him downstream to 
deep water where he drowned ... JawulT then left Mosul and sent Malikshah, Qilij Arslan's 
son, to Sultan Muharnmad. "254 
The author therefore emphasises that Kt he; Arslan' s conquest of Mosul and 
his assumption of the title sultan was a rebellious act against the Great Seljuq sultan 
and that he was aware of the consequences. Ultimately Jawull, the Great Seljuq emir 
and governor of Mossul, defeats Kt he; Arslan. In contrast to Aksarayi' s version the 
Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad Tapar features in this version of events and Kthc; 
Arslan is not drowned by his own emir but he drowns while he tries to escape. 
Moreover Kt he; Arslan 's son does not receive recognition as ruler of Rum from the 
caliph as Aksarayi claims but is sent to the Great Seljuq sultan. 
It can thus be concluded that like his father and grandfather before him Kthc; 
Arslan 's main goal was not to establish an independent sultanate in Anatolia but to 
253 lbn al-Athir, Richards, Crusading Period, I, 114; Bar Hebraeus gives a similar account of 
Muhammad's conflicts with his emirs and K1h9 Arslan. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, I, 239-243. 
254 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Cnlsading Period, I, 116-117. 
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take over the Great Seljuq throne. This on the other hand indicates that for the first 
three Rum Seljuq leaders in Anatolia the main goal was not to establish a sultanate in 
Anatolia but to take over the Great Seljuq sultanate. Consequently they did not 
formulate at this time an ideological concept to justify the establishment of a new 
state based in Anatolia, the Rum Seljuq sultanate. They were rebels who claimed to 
be rightful heirs to the Great Seljuq empire based in Iran and Iraq. 
The Period of Transition 
The history of the Seljuq principality in Anatolia from the death of K1h9 
Arslan in 50011107 to the death of Mas(iid in 55111156 is marked by a three-year 
interregnum and domination by the rival Turkish principality of the Danishmendids. 
Moreover, the whole period is one of turmoil and disorder in which many different 
players, the Seljuq princes and their guardians, the Danishmendids, the Byzantines, 
the Armenians, the Turkish and Crusader principalities in eastern Anatolia and 
northern Syria were involved in a race to secure their power in central and eastern 
Anatolia. The Rum Seljuq sources and other Muslim as well as Christian sources 
have only little to say about events in Anatolia and the snippets of information they 
do provide are confused and incoherent. It is therefore difficult, and in many cases 
impossible, to ascertain the course of events. We have also no epigraphic evidence 
for this period which would help us to fill the gaps as the Anatolian Seljuqs did not 
leave behind any monun1ents at this time. The first Seljuq coins appear only in the 
last years of the reign of Mas(iid. Modem scholars have shown very little interest in 
the reigns of Shahanshah and Mas(iid and have not analysed the information 
available in any detail. 255 This section aims to analyse the accounts given by the Rum 
Seljuq sources and other sources, especially the chronicle by Bar Hebraeus, which 
255 Turan, who gives the most comprehensive discussion, treats the medieval sources as sources of 
factual data and uses it to give a chronological account of the events during the period of these two 
rulers. Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 148-196. A more recent study on Mas•ud by the Turkish historian 
Muharrem Kesik is written in the same manner as the work of Turan. Kesik, Tiirkiye Selr;uklu Devleti 
Tarihi Sultan I. Mesud Donemi (1 116-11 55), Ankara 2003, (hereafter cited as Kesik, Mesud); Cahen 
devotes only little space to this period and gives merely a chronological account of the main events 
reported by the sources. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 87-100; idem, Formation, 15-24. 
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contains the widest information on this period. By this way deductions of the 
ideology and mentality of the Seljuqs in Anatolia during this period will be made. 
11.4. Shahanshah (Malik Shah), (504-51 0/ 111 0-1116) 
The death of Kthv Arslan after his failed rebellion against the Great Seljuq 
sultan Mul)ammad Tapar revealed that the Rum Seljuq principality was not yet 
firmly established. Kthv Arslan left behind four sons called Shahanshah (Malik 
Shah), Mas~iid, Tugrul Arslan and Arab. 256 According to the Rum Seljuq author 
Aksarayi, Kthv Arslan had one son named Mas~iid, whom he designated as his heir 
and left him in Konya before his campaign to the east. 257 The anonymous author 
writes that Ktlw Arslan had two sons, Mas~iid and Arab, and that the former was in 
Konya and the latter was with his father on the eastern expedition. This author 
informs us that Arab rebelled in order to obtain the throne but he died and that thus 
Mas~iid succeeded to the throne.258 The anonymous author admits that there were two 
throne pretenders, but he too claims that an uninterrupted succession was in place. 
There is a possibility that these authors did not have any different information at their 
disposal but it seems more probable that they were anxious to legitimise Rum Seljuq 
rule through their claim that the dynasty was already established with an 
uninterrupted succession of Rum Seljuq sultans in place. 
In reality, the death resulted in the captivity of one of his young sons and the 
division of his Anatolian realm among the remaining sons and their guardians. 
Matthew of Edessa, the earliest author to record these events, writes that Kthv 
Arslan's realm was divided among his sons: "His four sons succeeded him, each 
256 The lack of information from this period is revealed by the fact that the sources do not even agree 
on how many sons K1h9 Arslan had and what they were called. Ibn al-Athir names one son and gives 
his name as Malik Shah, Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Cn1sading Period, I, 116; Michael the Syrian names 
the sons of K1h9 Arslan I as Shahanshah, Mas·ud, Tugrul Arslan, and Arab. Michael the Syrian, 
Chabot, Ill, 194; Bar Hebraeus gives also the four names given by Michael the Syrian but gives the 
name of Shahanshah like Ibn al-Athir as Malik Shah, Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 243; Most probably 
Shahanshah and Malik Shah are the same person as Anna Comnena refers to him by both names 
Saisan (Shahanshah) and Malik Shah. Anna, Sewter, 445,447. 
257 Cf. Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 125. 
258 Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. 
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ruling a portion of his father's land."259 The earliest Muslim account is given by the 
Syrian author Ibn al-QaHinisi: 
"The son of Qilij had taken refuge in the city, and JawalT seized him and had him conveyed 
to the [Saljiiqid] Sultan Muhammad, with whom he remained until he escaped from the camp 
at the beginning of the year 503 (began 31st July, 11 09), and made his way back to his 
father's kingdom in Anatolia. It is said that when he arrived there, he formed a plot against 
his uncle's son and having killed him, firmly established himself in the kingdom in his 
stead. "260 
Ibn al-QaHinisi apparently did not have reliable information at his disposal, as 
he does not even give the name of the son he mentions. It seems that even in 
neighbouring Syria there was no information available on this period. Ibn al-Athir 
who wrote later gives some more details and confirms that K1l19 Arslan' s son was 
taken captive but does not relate anything about his return to Anatolia. 
"When Qilij Arslan had secured Mosul, he departed to make war on JawulT Saqao. He left his son 
Malikshah, who was eleven years of age, in the government house with an emir to guide his affairs 
and a detachment of the army, consisting of 4,000 cavalry with full equipment and excellent mounts . 
. . . Jawuli then left for Mosul and sent Malikshah, Qilij Arslan's son, to Sultan Muhammad."261 
The author's remark that Shahanshah ('Malikshah'), the son of K1h9 Arslan 
who accompanied him on his campaign, was eleven years old indicates that this was 
the eldest son and the others were still minors. It was to this son that he left Mosul 
after he had conquered it. Interestingly, however, the author gives no indications as 
to whom Kthy Arslan left his Anatolian territories, especially Konya. One possible 
explanation would be that K1h9 Arslan regarded as his heir this son Shahanshah 
whom he left in Mosul. Bar Hebraeus claims that he proclain1ed this son 'king': 
"And he set in the fortress of Maw~il a man whose name was 'Bazmish'. And he left his son 
Malik Shah, being a boy eleven years old, in Maw~il, and called him 'king', and the mother 
of the youth was also with him in the palace."262 
Like Ibn al-Athir, Bar Hebraeus writes then that after the death of K1h9 
Arslan this 'Bazm1sh' (Bozmt~) went with the former's wife and all their people to 
Malatya, except for the son Shahanshah who had been handed over to the Great 
259 Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 199. 
260 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Gibb, 81. 
261 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Cn1sading Period I, 116 and 117. 
262 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 240. 
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Seljuq sultan.263 In a different passage Bar Hebraeus writes that in Malatya Bozmt~ 
proclaimed Tugrul Arslan, the little son of Kt he; Arslan king: 
"Then Bazmish, having taken the wife of Kelej 'Arslan from Mawsil and gone to Melitene, 
proclaimed king Tughrel 'Arslan, the little son of Kelej 'Arslan. And there was there another 
Amir whose name was 'Arslan, and the mother of the young man made an agreement with 
him and killed Bazmish264, and he took her to wife. And as he made the people of Melitene 
to endure many evil things in respect of the collecting of gold, the mother of the young man 
made an agreement with the young man her son, and they seized 'Arslan, and shut him up, 
and it was thought that he had been killed. And after a year they brought him out and sent 
him to the SUltan Ghayath ad-Din in Kh6rasan. And the SUltan sent Malik Shah, the son of 
Kelej 'Arslan, to Melitene, and he was proclaimed king. And he dismissed Tughrel 'Arsh1n, 
his younger brother, and he shut up in prison his two other brothers, Mas'ud and Arab. And 
Malik Shah, having remained for many years in Melitene, and being troubled by Bar 
Danishmand, went to Alexis, the king of the Greeks, so that he might help him. And he was 
received joyfully, and much gold was given to him. And when he went forth Bar 
Danishmand laid an ambush for him, and captured him, and he blinded his eyes. Then the 
Amirs who were in Melitene brought out Mas 'iid from prison, and proclaimed him 
Sultan. "265 
It seems that in the state of confusion, following the death of Kt he; Arslan, the 
mother of his son Tugrul Arslan took matters into her own hands and assumed power 
in Malatya in the name of her son. More significant is the question why Kthc; 
Arslan' s wife and Bozm1~ chose to stay in Malatya and did not try to take the main 
residence Konya. It is peculiar that the author does not mention Konya in this report. 
The mother of the prince secured power in Malatya by marrying Bozm1~ and making 
him her son's atabeg. She then removed Bozm1~ and marrying Ilarslan/ Arslan, 
another Turkish chief, she promoted him to be her son's atabeg. According to Bar 
Hebraeus this Arslan mistreated the people of Malatya and was thus taken prisoner 
by Tugrul Arslan and his mother and was later sent to sultan Ghiyath al-Din in 
263 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 241. 
264 This name of this Rum Seljuq at a beg is spelt differently by our chronicler and is written as Bozm1~ 
in modem Turkish. We have no other information about this person except what is recorded in this 
passage. He was probably one of Kilw Arslan's mamluk officers whom he chose as atabeg for his 
son. 
265 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 243; "Quand la nouvelle de la mort du sultan Kilidj-Arslan arriva, on etablit 
a Melitene son plus jeune fils, qui s'y trouvait, nomme Togr[il]-Arslan. Son gouvemeur etait un 
homme age, appele Pizmis, et il y en avait un autre nomme Ilarslan. La mere du jeune homme fit un 
complot ave celui-ci, qui tua Phazmis, et la prit pour femme. 11 causa beaucoup de maux aux gens de 
la ville, par l'or qu'il amassa, et il chercha un pretexte pour s'en aller dans le Beit Roumaye. Quand sa 
femme s'en aper9ut, elle fit un pacte avec son fils et s'empara de lui. On l'enferma et on laissa croire 
qu'il avait ete tue. Au bout d'une annee, on le fit sortir et on l'envoya au sultan". Michael the Syrian, 
Chabot, Ill, 194. 
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Kh6rasan (Great Seljuq sultan Mul)ammad Tapar). The mother of Tugrul Arslan 
probably sent Arslan to the Great Seljuq sultan with the hope that the latter might 
recognise her son as ruler in Anatolia. However, the Great Seljuq . sultan sent 
Shahanshah (Malik Shah) to Malatya where he was proclaimed 'king'. Hence in 
502/1109 Shahanshah came to Anatolia. Ibn al-Qalanisi confirms the date but states 
that he escaped Great Seljuq captivity and came to his 'father's kingdom' and killing 
his uncle's son took over rule.266 This author does not specify in which town 
Shahanshah was proclaimed ruler. 
It is confusing that Bar Hebraeus on the one hand writes that Shahanshah 
dismissed his brother Tugrul Arslan when he came to Malatya but on the other hand 
later on in his narrative he refers to Tugrul Arslan as sultan of Malatya. He writes 
that in the year 1113 the mother of Tugrul Arslan married the Artukid Balak and 
made him her son's atabeg to secure his support and maintain power over Malatya. 267 
Thus even though it is not possible to ascertain the course of events, it is evident that 
Malatya had become an independent Seljuq polity which continued to exist probably 
until 1119, as Bar Hebraeus reports under this year, that the sultan of Malatya 
subjugated Elbistan and other neighbouring territories.268 
What is important to recognise for the context of the present study is that the 
Seljuq realm in Anatolia was divided into two polities, centred around Malatya and 
around Konya, where after an interregnum of three years the young 'sultan' 
Shahanshah assumed rule. The authors quoted above designate Shahanshah as king 
or sultan but it is curious that they do not note at all if he was officially recognised by 
the Abbasid caliph or the Great Seljuq sultan. Cahen merely remarks that when 
sultan Mul)ammad freed Shahanshah he "no doubt induced his prisoner to 
acknowledge some kind of suzerainty. "269 As the Great Seljuq sultan Mul)ammad 
was the supreme ruler of the Seljuq family, Shahanshah could only be a subordinate 
266 Ibn al-QaHinisT, Gibb, 81. 
267 "And in the year fourteen hundred and twenty-four of the Greeks (A.D. 1113) the wife of Kelej 
'Arslan, the SUltan of Melitene, sallied forth, and went to Balak, the lord of the fortress of BUla. For 
she said [to him], 'I have on many occasions heard the SUltan praising thee and saying, "Among all 
the Turkish Amirs there is none so wise or so mighty a man as Balak", and therefore I wish that I and 
my sons may be protected by thy name.' And thus she was protected. And Balak increased in power 
greatly, and he became the husband of the wife of the SUltan. And when the Khaton herself returned 
she drove out the 'Atabag, and she and her son sat down in the Citadel of Melitene". Bar Hebraeus, 
Budge, 245. 
268 Cf. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 249. 
269 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 88. 
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Seljuq pnnce and governor of the territories tn Anatolia. It is unlikely that he 
received the title sultan and probably he held the title ma!ik with the meaning of 
prince and not king. What is surprising here is that there is no mention as to who 
accompanied the young prince to Anatolia if he was sent by the sultan or who helped 
him to escape if he escaped. Shahanshah, who was eleven years old when his father 
died according to our authors, must have been thirteen when he was proclaimed ruler 
in Anatolia. It is thus very unlikely that he could have assumed the title sultan or 
even led the government himself. But we can plausibly speculate that there was a 
group of people in Anatolia, who were probably officials of Ktlw Arslan who lent 
their support to this prince. 
As quoted above, Bar Hebraeus writes that Shahanshah imprisoned his two 
brothers Arab and Mas~ud but that his position remained unsecure as he was attacked 
by the Danishmendids. On the other hand, the Byzantines had used the weakness of 
the Seljuqs following the death of Kth<; Arslan as an opportunity to re-conquer the 
coastal regions, but Turkmen raids into Byzantine territory continued. The Byzantine 
emperor Alexius, who regarded the Franks as more dangerous enemies, concentrated 
his efforts to reduce their power in Syria. For this reason he united with the 
Danishmendid ruler against the Franks. However, after he had reached an agreement 
with the Frankish ruler Roger of Antioch in 1116, the emperor decided to launch a 
large expedition against the Seljuqs in Anatolia. It is not clear why the emperor gave 
up his friendly relations with the Seljuqs but both sides met on the battlefield in the 
same year but both sides shunning a decisive battle concluded a peace treaty.270 The 
Danishmendid Giimii~tekin, using the peace between Shahanshah and Alexius as a 
pretext, interfered in Seljuq affairs and in the name of his son-in-law Mas~iid, the 
brother of Shahanshah, deposed the latter. Shahanshah was strangled with a bow 
string according to the idea that a member of the nobility must be executed without 
spilling his blood. 271 
270 These events and the relations between Alexius and Shahanshah will be discussed below, in the 
chapter on 'The Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium'. 
271 According to Koprtilii this tradition goes back to the ancient shamanistic idea prevalent among the 
Oguz Turks that the ruling family was sacred and that therefore members of the ruling family could 
only be executed without spilling their blood. For this reason members of the ruling family were killed 
with a bow-string. Koprtilii, Tiirk ve Mogol siilalerinde hanedan azasmm kan dokme mernnuyeti, in: 
TiirkHukuk Tarihi Dergisi, 1 (1944), 1-9. 
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11.5. Rukn al-Din Mas~iid I (510-551/ 1116-1156) 
The second Danishmendid ruler Giimii~tekin thus helped his son-in-law 
M as~ iid to take over Konya and thus made the Seljuq principality his protectorate. 
The Danishmendid principality remained the paramount Turkish power in Anatolia 
until the death of Giimii~tekin son and successor Mul}ammad in 536/1142 led to the 
division of the Danishmendid realm into three rival branches. As already noted, both 
Rum Seljuq authors omit from their narratives that Kilw Arslan' s son was taken 
captive by the Great Seljuq sultan, that his realm was divided and that his rivals the 
Danishmendids expanded their power. Aksarayi claims that Kthv Arslan made his 
son Mas~iid his designated and left Konya to him before he left for the campaign to 
the east. After the death of his father, Mas~iid ascended the throne in Konya and was 
recognised by the caliph, who sent him the insignia of rule. Mas~iid was a just ruler 
who expanded his realm and maintained friendly relations with his Danishmendid 
neighbours.272 It is revealing that this author devotes less space to the reign ofMas~iid 
than to the reign of Kthv Arslan. The author claims that the former was on friendly 
terms with the Danishmendids without giving any further information. The 
anonymous author omits the Danishmendids from his account altogether: 
"It was said that the deceased had two sons, one of them was called Malik Mas'Ud the other Malik 
Arab. Malik Mas'Ud was in Konya and Malik Arab was with his father. In 527/1133 they brought the 
coffin of the deceased to Mayfrakin. Malik Arab longed for the throne and made three times war on 
his brother. They made peace in the end and his brother gave Malik Arab a few of the fortresses. After 
some time the emirs plotted mischief and Malik Arab rebelled and asked the Roman King for troops 
and received them. Malik Arab died and following this, Mas'Ud came on the throne .... Then he 
marched on Telbe~ir and the Armenian emirs begged him and asked to have Telbe~ir back. The sultan 
built seventy seven Muslim pul~its in that region for the khutba to be read there. The caliph sent him 
preachers and robes ofhonour."-73 
What is striking about both accounts is that Mas~iid is the first ruler to whom 
our Rum Seljuq authors attribute the characteristics of a Perso-Islamic ruler. 
Aksarayi claims that he was a just king whose rule was legitimised by the caliph and 
272 Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 125-126; Aksarayi, I~1ltan, 38-39. 
273 Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. The anonymous Syriac chronicle confuses the Seljuqs and Danishrnendids 
but reveals that the latter became the paramount Turkish power in Anatolia: "In Malatia ruled after the 
sons of Danishmand a man of the great family of the Turkish kings, and after his death his two little 
sons with their mother; Mas'ud his first-born ruled in !conium and the interior towards the Greeks; 
Ghazi son of Danishmand ruled in Sebaste, Cresarea, and Neocresarea. He became proud, acted 
haughtily and set his face against Malatia". Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, Tritton, 89. 
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the anonymous author emphasizes that he fulfilled his religious obligations by 
expanding the realm of Islam. The anonymous chronicler implies that M as~ iid 
pursued a policy of Islamisation of the newly conquered Armenian Christian territory 
and therefore built Muslim pulpits there but the number of pulpits, seventy seven 
which he allegedly built, is suspicious. Moreover, there is no extant evidence for 
Rum Seljuq building activity at this time. The claim that Mas ~iid was driven by 
religious zeal seems somewhat odd as both authors do not exploit the warfare against 
the Crusaders to present him or his father Kthc; Arslan as jihad fighter. That both 
authors do not make use of jihad propaganda even though they were writing in the 
14th century at a time after the counter crusade reveals that the objective of the 
expansion policy of these Seljuq leaders was not ghazw or holy war. 
Aksarayi's claim that the caliph recognised Mas'iid as sultan sending him the 
insignia of rule is not confirmed by other sources. Ibn al-Athlr designates Mas'iid 
once as King Mas~iid of Konya and Aksaray but elsewhere as prince who ruled over 
Konya and neighbouring lands in Anatolia274 . The Byzantine author Kinnamos like 
Anna refers to the Seljuqs in Anatolia as sultans but he does not say if Mas~iid was 
officially recognised as sultan. His remark, "the chieftain of Ikonion [Konya], whom 
the Turks, honoring him above the rest, call sultan,"275 suggest that all Turks in 
Anatolia regarded Mas~iid as their overlord. Bar Hebraeus refers to Mas~iid as sultan 
of Konya but does not state if this title was officially bestowed on him. Yet, he gives 
a detailed record of the investiture of the Danishmendid ruler: 
"And in the year the K.hallfah sent to GHAZI, the Amir, the son of DANISHMAND, the lord 
of MELITENE, a collar of gold for his neck, a sign of subjection, and a staff of gold, and 
four black flags, and drums which were to be beaten before him. And GHAzi was 
proclaimed Malik. And when the envoys arrived they found him sick, and after some days he 
died. Then they fulfilled [the ceremonies] for his son MAHAMMAD, and went away."276 
274 Cf. D.S. Richards, The Chronicle of lbn al-Athir for the C111sading Period from al-Kiimil fi'l-
ta 'rfkh. Part 2 The Years 541-589/1146-1193 The Age ofNur ai-Din and Saladin, Aldershot 2007, 39, 
80, and 157, (hereafter cited as Richards, Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Crusading Period II). 
275 C.M. Brand, Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by John Kinnamos, New York 1976, 20, 
(hereafter cited as Kinnamos, Brand). 
276 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 258; Bar Hebraeus has taken this passage from Michael the Syrian who 
writes: "La meme anm!e, le khalife Bagdad et le sultan du Khorasan envoyerent a I' emir Ghazi, 
seigneur de Melitene, quatre drapeaux noirs, des tambours qu'on frappait devant lui comme roi, un 
collier d'or pour etre suspendu a son cou, et un sceptre d'or avec lequel il devait etre frappe par les 
cnvoyes, en confirmation de la royaute qui lui etait octroyee, a lui-meme et a sa descendance apres lui. 
Les envoyes, en arrivant, le trouverent malade. lis resterent en attendant ce qui arriverait. Quand sa 
mort arriva, il donna le pouvoir a son fils Mohammed. Les envoyes donnerent done I 'investiture a 
87 
This detailed description of the insignia which were sent to the Danishmendid 
ruler is evidence for its authenticity. That the same author remains silent about the 
investiture of Mas(ud indicates that he was not recognised by the caliph at this time 
and that the Danishmendid ruler was stronger than him. As already stated the 
Danishmendid ruler used the death of Kthv Arslan to expand his territories and by 
supporting Mas(ud who was his son-in-law in the succession struggle he made the 
Seljuq state in Anatolia his protectorate. The Danishmendids thus became the 
paramount Turkish power in Asia Minor, while Mas(ud's influence did not extend 
further afield than Konya and its environs.277 Nevertheless, as a member of a noble 
ruling family, Mas(ud was able to assume the title sultan for himself and at least 
nominally hold a higher status than the Danishmendids. The changes in the 
composition of the polities in Asia Minor and in Syria, Iraq, and Iran during the 
second half of the 12th century enabled Mas(ud not only to expand his power and to 
consolidate this power but also led him to re-define the place of his polity and his 
status. 
The death of Giimii~tekin, the father-in-law of Mas(ud in 529/1134, and that 
of the latter's successor Mul).ammad in 536/1142, led to the division of the 
Danishmendid realm into three rival branches.278 Mas(ud interfered in the internal 
struggle of the Danishmendids and extended and secured his power in Anatolia and 
became the strongest Turkish power in Anatolia. lbn al-Athir remarks under 
miscellaneous events of the year 53711142-43: 
"Muhammad ibn Danishmand, the ruler of Malatya and the Marches, died this year. His 
lands were conquered by Prince Mas'iid ibn Qilij Arslan, the ruler of Konya and one of the 
Saljuqs [of Riim]."279 
Mohammed, et il fut proclame Malik". Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 237; The anonymous Syriac 
author confirms that the Danishmendid ruler was invested with the title malik and adds that he was the 
most powerful Turkish ruler in Anatolia: "The caliph of Baghdad invested with sovereignty Ghazi, 
son of Danishmand, lord of Cappadocia and Malatia, who was more powerful than all the Turkish 
~rinces in those parts". Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, Tritton, 99. 
-
77 Cf. Holt, Cntsades, 170; The rise of the Danishmendids to the paramount Turkish power in 
Anatolia is described in the following works: Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 91-96; idem. Formation, 
18-20; Turan, Selr;uklular, 112-180; Sevim!Yucel, Tiirkiye Tarihi, 123-125 and 208-211; M. Kesik, 
Tiirkiye Selr;uklu Devleti Tarihi Sultan I. Mesud Donemi, 35-42. 
278 Cf. El2, Danishmendids, (Melikoft), 111; Cahen, Formation, 21; Turan, Selr;uklular, 178; Kesik, 
Mesud, 45. 
279 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Crusading Period, I, 367. 
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Mastud was able to follow an expansionist policy following the division of 
the Danishmendids, as there was no power to oppose him. The Byzantine empire, 
always anxious to keep a balance of power in Anatolia among the Turkish rulers was 
not in a state to oppose Mastud. The emperor John had died and his son and 
successor Manuel needed first to secure his throne against his internal enemies. And 
for the time being there was no power in the east which could prevent Mastud to 
fulfil his ambitions. In 1153 Sancar, the Great Seljuq sultan of the east, had been 
taken captive by the Oguz tribesmen and this gave all players in the east a free hand 
to seek autonomous domains. The atabegs of the Seljuq princes and other emirs 
established principalities usurping the remains of the Great Seljuq empire, the Iraqi 
sultanate and Syria as warlords. The Abbasid caliph in Baghdad used this state of 
affairs to revive his own temporal power. For the Seljuqs in Anatolia these 
transformations in the east were relevant in three ways. First, the Great Seljuq throne 
was not any more an objective to strive for. As a consequence, Mastud and his 
successors would not pursue a policy of expansion to the east to claim the lands of 
Seljuq dynasty but would concentrate their efforts on consolidating their power in 
Asia Minor. Second, the Abbasid caliphate became one of the polities in the contest 
for territorial rule but was still the only institution which could legitimise Muslim 
rule and thus use this advantage against the other territorial powers of the region. It is 
possible therefore that the caliph recognised Mastud as sultan. Third, the atabeg 
principalities especially that of Zengi in Mosul and Aleppo, was to play a crucial role 
in Rum Seljuq history not only because ZengF80 who conquered in 539/1144 the 
Crusader state of Edessa became the eastern neighbour of Mastud. The following 
decades were marked by political and ideological warfare between Zengi and his 
successors and the Rum Seljuq rulers. It can be suggested that it was the defence of 
the challenge presented by his new powerful neighbour Zengi that led Mastiid to 
assume the sultan title and to define and legitimise his rule. 
All these changes opened for Mas tud the possibility to assume the title of 
sultan without any fear of Great Seljuq intervention.281 Three copper coins from the 
28° Cf. Bosworth, New Islamic Dynasties, 190-191. 
281 Hamdullah Qazwini indicates that Sanjar's imprisonment by the Oguz gave Mas•ud a free hand 
when he writes in the Zafarniima that Mas•ud sent every year tribute to Sancar but that he stopped 
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reign of Mas~ud are the first known Rum Seljuq coins and evidence that he bore the 
title sultan. These coins copy the contemporary Byzantine folis with the imperial 
bust, probably of Alexius I Comnenus on the obverse and Mas~iid's name with that 
of his father and his title, 'sultan al-mu 'a~~am', "the exalted sultan," on the 
reverse. 
282 
The date on these coins is not legible, but, as already stated, M as ~iid could 
only have taken this title in the last years of his reign and so they must have been 
minted during that time. Mas~iid can thus be described as the first Seljuq leader in 
Anatolia who regarded himself as the head of a new dynasty and who established 
himself as a sedentary territorial sovereign283 . While his predecessors led the life of 
nomadic war leaders on campaign, he laid in the last decade of his reign the 
foundation stone for the administrative structures for the new Seljuq dynasty in 
Anatolia which was to become the Rum Seljuq sultanate under his successors. Thus 
at the end of his reign Mas~iid put in place the three elements which manifested a 
Muslim state. These were the sultan the head of state, the court comprising the 
military and civil leaders of the administration of the state, and the capital as the seat 
of the state. Mas ~lid started the development of Konya as the seat of the sultanate. 
This town which had been already seized by Sulayman sometime between 1 07 5 and 
1081 was a well irrigated site on the southern route of Asia Minor. With the building 
of the great mosque Konya was marked out as a Muslim town. 284 
In order to ensure the continuation of his dynasty Mas~iid arranged his 
succession and chose among his sons Ktlw Arslan as heir. This son had already 
sending it when the latter was taken captive. See for this 0. Turan, Selfuklular Tarihi ve Tiirk is/am 
Medeniyeti, 1 73. 
282 Cf. Kesik, Mesud, 121-22; H. Erkiletlioglu/ 0. Gtiler, Tiirkiye Sel9uklu Sultan/an ve Sikkeleri, 45-
46 (hereafter cited as Gtiler, Sikkeleri); Aykut, Tiirkiye Sel9uklu Sikkeleri, I, 187-189; Cahen states 
mistakenly that on one of his coins Mas•ud describes himself as "king of all Anatolia and Romania", 
Cahen, Formation, 136. 
283 Kesik writes in his book on Mas'ud the following: "The Turks in central Anatolia were living a 
nomadic life as they did not feel secure enough and wanted to be able to retreat quickly in case of 
Byzantine attacks. After sultan Mas•ud's victories over the Crusaders, Byzantines and Dani~mendids 
they were no longer the defending side but became the offensive side and became consolidated in the 
region". Unfortunately this point is only mentioned in the last chapter of the book but Kesik does not 
discuss or pose any questions as to why ask Mas'ud chose to become a sedentary ruler in contrast to 
his predecessors. Kesik, Mesud, 128. Turan merely states that K1h9 Arslan made Konya the capital 
after the fall of iznik during the First Crusade but that he did not find the time to live there as he was 
constantly on campaign. Therefore the town was only constructed during the reign of Mas•ud. Turan, 
Selfuklular, 194; The most comprehensive work describing the Turkification and Islamisation of the 
formerly Christian Greek and Armenian territories is still the work ofVryonis, Decline. 
284 Cf. J .H. Loytved, Konia. Inschriften der Seldschukischen Bauten, Berlin 1907, 21, (hereafter cited 
as Loytved, Konia); i.H. Konyah, Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Konya Tarihi, Konya 1964, 309-311; 
Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 201. 
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proved himself as a good military and political leader and had accompanied him on 
his campaigns and M as~ iid might have hoped that he was the one who could defend 
his position as supreme leader against his brothers and other rivals. Aksarayi states 
that Mas~iid designated Kthc; Arslan as his heir because among his sons he was one 
who possessed the best leadership qualities. 285 
To conclude, it seems safe to suggest that Mas~iid at the end of his reign laid 
the foundations which transformed the Seljuq principality in Anatolia into the Seljuq 
sultanate of Konya. 
Ill. The foundation of the Rum Seljuq sultanate 
1. ~Izz al-Din Kthc; Arslan II (551-588/ 1156-1192) 
Kt he; Arslan is regarded as one of the most important Rum Seljuq sultans because of 
his political and military success, and especially his great victory at Myriokephalon 
over the Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus in 57211176. Turkish historians 
argue that Kthc; Arslan consciously followed a grand strategy to make Anatolia a 
Turkish homeland and that the campaigns against his Turkish rivals and against the 
Byzantines were part of this plan. The battle at Myriokephalon almost a century after 
the battle at Manzikert is thus seen as the culmination of Kt he; Arslan II' s strategy 
and the final victory against Byzantium which demonstrated clearly that Anatolia had 
become a Turkish country.286 Western scholars recognise Kthc; Arslan's political and 
285 The anonymous author writes: "The sultan had three sons. One of them was complacent, the other 
was a house decorator and the third who was the intelligent one to him he gave the sultanate. He was 
named after his father." Anonymous, Uzluk, 25. 
286 One of the first modern Turkish historians, ibrahim Kafesoglu, wrote in his article on the Seljuqs in 
the Turkish Encyclopaedia of Islam (jsfam Ansiklopedisi, iA) that the battle of Myriokephalon 
"confirmed that Anatolia, which until then had been regarded in the Christian world as a kind of 
"country under Turkish occupation," had become a truly Turkish homeland". iA, Sel9uklular, 381. 
Kafesoglu's article was first published in the iA in 1964-1965 but republished by Turkey's Ministry 
of Education as a book for educational purposes. For the English translation see Gary Leiser, A 
Hist01y of the Seljuks jbrahim Kafesoglu 's inte1pretation and the Resulting controversy, Southern 
Illinois University Press 1988, 71; A Turkish historian from the same generation, Osman Turan 
concluded that Kll19 Arslan 11 "after overcoming all his enemies established political unity and 
founded a secure Turkey". Turan, Selr;uklular, 236; Cahen arrives at a similar view stating that: "This 
was, after an interval of a century, a replica of Manzikert, which showed that henceforward there 
existed a Turkey which could never be further assimilated". El 2, Kilidj Arslan 11 (Cahen). 
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military success and show interest especially in his victory at Myriokephalon.287 
They compare Kth9 Arslan 's victory at Myriokephalon with Alp Arslan 's victory at 
Manzikert and regard them as decisive victories of the Muslim Turkish sultans over 
the Christian Byzantine emperors and hence as part of the 'Holy War' between Islam 
and Christendom. 
Neither of these evaluations, however, is an appropriate presentation of this 
Seljuq leader in Anatolia. Both assumptions imply that Kth9 Arslan had a coherent 
political programme which he was determined to push through. Yet it is not possible 
to determine if K1h9 Arslan was thinking beyond the immediate campaign he was 
following at any one time. It seems more probable that his ambitions grew with his 
diplomatic and military successes against his Byzantine neighbours and especially 
against his Muslim neighbours in Anatolia and northern Syria, the most important of 
the latter being the Danishmendids and the so called 'Counter Crusaders' Nur al-Din 
and Saladin. In fact, the greatest part of his reign was marked by the conflict with his 
Muslim neighbours in eastern Anatolia. The battle of Myriokephalon was a late 
attempt by the Byzantine emperor to contain Kth9 Arslan and was enforced on him 
by the former. Kth9 Arslan II showed little interest in pursuing jihad against the 
Byzantines or the Franks as will be discussed below. 
It will be argued here that the important aspect which distinguishes KtlJ9 Arslan 
is that during his reign the ideological bases for the Seljuq sultanate in Anatolia were 
laid down and that thereby the Seljuq principality in Anatolia was transformed into 
the Seljuq sultanate of Rum. The first part of this chapter will discuss the accession 
of Kth9 Arslan and the question of dynastic succession. The second part will analyse 
the epigraphic and chronological evidence to draw a picture of the ideology of the 
Rum Seljuq sultanate as it was laid down under Kth9 Arslan. The questions to be 
asked here are which ideological concepts were available to Kth9 Arslan, which of 
these concepts were adopted and why. This part attempts also to highlight the gap 
287 Cf. Runcimann, Crusades, 11, 412-413; C. M. Brand, Byzantium confronts the West 1180-1204, 
Harvard 1968, 16; Vryonis, Decline, 120-129; P. Magdalino, The empire of Manuel I Komnenos 
1143-1180, Cambridge 1993, 96-99, (hereafter cited as Magdalino, Manue!); M. Angold, The 
Byzantine empire 1025-1204. A political histmy, London/New York 1984, 223, (hereafter cited as 
Angold, Byzantine Empire); R.-J. Lilie, Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176). Auswirkungen auf 
das byzantinishe Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert, in: REB 35 (1977), 257-275; The most recent 
and best analysis of the battle of Manzikert with a very useful chapter on the battle of Myriokephalon 
is given by Carole Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 153-166. 
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between the ideology which was employed to justify and legitimise K1h9 Arslan 's 
authority and the political realities of his rule. The third part will discuss the 
relationship between K1h9 Arslan and his main rivals Nfir al-D'in and Saladin and 
concentrate especially on the ideological warfare between these rulers. 
Consolidation of the dynasty 
The Muslim sources contain almost no data on K1h9 Arslan 's reign and thus we 
depend on Christian authors, especially Michael the Syrian (d. 1199), the Armenian 
author Gregory the Priest (d. 1162), and the Byzantine author Nicetas Choniates (d. 
1215/16) for information on this ruler. All three chroniclers were contemporaries of 
K1h9 Arslan and the first two resided within the Rum Seljuq realm. Therefore their 
accounts, though written from the point of view of outsiders, give us valuable 
insights into the workings of the Seljuq polity in Anatolia. Gregory the Priest 
describes the events before and immediately after Mas~fid's death as follows: 
"Falling sick the sultan summoned his son Kilij Arslan and, descending from the throne, 
prostrated himself before his son in the presence of the important personages of his court. He 
placed his crown on Kilij Arslan's head and then expired, leaving his son all his vast 
territories. This occurred in the year 604 of the Armenian era [1155-1156]. The [deceased] 
sultan also had two other sons, one of whom was generous to all and had a more comely face 
than his brother the sultan. The sultan began to think that perhaps this brother did not agree 
with him, and so he feared him; moreover his brother's body had a stronger build than his. 
Encouraged by certain people, one night during a time of feasting and merriment, the sultan 
strangled and killed his brother. His youngest brother for a time submitted to him like a 
beloved son but [later], out of fear of him, fled to his own fortified towns of Gangra and 
Ankara and never again saw his brother. Not only did Kilij Arslan kill his brother, but also 
many of the important personages of his court, as well as some emirs, his father's chief 
minister Paghtain, and his father's khati."288 
This passage is the earliest extant account describing a dynastic succession 
and ceremony under the Seljuqs in Anatolia. For the establishment and continuous 
rule of a dynasty the power structure had to be clarified so that authority could be 
transmitted easily from one generation to another. Mas~fid seems to have been the 
first Seljuq leader in Anatolia who aimed to establish dynastic continuity as he 
determined his heir in his lifetime. Gregory the Priest indicates that the reigning 
288 Matthew of Edessa, Continuation by Gregory the Priest, Dostourian, 265. 
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sultan Mastud had three sons but without giving any explanation he writes that he 
chose Kthc; Arslan as his successor. Kthc; Arslan seems to have been the eldest son 
but the reason why he was chosen was most probably because his father saw in him 
the most able candidate.289 According to our author, Mastud prostrated himself before 
his son Kt he; Arslan in the presence of his court and crowned him. We are not 
informed if this was the general procedure of succession under the Seljuqs in 
Anatolia and we have no confirmation in the Muslim sources that such a ceremony 
took place or any other independent evidence that Mastud had a throne and a crown. 
As the author does not describe the throne and· crown in any detail it seems more 
likely that he uses these terms as paraphrases for the ruler's authority. It seems 
unlikely that the Rum Seljuqs had a throne or crown at this time.290 What is important 
to note is that the author emphasises that the "important personages of his court" 
were present which shows that the officials played an important role in the election 
of the new sultan and could not be ignored. The author does not state if the officials 
took the oath of allegiance but he implies that the sultan demonstrated his allegiance 
to his chosen heir and thus obliged his officials to accept his decision. 
It is evident from Gregory's account that different factions existed when he 
writes that Kt he; Arslan especially feared one of his brothers because of his physical 
beauty and strength. The author implies that Kthc; Arslan did not posses these 
qualities and furthermore that his brother was also more popular among the people as 
he was "generous to all." For these reasons the author argues that Kthc; Arslan 
"encouraged by certain people" did kill his brother and his important courtiers, as 
well as his father's vizier and the qadi. The courtiers in Konya apparently did not 
approve of Kthc; Arslan as sultan, probably because they feared that they could not 
289 K1h9 Arslan held the town Elbistan as appanage and had accompanied his father on his campaigns 
and had proven to be a good political and military leader. Michael the Syrian notes: "A cette epoque 
Josselin, dans un esprit detestable, se montra 1 'allie de Kilidj-Arclan, fils de Mas'oud, qui etait 
seigneur d' Ablaistain [Elbistan] et du pays. Celui-ci fit venir son pere, et ils mirent le siege contre 
Mar' as, apres avoir pille la region". Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 290. 
290 Even lbn Bibi, the Rum Seljuq chronicler who usually indulges in long descriptions eulogising the 
Rum Seljuq sultans, does not gives detailed descriptions of throne and crown and uses them mainly as 
paraphrases for authority. See K. Erdmann, Ibn Blbl als Kzmsthistorische Quelle, istanbul 1962, 5-6. 
Hitherto neither Turkish nor western historians have paid much attention to such questions as to the 
role of symbols of power. Cahen made merely the following general assumption about throne and 
crown, without giving any specific details as to their physical constructions or when they were 
introduced by the Rum Seljuqs: "The sovereign had a throne, which was slightly elevated. For special 
ceremonies he had a kind of crown, but ordinarily wore a large turban." Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 
220. 
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exert influence on him and therefore conspired with his brother's officials and were 
killed. The drastic measures taken by Kth9 Arslan show that the Rum Seljuq 
officials, the military administrators, as well as the religious authorities, played a 
decisive role as sultan makers and that they exerted great influence on the 
government in general. The reason why officials could win such great influence is 
connected with the Seljuq concept of rule. 
The ancient Turkish concept of familial sovereignty which the Great Seljuqs 
were not able to ignore and which eventually led to the disintegration of their empire 
still persisted under the Rum Seljuqs. This tradition of rule by the family rather than 
by an individual monarch facilitated the fragmentation of power as each male 
member of the royal family was granted a province as appanage. Gregory writes that 
Mas'ud left all his vast territories to Kth9 Arslan but at the same time it is evident 
that the realm had been divided among his sons when he notes that Kth9 Arslan' s 
youngest brother "fled to his own fortified towns." The Byzantine author Choniates 
writes: 
"As he was about to depart this life and go on to the tortures of the next because of his 
impiety, he distributed among some of his sons the cities and provinces as their paternal 
inheritance; the metropolis of Ikonion and all that was subject to it he assigned to his son 
Kilij Arslan. To his son-in-law Yaghi-Basan, he allotted Amaseia, Ankara, the fertile 
province of Cappadocia, and all the adjacent lands of these cities; and to his son-in-law 
Dhu'l Nun, he portioned out the great and prosperous cities ofKaisereia and Sebasteia."291 
Choniates confirms that a division of the realm took place, but what is 
interesting is that Mas~iid's rivals the Danishmendid princes, as son-in-laws, were 
also granted appanages. It is not unusual that Seljuq son-in-laws were granted 
provinces but the Danishmendid princes were not suzerains of Mas~iid as they had 
inherited these territories from their ancestor and did not regard the Rum Seljuq ruler 
as their overlord. Both accounts imply that a succession regulation was in place and 
that there was no succession struggle. The accounts given by Michael the Syrian and 
Ibn al-QalanisT reveal that Kth9 Arslan's accession was immediately followed by a 
succession struggle and warfare with the Danishmendid princes. 292 Moreover, the 
291 H.J. Magoulias, 0 City of Byzantium Annals of Niketas Choniates, Detroit 1984, 66, (hereafter 
cited as Choniates, Magoulias ). 
292 Ibn al-QalanisT was not well informed about these events as he confuses the Seljuq princes with the 
Danishmendid princes but the following passage reveals that Kll19 Arslan II was opposed by his 
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question of family rule was never resolved and hence the Seljuqs in Anatolia like 
their Great Seljuq cousins were never able to regulate the succession. At the death of 
each ruler, therefore, the succession had to be decided anew. 
The Christian authors assume that a rule existed probably because they reflect 
their own traditions onto the Rum Seljuqs. In this respect it is interesting that 
Choniates underlines that Kthy Arslan, who was designated as sultan was bestowed 
with the "metropolis Ikonion [Konya]". For the Byzantines who regarded their state 
as the Empire of Rome the capital Constantinople, the 'New Rome', was 
synonymous with the empire and whoever held the capital was emperor. 293 Thus it is 
not surprising that the Byzantine author Choniates points out that the heir to the 
throne received the capital Konya. However at this time Konya was not yet the 
'metropolis' it would become later and it was never to play a role like 
Constantinople. Nevertheless, it is evident that at the beginning of Kthy Arslan's 
reign Konya had become the centre of the realm and that the member of the Rum 
Seljuq family who held the town was regarded as the 'sultan' who was the nominal 
overlord of the other members of the family who ruled over their respective 
provinces semi-independently. 
It can thus be concluded that when Kthy Arslan took over power, the Seljuqs 
in Anatolia had evolved from a principality into a 'state' with a developed court and 
capital. Konya was regarded as the seat of a new dynasty, the dynasty of the Rum 
Seljuqs or 'the House' of Sulayman b. Kutalmt~ b. Arslan Isra'Il b. Seljuq. 
At the time when Kthy Arslan came to power, the dominant ideological 
concepts for rulership were the Perso-Islamic ideology and the jihad ideology. Kthy 
Arslan did not commission a treatise where his ideology is elaborated but we have a 
brothers and the Danishmendids: "In the month aforementioned, news arrived from Aleppo of the 
outbreak of strife between the sons of the king Mas 'ud [son of Qilij Arslan] after this death, the sons 
of Qutulmish, and the sons of Qilij Arslan, and that al-Malik al- 'Adil Niir al-Din, lord of Damascus 
and Alcppo, intervened between them in order to promote peace and reconciliation and to warn them 
against a dispute which would strengthen their Greek and Frankish enemies and embolden them to 
attack the Muslim fortress. lbn al- Qalanisi, Gibb, 324. Michael the Syrian writes: "En l'annee 1466 
{ 1154}, mourut Mas'oud, sultan d'Iconium, et il eut pour successeur son fils Kilidj-Arslan. Comme 
cclui-ci pouvait a peine defendre son pays contre les princes de la famille de Danismend, et surtout 
contre Ya'qoub-Arslan, Nour ed-Din marcha sur Pharzaman et 'Aintab, et il s'empara de ces villes 
sans combat". Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 312. 
293 See Cyril Mango, Byzantium. The Empire of New Rome, London 1980. Mango's work is the best 
account of the Byzantine attitude and ideology to date. 
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couple of monumental inscriptions and a series of coins containing his titulature from 
which the ideological concept can be deduced. The first of the inscriptions can be 
found on the pulpit (minbar) commissioned by Mas~Ud but set up by K1h9 Arslan. It 
includes dedicatory inscriptions to both rulers. This carved wooden minbar is the 
earliest known Rum Seljuq work of art and according to the foundation inscription it 
was finished in 550/1155?94 It was most probably constructed for the mosque of 
Mas~ud and was placed later in the Ala al-Din Kay Kubad mosque which was built in 
the same place but some sixty-four years later in 616/1219.295 Kth9 Arslan's 
inscription is not dated and there are no indications in the literary sources as to when 
his inscription was added and where the minbar was located during his reign but it 
was added probably soon after his accession. 
The minbar was a central ptece tn the mosque from which the khatfbs 
delivered the Friday sermon, the khutba. An integral part of the khutba was the 
formal mention of the ruler's name and thus it was a public statement that 
demonstrated the position and authority of the ruler. The minbar and the mosque 
itself were important if not the most essential symbols of sovereignty for a Muslim 
ruler in this period.296 Hence the minbar with its inscriptions served as an instrument 
of propaganda, as every male Muslim of the area would have attended the Friday 
sermon. The minbar was built for the mosque in Konya and hence the audiences 
targeted were the administrative classes within the Rum Seljuq sultanate who were 
literate. It could, however, also reach a wider audience as the phrases generally used 
in the epigraphy were well-known so that every remotely literate worshipper would 
have been able to understand them. The existence of Mas~Ud's minbar with its 
inscriptions proves that the Seljuqs in Anatolia had reached a point where they 
regarded themselves as Muslim sovereigns. 
It should be noted here, however, that KtlJ9 Arslan II's inscription comprises 
several lines more and is far more ambitious than the inscription of his father who 
294 Cf. Loytved, Konia, 23; RCEA, No. 3200, vol. VIII, 37; 0. Aslanapa, Turkish Art and Architecture, 
New York/ Washington, 1971, 107. 
295 Cf. Loytved, Konia, 22; Aslanapa, Turkish Art and Architecture, 109. 
296 The symbolic function of the minbar has so far not received much scholarly attention, except for 
two works dealing with the Umayyad period Carl H. Becker, Vom Werden und Wesen der islamischen 
Welt, Leipzig 1924, 450-471; Jean Sauvaget, La Mosquee omeyyade de Medine, Paris 1947, 139-144; 
For a brief outline seeR. Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, Edinburgh 1994, 46-48. 
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had commissioned the monument in the first place. K1h9 Arslan II is styled in the 
inscription as follows: 
"The mighty sultan, the greatest King of Kings, lord of the sultans of the Arabs and Persians, 
possessor of the neck of the nations, glory of the world and religion, pillar of Islam and the 
Muslims, pride of kings and sultans, helper of the truth by proofs, killer of the infidels and 
the polytheists, aid of the warriors of jihad, guardian of the lands of God, protector of the 
servants of God, supporter of the caliph of God, sultan of the countries of Rum, Armenia, the 
Franks and Syria, Abu'l-Fath Qilij Arslan b. Mas'iid, son of Qilij Arslan, helper of the 
Commander of the Faithful, may God make his rule endure and his power doubled"297 • 
This inscription can be described as a compact formulation of K1h9 Arslan 's 
ideology and image. Three points spring out immediately, first the Perso-Islamic 
orientation expressed through the Muslim and Persian titles of sovereignty, second 
the absence of Turkish titles except for the Turkish name of the sultan, and third the 
inclusion of a range of jihad titles. K1h9 Arslan was using the ideology employed 
under the Great Seljuqs and the ideology of his main Muslim opponent Nilr al-Din to 
legitimise his rule. A series of titles expressing the ruler's sovereignty and legitimacy 
used by the Great Seljuqs are adopted in K1h9 Arslan's inscription. The first titles 
claimed are mighty sultan, sultan al-mu 'a++am and king of kings, shiihiinshiih. The 
Persian idea of supreme kingship expressed by the title shiihiinshiih had been 
introduced by the Buyids and was taken over by the Great Seljuqs but the Arabic title 
sultan bestowed by the Abbasid caliph on the Great Seljuqs was the more accepted 
term expressing supreme rule. 298 However, the title shiihiinshiih remained in use as 
part of the sultan's honorifics and was also used as a proper name. The claim to 
overlordship is then reinforced through the claims that the Rum Seljuq is the "lord of 
the sultans of the Arabs and Persians" and the "pride of the kings and sultans." With 
the death of the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shah the title sultan receded in 
importance, as it was assumed by several rulers at the same time. The titles used in 
this inscription imply that a hierarchy of Muslim sultans was in place and that K1h9 
Arslan II was the supreme sultan. The adjective 'mighty' is probably used to elevate 
the status of the Rum Seljuq sultan over that of his rivals, especially his Turkish 
rivals in Anatolia and northern Syria. These rulers were reluctant to accept the Rum 
297 As translated by Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 161; see also German translation by Loytved, Konia, 23. 
298 See L. Richter-Bemburg, Amir-Malik-Shahanshah: •Adud Ad-Daula's Titulature Re-examined, in: 
Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, 18 (1980), 83. 
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Seljuqs as heirs to the Great Seljuqs and the transfer of supreme leadership of the 
Great Seljuqs to the Rum Seljuqs. Even the principalities in Anatolia, such as the 
Saltukids of Erzurum, for example, preferred to recognise what had remained of the 
Great Seljuqs in Iran as their overlords expressing their allegiance to those on their 
coins.299 The purpose for the employment of the titles used previously by the Great 
Seljuqs was to demonstrate that the imperial status, held up to then by the Great 
Seljuq sultans, was transferred to the Rum Seljuq sultan K1h9 Arslan even though 
there was still a Seljuq who reigned in Iran. 300 The inscriptions on K1h9 Arslan' s 
coins propagate the same image of the great Muslim sultan. The title on the couple of 
dinars and several dirhams extant is sultan al-mu 'affam. 301 It might be accident of 
survival but the earliest coin of Kth9 Arslan II is a dirham minted in Konya in 
571/1175 and a dinar from the year 573/1178, one year after the battle of 
Myriokephalon. On both of these coins Ktlw Arslan is styled as the great sultan and 
on the dinar the name of the caliph al-Mustadi' (r. 566-575/1170-1180) is added. 302 
There is no extant evidence of an investiture by the caliph which can help us to 
ascertain the date when exactly K1h9 Arslan was recognised officially as sultan. It 
seems probable that the title was first self-assumed and that he was probably invested 
with the title after 1175 but which territories were officially recognised as under his 
rule is not clear. Muslim authors designate him as the prince ruling over towns or 
regions of Rum, Anatolia. 
The titles "protector of the dar al-Islam" and helper of the "caliph" are used 
to present Kth9 Arslan as loyal supporter of the Abbasid caliph who in theory 
remained the supreme ruler of all Muslims. Thus the idea of the sultan as the 
guardian of Islam who lends military support to the caliph formulated under the 
Great Seljuqs was taken over by the Rum Seljuqs as the role of the caliph as 
guarantor of legitimacy was still significant. In addition to this, might of force is 
plainly used to legitimise power through the designation of Kth9 Arslan as 
299 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 107. 
300 Tughril Ill b. Arslan (Shah), (571-590/ 1176-94) 
301 Gtiler, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 49-52. 
302 See Gtiler, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 50; Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 190-191. 
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"possessor of the neck of nations" and the Abu '1-fat/:z, father of conquest. Strangely, 
however, Kthv Arslan does not seem to have used this on his coins.303 
These titles are the same as those employed by the Great Seljuq sultans, 
however, the territories claimed to be under Rum Seljuq rule are different and the 
addition of jihad titles is new. The main rivals for the Great Seljuq sultans were two 
Shi 'i dynasties, the Buyids and Fatimids and thus a central claim in Great Seljuq 
ideology was that they were the supreme rulers and defenders of Sunni Islam. This 
was expressed especially through the title bestowed on them by the Sunni Abbasid 
caliph expressing the claim that they were kings of the east and west, malik al-
mashriq wa al-maghrib. 304 Thus, without an explicit reference to the Great Seljuqs, a 
dynastic connection with the Great Seljuq house is implied to emphasize the noble 
lineage of the Rum Seljuqs. 
The territorial aspirations of Kthv Arslan are listed and include the towns of 
"Rum, Armenia, the Franks, and Syria." This claim is striking in two respects, one 
the inclusion of all Christian territories of the region, though the Byzantine Empire is 
not referred to directly. The use of the term Rum attests that from Kthv Arslan's 
reign onwards the Seljuqs in Anatolia regarded themselves as the Rum Seljuqs and 
hence claimed to be successors to the Byzantine Empire. Second, the specific 
mention of "the Franks" and the inclusion of Syria, which was mainly ruled by Kthv 
Arslan's Muslim rivals Niir al-Din and then Saladin expresses a territorial and 
ideological supremacy over these rulers. In reality, however, neither Niir al-Din nor 
Saladin regarded Kthv Arslan as their suzerain but contested his claims, as will be 
shown below. Therefore the use of jihad epithets was most probably part of the 
ideological warfare among them rather than Kthv Arslan' s warfare against the 
Franks. Another point which can be derived from the ambitious claims made by K1h9 
Arslan is that his inscription might have been placed on the minbar after he had 
firmly established himself in Anatolia and was contesting power in Syria against Niir 
al-Din and Saladin. 
303 The title appears however nearly always on coins of Klh9 Arslan II's successors. J.-C. Hinrichs, 
'Sultan und Kalif auf Mtinzen der Seltschuken Anatolians', in: Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, G. Leiser 
(ed.), Paris 2006, 346. 
304 RCEA, VII, 247 (inscription no 2775). 
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The second inscription for K1h9 Arslan can be found on the mausoleum 
which he built to commemorate his father. 305 According to Ibn Bibi it included the 
tombs of K1h9 Arslan II, his father Mas~iid I and of his successors Kay Khusraw I 
and Sulayman II. 
"It has been commanded by the Great Sultan, Glory of the world and the Religion and the 
Pillar of Islam and the Muslims, Glory of the kings and the sultans, destroyer of the 
unbelievers, Sultan of the lands of Rum and Syria, the victorious K1h9 Arslan, son of 
Mas 'ud, son of K1h9 Arslan, the Helper of the Caliph. God has promised him ... "306 
In contrast to the first inscription here, it is not the title shahanshah which is 
used to claim supreme leadership but the title "Great Sultan of the world", and 
among the lands under the sultan's overlordship Armenia and the Frankish territories 
are not mentioned. The mausoleum is the only extant monument commissioned by 
K1h9 Arslan and there is no evidence that he commissioned any other secular or 
religious buildings. We can only speculate why he did not have a more extensive 
building project. He might have regarded such a project only as secondary to his 
military campaigns he undertook to expand and consolidate his power. Be that as it 
may, the building of the mausoleum is significant. So far, scholars have not 
discussed in any detail what role the mausoleum played under the Turks but a 
hypothesis which could be drawn here is that it was the rendition of a princely 
Turkish tent and in the case of the Seljuqs it seems to have been regarded as the 
symbol of subjugating territory. 307 K1h9 Arslan initiated construction of Konya as 
capital and that the development of Konya into the administrative and fiscal centre 
was started under his rule. 
305 The Mausoleum is part of the complex in Konya including the tower, which had originally been a 
Byzantine church, the Ala ad-DTn mosque, the mausoleum, the masjid, and the castle tower. For a 
drawing of the complex see Loytved, Konia, 21. According to the inscription on the masjid regarding 
the building of the masjid and mausoleum, they were built in 616/1219. However, as Loytved 
suggests, most probably there was an original mausoleum built by Klh9 Arslan II and the later one 
from 1219 was built at its place. Loytved, Konia, 27. 
306 Loytved, Konia, 28. 
307 The origins, role, and forms of the mausoleum in Islam are discussed by R. Hillenbrand, Islamic 
Architecture, 254-307. 
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When we compare the way how Kthc; Arslan II is presented by the Rum Seljuq 
authors, Aksarayi and the anonymous author, who both wrote under the Mongol 
protectorate in the 14 th century, then the gap between ideology and political reality 
becomes evident. The narratives of these authors indicate that Kthc; Arslan II's main 
goal was not the foundation of a Perso-Islamic state or to wage jihad but to unite all 
Turkish held territories in Anatolia under his leadership. For this reason Kthc; Arslan 
first secured his position internally and then turned his attention to his main Turkish 
rivals, the Danishmendids. The Rum Seljuq chronicler Aksarayi aptly reveals Kthc; 
Arslan's policy of aggression towards the Danishmendids. Even though this author 
devotes more space to Kthc; Arslan II's reign than to the reigns of the other Rum 
Seljuq rulers, he does not present the sultan as ideal Muslim ruler and most strikingly 
he does not even mention his great victory over the Christian Byzantines at 
Myriokephalon. Our author sees no need to justify the attack on the fellow Muslim 
and admits even that Kthc; Arslan II specifically for the conquest of Danishmendid 
towns fortified Aksaray308. 
"The weakness of the dynasty of the Danishmendids increased Izz al-Din K1h9 Arslan's 
desire to seize their realm. He succeeded in taking Kayseri and Sivas and forced Yag1basan's 
grandson from his daughter malik Dhu '1-Niin, who was ill and paralyzed, to flee to Niksar. 
Dhu'l-Niin sent an envoy to his father-in-law malik Adil Nur al-Din asking him for help. Nur 
al-Din send with his emir Fahruddin Abdulmasih 3000 men and the Syrians re-conquered 
Kayseri and Sivas. Fahruddin Abdulmasih had been ordered to stay in Sivas until K1h9 
Arslan turned back. He stayed there till the death of malik Adil. K1h9 Arslan however did 
not give up his plan to annex the land of the Danishmend and because of this wish he 
founded Aksaray where he remained for a long time. Fahruddin Abdulmasih turned back to 
Syria when hearing about malik Nur al-Din's death and Klh9 Arslan immediately attacked 
Kayseri from Aksaray and took this place. Malik Dhu'l-Niin fell ill because of this and 
fleeing to Niksar died there. 
When Dhu'l-Niin died his son Ismail succeeded him but he was only a minor with a weak 
mind. K1h9 Arslan making promises to the Danishmendid emirs won them over and led them 
to kill Ismail and thus he annexed the Danishtnendid state and extended the realm of the 
Seljuqs"309• 
This account shows how the inter-Muslim struggle dominated the actions of 
Kthc; Arslan II and his Muslim Turkish neighbours. The author states that Niir al-Din 
the ruler over Syria interfered and forced Kthc; Arslan to retreat from Danishmendid 
308 The Turkish historian Osman Turan states that Klh9 Arslan built Aksaray also as a base for jihad 
and that therefore bad people as well as Greeks and Armenians were not allowed into the town. 
However, he gives no other evidence to prove his thesis. Turan, Sek;uklular, 233. 
309 Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 126-127; Aksarayi, I~lltan, 39-40. 
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territory and underlines that despite this setback the Seljuq leader did not give up his 
plan. After the death of the Danismendid prince he subdued his territories. Aksarayi 
mentions here only the main incidents of the prolonged warfare between the Rum 
Seljuq ruler and his Danishmendid counterparts but it seems that K1h9 Arslan II's 
reign was dominated by the struggle with the Danishmendids in Anatolia and the 
counter crusaders in northern Syria. The Byzantine author Choniates confirms K1h9 
Arslan's preoccupation with the Danishmendids when he remarks that he did not 
even recoil to attack a coreligionist: 
"Nor did he hold back from Melitene. Determined to depose its emir, he disregarded the fact 
that he was a coreligionist, and having no charge of injury to bring against the man, he 
openly contrived an accusation after which the emir was indicated and expelled"310• 
The pattern ofK1h9 Arslan's expansions confirms that his aim was to control the 
Turkish held territories in central and eastern Anatolia and to expand eastwards into 
Syria. The foundation of the fortress of Aksaray and probably a caravansaray a short 
distance from it supports this suggestion311 • K1h9 Arslan 's constant efforts to acquire 
the strategically important town Malatya reveal that territorial and economic interests 
dominated his policies. The same is true for the other Muslim rulers as well as the 
Christian rulers of the region. K1h9 Arslan, the Danishmendids, Niir al-DTn, and 
Saladin, on one hand and the Byzantines and the Franks on the other were anxious to 
establish themselves in urban centres and especially to extend their power over those 
towns lying on important trade routes. In fact all players were involved in a game of 
power politics which is confirmed by the pattern of alliances established in this 
period as for all parties the defence of territorial and economic interests played a 
greater part in policy making than the defence of religion. Most of the alliances 
concluded during this period were ephemeral and pragmatic alliances across the 
religious divide. 
31° Choniates, Magoulias, 69. 
311 There are no remains extant ofthis caravansaray but it is mentioned in Ibn Bibi's work. See Turan, 
Sel9uk Kervansaraylan, in: Belleten 39 (1946), 476; In his report on the warfare between Rukn al-Din 
KI119 Arslan and Izz al-Din Kay Kawus Ibn Bibi mentions a place he describes as the sultan's 
caravansaray and caravansaray of Kth9 Arslan. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 256; Ibn Bibi, Oztiirk, II, 123. Ozttirk 
translates the sentence in question wrongly as "They came to the side of sultan K1h9 Arslan"; K. 
Erdmann/H. Erdmann, Das Anatolische Karavansaray Zweiter und Drifter Teil, Berlin 1976, 115. 
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In contrast to Aksarayi the anonymous author claims that Kthc; Arslan was an 
exemplary Muslim ruler from the beginning of his reign and changes the chronology 
of events accordingly. 
"At the beginning of his reign K1h9 Arslan founded Aksaray, karavansarays and market 
places. The tyranny of malik Dhu'l-Niin in Kayseri had extended all bounds, he spent his 
time with drinking wine. The sultan marched with his army against Zunun and in 560 took 
Kayseri from him and seized all the fortresses of that province and put them under the 
command of his emirs"312• 
The anonymous author claims that Kthc; Arslan founded the fortress Aksaray 
as well as caravansarais and market places already at the beginning of his reign. The 
fortification of Aksaray is presented as part of the sultan's building project and 
divorced from his plan to conquer the Danishmendid territories. Furthermore the 
author claims that this conquest by Kthc; Arslan had a Muslim justification as the 
Danishmendid prince had stepped outside Islam. This is a retrospective legitimisation 
of the seizure of Muslim territory. Kthc; Arslan II was therefore only fulfilling his 
duties as a Perso-Islamic ruler. For this reason probably the anonymous author 
includes an account on the battle of Myriokephalon between the Byzantine Emperor 
Manuel and Kthc; Arslan into his narrative. Yet, the account is very brief and the 
author does not exploit the ideological potential of the battle313 . 
"In 572/1177 the sultan received at Caesarea news that the Roman emperor Manuel wanted 
to attack the Muslim lands and that he was approaching him with his army at a distance of 
only a day from him. And that he had an infantry of seventy thousand archers, who had 
opened trenches at every stage and meeting no resistance took the way of ten miles and came 
to !conium. The sultan selected 1700 cavalryman and struck the drums of war in the first 
night attacked the enemy. The infidels were routed till the morning and the sultan cut off the 
retreat route for the enemy. Left without hope Manuel sent Michael for intercession to the 
sultan and asked for mercy. Manuel left for his land after he obliged himself to a tribute of 
100 thousand gold, 100 thousand silver dirhams, horses, broadcloth and et cetera. 
In the year 573/1178 on a Tuesday he [K1h9 Arslan] left for Malatya. The son of Dhu'l-
Kamayn did not get on with his father. They surrendered the town to the padishah before he 
had reached it and the sultan entered Malatya. The Artukids in Diyarbakir read the khutba in 
the name of the sultan and the rulers of Amid from the house of the Nisanids came to kiss the 
sultan's hand. The rulers of Erzurum and Erzincan submitted to the sultan. In short he 
dominated all regions. After thirty-nine years he left the dominion to his son Qutb al-Din and 
making him heir apparent sent him to Konya"314. 
312 Anonymous, Jalali, 81-82; Anonymous, Uzluk, 25. 
313 Cf. Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 155. 
314 Anonymous, Jalali, 82-83; Anonymous, Uzluk, 25-26. 
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The author's tone is sober without any triumphalism and Kth~ Arslan is not 
portrayed as jihad warrior. Most striking is that he does not even draw a comparison 
between the battle of Myriokephalon and the battle of Manzikert to connect Kth~ 
Arslan to the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan and hence to underline his noble linage. 
The author does not even use the battle as a specific occasion to celebrate Kth~ 
Arslan as a great warrior ofjihad against the Christian Byzantine enemy. He merely 
states that Kth~ Arslan was attacked by the Byzantine emperor but that he was 
victorious and made the latter his tributary. This might be explained by the fact that 
this chronicle is brief and only lists the events known to the author for each sultans 
reign without any elaborative characterisations of them or ideological concerns. On 
the other hand it seems more probable that the battle of Myriokephalon left no 
memory in Rum Seljuq history as the author did not have any detailed information 
on the battle and does not even mention Myriokephalon, the place of the decisive 
battle. Moreover, the anonymous Rum Seljuq chronicle is the only extant Muslim 
source which mentions the battle ofMyriokephalon315 • 
In this respect it is noteworthy that even Ibn Bibi, the author of the most 
extensive Rum Seljuq chronicle who starts his narrative with the year of Kth~ 
Arslan 's death in 58811092 does not include past events from the Great Seljuq 
history or the Rum Seljuq history to glorify the Rum Seljuq sultans even though he is 
fully aware of the importance of noble lineage. At some point in his work he links 
the Rum Seljuqs to their Great Seljuq ancestors Alp Arslan and Malik Shah but he 
fails to mention the battle of Manzikert or Myriokephalon. He puts the following 
words into the mouth of Kay Khusraw I said to the Byzantine emperor during his 
refuge in Constantinople: "You know that I am the son of Kth~ Arslan and that I am 
descendant from the house of Alp Arslan and Malik Shah"316• Medieval Muslim 
chroniclers writing outside Anatolia ignore the battle of Myriokephalon even those 
who celebrate the battle of Manzikert as a great Muslim victory against the Christian 
Byzantines317 • Ibn al-Athir, who has some information on the Rum Seljuqs and is 
315 Cf. Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 154. 
316 Ibn Bibi, Duda, 28; lbn Bibi, Oztiirk, I, 71. 
317 For a complete list of the Muslim accounts on the battle of Manzikert from the twelfth up to the 
fifteenth century see Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 26-78. 
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usually well informed about events in the Muslim world in general and even beyond 
it, seems not to have had any information on this battle at his disposae 18 • In any case 
the Muslim authors overlook Myriokephalon and do not draw a comparison between 
the two Seljuq victories which their Christian Byzantine counterparts on the other 
hand drew
319
. The Muslim authors probably neglect Myriokephalon because as 
Carole Hillenbrand states, "the ongoing struggle between Islam and Christianity was 
a drama that, in their view, was now being played out not in distant Anatolia, as at 
Manzikert, but on Syrian, Egyptian and Palestinian soil against the Franks rather than 
the Byzantines"320. 
The important question here is in how far K1h9 Arslan himself exploited his 
victory at Myriokephalon ideologically. It is difficult to give an answer however as 
there is only a single indication in the narrative sources that he used his victory for 
propagandistic ends. Michael the Syrian writes that Kthc; Arslan send out letters to 
the amirs, the caliph in Baghdad and the sultan of Khurasan to inform them of his 
victory over the Byzantines. 
"Le sultan envoya a tous les emirs, au khalife de Bagdad et au sultan du K.horasan des 
esclaves, des servantes, des armes, et les tetes des Grecs et leurs chevelures au bout des 
lances, et ils les promenaient par les rues sur la croupe de leurs chevaux, en se rejouissant. 
Telle fut l'issue malheureuse de !'expedition de l'empereur des Grecs. Et qui ne confesserait 
rien n' arrive sur la terre sans le consentement d' en ha ut, selon des desseins 
. , , bl ?"321 1mpenetra es . . 
The usual procedure was that victories against the Christian enemy were 
reported to neighbouring rulers to demonstrate superiority and to the Abbasid caliph 
to gain his favour and legitimisation for the rule of newly conquered territories or 
those already acquired. These communications of victories to the caliph in Baghdad 
through fath namahs was a good opportunity to propagate the ruler's status and 
318 This is particularly surprising since Ibn al-Athir records the short warfare between Manuel and 
K1h9 Arslan II under the year 1173-1174, Miscellaneous events, which probably refers to Manuel's 
attack following the rapprochement between Klh9 Arslan II and Niir al-Din in 1173. "During this year 
the emperor of Byzantium crossed the Bosphorus and invaded the land of Qilij Arslan. Warfare 
ensued in which the Muslims were victorious. When the emperor saw his weakness, he returned 
home, after a large number of his army had been either killed or taken prisoner". Ibn al-Athir, 
Richards, Crusading Period 11, 228. 
319 The view of the Byzantine sources will discussed below in the chapter on the relations between the 
Rum Seljuqs and Byznatium. 
32° C. Hillenbrand, Manzikert, 157. 
321 Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 372. 
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power. It would be surprising if Kll~ Arslan did not use his great victory over the 
Christian emperor to present himself as supreme ruler and jihad warrior despite the 
fact that during his reign the ideological warfare between him and ·his Muslim 
neighbours was at its height. But, K1h9 Arslan did not lead any major campaigns 
against Byzantium and in fact regarded the Byzantines as allies and concluded peace 
treaties with them. K1l19 Arslan's visit to Constantinople in 1162 is an often quoted 
example for his diplomatic genius to secure peace with Byzantium. The raids 
undertaken against Byzantine territory in western Anatolia and the coastal regions 
were undertaken by Turkmen bands which mainly operated independently. 
It seems therefore safe to suggest that KI119 Arslan might have not exploited 
his victory against the Byzantine emperor extensively because he had no interest in 
waging jihad against the latter. The war was enforced on him by the Byzantine 
emperor he had no interest in continuing warfare in the west against the Christians 
and wanted a free hand to turn his attention back towards the east. It is telling in this 
context that the anonymous author continues his narrative stating that the sultan took 
Malatya and that his Muslim neighbours regarded him as their overlord. He 
emphasises that the Artukids of Diyarbaktr read the khutba in his name and that the 
rulers of Amid came to kiss the sultan's hand. The author reveals thereby that the 
submission of Muslim neighbours was far more important for K1h9 Arslan 11 then the 
struggle against the Christian enemy. It is evident thatjihad was not a cornerstone of 
Kilw Arslan 's ideology and that political and economic concerns played a more 
decisive role as the next part of this chapter will confirm 
K1h9 Arslan II and the 'Counter Crusaders' 
K1h9 Arslan 's seizure of Danishmendid territory in eastern Anatolia and his schemes 
for territories further east in Mesopotamia and northern Syria brought him into 
conflict with the so-called 'Counter Crusaders' Niir al-Din and later Saladin. As the 
'Counter Crusaders' for their part also had schemes for Mesopotamia and northern 
Syria it was inevitable that both sides would collide. The military warfare for 
supremacy between them was accompanied by an ideological warfare, as both sides 
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needed to legitimise their actions against each other. The following chapter will not 
concentrate on the military warfare between Kth9 Arslan and Niir al-D'in and later 
Saladin but on the ideological warfare. At the same time it is important to discuss 
which ideological concepts these rulers employed and why as this question has so far 
not been posed and discussed in any detail. 322 
Kth9 Arslan was the descendant of the rebellious line of the Great Seljuq 
dynasty which had usurped power in Anatolia as warlords. Hence the Rum Seljuq 
leader was in reality a warlord like the 'Counter Crusaders' but he was a member of 
the 'House of Seljuq' and hence of noble lineage. He was thus in a position to 
employ two ideological concepts, his noble lineage, andjihad. Because of his lineage 
he was able to claim to be a rightful Perso-Islamic ruler and heir to the Great Seljuq 
dynasty. Moreover, as direct neighbour of the Christian Byzantine enemy who had 
conquered new territory for Islam, KtlJ9 Arslan could claim to be a frontier warrior 
who safeguarded the Dar al-Islam from the Christian enemy. Niir al-D'in and Saladin 
in contrast were upstarts, the former was the son of the Zengi, a military slave 
commander of the Great Seljuqs and the latter was the nephew of Shirkuh, Niir al-
D'in's Kurdish lieutenant. Nur al-D'in and Saladin were aware of their lack of 
genealogy and thus an alternative ideology to legitimise their rule was formulated by 
their mainly Persian advisers. The most characteristic feature of this alternative 
ideology was the use ofjihad which allegedly transformed these fierce war lords into 
champions of Sunni Islam and 'Counter Crusaders'. Medieval Muslim chroniclers 
present both these rulers as military warlords who changed to pious Muslim rulers 
and thereby sidestep the question of their lineage.323 For the 'Counter Crusaders' 
jihad was very important as it was the only concept they could employ to legitimise 
322 Cahen in his work on the Rum Seljuqs, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, only very briefly narrates the conflict 
between the two Muslim rulers. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 105, 113-114; Lyons and Jackson in 
their book on Saladin and Kohler in his book Allianzen und Vertriige mention in passing KI119 Arslan 
in connection with Saladin's jihad propaganda. Lyons/Jackson, Saladin. The Politics of the Holy War, 
Cambridge 1982, 144, 148, (hereafter cited as Lyons/Jackson, Saladin); M.A. Kohler, Allianzen und 
Vertriige Zlvischen friinkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient Eine Studie iiber das 
zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin/ New York 1991, 318-
320, (hereafter cited as Kohler, Allianzen); Modem Turkish scholars do not share the theory of jihad 
propaganda as related by modem western scholars and thus do not discuss this question. Turan in his 
book on the Rum Seljuqs briefly relates the warfare between Saladin and Klh9 Arslan 11 and 
concludes his assessment on the latter's religious views stating that he was regarded by the Muslims 
as a fighter for Islam and a reformer of religion. Turan, Selr;uklular, 211-213, 235. 
323 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, The Cn1sades Islamic Perspectives, Edinburgh 1999, 134-145, 194, (hereafter 
cited as C. Hillenbrand, Crusades); £12, Salah al-Oin, 910. 
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their usurpation of power. At the same time it was an instrument to mobilise Syrian 
troops and unite them under their leadership. For K1h9 Arslan, on the other hand, it 
was easier to legitimise his rule as a member of the Seljuq dynasty, who had 
conquered Christian territory and not Muslim territory. Besides, the influx of more 
and more Tiirkmen bands into Anatolia made it easier for him recruit soldiers. With 
the prerogative of imperial lineage on his side Ktlw Arslan had an ideological 
advantage and was in a position to denigrate the claims of his rivals Niir al-Din and 
Saladin using their lack of genealogy against them. 
The fact that the source material for Ktlw Arslan is not nearly as rich as for 
Niir al-Din and Saladin makes it difficult to assess how far he used his ideological 
advantages against his Muslim rivals. Niir al-Din and Saladin in turn employed 
~Imad al-Din al-I~fiihani (d. 597/ 1201), an important Persian scholar who served 
both rulers as scribe and adviser and also composed chronicles and a biography for 
Saladin.324 Saladin's adviser Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad (d. 632/ 1234) also wrote a 
biography of Saladin.325 Moreover, Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1233) covers not only the 
reigns of Niir al-Din and Saladin in his universal history but also composed a 
dynastic history of the Zengids.326 Biographical accounts are "a most rare 
historiographical occurrence up to this period"327 and it is debatable how far they 
were initiated by Salad in himself. Nevertheless, it seems safe to suggest that Saladin, 
as well as Niir al-Din, consciously supported the compilation of these works. That 
both rulers sponsored an extensive jihad literature and religious institutions and 
buildings indicates that jihad was a cornerstone of their ideology. K1h9 Arslan, in 
contrast to his rivals, neither sponsored any jihad literature nor extensive building 
projects presenting him as jihad warrior. Moreover, there are no works of history 
composed later which eulogize K1h9 Arslan: this shows that he was most probably 
not remembered as an importantjihad fighter. 
Two points have to be therefore considered here. First, the richness of the 
source material for Niir al-Din and Saladin but the lack of source material for K1h9 
Arslan implies that jihad was not an integral part of his ideology and mentality. 
Second, it should be kept in mind that the sources for the Counter Crusaders are 
324 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Cn1sades, 171; eadem., Non-Greek Sources, 313-314, 334. 
325 Cf. C. Hill en brand, Crnsades, 171; eadem., Non-Greek Sources, 331. 
326 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Non-Greek Sources, 315-316. 
327 C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 171. 
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highly partisan and thus should be used with caution in respect to the information 
they give on Kthy Arslan. The lack of documents of diplomatic exchange that were 
composed for these rulers makes it difficult to double check the information provided 
in these biased sources. 
As has been discussed above, Kthy Arslan concentrated his military efforts 
on the submission of the Anatolian territories held by fellow-Muslim Turkish rulers 
and the consolidation of his power over Anatolia. He was not much concerned with 
leading jihad against Byzantium or supporting the jihad against the Crusaders and 
Frankish rulers and he maintained for the greatest part of his reign good relations 
with Byzantium. Kthy Arslan did not use his great victory over Manuel at 
Myriokephalon to crush the weakened Byzantine empire. Indeed it seems that Kthy 
Arslan, not only showed little interest in fighting the Christians but, he also did not 
see any great need for jihad propaganda. This is surprising when one considers that 
he was the direct neighbour of the Christians and that a precedent for such 
propaganda existed. Already under the Hamdanids jihad propaganda had been used 
to encourage the Muslims against the Christian Byzantines. But, as Carole 
Hillenbrand points out, jihad propaganda in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
became focused on Syria, the main battlefield against the Crusaders. 328 
Zengi, and not the Rum Seljuqs, was the first Muslim ruler to use jihad 
propaganda it in the war against the Crusaders.329 Nur al-Din, the son and successor 
of Zengi continued his father's legacy and established an extensive propaganda 
machine. Both rulers sponsored extensive building projects with many inscriptions 
sometimes of colossal size placed on them to promote their official ideology.330 Here 
the personal religious piety ofNur al-Din and Saladin is emphasized describing them 
as ascetic and pious mujahid warriors on the one hand and as just legitimate rulers on 
the other hand. Furthermore, in order to establish himself as the 'just king', Nur al-
Oin introduced a new institution, the Diir a!- 'ad! or Palace of Justice here he sat in 
328 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, 'Jihad Propaganda in Syria from the Time of the First Crusade until the death 
of Zengi: The Evidence of Monumental Inscriptions', in: The Frankish wars and their Influence on 
Palestine, K. Athamina/ R. Heacock (eds.), 1994, 63. 
329 See C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 101,103. In an inscription at Aleppo dated 537/August 11142 Zengi 
is called 'tamer of the infidels and the polytheists, leader of those who fight the Holy War, helper of 
the armies, protector of the territory of the Muslims". C. Hillenbrand, Cn1sades, 111. 
330 Monuments such as the high towering minarets sponsored by Nii.r al-Din for example carried a 
message. They demonstrated the triumph of Islam over Christianity; cf. C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 
129. 
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person with Muslim jurists and judges to listen to the petitions of his subjects.331 In 
the first years of his reign Niir ai-Din build the Diir a/- 'ad/ in Aleppo and one in 
Damascus in 1163. Accordingly, the titles used by Niir al-Din and Salad in 
emphasised their dedication to jihad, their affirmation of Sunni orthodoxy and their 
establishment of justice. 332 
K1h9 Arslan II and Nur al-Din 
Kthcy Arslan's accession was accompanied by the usual Seljuq succession struggle 
but he had been appointed by his father as he was obviously the strongest candidate 
and ruthlessly wiped out the internal opposition immediately. He could, however, not 
easily rid himself of the external opposition of the Danishmendid ruler Yagtbasan 
and his supporter Niir al-Din. Both these rulers regarded the prospect of a strong 
Seljuq ruler in Anatolia as a threat to their power. Kthcy Arslan's objective in 
bringing all Turkish-held Anatolian territories under his control threatened the very 
existence of the Danishmendid polity. On the other, hand it would inevitably lead to 
a clash with Niir al-Din who aimed to bring the Syrian territories under his contro1.333 
Hence the northern Syrian territories were disputed territories between Kthcy Arslan 
and Niir al-Din alike and the Euphrates became the natural frontier between the two 
powers. 
When Kthcy Arslan acceded to the throne, Niir al-Din was already in office for 
a decade. He had established his power over most of Syria and now possessed great 
military strength. More importantly, Niir al-Din had extended the propaganda 
machine founded under his father and he claimed to be the real champion of Islam 
and warrior for the faith, despite the fact that he had up to then mainly directed his 
military activities against fellow-Muslims, and not the Franks or Byzantines. He 
justified his actions against fellow-Muslims by claiming that he had to force union on 
331 Cf. Holt, Cn1sades, 73; cf. C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 127f. 
332 For a discussion of Niir al-Din 's titulature see Y. Tabbaa, 'Monuments with a Message: 
Propagation of Jihad under Niir al-DTn (1146-1174)', in: The Meeting of Two Worlds Cultural 
exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades, ed. V.P. Goss, Michigan 1986, 
223-240. 
333 Cf. £12, Niir al-Din Mahmiid b. ZankT (Elisseeff). 
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the unwilling princes of Syria for the jihad against the Franks. The main objective for 
both sides seems to have been to secure their power over Muslim territories, K1h9 
Arslan in Anatolia and Niir al-Din in Syria. Thus they used every opportunity to 
interfere in the affairs of the other in order to expand their territories and to extend 
their sphere of influence. Each side was even prepared to ally with Christians against 
the other. Niir al-Din renewed his treaty with the Crusader state of Jerusalem and 
concluded another with Antioch to have a free hand and to make use of the dispute 
between Kth9 Arslan and Yagtbasan. Under the pretext of protecting the latter 
against the former he invaded Seljuq territories in eastern Anatolia and northern 
Syria. The Syrian chronicler Ibn al-QaHinisT reports the clash between K1h9 Arslan 
and Niir al-Din under the year 550/1155-56 stating first the following: 
"In the month aforementioned, news arrived from Aleppo of the outbreak of strife between 
the sons of the king Mas ~ ud [son of Qilij Arslan] after this death, the sons of Qutulmish, and 
the sons of Qilij ArsHin, and that al-Malik al- ~ Adil Nur al-Din, lord of Damascus and 
Aleppo, intervened between them in order to promote peace and reconciliation and to warn 
them against a dispute which would strengthen their Greek and Frankish enemies and 
embolden them to attack the Muslim fortress. He put out all his efforts to this end with 
admirable mediation and lavish gifts and gratifications, and peace was restored between 
them."334 
Our author is obviously partial towards Niir al-Din and claims that he acted as 
mediator between the Seljuqs in Anatolia in order to avoid a Christian attack on the 
Muslims. Despite the presentation ofNiir al-Din as the defender of Islam who sought 
reconciliation between the Muslim powers the author continues his report stating that 
he attacked K1h9 Arslan's territories: 
"In the month of Ramadan (began 9th October), further news arrived that al-Malik al- ~ Adil 
Niir al-Din had descended with his 'askar upon the territories belonging to the King Qilij 
Arslan, son of the King Mas'ud [b. Qilij-Arslan] b. Sulaiman b. Qutulmish, king of Quniya 
and the neighbouring lands, and had captured a number of its castles and fortresses by the 
sword and by capitulation .... The king Qilij Arslan and his two brothers, Dhu'l-Niin and 
Diilab (?), were engaged in warfare with the sons of al-Danishmand". "It fell out that the 
sons of the King Mas'ud were sustained with Divine aid against the sons of al-Danishmand 
and granted victory over their forces in a battle fought near a place known as Aqsara in 
Sha'ban 550 (began 30th September). When Qilij Arslan returned and learned of the action 
of al-Malik al- f Adil Niir al-Din in his lands, he considered it a detestable outrage in view of 
the treaty terms, truce, and marriage relations which existed between them, and wrote letters 
to him in a tone of censure, reprobation, menaces and threats. Nur al-Din replied to him with 
334 Jbn al-QaHinisT, Gibb, 324. 
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polite excuses and smooth words, and the situation between them remained unchanged on 
this footing. "335 
The second part of the report seems to be a more realistic version of the 
events and is confirmed by the Anatolian Christian authors Michael the Syrian and 
Gregory the Priest. While Ibn al-QaHinisl fails to mention the alliances both Muslim 
rulers concluded with the Christians Gregory the Priest does include this aspect to 
demonstrate the corrupt character of the Muslim rulers. He writes that K1h9 Arslan 11 
while on the campaign against the Danishmendids was informed of the invasion of 
Nur al-Din and returned to his lands and, 
"deliberated with the high officials of his court abut strengthening the peace he had made 
with the Franks and Armenians. Obtaining their assent in this matter the sultan one again 
sent his trusted envoys to Jerusalem, Antioch and to T'oros in order to conclude an 
unqualified peace treaty consented to by both sides. All this was not the result of the natural 
inclinations of the sultan's heart, for what has Christ in common with Belial? Now the 
reason [for the sultan's actions] was [to gain support against] the son of Zengi, who was the 
lord of Aleppo and the husband of his sister. After Sultan Masriid's death, the son of Zengi, 
scorning the son whom the late sultan had elevated to the throne of his realm, seized the 
territories of the Christians and, crossing over the frontiers established by Masriid, was able 
to capture the impregnable fortress-towns of Aintab and P'arzman, together with all their 
surrounding villages. The sultan Kilij Arslan wrote him many times saying: "Cease acting 
unjustly and return the territory which belongs to me and which my father established to 
serve as the border between me and you."336 
Under a different passage Gregory the Priest repeats himself and adds that 
Nur al-Din for his part sought the alliance of the Christians so that he could 
concentrate his efforts against Kth9 Arslan 11: 
"At the beginning of the year 604 [1155-1156] the son of Zengi bribing the king of 
Jerusalem and the lord of Antioch with large amounts of money, induced them to accede to 
his evil designs and made an alliance with them. The two rulers consented to his invading 
those Christian territories which formerly had belonged to the Franks. So the son of Zengi 
arrived before the renowned and great city of Aintab with a large number of troops and laid 
siege to it without delay."337 
335 Ibn al-QaHinisi, Gibb, 324-325. 
336 Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 269-270. Michael the Syrian, without mentioning the alliances, 
gives a brief account of the encounter between K1h9 Arslan and Niir al-Oin: "En 1 'annee 1466 { 1154}, 
mourut Mas'oud, sultan d'Iconium, et il eut pour successeur son fils Kilidj-Arslan. Comme celui-ci 
pouvait a peine defendre son pays contre les princes de la famille de Danismend, et surtout contre 
Ya'qoub-Arslan, Nour ed-Din marcha sur Pharzaman et 'Aintab, et il s'empara de ces villes sans 
combat". Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 312. Cf. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 281. 
337 Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 271. 
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We cannot be sure that Gregory the Priest had an exact knowledge of K1h9 
Arslan 's correspondence as he claims in the previously quoted passage. Yet, it 
confirms the vague information of lbn al- QaHinisi about the content of the letters 
from K1h9 Arslan and gives us an important clue of the diplomatic exchange between 
these rulers. We can see that both sides used diplomacy and ideology as a tool to 
outbid each other. According to these authors, KI119 Arslan accused his rival of 
injustice and breach of the treatises that he had concluded with his father. What is 
important to note here is that neither side seems to have used jihad as a means to 
discredit the other at this stage, as even Ibn al- QaHinisi does not include any concern 
for jihad in the information he gives on the letters. 
Indeed K1l19 Arslan and Nur al-Din continued their policy of consolidating 
their power over Muslim neighbours while the war against the Christians remained a 
secondary concern. In the year 55511160 while Ktlw Arslan was still trying to subdue 
the Danishmendids, Nur al-Din again took this as an opportunity to invade eastern 
Anatolia. Gregory the Priest informs us that Nur al-Din had concluded treaties with 
the Byzantine emperor and the Frankish king of Jerusalem in order to attack the 
Muslim territories.338 lbn al-Athir wrongly records the conflict under the year 
560/1164-65 and seems to have had little information about the relationship between 
the two rulers at his disposal. 
"This year there was a deep estrangement between Nur al-DTn Mahmud ibn ZankT, lord of 
Syria, and Qilij ArsHin ibn Mas~ud ibn Qilij ArsHin, lord of Anatolia, which led to warfare 
and mutual grudges. When news of this reached Egypt, the vizier of the Egyptian caliph, al-
338 "However, the lord of Aleppo, a torchbearer of his people, freed from the fear of a war and 
influenced by his evil brother and the Greeks who were in agreement with him, sent to the king of 
Jerusalem, requesting from him a four-month treaty of peace. Having bribed the king, [who was] an 
avaricious man, with a large amount of money and having outwitted him in every way, the lord of 
Alcppo went towards Harran, which he previously had turned over to his brother Miran. At this point 
there were certain slanderers who said that, when he was sick, his brother wanted to kill him. The lord 
of Aleppo, believing these treacherous individuals, went against Harran with a formidable army. After 
remaining there for two months, he captured it by assault, together with the neighbouring territories of 
Raqqa and Edessa; moreover he brought under his control all the places which had formerly shaken 
off his yoke. He came to the territory of Raban, which at this time belonged to the sultan, and captured 
it by assault. Then he went to Marash and captured this place also. Now when the emir who was the 
lord of Kesoun learned of the victorious successes of this despot, fearing that the lord of Aleppo might 
take his town also, he abandoned the sultan. Recognizing the suzerainty of the lord of Aleppo, the 
emir came to him while he was at Raban, and the two marched together against Marash and Behesni". 
Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 276-277. 
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Salih ibn RuzzTk, wrote to Qilij Arslan, forbidding this and ordering him to come to an 
agreement with Niir al-DTn."339 
It is noteworthy however that Ibn al-Athir remarks that the Fatimid vizier 
urged Kthc; Arslan to stop the internal conflict for the sake of jihad against the 
Franks. As a pro-Zengid chronicler he tries to put the blame for the inter-Muslim 
conflict on Kthc; Arslan claiming, that the Fatimid vizier addressed him rather than 
Ibn al-Athir. Abii Shama who wrote his work a few years later than Ibn al-Athir is 
also partial towards the Zengid ruler but concedes that the Fatimid vizier appealed to 
Niir al-Din to engage in jihad against the Franks.340 The fact that the extant sources 
favour Niir al-Din makes it difficult to give a complete picture of the ideological 
warfare between him and Kt he; Arslan. For the same reason we can also only 
speculate how the latter was viewed by his contemporaries. It seems that Niir al-Din 
was more prominent as fighter of jihad than Kt he; Arslan. 
Niir al-Din usedjihad propaganda against Kthc; Arslan when he saw the need to 
intervene in Anatolian affairs. The death of Yagtbasan and the weakness of the 
remaining Danishmendid princes enabled Kthc; Arslan to continue the annexation of 
the Danishmendid territories. The prospect of Kthc; Arslan controlling Malatya and 
thus the routes into northern Syria threatened Niir al-DTn and he did not hesitate to 
respond when the Danishmendid prince of Sivas (Sebastia) appealed for help against 
Kthc; Arslan. In 56811173 Niir al-Din sent a large army to Anatolia which recaptured 
Sivas and Mara~.341 However, neither side wanted to continue the warfare too far, 
because Kthc; Arslan was anxious not to overstretch his military strength and he 
preferred to reach a diplomatic solution especially as an agreement was concluded 
which did not weaken his position.342 Niir al-Din, on the other hand, was anxious not 
to lose the contact with his base in Syria which would have given Saladin an 
opportunity to proclaim himself as independent ruler. Another factor was that Niir al-
Din received news of the arrival of a new wave of Crusaders and therefore agreed to 
339 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Cn1sading Period, 11, 157-158. Ibn al-Athir records these events wrongly 
under the year 560 ( 1164-1165). 
34° Kohler writes that the Fatimid vizier reproached both, K1h9 Arslan and Niir al-Din in the year 1160 
for fighting each and not the Franks but he does not give any proof for this. Kohler's main aim is to 
prove that Nur al-Din used jihad propaganda for his political ends to unite Syria and establish his 
supremacy in Egypt and thus he is not concerned to analyse the relationship between the two Muslim 
rulers in any detail. Kohler, Allianzen, 225, 237-239. C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 137-141. 
341 Cf. Lyons/ Jackson, Saladin, 63. 
342 Cf. Holt, Crusades, 171. 
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peace. Noteworthy is that Nur al-Din accused Kthy Arslan of religious laxity and he 
was suspected of following the doctrines of the philosophers and of having 
abandoned the "Holy War" against the Byzantines.343 
Ibn al-Athir emphasizes that Nur al-Din agreed to peace because he wanted to 
settle the matter without hostilities, indicating that he wanted to avoid warfare 
between Muslims, and goes on saying that Nur ai-Din had received news about the 
Frankish advance. Nur al-Din allegedly wrote to Kthy Arslan: 
"You are a neighbour of the Byzantines but you do not raid them. Your lands are a large part 
of the lands of Islam. You must wagejihad with me'. He agreed to that and that Sivas should 
remain as it was in the hands ofNiir al-Oin's lieutenants, while belonging to Dhii'l-Niin."344 
That Nur al-Din expressed resentment at the friendly relations of Kthy Arslan 
with the Byzantines and invited him to join the "Holy War" against the Christians 
shows how he usedjihad to justify his actions against fellow Muslims. We have no 
record of the reply from Kthy Arslan and can thus only speculate on how far he also 
used jihad propaganda. He could certainly counter that Nur al-Din himself had also 
concluded alliances with the Christians and had abandoned the jihad. What is clear is 
how important the question of legitimisation for these rulers was and that they laid 
great importance on symbolic demonstration of the legitimacy of their "usurped" 
power. The fact that they sought the approval of the Abbasid caliph underlines this. 
Ibn al-Athir writes, for example, that Nur al-Din received from the caliph a diploma 
granting him the following: 
"While Niir al-Din was on his expedition, his envoy Kamal al-Din Abii '1-Fadl Muhammad 
ibn 'Abd Allah ibn al-Shahraziiri came to him from Baghdad, bringing with him a diploma 
from the caliph, granting him Mosul, the Jazira, Irbil, Khilat, Syria, the lands of Qilij Arslan 
and Egypt. "345 
Here Nur al-Din's territorial ambitions are clearly demonstrated and most 
curiously the lands of Kthy Arslan are included in the list. We have no evidence 
about the dealings of Kthy Arslan with the caliph but it is possible that he for his part 
343 Cf. Lyons/ Jackson, Saladin, 64. 
344 lbn al-AthTr, Richards, Crnsading Period 11, 213. 
345 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Crusading Period 11, 213; Ibn al-AthTr then writes under 'Miscellaneous 
events for the year' that Niir al-Oin sent this envoy with a message "which contained his duty to the 
caliph and an account of his efforts in the Jihad against the infidels and of his conquests and an 
request for a diploma for the lands he held ... ". 215-216. 
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asked the caliph for a diploma. As collections of these official documents were not 
made in the Muslim world, it is not possible to verify the claim made by Ibn al-Athir 
or to determine with certainty which of these rulers received which diploma from the 
caliph. We can be certain however that Ibn al-Athir is guilty here of exaggerating the 
status of his Zengid masters. It is very unlikely that the caliph would have had any 
interest in alienating the Rum Seljuq ruler. Nevertheless, Ibn al-AthTr's claims 
indicate that Nur al-DTn presented himself as a legitimate Perso-Islamic ruler and real 
champion of Islam. The title he used confirms this suggestion. Nur al-DTn dropped 
the title "atabeg" designating his position as guardian of Great Seljuq princes which 
his father Zengi had always used. It was the status as guardian of Seljuq princes that 
Zengi had come to power. By dropping this title Nur al-DTn claimed to be 
independent from the Great Seljuqs.346 Moreover, the inclusion of "Mosul, the JazTra, 
Irbil, KhiHit, Syria, the lands of Qilij Arslan and Egypt" in the alleged investiture by 
the caliph demonstrates his independence from the rest of his family, presenting him 
as overlord of Saladin in Egypt and KtltV Arslan in Anatolia. Nur al-DTn thereby 
presented himself as the strongest ruler in the Muslim world. 
KI119 Arslan II and Saladin 
The death of Niir al-DTn deprived the Danishmendids of their protector and gave 
Kthv Arslan a free hand against them. Kthv Arslan finalized the annexation of 
Danishmendid territories in 573/1178 by taking Malatya, the last Danishmendid 
stronghold. Meanwhile, following the death ofNur al-DTn, his lieutenant Saladin had 
started his campaign to establish himself as his former master's successor in a 
complicated diplomatic and military conflict with his master's family members, 
emirs, and the minor princes of Syria. 
Both rulers did not have a legal base for their rule and were usurpers of power 
and were therefore in need of justifying and legitimising their power. For Saladin it 
was even more difficult than for Nur al-DTn as he was just a military commander of a 
346 Cf. D.L. Patton, A History of the Atabegs of Mosul and their relations with the Ulama A.H. 521-
660/ A.D. 1127-1262, (New York University PhD 1982), 333-334. 
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master who himself had no right to kingship. He could be described as an upstart 
without a noble lineage to compete with Kthv Arslan. It could be argued that Saladin 
therefore extended the jihad ideology and propaganda to establish himself as warrior 
ofjihad and hence rightful heir to Nur al-DTn. Saladin claimed that his main aim was 
not personal gain but the unification of the Muslim territories for the jihad against 
the Franks. In the reply Saladin sent back with the envoy of Kthv Arslan he reveals 
his standpoint by stating that, 
"he would not permit mutual warfare between Muslim princes instead of uniting in the jihad, 
and that this own friendship or hostility depended upon their attitude towards the cause of 
God."347 
Before or during his attack on Malatya, Kthv Arslan had sent an envoy to 
Saladin to ensure that he would not intervene in favour of the Danishmendid prince, 
as Nur al-DTn had done. The attack of Kthv Arslan on the Danishmendid prince had 
no Muslim justification and was simply part of his expansionist policy. The motive 
behind Saladin's opposition was not entirely religious. Kthv Arslan's expansion 
towards upper Mesopotamia was a threat to Saladin's power but he used jihad 
ideology to express his opposition to the warfare of Kthv Arslan against a fellow-
Muslim. Saladin himself was at that time not predominantly engaged in jihad but 
was fighting fellow Muslims in Syria to secure his position using the same jihad 
ideology there.348 
After Kthv Arslan had secured Malatya, he directed his attention further east 
and demanded in 57411179-80 that the fortress Ra'ban should be restored to him. 
According to (Imad al- Din I~fahanT, Kthv Arslan argued that Nur al-DTn had taken 
the fortress without his permission and that now the latter's son, al-Salih agreed to 
give it back.349 This put Saladin in a difficult position as there was no legal base to 
refute the claim made by Kthv Arslan and he resorted to force and responded by 
347 As quoted by Gibb, The Life of Saladin, 35 footnote 1. Lyons and Jackson write that KI119 Arslan 
sent an envoy but they do not make the connection between the conquest of Malatya. Lyons/Jackson, 
Saladin, 137. 
348 Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 185; Kohler, Allianzen, 320. 
349 Cf. R. Se~en, 'imad Al-Din Al-Katib Al-isfahanl'nin Eserlerindeki Anadolu Tarihiyle ilgili 
Bahiseler ', in: SAD, 3 ( 1971 ), 266, (hereafter cited as I mad al-Din I~fahani, Se~en). 
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sending an army against him. 35° Kthc; Arslan's army at Ra'ban was decisively beaten 
by Saladin's forces. 351 At the outset this was a dispute over a fortress but there was 
more at stake than this, as both rulers were fighting for influence over the whole 
region of eastern Anatolia and northern Syria. What is important to observe here is 
that Kthc; Arslan was a strong rival whom Saladin could not ignore. So far this has 
not been recognised by scholars because of the later fame of Saladin. Kthc; Arslan 
not only had territorial and military power but he also possessed ideological 
advantages which posed a threat to Saladin. Saladin 's reaction to the expansion of 
Kthc; Arslan towards the east reveals that he regarded the latter as an equal opponent. 
Saladin risked losing his credibility as a warrior of jihad and losing control in 
Syria and Egypt for a campaign in upper Mesopotamia where there was no 
substantial territorial gain to be made. It is not convincing that Saladin did not want 
to abandon the Artuqid ruler who asked for his help and it seems more likely that he 
feared the ambitious expansionist policy of Kt he; Arslan. The possession of Malatya 
had clearly strengthened the position of Kthc; Arslan. Moreover, Saladin had n1ost 
probably been informed about the victory of Kthc; Arslan against Byzantium at 
Myriokephalon and that Kthc; Arslan knew that he had a free hand to expand into 
Saladin' s territory if he could win over the Mesopotamian and Syrian princes. It is 
surprising therefore that Saladin, at a time when his position was far from secured, 
claimed superiority over Kth<; Arslan claiming with this statement that it was within 
his capability to conquer the latter's lands. Kthc; Arslan in contrast was in a position 
from where he was able to better negotiate better. With his victory against the 
Byzantine emperor at Myriokephalon and with the subjugation of the Danishmendid 
principality he had become the ruler of most of Anatolia. 
In 576/1180 Saladin led an expedition in person towards the Euphrates 
against Kth<; Arslan despite other more pressing matters as his own official, al-Qa<;li 
al-Fa<fil, remarked at the time.352 The way, Saladin's biographers relate or chose not 
to relate this episode in upper Mesopotamia reveals the power struggle between the 
350 Lyons and Jackson write that "there is no recorded attempt to refute" Klh9 Arslan 's claim. 
Lyons/Jackson, Saladin, 137. 
351 Cf. Imad al-Din l~fahani, Se~en, 267; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 382; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 
309; Gibb, Saladin, 574; Turan, Selfuklular, 212; Lyons/Jackson, Saladin, 138. 
352 Saladin's administrator al-Qa<;fi al-Fa9il criticising him directly in a letter for not taking Sidon 
stated that it was "meaningless to concern himself with war against his fellow Muslims." As quoted 
by Lyons/Jackson, Saladin, 139. 
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two sultans. Saladin' s personal adviser and biographer ~ Imad al- Din I~ fah ani writes, 
that the Artuqid ruler Nfir al-Din Muhammad b. Kara Arslan (r. 562-58111167-1185) 
had married the daughter of Kthc; Arslan but that he neglected her in favour of a 
singing girl. But this daughter, he emphasizes, is from the 'House of Seljuq and the 
line of the sultanate'. This behaviour on the part of his son-in-law angered Kt he; 
Arslan, who sent out envoys with letters to threaten him. The Artuqid ruler sent 
Saladin letters asking for his help and affirming his innocence. Saladin asked Kthc; 
Arslan to restrain from his threats against the Artuqid prince but the former sent a 
reply full of threats with a list of his son-in-laws faults. ~Imad al- Din I~fahani 
continues: 
"In this letter Klh9 Arslan said: 'If you are the mediator between him and me then surely he 
has to pay me his debt. When I concluded the alliance with him I gave him a part of my 
territories as my daughter's dowry. If he does not agree with my condition then he has to 
return the places belonging to me'. We replied: 'You cannot touch him as we have made an 
agreement with him and we will not deter from the promise we have made' .... Kara Arslan's 
son feared his father-in-law [K1h9 Arslan] because his territories were near his lands. He 
could not find anyone who would help him and envoys and letters reached us one after the 
other. [Niir al-Din's] neighbours, members of the Artukid family and others he knew did not 
want to help him. Our sultan [Saladin] was loyal and decided to come to his aid."353 
In a somewhat apologetic manner ~Imad al- Din I~fahani inserts the 
information that Saladin concluded a peace treaty with the Franks, because they had 
asked for the treaty and they were prepared to fulfil Saladin's conditions. He writes 
that Saladin, finally "securing Syria", marched to the north and pitched his military 
camp at the Goksu.354 It is remarkable how this author glosses over the fact that 
Saladin concluded a treaty with the Christian enemy to lead an expedition against a 
fellow-Muslim. Obviously there was no Muslim justification for this campaign. Kt he; 
Arslan , however, could justify to some extent the attack on his Artuqid neighbour 
NUr al-Din by claiming that he was protecting his daughter and that he had a right to 
force him to keep to the terms of the marriage alliance. Saladin, on the other hand, 
had nothing to counter this claim. This might explain why the author avoids the use 
of jihad propaganda to justify Saladin's actions against Kthc; Arslan. However, 
Saladin must have been aware that he had to justify his actions against his fellow-
Muslim especially since he had promised the caliph the conquest of Jerusalem and 
353 Imad al-Din I~fahani, Se~en, 268. 
354 A river in upper Mesopotamia which flows into the F1rat/Euphrates about 50 km north of al-Bira. 
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was under pressure to deliver. 355 Most probably this was the reason why he sought 
the caliph's consent in a letter arguing that his financial situation did not allow him to 
fight the Franks and K1h9 Arslan at the same time and that he was thus forced to 
conclude a truce with the Franks.356 Saladin continued to use jihad propaganda to 
justify his actions in upper Mesopotamia, claiming in the same letter that K1h9 
Arslan had "broken the staff of Islam. "357 He maintained that "all our efforts are 
exerted to incline everyone to the Holy War."358 Yet, the only justification ~Imad al-
Din I~fahani gives in his account is that Saladin could not abandon someone who had 
asked for his support. Nonetheless, this author writes that after Saladin's conquest of 
the coastal towns in Palestine, K1h9 Arslan sent an embassy to offer an alliance with 
him. The leader of this embassy was Ikhtiyar al-Din Hasan b. Gufras'i, and 
according to ~Imad al- Din I~fahani, he was the most powerful Rum Seljuq official 
who had great influence over his master. Here Salad in's adviser wants to denigrate 
the status of Ktl19 Arslan as sultan claiming that this official who acted like a 
sovereign was the real holder of power over the Rum Seljuq realm. 359 
There is a hint in the report of ~ Imad al- Din I~fahani, which reveals that the 
real motive behind the whole conflict had to do with power politics and that Saladin 
feared K1l19 Arslan. The remark that the Artuqid prince Niir al-Din feared his father-
in-law because his lands were adjacent to the latter's implies that it was the 
expansionist policy of the Rum Seljuq sultan towards the east that lay at the heart of 
the conflict. The author does not mention the sultan's conquest of Malatya but it is 
clear that the Artuqid prince suspected that he would be the next target. Moreover, 
that he appealed to Saladin for help because no one in the region was prepared to 
help him indicates that the neighbouring rulers might have been under the influence 
ofK1h9 Arslan. At a time when Saladin's position was far from secured, KtlJ9 Arslan 
had defeated the Byzantine emperor decisive~y in 57211176 at Myriokephalon and 
with the conquest of the last Danishmendid principality had become the ruler of most 
of Anatolia. Moreover, Saladin had most probably been informed about the Seljuq 
victory against Byzantium and knew that he would have a free hand to expand into 
355 Cf. Kohler, Allianzen, 303. 
356 Cf. Lyons/ Jackson, Saladin, 144; Kohler, Allianzen, 304-305, 320. 
357 As quoted by Lyons/Jackson, Saladin, 144. 
358 Lyons/ Jackson, Saladin, 137. 
359 Cf. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, $e~en, 345. 
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Salad in's territory if he could win over the Mesopotamian and Syrian princes. It is 
not possible to determine what role the battle of Myriokephalon played but it is clear 
that the Rum Seljuq expansion of power did not just alarm the Artuqid ruler but also 
Saladin. 
The Artuqid principality represented an important buffer zone between K1h9 
Arslan and Saladin and thus the loyalty of its ruler and other princes in the region 
had become crucial. That Saladin received Nilr al-Din and his brother at his camp 
and "called them brother" and presented them with rich gifts worth 100.000 dinars as 
tlmad al- Din I~fahani testifies, shows how important the loyalty of these princes 
was. With this the author wants to demonstrate Saladin 's superiority, but it is striking 
that he avoids any comparison between the two sultans and does not mention K1h9 
Arslan again. Then, without any further explanation the author writes that finally the 
delegation led by the emir Ihtiyar al-Din Hasan b. Gufras'i finally came and that a 
treaty he had written was concluded between them and Saladin and that thus the 
dispute was resolved.360 In an attempt to connect this episode to jihad, the author 
continues his narrative stating that they then turned against the Armenians who had 
mistreated the Muslims. 
Ibn Shaddad, Saladin's second biographer, omits the episode of 576/1180 
altogether, according to Lyons and Jackson he does this because of the lack of any 
Muslim justification.361 Another motive might have been that the author did not want 
to reveal that his master Saladin felt threatened by K1h9 Arslan. For this reason, Ibn 
Shaddad puts the events into a chronology which fits his master's jihad ideology 
claiming that the Armenians were the reason behind Saladin's expedition to upper 
Mesopotamia: 
"He then learnt of the disorder in Syria and determined to return here, which return was for 
warfare against the Franks. Envoys of Qilij [KtlW Arslan II] came to him, requesting a treaty 
with the sultan and asking him for aid against the Armenians. The sultan planned to move 
towards the territory of the son of Leon to help Qilij Arslan against him. He camped at Qara 
Hisar and the troops of Aleppo under his command, because he made that condition when 
peace was made. They assembled at the Blue River [Goksu] between Bahasna and Mansiir's 
Fort [Adtyaman]. From there he crossed the Black River [Karasu] and raided the territory of 
the son of Leon, taking from the enemy a fort which he destroyed. They offered him [return 
of] prisoners and sued for peace, whereupon he withdrew. 
360 Imad al-DTn I~fahanT, $e~en, 269-270. 
361 Cf. Lyons/Jackson, Saladin, 148. 
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Then Qilij ArsHin made overtures concerning a general peace treaty for all the eastern 
princes. Peace was concluded and the sultan took an oath on 10 Jumada I 576 [ 1 October 
1180]. The peace treaty covered Qilij Arslan and the rulers of Mosul and Diyar Bakr. "362 
According to this version of events, Kthv Arslan asked Saladin for a treaty and 
help against the Armenians and therefore Saladin, who had returned to Syria to fight 
the Franks, undertook the military expedition as far as the Goksu. Kthv Arslan is thus 
presented as one of the inferior 'princes' who depends on the help of sultan Saladin. 
Not surprisingly, the author refers to the Rum Seljuq sultan just by his personal 
names and neither lists his honorifics nor his ancestry. This is no doubt because that 
would show that Kthv Arslan was a rival sultan, who was moreover, the descendant 
of the Great Seljuq sultans whereas his master was an upstart. Nevertheless, Ibn 
Shaddad attests the real motive behind the expedition. He finishes his report stating 
that a peace treaty was concluded with Kthv Arslan and the rulers of Mosul and 
Diyarbaktr and in a follow-up account about Saladin' s return to Egypt he repeats that 
"peace had been made through Qilij Arslan." The terms of this treaty are not given 
by (Imad al- Din I~fahani and Ibn Shaddad, except for the latter's remark that the 
sultan took an oath. It is, however, evident that Saladin could not have assumed 
supremacy over Kthv Arslan though his biographers and even Ibn al-Athir suggest 
this. It is thus worth quoting here Ibn al-Athir's version of the events which he 
recounts in some detail under the year 57611180-81: 
"Messengers went to and from between them but there was no settlement of the matter. 
Saladin made a truce with the Franks and marched out with his troops. Al-Malik al-Salih 
Isma'Il ibn Nfu al-Din Mahmiid was ruling in Aleppo, so he left it on his left hand and 
marched by Tel Bashir to Ra'ban, where Nfu al-Din Muhammad came and joined him. 
When Qilij Arslan heard that he was close by, he sent his senior emir to him, saying, 'This 
man had done such-and-such to my daughter. It is imperative to attack his lands and teach 
him his position.' After the envoy had arrived, he met with Saladin and delivered his 
message. Saladin became furiously angry and said to the envoy, 'Say to your master, "By 
God, besides whom there is no other god, if he does not retire, I shall set out for Malatya, 
which is two days' march away, and only when I am in the town shall I dismount from my 
horse. Then I shall attack all his lands and take them from him.' The envoy recognized a 
serious situation. He rose and left Saladin. He had seen his army, its strength and brave 
array, the quantity of its weapons and mounts and such like. He had nothing to match it. He 
realized that, if Saladin attacked them, he would take their lands. The next day he asked for a 
meeting. He was summoned and said to Saladin, 'I wish to say something on my own 
initiative, which is not a communication from my master.' 'Speak,' said Saladin. He went 
on, 'My lord, is it not bad for such as you, one of the greatest and most powerful of sultans, 
362 D.S. Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, Aldershot 2002, 55. 
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that people should hear it said of you that you have made peace with the Franks, abandoned 
the holy war and the interests of the kingdom, turned away from everything in which lies 
salvation for you, your subjects and the Muslims at large, gathered troops from regions far 
and near, taken the field and spent vast sums, both you and your troops, for the sake of a 
harlot singing girl? What will be your excuse before God Almighty, the caliph, the princes of 
Islam and all the world? Grant that no one is confronting you with this, but do they not know 
that this is how the matter is? Suppose that Qilij Arslan had died and that it is his daughter 
who has sent to you asking for protection and requesting you to procure her justice from her 
husband. If she did so, the expectation is that you would not reject her.' 
Saladin said, 'By God, the truth is with you. The matter is as you say, but this man came 
to me, relied on me and it is bad for me to desert him. You meet him and settle the situation 
between you as you wish. "363 
Thus the pro-Zengid author Ibn ai-Athir in contrast to Saladin 's two contemporary 
biographers includes concerns for jihad in his account of the expedition in 576/1180. 
Through· this alleged statement made by Kt lW Arslan' s envoy he voices his critique 
of Saladin. He doubts Saladin's commitment to jihad and regards the efforts put into 
the expedition in the north to support the Artuqid ruler against Ktlw Arslan as 
disproportionate especially in the face of financial problems in Syria. Ibn ai-Athir 
claims that the Rum Seljuq envoy reproached Saladin because he "abandoned the 
holy war and the interests of the kingdom" and "spent vast sums" when they were 
needed elsewhere. Moreover, the envoy goes so far as to ask Saladin how he will be 
able to justify before the caliph and God that he fought a fellow-Muslim instead of 
the infidels.364 Despite his criticism, however, lbn al-Athir too "sees Saladin as being 
full of zeal for waging jihad."365 Indeed, he implies that Saladin was the stronger 
party in this conflict, stating that he was confident enough to threaten Kthv Arslan 
that "if he does not retire, I shall set out for Malatya, which is two days' march 
away." The author implies that Saladin's military might made the Rum Seljuq envoy 
realise that "he would take their lands" if he wanted and therefore he managed to 
reach an agreement. 
A further example which indicates that the relationship between Saladin and Kthv 
Arslan was dominated by power political concerns is shown by their conduct during 
the Third Crusade. This crusade led amongst others by the German Emperor 
Frederick Barbarossa gave Saladin the opportunity to voice his claim to be the real 
363 Ibn al-AthTr, Richards, Cn1sading Period, II, 271-272. 
364 Cf. Kohler, Alianzen und Vertriige, 318. Kohler states that Kilic Arslan made this statement 
through his envoy. 
365 C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 182. For a complete discussion of the medieval Muslim sources on 
Saladin and jihad see ibid. 180-183. 
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champion of Islam and Holy War, as Kthv Arslan was in diplomatic contact with the 
German Emperor. 366 Kthv Arslan had asked Saladin in 58611190 for help against the 
Crusaders but he had probably already promised Frederick Barbarossa free passage 
through his lands. The conflict between the Crusaders and the sultan's eldest son in 
Konya together with his Tiirkmen was his son's fault. Indeed in his later years he 
was dominated by his son Qutb al-Din Malikshah.367 
To sum up this discussion, it is evident that all extant Muslim sources are partial 
to Nur al-Din and Saladin rather than K1h9 Arslan and they misrepresent the power 
balance between the two rulers. Nevertheless, from the information they give it can 
be easily gleaned that the Counter-Crusaders regarded Kthv Arslan as an equally 
powerful, if not stronger rival. There is no extant record of the letters written and the 
envoys sent in the name of the Rum Seljuq sultan but it seems safe to assume that he 
used jihad propaganda, at least to some extent, to counter Saladin's claims. It has to 
be conceded, however, that he never established a propaganda machine as Saladin 
had established and that he was indifferent to the situation in Syria. The jihad against 
the Franks in Syria or indeed the jihad against the Byzantines does not seem to have 
been high on his agenda. In fact the evidence available suggests that did not even 
fully use his 'great' victory against the Byzantine emperor Manuel in 57211176 at 
Myriokephalon for jihad propaganda. 
III.2. Ghiyath al-Din Kay Khusraw I 
(588-593/1192-1197 and 601-608/1205-1211) 
Ghiyath al-Din Kay Khusraw came twice to the throne and reigned each time for 
about five years. Hence, he did not reign for a long period but his reign is important 
for the later apogee of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. It was during his reign that all the 
influences, the Persian, Byzantine, and Turkish which affected the development of 
the Rum Seljuq sultanate became evident. At the same time the structures of Rum 
Seljuq government and how it was run and who actually were the people who run it 
366 Cf. Holt, CnJsades, 171-172. 
367 Cf. Imad al-Oin I~fahani, Se~en, 350. 
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became evident. These structures would remain the same under the rule of the two 
sons of Kay Khusraw, Kay Kawfis and Kay Qubadh, who ruled after him in turn and 
whose reigns mark the zenith of Rum Seljuq power. The most striking feature of the 
Rum Seljuq sultanate is the extent of power exercised by the Rum Seljuq officials. It 
seems safe to assume therefore that even though the medieval authors, especially by 
lbn Bib I, present the sultans as Perso-Islamic monarchs, who ruled over a united 
sultanate, they were not autocratic rulers. Thus the Rum Seljuq sultanate at the time 
of Kay Khusraw can still be regarded as a confederation of provinces. The uc (border 
regions), especially the former territories of the Danishmendid principality, were 
dominated by the descendants of that dynasty and they interfered successfully in 
state affairs. Moreover, the emirs and notables of all towns, especially the capital 
Konya and Kayseri, not only seem to have played a decisive role in the running of 
the Rum Seljuq state but they also acted as sultan makers. This chapter aims to 
reconstruct, as far as the sources allow, how the above mentioned influences 
manifested themselves in the ideology formulated under Kay Khusraw. 
The first reign of Kay Khusraw (588-593/1192-1197) was overshadowed by 
the succession struggle which had started already during the last years of the reign of 
Kthc; Arslan. Kay Khusraw was the youngest son of Kthc; Arslan and had been 
assigned the western province Burglu (Uluborlu/ Sozopolis) on the border with the 
Byzantine empire. Cahen suggests that he was allotted these lands probably because 
he had a Christian Byzantine mother. 368 Kt he; Arslan, who had been expelled from 
Konya by his son Qutb al-Din Malik Shah who held Sivas and Aksaray as appanage, 
went from one son to the other until he found refuge with his youngest son Kay 
Khusraw. The latter supported his father against his brother and tried to reinstate him 
in his capital Konya, and probably in return for this support Kthc; Arslan designated 
Kay Khusraw as his heir to the throne. Ibn Bibi omits these events and starts his 
narrative stating that Kthc; Arslan chose Kay Khusraw as his successor even though 
he was the youngest because he regarded him as worthy for kingship. 369 According 
368 Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 114. 
369 Cf. Ibn BTbT, Duda, 17-18. The internal strife and the wandering life of Klhc; Arslan are described 
by the Christian authors Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus. See Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 
405, 410; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 341. Among the Muslim sources al-l~fahanT for whom Klhc; Arslan 
was the rival of his master Saladin mentions the internal strife. •Jmad al-DTn al-I~rahanT, $e~en, 360-
361. 
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to Ibn Bibi, Kthy Arslan left the throne to his son Kay Khusraw before he died and 
made his officials take the oath of allegiance. But al-I~fahanT writes that Kthy Arslan 
died while Kay Khusraw with the help of the uc Turkmen was trying to reinstate him 
in Konya and was attacking Aksaray. This author states that Kay Khusraw entered 
Konya after his father died and asked the notables to recognise him as the new 
sultan.370 
Kay Khusraw, however, was not capable to get his supremacy recognised by 
his brothers who contested his succession. The struggle for the throne continued and 
when Qutb al-Din died in 593/1197 Rukn al-Din Sulayman Shah seized the Rum 
Seljuq throne and Kay Khusraw first retreated to his territories in Uluborlu but was 
then forced to flee. Ibn Bibi describes at length the exile of Kay Khusraw and how he 
finally found refuge in Constantinople and after the city was taken by the armies of 
the Fourth Crusade he found refuge with the Byzantine lord Maurozomos.371 What is 
important to observe here is that Kay Khusraw, whose own territories bordered 
Byzantium, most probably maintained close relations with the Byzantines and at the 
same time with the uc Ti.irkmen. Hence it seems safe to assume that he must have 
been under the influence of both sides and that Byzantine Christians as well as 
Ti.irkmen emirs played an important role.372 
Indeed that the uc Turkmen and the descendants of Danishmend played a 
decisive role in the return of Kay Khusraw to the Rum Seljuq throne demonstrates 
that the Turkish element was still effective within the Rum Seljuq State. 373 Ibn Bibi 
writes that after the death of Sulayman the emirs Niih Alp, Mende, and Tornik who 
had come from Tokat to serve the sultan, put his little son Kthy Arslan Ill on the 
throne and acted as his regents. He then states that Mu?affar al-Din Mal)miid, Zahir 
al-Din In, and Badr ai-Din Yiisuf, the sons of Yagtbasan, did not agree with the 
accession of Kthy Arslan Ill, the son of Sulayman because they were friends of Kay 
Khusraw. These three brothers were the commanders of the troops of the uc and they 
370 Ibid., 361. 
371 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 23-31. 
372 The refuge of Kay Khusraw in Constantinople and his relations with the Byzantines and Christians 
in general will be discussed within the chapter, The Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium. 
373 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 37; lbn BTbi, Oztiirk, 97; Bar Hebraeus writes: "And one ofthe Amirs of lUG 
[ uc ], a great country of the TURKOMANS which was on the border of the GREEKS, sent and had 
brought to him GHA Y ATH AD-DIN KAI KESR0, who was a fugitive to the GREEKS. And many 
troops were gathered together to him and they went and encamped against ICONIUM." Bar Hebraeus, 
Budge, 360. Wittek, Toponymie, 23-24. 
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won over the other emirs of the region through oaths and written treaties and then 
sent the chamberlain Zakariyya' to bring Kay Khusraw back from his Byzantine 
exile.374 Obviously the descendants of the Danishmendid dynasty still held power 
over the territories which were formerly part of the realm of their dynasty as emirs 
serving under the Seljuqs. Hence the question of succession reveals that it was the 
high-ranking emirs who in fact held the reins in their hands and were able to act as 
sultan makers in order to realize their own goals. Moreover, the emirs did not just act 
out of personal interest when they decided who should become sultan but they were 
considering what would be good for their respective provinces. It seems that 
independent from them the provinces had established local interest and that therefore 
it can be argued that the Rum Seljuq sultanate remained a confederation rather than a 
centrally organised state. 
The fact that the population of Konya resisted the entry of Kay Khusraw into 
the town indicates that the town, or better its notables, were in a position to negotiate 
their interests with a throne pretender. It is interesting that Ibn Bibi admits that Kay 
Khusraw destroyed the fields surrounding the town and that he killed the qadi when 
he finally entered the town. 375 The author explains that the sultan blamed the qadi for 
the town's rebellion because he had expressed in a fatwa that Kay Khusraw was not 
worthy to become sultan, as he had maintained friendly relations with unbelievers 
(Byzantines) and had violated religious commands.376 These episodes imply that Kay 
Khusraw was ruthless like his father Kthc; Arslan and also arouse doubt about his 
religious conviction. At different places in his report on the reign of Kay Khusraw, 
Ibn Bib I presents him as an ideal Perso-Islamic ruler who was pious and just. It is 
striking, however, that the author does not give a portrait of Kay Khusraw but he 
praises his education and piety when he writes that Rukn al-Din Sulayman Shah at 
first defended his father's decision to make Kay ·Khusraw heir to the throne even 
though he was young as he had mastered the Quran and also put his religious 
learning into praxis.377 Ibn Bibi quotes a long poem Kay Khusraw allegedly 
composed for his tutor and friend shaykh Majd al-Din Isl)aq to call him back from 
374 Cf. lbn BThi, Duda, 37. Ibn BThi does not give any other details about the chamberlain Zakariyya'. 
375 Ibid., 39-40, 43. 
376 Ibid., lbn BThi, Duda, 43. 




He also writes that Kay Khusraw spoke with his courtiers in Persian and it 
might well be that he had received a Persian and Arabic education but it is difficult to 
assess how far this sultan was influenced by Iranian ideals of kingship. The Persian 
scholar RawandT dedicated his history of the Seljuqs named Rii/:zat al-$udur to Kay 
Khusraw because as he himself states in his work there was no Great Seljuq sultan 
anymore. In contrast to Ibn BThT, RawandT is a contemporary but the nature of his 
work makes it difficult to deduce from it to what extent Rum Seljuq Anatolia at the 
time of Kay Khusraw was Persianised. 379 There is almost no historical data on Kay 
Khusraw to be found in the work of RawandT. Throughout his work the author gives 
panegyrics to this ruler and it is clear that for him the Rum Seljuqs were the heirs to 
the Great Seljuqs and "the new champions of Sunni Islam, and Konya the centre for 
the continuation of Persian scholarly traditions".380 The titles RawandT accords to 
Kay Khusraw and his presentation of the conquest of Antalya are evidence for 
this.381 
It is difficult therefore to deduce from these highly partisan sources what 
image and ideology Kay Khusraw used to legitimize his rule. The epigraphic 
evidence for the reign of this ruler is sparse but an analysis of what is extant is a 
welcome addition to draw a more complete picture. A close look at the coinage 
extant from the first reign of Kay Khusraw and from his second reign reveals that 
they have a few differences which expose the political realities of this sultan's rule. 
Kay Khusraw began to strike his first coins already during the first year of his first 
reign. All dirhams from this period which have come down to us were minted in 
Konya and are in accordance with Muslim models and thus just Arabic inscriptions. 
The earliest of these silver coins dates from 589/1193 and the latest from 594/1198382 
and there are also several which are not dated. 383 These dirhams from the first reign 
bear on the front the name of the caliph al-Na~ir and on the reverse the titulature of 
378 Ibid., 41-42. 
379 The work has "strong Mirror for Princes overtones, written in rhetorical style." C. Hillenbrand, 
Non-Greek Sources, 323. See also eadem., Seljuq historiography, 78. 
38° C. Hillenbrand, Seljuq historiography, 77. 
381 Among others RawandT designates Kay Khusraw as "the shelter of Islam and Muslims" See 
RawandT, Ate~, 19, 62, 133-134. The author even goes so far as to claim that because of the empire 
established by the Scljuqs the Byzantine emperors converted to Islam. Idem., 134. 
382 Cf. Giiler, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 66; Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 275-281. Aykut lists four dated silver 
coins and three undated ones whereby the last is dated 59411198 and Giiler lists five and has as last 
date 595/1199. 
383 Cf. Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 282-288; Giiler, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 67. 
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the sultan, "al-sultan al-mua??am Kay Khusraw b. Kth9 Arslan." During the second 
reign of Kay Khusraw more coins seem to have been struck and they stem not just 
from Konya but also Kayseri and Malatya and they date from the 601-607 I· 1205-
1211.
384 
The silver coins from the second reign also contain only Arabic inscriptions. 
The titulature of the sultan on these coins is the same with the only addition of the 
title Abu '1-fat/:z. It seems safe to suggest therefore that during his first reign Kay 
Khusraw was more or less only the lord over Konya and his authority was not 
recognised by his brothers who held the other provinces. At the same time coins were 
struck in Konya in his name even after he lost the throne and was exiled by his 
brother Sulayman, indicating that the town even after the latter's accession held to 
Kay Khusraw. From this it can be concluded that the different regions of the Rum 
Seljuq sultanate still acted independently from each other. 
During his second reign however Kay Khusraw was able to strike coins not 
just in Konya but also in the important towns Malatya and Kayseri. It is important to 
note in this context that Kayseri and Malatya as mentioned above were still 
dominated by members of the Danishmendid dynasty and other emirs of the Rum 
Seljuqs. At the same time it should be noted that immediately after his second 
accession to the throne Kay Khusraw allotted Kayseri and Malatya as appanages to 
his sons. lbn BThi states that (Izz al-Din Kay Kawiis received Malatya and (Ala al-
Din Kay Qubadh received the country of the Danishmendids with the borderlands 
(uc).385 Wittek claims, however, that this was not another division of the realm, as 
the sons of Kay Khusraw were only holding the position of province-governors and 
that the fact that the sultan minted coins in Malatya, the capital of his eldest son, 
already proves this.386 The coins are actually evidence that he minted coins in the 
provinces of both of his sons but this not conclusive evidence that Kay Khusraw had 
or aimed to have direct control over all the dominions which were in theory under his 
authority. 
384 Cf. Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 326-379; Giiler, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 77-84. 
385 Cf. Ibn BThi, Duda, 41. 
386 Cf. Wittek, Toponymie, 31. The Turkish historians Kafesoglu and Turan share this view. Kafesoglu 
writes in his article on the Seljuqs in the iA, without going into any detail, that "Kai-Khusraw sought 
to strengthen the unity established in Anatolia by Sulaiman-Shah." Kafesoglu as translated by Leiser, 
A History of the Seljuks, 72. Turan states that after the reign of K1h9 Arslan 11, the Rum Seljuq princes 
were not more than governors but does not elaborate on this point. Turan, Selr;uklular, 293-294. 
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Significant for the context of the present work is the question if Kay Khusraw 
aimed to establish himself as autocratic ruler and if he can be described as the first 
truly Perso-Islamic sultan of the Seljuq dynasty in Anatolia. In all probability he did 
not have an extensive building project and there are no elaborate and ambitious 
inscriptions extant from his reign. These points suggest that it was not his main 
concern to present himself as an ideal Persian king, though he was named after one 
of the mythical ancient Persian rulers and is likened to him by the chroniclers. 
The C::ifte Madrasa in Kayseri which is the first Seljuq madrasa in Anatolia is 
probably the only monument which was founded by Kay Khusraw. This construction 
includes a medical school and a hospital which was built on behalf of Kawhar 
Nasiba, the sister of Kay Khusraw. 387 The foundation inscription dated 60211206 
reads as follows: 
"During the reign of the great sultan Ghiyath al-Dunya wa'l-Din Kay Khusraw b. K1h9 
Arslan, may his rule be perpetual, this hospital was constructed following the will of the 
queen (I~mat al-Dunya wa '1-Din Kawhar Nasiba b. K1h9 Arslan, may God be content with 
them."388 
This inscription is especially important because it is the only inscription 
where we can be sure that Kay Khusraw might have decided the formulation of it. It 
is striking that the titulature included in this inscription is simple and only includes 
the title great sultan and the honorific and name of the sultan. This inscription pre-
dates the conquest of Antalya in 60111207 but it is still surprising that the sultan is 
not at least described as the protector of the faith or fighter against the infidel. 389 The 
other inscriptions dedicated to Kay Khusraw can be found on monuments 
commissioned by emirs in his service and they are not different from the above 
quoted one. An inscription of the Ulu Cami (Great Mosque) built by the 
387 See Aslanapa, Turkish Art and Architecture, 129; Turan, Selr;uklular, 292. Turan writes that 
Kawhar NasTba was the nurse of Kay Khusraw but the foundation inscription states that she was the 
daughter of Kthc; Arslan which proves that she was his sister. <;etin states that Kawhar NasTba, the 
sister of Kay Khusraw, died at the age of 26 or 27 of tuberculosis and that he therefore ordered the 
building of this complex. The author does not give any references, however, as to where he got this 
information from. <;etin, Selr;uklulu Miiesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, 294. 
388 RCEA, no.3616, vol. X, 9-1 0; For a Turkish translation of this inscription see, <;etin, Selr;uklulu 
Mi'iesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, 295. 
389 See Wittek, Toponymie, 30; Wittek, Fiirstentum Mentesche, 8. Wittek writes that Kay Khusraw 
after he had ascended the throne with the help of the Turkmen built a shrine for the hero of the frontier 
fighters Battal Ghazi. 
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Danishmendid emir Mu?:affar al-Din Ma}Jmud in Kayseri in 602/1205390 states the 
following: 
"During the reign of the great sultan Kay Khusraw b. K1h9 Arslan, to strengthen and support 
his life, this was constructed by Mu?affar al-Oin Mal)mud b. Yagibasan, in the year 602/ 
1206."391 
The emir Jamal al-Din Is}Jaq built a masjid in Konya, named after him which 
contains the following titulature for Kay Khusraw: 
"During the rule of the great sultan Ghiyath al-Dunya wa'l-Din abu '1-fat/:1 Kay Khusraw, this 
masjidwas built by Jamal al-Oin Isl)aq, the son ofthe emir Ali in the year 607/1210."392 
The only addition we can find in these inscriptions is the title Abu 'l-fat/:1, which is 
most probably used here to celebrate the sultan's conquest of Antalya. But here too 
any jihad related titles are missing. 
It is true that for a great part of his reign Kay Khusraw maintained friendly 
relations with Byzantium and that behind the conquest of Antalya in 60111207 were 
economic rather than religious considerations. In fact he might have realised the 
importance of maritime power because of his contacts with the Byzantines. The most 
obvious piece of evidence of the Byzantine influence can be seen on his copper coins 
which were most probably used for circulation among Christian subjects. These 
coins include images copied from Byzantine tradition, a seating ruler and a rider and 
thus were used to propagate the sultan's status to his Christian subjects.393 
Nevertheless, as has been shown in the chapter on Kth<; Arslan 11 and the Counter 
Crusaders, despite friendly relations with the Christians, Muslim rulers still presented 
themselves as jihad warriors. Moreover, the Muslim neighbours of Kay Khusraw 
390 Aslanapa writes "that this is merely a renovation inscription and the first mosque would naturally 
be connected with Yag1basan himself in the middle of the 12th century." Schottler suggests also that 
the Ulu Cami in Kayseri might have been built at the place of an earlier Danismendid construction 
dating from 1140. Schottler, Rumseldschuken, 54. However both authors do neither give any further 
explanations nor references for this building. 
391 RCEA, X, 9 (inscription no. 3615). 
392 RCEA, X, 48 (inscription no.3666); cf. also Loytved, Konia, 28. 
393 For the copper coins see Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 288-291 (first reign), 380-396 (second reign). It 
should be noted here that most of the coins minted during the second reign bear the title Abu '1-fat/:z, 
whereas the coins from the first reign do not have this additional title. Hinrichs, writes that it would be 
wrong to assume a connection of the title Abu '1-fatl:z with the second reign as there are also coins not 
bearing this title; cf. Hinrichs, Sultan und Kalif auf Miinzen der Seltschuken Anatoliens, 345. 
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such as the Artuqids and Ayyubids have left behind very ambitious inscriptions 
which also include jihad titles.394 lbn BTbi describes the conquest of Antalya in 
retrospect as jihad and it is most probably true that he founded minbars and mihrabs 
in Antalya but it is curious that he did not commission any monument as to mark his 
conquest as a great victory for Islam. 395 Kay Khusraw was killed in 608/1211 during 
the battle at Ala~ehir against the Byzantines where his army was victorious but took 
flight when he died. He was posthumously designated as martyr (shahld) as the 
inscription of his son ~Izz al-Din Kay Kawils shows. This indicates that jihad 
propaganda was still an important tool in the ideological warfare between the 
Muslim rulers but that it was despite this not used by Kay Khusraw. 
The deductions we may draw from these evidence with some certainty are 
that the ideological concepts employed by Kay Khusraw are not stated in an 
inscription, which is surprising when we consider the growing Persian influence. 
This is even more noticeable as an ideological concept was formulated under his 
father Kthc; Arslan and later under his sons as their inscriptions show. In addition it is 
almost safe to suggest that jihad was not part of the ideology Kay Khusraw even 
though he did undertake several expeditions against the Byzantines and he could 
have propagated himself as the defender of the frontiers especially as this concept 
was employed by his Muslim opponents. 
III.3. Rukn al-Din Sulayman Shah II (593-600/1197-1204) 
The reigns of Sulayman Shah 11 and Kay Khusraw I represent an important turning 
point in the history of the Rum Seljuqs. During their more or less a century-long 
presence in Anatolia, from the establishment of the principality of Nicaea by 
Sulayman I in 4 7311081 to the death of Kt he; Arslan 11 in 58811192, the Seljuqs had 
not even founded one single mosque, the main symbol of a Muslim state. Indeed, as 
already stated the first coins appeared in the second half of the 12th century. The 
394 The Ayyubid rival of Kay Kbusraw, al-Malik al-Adil in an inscription on the citadel of Damascus 
dated 606/ 1209, is accorded among other grandiose secular and religious titles "slaughterer of the 
infidel and polytheists". RCEA, (no. 3651 ), vol. X, 37. 
395 Cf. Ibn Bib I, Duda, 4 7. 
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influence of Iranian Muslim advisers and Byzantine nobles on the Rum Seljuqs 
which seems to have started during the last decade of the reign of M as ( ud was 
intensified. Following events occurring in the eastern Islamic territories in Khurasan, 
the rise to power of the Khwarazmshahs and then the Mongol invasions, the number 
of Persian officials and Tiirkemen groups migrating westward towards Anatolia 
increased and influenced developments in the Rum Seljuq polity. 396 The Muslim and 
Christian sources do not connect events in Anatolia to the events in Khurasan but 
give us some snippets of information on the Tiirkmen migrations. 397 Already the last 
years of the reign of K1h9 Arslan were marked by problems raised by the increasing 
number of Tiirkmen coming into Anatolia. 
On one hand, the Persian element and on the other hand however the Turkish 
element grew during the reigns of Sulayman Shah II and Kay Khusraw I, and their 
successors. With the incursion of Tiirkmen tribes the nomadic element in Anatolia 
intensified and this not only led to social unrest in Rum Seljuq Anatolia, especially in 
the border regions, but also influenced the ruling classes. 398 The situation arising 
from the Tiirkmen invasion almost replicates the situation in Anatolia a century 
earlier when the first waves of Tiirkmen bands infiltrated Anatolia. At that time the 
Turkmen bands were recruited by the Byzantines in their internal struggle for the 
throne and in this case the Rum Seljuqs deployed them in their internal struggle for 
the throne. It seems reasonable to suggest that the Tiirkmen bands did not just serve 
as a reservoir of manpower for the Seljuq ruling family but that many Tiirkmen were 
396 For the history of the Khwarazm Shahs in this period, cf., E/2, Khwarazm Shahs (.Bosworth). 
397 The problems raised by the movement of more and more Turcoman tribes from Khurasan 
westward into Azerbayjan, Syria and eastern Anatolia are evident in the following passages. Ibn al-
Athir under the year 58111185-1186 writes that disputes arose between them and the Kurdish tribes 
who lived in those regions. According to Ibn al-Athir the strife between the Ttirkmens and Kurds in 
the Jazira and Mosul started because of a minor dispute between the two groups. Yet his account 
reveals the wider impact of the Turcoman expansion whose causes lay in the conflicts caused by the 
Khwarazmians in Khurasan. 
"During this year there was the beginning of the strife between the Ttirkmens and the Kurds in the 
Jazira, Mosul, Diyar Bakr, Khilat, Syria, Sharaziir and Azerbayjan. Because of it a multitude beyond 
counting were killed. It lasted several years. Roads were made impassable, property plundered and 
much blood spilt." 
Ibn al-Athir, Richards, C111sading Period, II, 310. Bar Hebraeus includes this information give by Ibn 
al-Athir in his chronicle and adds that the Armenian and Syriac Christians in eastern Anatolia were 
killed or enslaved by the Tlirkmens. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 321-322. 
398 Bar Hebraeus informs us for example of Ttirkmen uprising in Cilicia in 583/ 1187: "And in that 
year a certain Turkoman shepherd whose name was RUST AM collected five thousand horsemen of 
the TURKOMANS, and a very large number of foot-soldiers, and went into CILICIA to loot and 
plunder the country". Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 328. 
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employed as emirs. As all our sources are written by Persian administrators who are 
anxious to mould the Seljuq rulers into the Perso-Islamic model of kingship they do 
not give us any information on how far their lifestyle and thinking remained Turkish. 
Only some casual references reveal the continued existence of Turkish traditions. 
One obvious demonstration of this is that Kt he; Arslan divided his realm according to 
the old Turkish tradition of family rule. Cahen states that Kthc; Arslan might have 
also considered the unrest of the Tiirkmen bands in Anatolia who could be controlled 
more easily by independently ruled strong provinces. 399 It would be probably better 
to suggest that the real reason behind the division was the Turkish concept of familial 
sovereignty, even though it seems to contradict the fact that Kthc; Arslan put much 
effort into uniting the Anatolian territories under his authority. 
At any rate it is difficult to assess to what extent the Rum Seljuq sultans 
maintained a Turkish lifestyle but it seems safe to suggest that it remained an 
important part of their self-image up to the end. Hence the information given to us by 
Ibn Bibi, one of the immigrant Persian men of the pen and at the same time the most 
important chronicler of the Rum Seljuq sultanate, will be used with caution. Ibn Bib I 
begins his narrative with the death of Kthc; Arslan and gives detailed portraits of the 
Rum Seljuq sultans reigning from that time onwards. Herein he uses the ideal of 
kingship as described by Firdausi in his Shiihniima as a criterion to evaluate the 
reigns of the Rum Seljuq sultans.400 This author and other Muslim as well as 
Christian authors however do not discuss the Turkish and the Byzantine influence on 
the sultans. 
The Persian and Muslim influence is most evident in the names Kthc; Arslan 
gave his sons. Ibn Bibi, the most important Rum Seljuq author, begins his narrative 
with the death of Kt he; Arslan and gives the following list of the division of his realm 
among his sons: 
"Rukn al-Oin Sulayman Shah governed Tokat [Ookeia] and its environs, Na~r al-Oin 
Barqyaruk Shah governed Niksar [Neocaesarea] with its environs, MughTth al-Oin Tughrul 
Shah governed Elbistan [Ablastha], Niir al-Oin Sultan Shah governed Kayseri [Caesarea], 
Qutb al-Oin Malik Shah governed Sivas [Sebastea] and Aksaray [Colonia Archelais], Mu~izz 
399 See Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, Ill. Unfortunately Cahen does not give any references for his 
statement and does not elaborate how he reached the conclusion that Klh~ Arslan divided his realm 
because of the Turcoman threat. 
400 lbn Bibi describes Firdausi as the leader of learned men of the Iranians and Arabs. Cf. Ibn Bibi, 
Oztiirk, I, 92. 
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al-DTn Qaysar Shah governed Malatya [Melitene ], San jar Shah governed Eregli [Herakleia 
Kybistra], Arslan Shah governed Nigde [Antigu], Ni~am al-DTn Argun Shah governed 
Amasya [Amesea], MuhyT al-DTn Masfiid Shah governed Ankara [Ancyra], and Ghiyath al-
DTn Kay Khusraw governed Burglu [Uluborlu/ Sozopolis]. They did not depend in any 
aspect on the divan of their father's sultanate for the governance of their territories. .. . They 
came once a year to their father's court and left for their lands after they had reached their 
intentions."401 
The Seljuq princes mentioned here all have an Islamic honorific with din 
(religion) prefixed to their personal names which are taken from Arabic, Turkish, and 
Persian. All personal names are suffixed by the Persian title shah, king and some of 
them contain the Arabic title malik (king). The names of the Seljuq princes is another 
indication that K1h9 Arslan was under the influence of Muslim Persian advisers and 
that he was prepared to adopt the Perso-Islamic ideology at least in outlook. The 
Rum Seljuq sultanate was in reality not more than a confederation of principalities, 
which resisted attempts by the supreme sultans to impose a more centralised 
authority. Ibn BThi states clearly that the sons ruled their respective provinces 
independently from the 'central government' of their father in Konya but seems to 
suggest that the divided polity was still a centralised Perso-Islamic state as he 
understood it. It will be argued here that the growing Iranian influence during the 
reigns of Sulayman Shah II and Kay Khusraw I spurred the development of the Rum 
Seljuq polity into a powerful Muslim state but that the Turkish and Byzantine 
influence also played a role. 
The reign of Sulayman lasted only seven years but he is one of the most 
important sultans of the Rum Seljuq dynasty. His importance has however so far not 
been recognised and even Cahen devotes just half of a page to the reign of this 
sultan402 • It was Sulayman established the unity of the Rum Seljuq realm which had 
been compromised by the division undertaken by his father K1h9 Arslan. He put a 
halt to the internal quarrels and established himself as supreme ruler and secured the 
sultanate internally and externally and thus made possible that it reached its apogee 
401 Ibn BibT, Duda, 19; see also lbn BibT, Oztiirk, 41. Klhc; Arslan's division of his realm among his 
sons as stated by lbn BibT is confirmed by Michael the Syrian, and Ibn al-Athir, both authors 
contemporaries to the events, and also Choniates. Even though the list of the Rum Seljuq princes in 
these sources is not identical with the list given by Ibn Bibi, the latter's list of eleven sons and their 
respective territories seems accurate because, as Wittek writes, they are also confirmed by coins and 
inscriptions. Wittek, Toponymie, 15. Choniates, Magoulias, 286; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, Ill, 410; 
For the list given by lbn al-Athir see Wittek, Toponymie, 16; Choniates, Magoulias, 286. 
402 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 115; idem, Formation, 42. 
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under Kay Qubadh ( 616-63411220-123 7). It will be shown here that the Persian and 
Byzantine influence increased but that the mentality of Sulayman was very similar to 
that of his father. He united the Rum Seljuq dominions with the same determination 
and ruthlessness as his father had done at the beginning of his reign. 
Sulayman continued his father's expansionist policies and it seems that for 
him as for his father the subjugation of Turkish rivals was the main concern. After he 
had taken the Turkish-he1d territories in Anatolia under his control he tried to expand 
into Christian-held territories, especially Georgia. As a scribe Ibn Bibi is not 
interested very much in political or military details of the reign of Su1ayman. He also 
glosses over the circumstances of how Sulayman subjugated his brothers to gain 
supreme rule. The Christian authors Choniates and Bar Hebraeus give us some 
information on how Sulayman put aside his brothers to gain supreme rule. 
"When Qutb al-Din departed this life, Rukn al-Din, who held sway over Dokeia, and 
Mas'iid, the ruler of Ankara, contended hotly over this satrapy. Rukn al-Din, who was more 
clever by nature and exulted exceedingly in warfare, outdistanced his brother and rival and 
carried off the victory. Since Mas~iid submitted and agreed to a covenant of friendship, the 
more powerful Rukn al-Din took possession of only a portion of Mas~iid's toparchy and 
allowed him to govern there as before. He was especially maddened, however, by 
Kayhusraw and suffered a burning passion for Ikonion, the paternal seat of government ... 
Through envoys he advised Kaykhusraw to withdraw from Ikonion and remove himself from 
all power if he wished to perform a good service and spare the cities and the individuals and 
nations therein from the horrors of war. Thus did the barbarian boast, unsurpassed in his 
arrogance, his eyebrows raised above the clouds in scorn, as he poured out and scattered his 
deadly venom in many directions. "403 
This Byzantine author recognises that Sulayman was a clever ruler and an 
excellent military leader; this helped him to force his rivals into submission. 
According to Bar Hebraeus, Sulayman even went so far as to kill one of his brothers, 
who, it seems, was powerful and not prepared to submit to his authority. 
"And in this year Sultan RDKN AD-DIN, the lord ofMELITENE and !CONIUM, took the 
city of ANCYRA from his brother, after he had warred against it for years, for it was very 
strong. And he brought out from it his brother and the two sons which he had, and he gave to 
them a fortress in the Outer Marches. And whilst they were going there he sent an army 
against them as if they had been highway robbers and killed them. Five days after his brother 
and his sons were killed, a disease of the colon attacked him and he died quickly. And there 
rose after him a young son which he had whose name was KELEJ 'ARSLAN. "404 
403 Choniates, Magoulias, 286. 
404 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 360. 
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These passages demonstrate that like his father Kth9 Arslan, Sulayman was a 
ruthless and determined military leader and that his main aim was to bring all 
Turkish-held territories under his control. Ibn Bib I claims that (Ala al-Din from the 
house of Saltuk,405 the lord of Erzurum, tried to evade the sultan's orders and was 
reluctant to take part in the campaign against Christian Georgia and that therefore the 
sultan deposed him as ruler and assigned his lands to his brother Mugith al-Din 
Tugrul Shah406• It is not possible to determine if Sulayman had greater political 
vision than his father Kth9 Arslan and if he aimed to establish a strong central Perso-
Islamic government and therefore strove to establish unity. The course of events 
indicates that he acted tactically to reach his goal. Nevertheless, what he really 
achieved was nominal overlordship as several of his brothers and other Turkish lords 
ruled over their own semi-independent provinces but recognised him as their 
overlord. It is also not clear how he would have regulated his succession if he had 
lived longer and had not left behind just an infant son. There is no conclusive 
evidence that he wanted to abolish the Turkish tradition of family rule and establish 
himself as an autocratic king in accordance with the Persian ideal of kingship.407 It is 
noteworthy that the son he left behind had the Turkish names of his father, Kth9 
Arslan and that he did not found any religious monuments. We can assume that in all 
probability Sulayman adhered to almost the same ideological concept as was 
formulated under his father. 
405 For the Turcoman dynasty of the Saltuk Ogulan see E/2, Saltuk Oghullari (Leiser). 
406 Ibn BibT, Duda, 35; Ibn BibT, Oztiirk, I, 93. The version of events given by Bar Hebraeus proves, 
however, that it was the aim of Sulayman to prevent any opposition by his Turkish rivals: "And in the 
year, when MU'IZ AD-DIN KAISAR SHAH was reigning in MELITENE, his brother RUKN AD-
DIN, Sultan, the son of KELEJ 'ARSLAN, attacked him, and he made war on the country and took it 
from him in the month of HAZIRAN (June) of the year fifteen hundred and eleven of the GREEKS 
(A.D. 1200). And MU'IZ AD-DIN KAISAR SHAH fled from before his brother to MALIK ~ADIL, 
his father-in-law; and ~ ADIL sent and made him to dwell in EDESSA and supplied him with 
provisions. And from there RUKN AD-DIN went to 'ARZAN AR-RUM. And there was in it a son of 
MALIK MAHAMAD, the son of SALT AK; now they belonged to a very old family (or, house), and 
had ruled over 'ARZAN AR-RUM for a very long time. And when its lord went forth to RUKN AD-
DiN in a kindly and humble manner, he seized him and shut him up in prison and took his city. And 
he also took I CONIUM from GHAY ATH AD-DIN KAI KESR0, his brother". Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 
350. 
407 Osman Turan claims that Sulayman abolished the ancient feudal Turkish tradition of collective 
sovereignty, which had been a factor of division in all previous Turkish states and that it never re-
appeared. This, he states, was the model for centralised government for the Ottoman Empire. As it 
will be shown in the following chapters, the Turkish tradition did persist and it was only the luck of 
circumstances which enabled the successors of Sulayman to be sole rulers. See Turan, Selr;uklular, 
264. 
138 
Unfortunately, however, the only inscription of Sulayman which has come 
down to us and can be found on the citadel in Niksar is not as extensive as the 
inscription of K1h9 Arslan. A direct comparison is thus not possible. This inscription 
is dated muharram 594 (November/ December 1197) and was most probably 
commissioned when he was the prince regent of the province. It is not completely 
legible but it contains the following titulature: 
"[lacuna] the subjugator (al-qiihir), pillar of state and religion (Rukn al-Dawla wa '1-Dfn), 
Abu Mu?affar Sulayman b. K1h9 Arslan.',4°8 
This inscription only includes the honorific of Sulayman and the title al-qahir 
which he already used as prince and which he continued to use when he became 
sultan, as his coinage shows. The coins of Sulayman bear the following titles: 
"The sultan the subjugator (al-qiihir), father of conquest (Abu '1-fat/:1), Sulayman b. K1h9 
Arslan, Protector of the Commander of the Faithful (Nii$ir Amfr al-Mu 'minfn).',4°9 
From this we can see that Sulayman continued the use of the title Abu '1-fatl:z 
employed by his father and that it goes without saying that he too presented himself 
as the supporter of the Abbasid caliph. In contrast to his father, however, Sulayman 
did not need to present himself as a jihad warrior. His father's great rival Saladin 
died shortly after the former and none of his successors reached the power he had. It 
seems to have been more important for Sulayman to demonstrate to his internal rivals 
his military might with the title al-qiihir. It is noteworthy in this respect that his 
brother, Mas~iid who challenged his authority and was eventually killed also bore the 
title al-qiihir. An inscription in the name of Mas'iid in Ankara dated safar 594 
(December/ January 1197-1198) reads: 
"The prince the subjugator (al-malik al-qiihir), the reviver of state and religion (Muhyi al-
Dawla wa '1-Dfn), the prince of Rum and the Greeks, Abu Nasr Mas'iid b. Klh9 Arslan',410• 
408 RCEA, VIlli, 218 (inscription no 3511 ). 
409 For the coinage of Sulayman see Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 292-325; Giiler, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 69-
74. Both these works list the inscriptions and images to be found on the coins and give also 
~hotographs of the coins but do not discuss them at all. 
10 RCEA, VIlli, 217-218 (inscription no 3509). 
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Mas'iid quite evidently challenged the central government with the ambitious 
claim that he was the prince/king of Rum and the Greeks. Besides he used the same 
title as Sulayman which explains why Sulayman later regarded this brother as a 
threat to his authority and did not tolerate him. This is however not enough evidence 
to prove that this ruler aimed to become an autocratic Perso-Islamic sultan. The 
information we can gather from the chronicles is not conclusive. 
Ibn Bibi is anxious to mould Sulayman into his ideal of ancient Iranian 
kingship and portrays him in the following lines: 
"The mighty sultan Rukn al-Din Sulayman Shah was such a ruler about whom the following 
is valid: A high tree such as had not risen in the garden of power of the children of KI119 
Arslan, probably even not in the garden of power of the descendants of Seljuq; he was in 
possession of a great fighting club (spirit), a great clemency towards the subjects, an 
immeasurable virtue, an infinite piety and morality ... shining in the different sciences and 
thirsty and thirsting for the wish to accumulate knowledge."411 
According to our Persian author, Sulayman was an exceptional ruler even in 
the line of all sultans descended from Seljuq, which implies that he was better than 
the Great Seljuq sultans Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. This underlines the sultan's 
noble lineage and puts him at the same time above the two greatest rulers from the 
dynasty. lbn Bibi accords the important qualities of an ideal Persian king, right 
religion, martial ability, clemency, and knowledge. To demonstrate how learned 
Sulayman was the author quotes a quatrain he allegedly wrote for his brother whom 
he killed and adds that those lines show his whole character. 
"0 Qutb (pole), like the heaven I do not turn my head from you, 
Until I have pulled you into the circle like the dots. 
Be the skin of my body stretched over the drum, 
If I do not pull your head from your forelock."412 
What is remarkable here is that the content of these lines seems to reflect the 
spirit of a Turkish warlord. The dots pulled into a circle, the body stretched over the 
drum, and pulling the head from the forelock are all elements from ancient Turkish 
traditions. Additionally to underline the sultan's love of learning, lbn Bibi states that 
he sponsored poets and learned men and gave vast amounts of money to famous 
411 Ibn BTbi, Duda, 31-32; Ibn BTbi, Oztiirk, I, 77-78. 
412 Ibn BTbi, Duda, 32. 
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poets who devoted poems to him.413 Then, to complete his panegync he uses 
anecdotes to demonstrate the generosity and justice of the sultan.414 Bar Hebraeus 
makes in his work a comment which puts a shadow on the description of Sulayman 
given by Ibn BihL 
"Concerning this SUltan RUKN AD-DiN it is said that he was very astute, and methodical 
(or, orderly) in his actions. He inclined to the opinions (or, teaching) of the foreign 
philosophers, and though he observed the form, he did not publish it openly"415 • 
The accounts given by the other Rum Seljuq chroniclers are very brief and 
descriptive. Aksarayi writes that Sulayman received three times the insignia of 
kingship, baldachin, and banner, from the Abbasid caliph and that he was officially 
recognised as sultan. The author continues that following his success in his lands the 
sultan attacked Georgia but he does not specify the internal achievements. He then 
took Erzurum and gave it to his brother Mugith ai-Din Tugrul Shah. The sultan then 
undertook with 20.000 soldiers another campaign against Georgia but was defeated 
and returned to Rum and died before he could take revenge for this setback. 416 The 
anonymous author does not devote a separate heading to the reign of Sulayman but 
includes his reign in the end of his record on K1hc; Arslan. Moreover the chronology 
and the details of the information he gives is confused and not in accordance with the 
records given by the other sources. Our author claims that K1hc; Arslan designated 
Qutb al-Din as his heir and sent him to Konya where he went and ascended the 
throne in Ramadan 585/1189. He then continues that after seven months the Franks 
took Konya but that the sultan defeated the Franks in 586/1190. Finally, he writes the 
sultan was poisoned by a certain Ibn A wariz. 417 
413 Ibn BTbi, Duda, 32; lbn BTbi, Ozttirk, I, 80. 
414 See Ibn BTbi, Duda, 32-33; lbn BTbi, Ozttirk, I, 79-84. 
415 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 360. 
416 Cf. Aksarayi, Ozttirk, 24; Aksarayli, Genc;osman, 128. According to Genc;osman's translation the 
no bet was sounded three times for Sulayman Shah in Konya and he received the insignia of rule from 
the caliph once. 
417 Cf. Anonymous, ed. Jalali, 83; Anonymous, Uzluk, 26. 
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IV. The apogee of the Rum Seljuq State 
Kay Kawfis and his brother Kay Qubadh ruled after the death of their father Kay 
Khusraw in turn from 608/1211 until 634/1237. Arguably, these two brothers are the 
'greatest' Rum Seljuq sultans and the period of their reigns represents the zenith of 
Rum Seljuq power. Yet, as already indicated in the previous chapter, these two rulers 
owed their powerful status to the achievements of their predecessors, their uncle 
Sulayman Shah and their father Kay Khusraw. More significantly, drastic 
transformations in the political landscape contributed to their success. On the one 
hand the Crusaders had turned against Christian Byzantium and the armies of the 
Fourth Crusade conquered Constantinople in 1204. On the other hand, the 'Counter 
Crusade' had lost its momentum and the Ayyubid state was divided among Saladin's 
successors. In the power vacuum that developed the Rum Seljuq state was 
transformed into a maritime state and the strongest power in Anatolia. The division 
of the remainder of the Byzantine Empire into two rival polities, the 'Empire' of 
Nicaea and the 'Empire' ofTrebizond, contributed to the Rum Seljuq conquest of the 
important sea outlets of Attaleia (Antalya) in 603 ( 1207), Sin ope (Sinop) in 611 
(1214) and Kalon-Oros ('Ala'iyya, modern Alanya) in 620 (1223).418 With the 
seizure of Sinop from the 'Empire' of Trebizond and the re-conquest of Antalya 
which had been recaptured by the Christians under Kay Kawiis the Rum Seljuq 
sultanate was able to control all important trade routes. This led to the economic 
expansion of the Rum Seljuq state and made it the wealthiest power in the region. 
Two Latin authors writing in the second half of the 13th century at a time when the 
Rum Seljuq sultanate was under Mongol control and in decline have left us 
descriptions of the great wealth of the sultanate and its highly developed towns and 
41
R Without giving any evidence Vryonis puts forward that: 
"'The disintegration of the maritime provinces was well underway by the end of the twelfth century, 
and it is quite likely that the Turkish conquest of the coastal regions might have taken place one 
century earlier than it actually did had it not been for the events attendant upon the Fourth Crusade. 
By the marshalling of their forces in Anatolia, the Byzantines halted the Turkish penetration after it 
had attained Attaleia (1207) in the south and Sinope (1214) in the north." Vryonis, Decline, 132. Holt 
writes that: "The capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade and the establishment of the Latin 
empire (1204) paradoxically strengthened the Byzantines against the Seljukids." Holt, Cn1sades, 172. 
That the conquest of Constantinople necessarily led the Byzantines to concentrate on their Anatolian 
territories is true but there are no indications in the sources that the Rum Seljuq rulers were able or 
made it their priority to seize sea ports in the 12'h century. Turkmen nomads were raiding the coastal 
regions already in that period but they were personal enterprises of these groups. 
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hinterland. Jean de Joinville writes: "At the time of our arrival in Cyprus the Sultan 
of !conium [Konya] was the richest ruler in all the pagan world."419 Simon de St 
Quentin states: "Erat quidem illud Turquie regnum nobilissimum et opulentissimum. 
Ibi civitates fere .C. exceptis castris et villis et casalibus."420 
The political and economtc transformations were accompanied by the 
transformation of Rum Seljuq culture. The number of Iranian bureaucrats, scholars, 
poets, Sufis and craftsmen from Persian territories especially Khurasan, who fleeing 
before the Mongol invasions sought refuge in Anatolia, grew substantially during 
this period. It was also during this period that the real development of the Rum 
Seljuq state took place, cities, especially the capital Konya, were developed and 
mosques, madrasas and caravanserais constructed. At this time the development of 
literature written in Persian began in Anatolia and was supported by the sultans 
themselves. The most important results of these developments were the further 
Persianisation and Islamization of the Rum Seljuq sultanate and thus the constitution 
of the sultanate as a Muslim state. As will be shown below both Kay Kawiis and Kay 
Qubadh were anxious to maintain good relations with the Abbasid caliph al-Na~ir. 
It has to be conceded, however, that the power structures remained 
fundamentally the same during the reigns of these two sultans. The leading emirs of 
the sultanate held the reins of the central as well as local governments in their hands. 
It is noteworthy that both Kay Kawiis and Kay Qubadh owed their succession to the 
emirs who chose them to be sultans and thus cannot in the strict sense of the word be 
regarded as autocratic rulers. Ibn Bibi, whose work is the main narrative source for 
the reigns of these two rulers, is highly partisan and presents these two sultans, and 
especially Kay Qubadh, as exemplary Perso-Islamic kings. As already noted, this 
author belongs to the group of the Persian men of the pen. His work represents first 
and foremost his attitude and his ideas of kingship and therefore must be read with 
special caution. Nevertheless, his work is of great value, as he was a member of the 
Rum Seljuq elite and the image of these rulers projected in his work is the officially 
propagated image. Besides, the author is not completely biased and includes in his 
419 Jean de Joinville, tr. M. Shaw as The Life of Saint Louis, Harmondsworth 1984, 199. 
420 Simon de St Quentin ed. J. Richard as Histoire des Tartares, Paris 1965,66. 
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narrative some information which exposes the political realities of the period and 
some of the real characteristics of the sultans. There is also some information in the 
Christian sources, such as Bar Hebraeus which helps us to confirm the information 
given by Ibn Bibi. The epigraphic source material for Kay Kawiis and Kay Qubadh is 
much richer than for their predecessors and thus we have more contemporary 
evidence which helps us to confirm the narrative sources written in retrospect and to 
draw a more complete picture of the self-image and ideology of these rulers. 
However, a first survey of the inscriptions reveals that they also should be handled 
with caution, as they were most probably formulated by men sharing the same ideas 
as lbn Bibi. 
The purpose of the following two chapters is to discuss if the development of 
the Rum Seljuq sultanate into the strongest power in the region led these two rulers 
to adopt a different ideology from that of their predecessors. How were the 
significant changes in the political landscape accommodated in the Rum Seljuq 
ideology formulated under these rulers? Did they have a different self-image from 
that of their predecessors as they were rulers of a powerful state? Did they try to cut 
back the power of the emirs and assume autocratic kingship in accordance with the 
newly won power of their state? 
IV.1. ~Izz al-Din Kay Kawlis I (608-616/ 1211-1220) 
That the question of succession following the sudden death of Kay Khusraw in battle 
was decided by the emirs shows the extent of their power. Kay Khusraw had allotted 
to each of his three sons one of the important towns of the Rum Seljuq realm. Kay 
Kawfis held Malatya, Kay Qubadh held Tokat, and the third son Kay FarTdun about 
whom not much is known was probably in Antalya. There are no indications that 
Kay Khusraw designated one among his three sons as his heir. The report of the 
succession given by Ibn BibT unveils that the emirs held the reins of power in their 
hands and acted as sultan makers.421 Three episodes described by Ibn BibT in 
connection with the succession dispute between Kay Kawiis and Kay Qubadh 
421 For the report of the succession dispute see lbn BThi, Duda, 51-54. 
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illustrate this clearly. The first of these is the report of how the heir to the throne was 
chosen by emirs of high rank. Ibn Bibi writes that the emirs of the sultanate, after 
they conferred about which of the three princes they should choose, agreed on Kay 
Kawus, who was the eldest son and at the time was in his province Malatya. Here lbn 
Bibi names only one of the emirs, Nu~rat al-Din al-I:Iasan b. Ibrahim the lord of 
Mara~, who apparently had the deciding vote and determined that Kay Kawiis should 
be the next sultan.422 He writes that the emirs went immediately from Konya to 
Kayseri and that within five days Kay Kawiis was brought from Malatya to Kayseri 
where he was crowned sultan. 
The second son Kay Qubadh, however, had won over his uncle Mughith al-
Din of Erzurum, the Danishmendid Z:ahir al-Din Ili, who controlled the border 
regions (uc), and Leo of Armenia and laid siege on Kayseri. Kay Kawiis then 
suggested that he should leave with his army and try to take Konya with the help of 
the emirs and troops of the uc. Jalal al-Din Qaysar, the governor of Kayseri, 
however, approached the sultan stating that he had a plan which would lead them to 
victory without engaging in combat. He won over Z:ahir al-Din HI and Leo, the allies 
of Kay Qubadh, and the latter was forced to flee to Ankara. Kay Kawus was thus 
raised to the throne by one faction of the emirs of the Rum Seljuq sultanate and owed 
his victory over his brother to them. In return for their support Kay Kawiis granted 
the emirs who had supported him high offices and governorship of important towns. 
lbn Bibi states that Jalal al-Din Qaysar was raised to the office of the perviine423 and 
that the other emirs received each a town, Zayn al-Din Bishara, Nigde, I:Iusam al-Din 
Yusuf, Malatya, and Mubariz al-Din Chawly, Elbistan.424 Kay Kawiis then went to 
the capital Konya where he was received by the important personages of the town 
and crowned as sultan. 
The towns, it seems, independently from the governors who ruled over them, 
acted in their own right as the third episode in the succession struggle shows. Kay 
422 It is interesting to note that lbn BibT accords the qualities of Persian king to Nu~rat al-DTn and 
likens him to the ancient kings Fandiin and Khusraw. The Persian author thereby indicates his 
approval that the choice of ruler should lie with the advisers of the kingdom. Ibn BibT, Duda, 50; In 
the original panegyric of lbn Bib I it is even written that not even rulers and sultans possessed the fame 
that Nu~rat al-DTn had won in this world. See for this lbn BibT, Oztiirk, I, 133. 
423 This is a title derived from the Persian term for butterfly. The perviine held a powerful office as the 
personal assistant of the sultan who conveyed his messages and distributed the favours. This office 
increased in importance during the Mongol protectorate. See Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 221-222. 
424 lbn BibT, Duda, 54-55. 
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Qubadh who had entrenched himself in Ankara presented a threat to Kay Kawiis, 
who, as lbn Bibi writes, was aware of this and thus ordered the emirs of the regions 
and commanders of the troops to assemble for the siege of Ankara. What is curious is 
that the town resisted for a whole year and that when they run out of provisions the 
townspeople started negotiations with the camp of Kay Kawiis. It is important to note 
that the emir Sayf al-Din Aybe led the negotiations with the townspeople, who only 
after receiving a written contract ensuring their demands, handed over the town. 
They had asked to be pardoned for their resistance and that Kay Qubadh should not 
be killed but taken into confinement.425 
From these descriptions given by Ibn BThi it can be deduced that the power of 
the sultan was limited by the emirs employed in the central government as well as the 
emirs who acted as local governors of the Rum Seljuq realm. The Rum Seljuq 
sultanate in this period can still be described as a confederation of provinces led by 
emirs who acted quasi-independently and determined the fate of the Rum Seljuq 
sultan. In theory, the emirs were serving the sultan but in reality they acted as local 
autonomous rulers. In reality, however, these emirs possessed great economic and 
n1ilitary power derived from the provinces they held as hereditary iqtas.426 It is also 
important to note here that Turkish emirs holding command over the Turkmen troops 
in the border regions (uc) as ever played a crucial role. It is therefore legitimate to 
infer that the Turkish element must have had some effect on the image and ideology 
of these rulers but our sources are silent about this. 
Ibn BThi presents Kay Kawiis as an autocratic Persian king and in a panegyric 
portrayal accords several characteristics of an ideal ruler to him. He includes in this 
list that the sultan was very generous, intelligent, that he possessed physical beauty, 
that he was an excellent archer, that he was a great patron of poets and learned men, 
and that the Rum Seljuq sultanate prospered under him and the people were happy.427 
The ultimate praise the author confers on Kay Kawiis is that: 
425 Ibn Bib I, Duda, 5 8-61; lbn Bib I, Oztiirk, I, 154-161. 
426 It is very telling in this respect that Ibn BTbT includes in his portrayal of Kay Kawiis that the iqtas 
allotted by the divan of this sultan were not changed or reduced in size and that when the holder of the 
iqta died it was inherited by his family. This passage is left out by the muhtasar but appears in the 
original work see Ibn BTbT , Oztiirk, I, 150. 
427 The muhtasar gives a shortened version of this portrait than the original work which includes the 
poem composed for the sultan by the daughter of the commander I:Iusam al-DTn and sent to him from 
Mosul, and the poem composed by Ni?:am al-DTn Erzincani. The original work also includes several 
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"His mind was as complete as the religion of Islam and his justice was like the shadow of 
the white cloud that pours showers over high and low."428 
The author concludes by stating that the sultan had been dressed with the robe 
of the futuwwa and that he had drunk from the cup of the muruwwa, thus claiming 
that he possessed the qualities of both the young and the mature man. According to 
Ibn Bibi, Kay Kawiis was an ideal Persian king and a Muslim ruler who was 
officially recognised by the Abbasid caliph al-Na~ir to whose reformed futuwwa he 
adhered429• In retrospect Ibn Bib I tries to mould this ruler into the Perso-Islamic 
model of kingship. But the author also criticises this sultan who he claims in the last 
year of his reign lost God's favour, as will be discussed below. Within his report of 
the Syrian campaign the author notes an incident which reveals a dark side of the 
character of Kay Kawiis. He writes that during the campaign against Aleppo 
following the capture of Tel Bashir the sultan was informed that the grave of 2ahir 
al-Din In was in that vicinity. 
"The sultan ordered that his grave should be rummaged and his crumbled bones taken out of 
the earth, thrown into fire and the ashes left to the wind. Through this the sultan cooled his 
anger. "430 
A look into the inscriptions dedicated to Kay Kawiis reveals that the 
ideological concept adopted during his reign is strikingly similar to that used by Ibn 
Bibi writing in retrospect. Therefore we can only draw a picture of the self-image 
and ideology which Kay Kawiis wanted to articulate to the public to legitimise his 
rule. A wide range of inscriptions carved during the reign of Kay Kawiis on different 
buildings in some of the major cities of the Rum Seljuq sultanate, such as Sinop, 
Antalya, Konya, Sivas, and Mara~, convey the official ideology and image of the 
sultan. The inscriptions on the city walls of the newly acquired towns of Sinop and 
more lines praising the sultan's justice, generosity, and achievements in respect to the prosperity of 
the state. See Ibn BibT, Duda, 55-57; Ibn BibT, Oztiirk, I, 141-151. 
42
ll Ibn BibT, Duda, 56; Ibn BibT, Oztiirk, I, 141. 
429 The caliph al-Na~ir in his attempt to institutionalise the futuwwa in order to achieve the unification 
of the central Islamic lands under his authority, his moral authority at least, tried to win over all 
Muslim rulers for his cause. Kay Kawiis for his part was happy to accept the futznvtva in return for the 
caliph's official recognition. For a discussion of al-Na~ir and the fiiluwwa see A. Hartmann, an-Nii$ir 
li-Dfn Allah (180-1225) Politik, Religion, Kultur in der spiiten 'Abbiisidenzeit, Berlin/ New York 
1975; EI2, Futuwwa, (Cahen/ Taeschner). 
430 Ibn BTbT, Duda, 84. 
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Antalya are particularly interesting in this respect. Following the conquest of Sinop 
the sultan ordered the emirs to repair its walls and they in turn commissioned 
inscriptions to be inserted on the walls to record their respective contributions .. Of the 
fifteen inscriptions preserved, thirteen are dedicated to the Rum Seljuq emirs and are 
dated 612 (August 1215).431 It is surprising that the sultan did not commission 
himself an inscription to commemorate his victory. However, all thirteen inscriptions 
of the emirs mention first the name of the sultan with his titles and then the name of 
the emir the town he governed and sometimes the office he held. Not all of these 
inscriptions are of the same length and the two longest among these are the most 
interesting as they include almost the complete protocol of the sultan, and it is thus 
worth quoting them in full here. The first of these inscriptions gives the following 
titulature for the sultan: 
"The victorious sultan, the king of the east and the west, the master of the kings of the world, 
the ruler of the Arabs and the Persians, ~Izz al-Dunya wa'l-Din, the refuge of Islam and the 
Muslims, the sultan of the land and the sea Abu 'l-fatb Kay Kawiis b. Kay Khusraw, the proof 
of the Commander of the Faithful."432 
The second of these inscriptions was commissioned by the emir of Malatya: 
"The construction of this tower ... with the blessing and order, with the permission of the 
victorious sultan, the greatest King of Kings (Shahanshah), possessors of the neck of the 
nations, ~Izz al-Dunya wa'l-Din, the pillar of Islam and the Muslims, killer of the infidels 
and the polytheists, the pride of kings and sultans, sultan of the lands of God, guardian of the 
worshippers of God, supporter of the caliph of God, the sultan of the countries of Rum, 
Syria, Armenia, of the land and of the sea, Abu '1-Fatb Kay Kawiis b. Kay Khusraw, the 
proof of the Commander of the Faithful, ... the emir the sipahsalar Husam al-Din Yiisuf al-
Sultani, ... Malatya. "433 
Special emphasis is laid here on attributes of legitimacy and sovereignty 
derived from ancient Persian titles of sovereignty and from Muslim titles received by 
the caliph. The integral parts of the ideology formulated under Kay Kawiis are not 
very different from those formulated under his grandfather K1h9 Arslan II and are 
expressed through almost identical phrases. The first significant element is the claim 
431 Cahen writes that the inscriptions of fifteen emirs are recorded but he gives no reference 
whatsoever for this statement. For a list of the Sinop inscriptions see the 1oth volume of the RCEA, 
(inscription no 3760 to 3774), 113-122. Here fifteen inscriptions are listed but the first of these 
(inscription no 3760, 113) is the dedication inscription of the architect. 
432 RCEA, X, 114 (inscription no 3761). 
433 RCEA, X, 118 (inscription no 3767). 
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to supreme kingship expressed in the second quoted inscription with the titles used 
by K1h9 Arslan II, "King of Kings" and "possessor of the necks of nations." In the 
first inscription the title "king of the east and west" which had been accorded by the 
Abbasid caliph to the first Great Seljuq sultan Tugrul reappears and in addition the 
title "master of the kings of the world" is used to reinforce the overlordship of the 
Rum Seljuq sultan. Unfortunately we cannot trace back why the engraver adopted 
certain titles. It is not possible to assess if they were just taken from a repertoire of 
titles and phrases generally used without any specific consideration on the part of the 
artist, or if in this case the sultan or emirs gave instructions as to which titles should 
be used. In either case the titles employed are very ambitious and exaggerate the 
extent of the authority of Kay Kawiis. 
The question is to whom was this propaganda targeted? The population of 
Sinop at the time of the conquest was pre-dominantly Christian Greek and would 
thus not have been able to read these inscriptions. That despite the extensive 
territorial ambitions the specifications are made that Kay Kawiis is the ruler of the 
Arabs and the Persians and the sultan of the territories of Rum, Armenia, and Syria 
indicates that the audience to whom these inscriptions were addressed were in the 
first instance his Muslim rivals. Sinop, a town on the Black Sea, lay far from any of 
his Muslim neighbours, but it was part of the propaganda to demonstrate the sultan's 
authority, especially in recently acquired frontier territories. In this way the extent of 
the sultan's realm and power was demonstrated to his rivals. In addition, a new title 
"the sultan of the land and the sea" is adopted. Thereby the Rum Seljuq sultan 
assumes an imperial status and the extent of the Rum Seljuq realm and his 
superiority over his Muslim neighbours are underlined. The territories claimed to be 
under the rule of Kay Kawiis reveal that the same territorial claims are made as under 
his predecessors and that the Rum Seljuq interest _was directed towards the east and 
hence Armenia and Syria. These last mentioned territories were contested by his 
Muslim rivals, as will be discussed below in connection with the campaign Kay 
Kawfis led against Syria. 
The second integral element of the ideology is the role of the sultan as the 
guardian of Islam and the helper of the Abbasid caliph. In all inscriptions the role of 
Kay Kawfis as the supporter of the caliph is included. Moreover, when analysing the 
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coins issued by Kay Kawiis, it is striking that pictorial images are omitted and that 
the name of the caliph appears on all of them, even on the copper coins.434 It may 
well be that the sultan did this to impress the caliph and win his favour. During this 
period the best way to win the favour of the current Abbasid caliph al-Na~ir was to 
join his reformedfutuwwa. lbn Bibi writes that Kay Kawiis send the shaykh Majd al-
Din Isl)aq to Baghdad with the message of the conquest of Sinop and to request the 
trousers of the futuwwa for him. 435 The author remarks that now that Kay Kawiis had 
conquered Sinop and thereby strengthened Islam he used this as an opportunity to 
send an envoy with this news and gifts to the caliph. The rivalry among the Muslim 
rulers is exposed here again, as the author begins his report with the remark that in 
those days the sultan received the news that al-Malik al-Ashraf, the Ayyubid ruler of 
Mayyafiiriqin, sent precious gifts to the caliph and in return received many 
favours. 436 Kopriilii argues, however, that Kay Kawiis must have sent the envoy to 
the caliph shortly after he ascended the throne in Konya.437 In the context of this 
study the question of when exactly the envoys were exchanged or in how far Kay 
Kawiis really adhered to the futuwwa cannot be discussed here.438 What is important 
to note here is that both sides seem to have been anxious to maintain good relations. 
The caliph al-Na~ir send back an envoy to Kay Kawiis with the trousers and an 
investiture letter for the futuwwa439 . Together with this the sultan received an 
434 According to the list given by Artuk the following coins are extant: fifteen dirhams issued in 
Konya between 607(8)-615/1211-1219; eleven dil·hams issued in Sivas between 610-61611213-1220; 
one dirham issued in Kayseri in 608/1211; one dirham issued in Tokat in 61011213; twenty-seven 
copper coins of which only three contain the issue, date and place, Si vas between 610-61411213-1218. 
See Aykut, Selfuklu Sikkeleri, 397-491. See also Giller, Selp1klu Sikkeleri, 85-89. 
435 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 68-69; Ibn BTbi, Oztiirk, I, 175-180. 
436 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 68; Ibn BTbi, Oztiirk, I, 175. 
437 Kopriilii writes that a passage in the Anis al-Kulub written by al-Anawi proves that the envoy had 
been sent to the caliph, on the occasion of the accession to the throne. Koprillii, 'Anadolu Sel9uklulan 
Tarihi'nin Yerli Kaynaklan', in: Belleten xxvii (1943), 484. See also Turan, Selfuklular, 298-299. 
Hartmann writes that in a letter the caliph confirmed that Kay Kawi1s had asked him to be invested 
with the insignia of the futuwwa already in the year 608 (1212). Hartmann, an-Na$ir li-DJn Allah, 108. 
438 The question of the futzrwwa (Turkish fiitiivvet) under the Seljuqs in Anatolia has not been dealt 
with at any length by historians of the Seljuqs. Cahen writes that Kay Kawi1s "remained faithful to the 
futuwwa as reshaped by al-Nasir and, although it is impossible to determine by what means, it can be 
accepted that as a result the organization of the futuwwa in Anatolia was stimulated, on lines possibly 
conforming more nearly with the Caliph's wishes than they did in the ancient towns where too rigid a 
tradition was dominant." Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 196; Turan in his work on the Seljuqs and 
Islam just makes passing remarks about how the caliph al-Nasir used this institution to extend his 
authority. Turan, Selfuklular Tarihi ve Turk-Islam Medeniyeti, 186-187, 225-226. 
439 The muhtasar of Ibn Bib I only states that the sultan received the investiture letter, kitab-i futuvvl,va, 
whereas in the original work the letter written in Arabic is reproduced. See Ibn BTbi, Duda, 69. In the 
endnote 3 7 Duda mentions how the caliph addressed Kay Kawiis in this letter. According to this the 
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investiture patent for his sultanate in which he was cautioned to execute the 
punishment instructions given by the Sharl'a law440 . This warning might be an 
indication that a laxity in the execution of the religious law in the Rum . Seljuq 
sultanate existed. It is, however, not possible to derive from the information given by 
Ibn Bibi and the phrases used in the inscription the religious zeal of Kay Kawiis. It 
was important for his public image to receive the official recognition of the caliph 
but his policies were not dominated by religious concerns. 
Ibn Bibi describes the conquest of Sinop as a victory for Islam but his report 
of the seizure of the town reveals that it was motivated by economic considerations 
rather than the expansion of the territory of Islam. The battle at Ala~ehir in 608/1211 
in which Kay Khusraw died was the last serious military conflict between the 
Byzantines and the Rum Seljuqs. Moreover, Kay Kawiis concluded a peace treaty 
with Lascaris the 'Emperor' of Nicaea that was to last for half a century except for 
the raids undertaken by the independent Turcomans who dwelt on the frontiers. Kay 
Kawiis had no interest in destroying the empire ofNicaea and expanding the realm of 
Islam.441 As for the other Christian principalities, the Empire of Trebizond, Georgia, 
and Cilician Armenia, the main aim of Kay Kawils was to be recognized as suzerain 
and thus secure his grasp over Anatolia, but not to wage jihad. Besides, the 
campaigns against the Armenians of Cilicia were undertaken in favour of the 
Frankish prince Bohemond IV and al-Z:ahir the Ayyilbid prince of Aleppo who was 
one of the allies of Kay Kawiis. Hence the expansionist policy of this Rum Seljuq 
sultan was led by power-political concerns and trade interests and the religious 
divide was easily overcome by Christians as well as Muslims. As in the time of Kthv 
Arslan and the 'Counter Crusaders', in most cases for the Muslim as well as the 
Christian rulers the main enemies were co-religionists who were greater rivals. Trade 
interests were more often than not the deciding factor, and not the question of 
sultan was designated as, "Izz al-Din the King (Malik) of Anatolia (Bilad ar-Riim), Abu'l-Mu?:affar 
Kay Kawiis b. Kay Khusraw b. Klh9 Arslan" and as "Izz al-Din Amfr al-Umarii ', King of Kings 
(Malik Mu/ilk) ... (al-Khawii$.~) Inanj Beg Aga Beg". It is noteworthy that the caliph alludes to the 
Turkish descent of Kay Kawiis and assigns Turkish titles to him which he most probably did not use, 
at least not in public, as there is no epigraphic evidence for them. Oztiirk translates the investiture 
letter for the futuwwa but he leaves out the second listed titulature. Ibn Bib I, Oztiirk, I, 178. 
44° Cf. lbn Bibi, Duda, 69; lbn Bibi, Oztiirk, I, 179. 




Kay Kawiis was happy to conclude trade treaties with the Cypriots and 
the Venetians guaranteeing them favourable conditions.443 
The conquest of Sinop from the Great Comneni of Trebizond, who were 
rivals of the emperors of N icaea, did not disturb the peace between N icaea and 
Konya. The acquisition of Sinop as outlet to the Black Sea was the logical next step 
after the acquisition of Antalya, as it was only the possession of outlets to both seas 
would enable the Rum Seljuqs to control the trade passing through Anatolia. 
Concerns for trade are not mentioned by Ibn Bib! who writes that the campaign was 
initiated by the attacks of the Byzantine ruler of Trebizond Alexius I Comnenos on 
the territories of the sultan. But he does not use phraseology describing Muslim -
Christian animosity or jihad in connection with this campaign. Furthermore, the 
author states that, after the town was taken friendly relations were assumed between 
Alexius I Comnenos and Kay Kawiis, although he underlines that the Byzantine was 
inferior in status.444 After the conquest of Sinop the churches were converted into 
mosques but this of course was the general procedure following the conquest of new 
territory to demonstrate Muslim domination and is not proof of the religious zeal of 
Kay Kawiis. Thus the superiority of the Rum Seljuq sultan is emphasized but the 
conquest of Sinop is not elaborated at any length in the inscriptions or in the 
narrative of Ibn BThl as a great victory of Islam over Christianity. From the thirteen 
inscriptions only the inscription of the emir of Malatya employs the ideological 
concept ofjihad using the epithet "killer of the infidels and the polytheists." 
In contrast to the Sinop inscriptions, in the Antalya inscription jihad IS a 
central element. Following the rebellion of the Christian townspeople of Antalya and 
the re-conquest of the city by the Rum Seljuqs an exceptionally long inscription was 
placed on its walls. This inscription comprises thirty-eight lines. Another striking 
442 As Cahen writes "The difficulty was that, in the Syro-Cilician political manoeuvres, Seljukids and 
Cypriots supported opposing sides. However, correspondence exchanged from 1213 to 1216 in 
increasingly specific terms made it possible to separate the problems and to ensure favourable 
conditions for trade between the two countries, while leaving each of them free to support or resist 
Leo I or his enemy Bohemond IV of Antioch, helped by the Ayyiibids of Aleppo." Cahen, Pre-
Ottoman Turkey, 122. 
443 For a discussion of the relationship between Kay Kawiis and Hugo, the ruler of Cyprus and the 
Venetians, see Turan, Tiirkiye Selt;uklulan Hakkmda Resmi Vesikalar, 108-137. A Turkish translation 
of four letters exchanged between Kay Kawiis and Hugo is given in ibid 139-143. 
444 Ibn Bib I claims that Alexius I Comnenos prostrated himself before the sultan and kissed the ground 
of humiliation and subjugation and that he stood at the stirrup of the sultan but that the sultan treated 
him in accordance with his standing as he assigned a seat to him higher than that of all of his emirs. 
Cf. Ibn BTbT, Duda, 65, 67. 
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point is that the Christian Greek inhabitants are addressed directly, though they 
would not have been able to read the Arabic inscription. In a self-laudatory fashion 
the victory of Kay Kawus over the Christians is described and his full protocol is 
gtven: 
"the shadow of God on the two horizons ... the great Shahanshah, the sovereign of the necks 
of the nations, the master of the Arab and Persian sultans, the king of the kings of the world, 
'Izz a/-Dunya w '1-Dfn, the refuge of Islam and the Muslims, the pillar of the triumphant 
empire (dawla), the glorifier of the eminent community, the rescuer of the flourishing nation, 
the sultan of the two seas, Abu '1-Fat/:z Kay Kawiis the son of the martyr (shah id) sultan Kay 
Khusraw, the son of the most happy sultan K1h9 Arslan, the proof of the Commander of the 
Faithful. ,,445 
The purpose of this inscription was to demonstrate the sovereignty and power 
of the Rum Seljuq sultan to the Christians and to warn them not to rebel again. At the 
same time, however, it is also a demonstration of the power of the Rum Seljuqs to 
the rival Muslim rulers. The Rum Seljuq sultan presents himself not only as an 
exemplary Muslim ruler but the epithet pillar of the empire seems to suggest that he 
is the supreme ruler of the Muslim Empire, hence of the whole of the Sunni Muslim 
lands. This imperial ideology is further strengthened by the assumption of the title 
"the sultan of the two seas (al-bahrayn)" alluding to the maritime power of the Rum 
Seljuq state. The epithet al-bahrayn was also used in the inscriptions on monuments 
built in the inner Anatolian strongholds of the Rum Seljuqs such as in Sivas, "the 
sultan of the land and the sea"446, and in Konya the Ala al-Din mosque has "the 
sultan of the land and the two seas."447 It seems that after the Rum Seljuq sultanate 
had been transformed into the strongest Muslim power in the region Kay Kawus 
thought to assume a role in accordance with this and to present himself as an 
autocratic king. On the dinar issued in Si vas in 615/1219 the titulature of Kay Kawus 
is extended to, 
"the sultan, through the favour of God, the victorious through the command of God ~Izz al-
Oin Kay Kawiis.'M8 
445 RCEA, X, 109-112 (inscription no 3757). 
446 RCEA, X, 146-147 (inscription no 3809). 
447 RCEA, X, 163 (inscription no 3835). See for this also Loytved, Konia, 32. 
448 For the liege of this coin see Aykut, Selr;uklu Sikkeleri, 397-398; For the German translation see 
Hinrichs, Sultan und Kalif, 345. 
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It is curious that even though Kay Kawiis was anxious to win the caliph's 
favour, as stated above, here the latter is taken out of the equation. The sultan claims 
here that his power is immediately derived from God without the caliph as 
intermediary to legitimise it. The claims made by this title seem to reflect the ancient 
Iranian tradition that, "the sultan [king] is the Shadow of God on Earth."449 The use 
of these titles here is extraordinary, and since they only appear on this single dinar it 
is difficult to assess their meaning. As this coin was issued in 615 ( 1219) after the 
conquest of Sinop and re-conquest of Antalya we can be certain that its purpose was 
to demonstrate the superiority of the Rum Seljuq sultan. In the old strongholds of 
Konya and Sivas, and especially in the newly acquired towns Sinop and Antalya the 
imperial ideology of supreme kingship was symbolised and propagated to internal 
and external audiences through architectural monuments and inscriptions. 
The invocation of jihad in the inscription of Antalya seems somewhat 
inappropriate and superficial, because the re-conquest of the town was crucial for the 
trade of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. As already noted in connection with the conquest 
of Sinop, the main motive of the Rum Seljuqs was not to wage jihad against the 
Christians and defend the Muslims but to secure the important sea outlets. It is thus 
surprising that, whereas in the inscriptions of Sinop only a jihad epithet was used 
once, now jihad epithets are adopted and Kay Khusraw is referred to as shahid. 
Hereby it is implied that Kay Khusraw, the father of Kay Kawiis, died waging 'holy 
war' against the Christians and that the latter is continuing the 'holy war'. Kay 
Khusraw is designated as shah id in all subsequent inscriptions. Yet for Kay Kawils 
as for his predecessors the control of Anatolia and influence over Muslim neighbours 
in the east played a greater role than the seizure of Christian territories. He continued 
the traditional Rum Seljuq policy of expansion towards the east. Like his 
predecessors he sought the alliance of his immediate neighbours in Anatolia in order 
to receive support against the Ayyilbids ruling in Mesopotamia and northern Syria. 
For this reason most probably he concluded a matrimonial alliance with the 
449 As cited from the Na$f}Jat al-muliik of pseudo - al-Ghazali by Lambton, State and Government in 
Medievallslam, 121. Al-Ghazali was one of the Muslim scholars who incorporated Iranian ideas into 
Muslim tradition. 
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Mengliclik dynasty and married the daughter of Dawiid 11 Bahram Shah, the ruler of 
Erzincan before his campaign into Syria. 450 
When al-Z:ahir Ghazi of Aleppo died in 61311216 he left as his heir a minor 
son, whose mother acted as regent. Kay Kawiis used this as an opportunity to 
interfere in Ayyubid affairs and seize some of their territories and thereby put a halt 
to the growing power of his main Muslim rival the Ayyiibid al-Ashraf. The titles 
claimed by al-Ashraf in his inscriptions reveal that he contested the power of the 
Rum Seljuq sultan.451 Kay Kawiis approached al-Af9al the Ayyiibid who was in exile 
in Samosata for support in a campaign against the principality of Aleppo and the 
territories of al-Ashraf. They agreed that al-Af9al would receive Aleppo and 
continue to recognise Kay Kawiis as his suzerain and that in return the latter would 
receive any lands that they would conquer east of the Euphrates. 452 
lbn Bibi devotes several pages to the Syrian campaign of Kay Kawiis and 
according to him it was the sultan's decision to take advantage of the weakness of 
Aleppo. It will be useful here to first summarise some of the relevant features of this 
account. The author starts by stating that the sultan desired the kingdom of Aleppo 
which in the past had belonged to his uncles on his father's side and that he 
approached for their advice the great emirs of his realm, Sal).ib Majd al-Din Ani, 
Malik al-Umara' Sayf al-Din Ajbe,453 Zayn al-Din Bishara, and Mubariz al-Din 
Chawly. According to the version of events given by Ibn Bibi, the emirs 
recommended that an attack on Aleppo would not be advisable because of several 
reasons. They pointed out that it would be a break of friendship because of the 
450 lbn Bibi naturally does not give the political background of this marriage alliance but it is 
interesting that he argues that the sultan wanted to marry the daughter of the Mengi.ici.ik ruler because 
of her noble lineage as she was "of the brilliant descent of the sultan K1h9 Arslan and root of Sel9uk". 
lbn Bib I, Duda, 77. 
451 For example in the inscription on the minaret in Mayyafiiriqin al-Ashraf assumes almost the same 
protocol: "the sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf, the learned, the just, the champion of the faith, the defender 
of the frontiers, Mu~affar a/-Dunya w '/-Din, the pillar of Islam and the Muslims, the lord of the 
nations, the King of the Arabs and the Persians, the Shah of the Armenians, Abu '1-FatJ:z Musa, the 
defender of the Commander of the Faithful, during the reign of our master the Imam Abu'l-Ma'ali 
Al)mad al-Na~ir li-Din Allah." Not only does al-Ashraf claim here to be the sultan ruling over Arabs, 
Persians and Armenians as Kay Kawus claimed but implies that he is the real defender of Islam. To 
underline his religious zeal the Abbasid caliph is mentioned by his name. RCEA, X, 76-77 (inscription 
no 3709). 
452 Cf. Humphreys, From Sa/adin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260, New York 
1977, 159. 
453 This was most probably a Turkish name and according to the spelling given by Ozti.irk it should be 
Ayaba (Turkish ay: moon). Cf. lbn Bib I, Ozti.irk, I, 201. 
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previously friendly relations between the Ayyiibid rulers of Aleppo and the Rum 
Seljuqs, that the child had been recognised by the neighbouring rulers, and that his 
mother was the daughter of the Ayyiibid sultan al- ~ Adil and would certainly. ask her 
brothers for support.454 Bar Hebraeus on the other hand states that the emirs advised 
the sultan that an attack on Syria was possible and that the sultan could use as a 
pretext the defence of the rights of the exiled Ayyubid al-Afc;lal.455 Ibn Bibi then 
writes that the sultan sent farmiins to emir Nu~rat al-Din al-I:Iasan b. Ibrahim, the 
lord of Mara~, the emirs of Malatya and Sivas as well as to the emirs of the uc to 
prepare their forces for the campaign and to assemble at Elbistan. The troops of the 
sultan annexed without any difficulty the fortresses Raban and Tell Bashir, where he 
appointed as governors the son-in-law and the brother of emir Nu~rat al-Din 
respectively.456 When the sultan was at Elbistan spies within his camp informed the 
malika and her nii 'ib Jamal al-Din Lu'Lu' that he was attacking Syria. They pleaded 
for help to al-Malik al-Ashraf, the brother of the malika, who came to Aleppo with 
many troops. 457 In the meantime, the malika also resorted to a ruse against the Rum 
Seljuqid sultan and it is particularly interesting what kind of trick was used according 
to our author. In order to create distrust between the sultan and his emirs the malika 
fetched a Rum Seljuq subject who was well informed about the names of all emirs. 
Then letters were composed which allegedly were replies to letters sent to Syria by 
the Rum Seljuq emirs and hidden somewhere, only to be found and brought to the 
sultan. The latter was furious but ordered that this incident should be concealed for 
the time being. On the following day Ibn Bibi writes that the vanguard of the sultan's 
army was defeated by al-Ashraf and several emirs were taken captive. It seems the 
sultan was undecided, not knowing if he should retreat or stay. The comment that Ibn 
454 See Ibn Bibi, Duda, 81-82. The muhtasar of lbn Bibi omits the argument that the malika could 
receive support from her brothers but it is included in the original work. For this see Ibn Bibi, Oztiirk, 
I, 201-202. 
~55 "And in the year Sultan ·1zz AD-DiN KAI KAOs, the lord ofBETH RHOMAYE, eagerly desired 
to reign over ALEPPO, for he saw that it was lacking a lord, and that a sucking child was proclaimed 
in it. And his nobles advised him that this could easily take place, 'if thou wilt take with thee this 
MALIK 'AFQAL, the son of SALAI:I AD-DiN, the lord of SAMOSAT A, and wilt pretend that thou 
art jealous on account of him who is wronged by his brothers, and wilt restore to him the kingdom of 
his father because he is the eldest son ofSALAI:l AD-DiN'." Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 372. 
456 See Ibn Bibi, Duda, 84; Ibn Bibi, Oztiirk, I, 205-206. 
457 Al-Malik al-Ashraf I Miisa b. al- • Adil I Mu}:lammad the ruler of the Ayyubid line in Diyarbalar 
(Mayyafiirqin and Jabal Sinjar). Cf. Bosworth, New Islamic Dynasties, 72. According to Humphreys 
Shihab al-Din Tugrul, the at a beg of Aleppo called on al-• Adil the sultan of Egypt for help but the 
latter sent his son al-Malik al-Ashraf I. Cf. Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols, 160. 
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BThi makes in this context is very telling. Al-Ashraf said at this point that the sultan 
probably wanted to continue the fight but that the emirs were probably holding him 
back. 
Without any further explanation the author concludes that Kay Kawi1s left 
and came to Elbistan. When the brother and son-in-law of emir Nu~rat al-Din handed 
over Raban and Tell Bashir to al-Ashraf and came to Elbistan, Kay Kawi1s ordered 
all emirs to assemble in the reception room as he was still angry about the letters. 
These letters were then presented to the emirs who protested their innocence but he 
ordered that they should be killed in a fire. Ibn BThi writes that the sultan was 
reproached by the hidden world of dreams and that he regretted the killing of the 
emirs. Because of that error he was afflicted by the hectic fever and he eventually 
died458 . Ibn BThi concludes his report stating that it can only be hoped that the 
sultan's good deeds in the beginning of his life will erase the sins committed in the 
last part of his life. 
Two relevant deductions can be drawn from this account. First is the author's 
indirect indication of the power struggle between the sultan and the emirs and second 
is the unveiled criticism of Kay Kawi1s. As already noted, the emirs ruled their 
respective provinces almost independently and it is again clear from this report that 
the sultan depended on their support for his campaigns. Even though the author 
emphasises the innocence of the emirs he gives at the same time some clues that they 
did not agree with the sultan's decisions. The emirs were probably not prepared to 
risk great losses and continue the campaign when they realised that the army of al-
Ashraf was stronger. Despite the great power held by the emirs in this instance the 
sultan demonstrated his superiority by giving them the ultimate punishment. The 
author is partisan towards the emirs and criticises the sultan for killing them without 
previous counselling and hence for his disregard of a 'good king's' duty to listen to 
his advisers or learned men. Thus the author uses this as an exemplary warning for 
present and future kings and claims that the sultan died from a terrible illness 
because of his reckless decision and in this way punished by God. For this reason 
probably the author omits the fact that Kay Kawi1s actually fell ill latter on the 
458 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 89-90. 
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revenge campaign he led against al-Ashraf and died.459 Hence Ibn Bibi indicates here 
that the sultan whom he at first praised as an exemplary king had lost his right to 
rule. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the significant changes in the political 
landscape led to a re-formulation of the official ideology propagated under Kay 
Kawiis. The significant changes in the political landscape which transformed the 
Rum Seljuq sultanate into a strong maritime power during the reign of this sultan 
were accommodated into this ideology. The analysis of inscriptions reveals that an 
imperial status for the Rum Seljuq sultan was assumed claiming kingship over 
Muslims and Christians. Furthermore, he was presented as the supreme Muslim 
ruler. At the same time a discussion of the narrative of the Syrian campaign given by 
Ibn Bibi has revealed that Kay Kawiis wanted to cut back the power of the emirs and 
probably wanted to establish a more centralised government. Thus it could be argued 
that the rise of the power of the Rum Seljuq sultanate led this sultan to assume in real 
political practice the role of an autocratic Perso-Islamic ruler which in theory was 
already claimed for his dynasty. 
IV.2. ~Ala' al-Din Kay Qubadh I (616-634/ 1220-1237) 
Ibn BibT who devotes a great part of his work to Kay Qubadh regards him as the 
'greatest' sultan not only of the Rum Seljuq sultans but of the whole Seljuq dynasty. 
Kay Qubadh is presented as the most exemplary Perso-Islamic king who ruled over a 
powerful state and as the supreme Muslim ruler who aimed to subdue the whole 
world. This image constructed by the medieval Persian author has been taken over 
uncritically by modem historians of Seljuq history. Cahen writes that Kay Qubadh 
was the most distinguished of the sultans of Rum but recognises at the same time 
that: "This glorious reputation he probably owed in part to the fact that he was the 
last of the Seljukids to die in independence, but also to the indisputable success of his 
policy and to his outstanding personality."460 However, Cahen neither discusses the 
459 See Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 375. Bar Hebraeus writes that when the sultan reached Malatya on his 
way to wage war against al-Ashrafhe fell ill and died of tuberculosis. 
46° Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 124; Cahen, The Formation, 52-65. 
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policy of Kay Qubadh nor his personality and merely analyses his military exploits. 
Moreover, he glosses over important aspects such as the fact that Kay Qubadh was 
the only Seljuq sultan who in the fashion of Byzantine emperors named a town after 
himself and erected a series monuments including a palace also named after him, 
Kayqubadiyya. It is true that Kay Qubadh was lucky to die before the Mongol 
invasion and was therefore remembered as the 'greatest' Rum Seljuq sultan. The 
success of the sultan's policy and personality are, however, disputable. First because, 
as already noted, the basis for the apogee of the sultanate had been laid down under 
his predecessors and second because the seeds of the downfall of the sultanate were 
sown during his reign. 
The Turkish historian Emine Uyumaz has written her thesis on Kay Qubadh 
and the political history of his time which is the longest and latest analysis of the 
reign of this sultan.461 The book is short but uncritical and does not add more 
information to what has been provided by Osman Turan in his book on the Seljuqs of 
Rum whose account of the reign of Kay Qubadh follows very closely the narrative of 
lbn Bibi without analysing the material critically.462 Moreover, the methodological 
and ideological approach taken by Uyumaz to the history of the Seljuqs is very 
similar to that of Turan, as she shares his anachronistic nationalistic concerns. 463 
Thus, to date, modern historians have provided accounts of the political history of the 
reign of Kay Qubadh whom they recognise as the most important Rum Seljuq sultan. 
None of the modern scholars have discussed, however, what singles out this ruler and 
nor have they questioned the ideology and mentality of this ruler. Moreover, modern 
historians have so far exploited the account provided by lbn Bib I for the reign of Kay 
Qubadh only as a source of political history and have hardly made any use of the 
epigraphic evidence. In respect of Kay Qubadh the work of Ibn Bibi has to be read 
with even greater caution, as his account of this sultan's reign is unequivocally 
panegyric. It should be also highlighted here again that both parents of the author 
461 Uyumaz, Sultan I Aldeddin Keykubad Devri Tiirkiye Selr;uklu Devleti Siyasi Tarihi (1220-1 23 7), 
Ankara 2003. It was not possible for me to look into the original thesis of Dr. Uyumaz and the copy at 
my disposal is the popularized form of the thesis which does not include any references. 
462 Turan, Selr;uklular Zamanmda Tiirkiye, Istanbul 1971, 325-402. 
463 Uyumaz concludes her book stating that her research based on the source material shows that •AHi' 
al-DTn Kay Qubadh I followed during his reign a consistent policy and that the matter he regarded as 
most important was to secure the continued existence of an independent Seljuq state of Turkey in the 
region and to take as much of the income of the international trade obtained on the trade-routes going 
through Anatolia. Cf. Uyumaz, Sultan I Aldeddin Keykubad, 101. 
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were employed by Kay Qubadh and that he was a member of the Persian 
administration of the Rum Seljuq state. Besides, he composed his chronicle after the 
Mongol occupation and he looks back at the period of Kay Qubadh as the lost golden 
age. He does not aim to give an account of events wanting instead the sultans of his 
time who were powerless puppets dominated by the Mongols and their equally 
incompetent advisers to learn from the example of Kay Qubadh. 
This chapter aims to give an analysis of the ideological concepts formulated 
under this ruler. The questions to be asked here are: Is Kay Qubadh the most famous 
Rum Seljuq sultan because he established himself as a supreme ruler in Anatolia? 
Did he consciously aim to become an autocratic Perso-Islamic king or was this the 
propagandistic image formulated for him by his Persian officials? 
lbn Bib I dedicates the most elaborate and glorifying of his sultan portrayals to 
Kay Qubadh, which reads like a eulogy that credits him with all qualities expected of 
an ideal Perso-Islamic king. The author claims that Kay Qubadh possessed 
exemplary religious zeal, justice, good character, courage, warlike qualities, physical 
beauty and that he was learned and well versed in the arts and sciences.464 This 
eulogy goes over several pages and is written in the author's usual bombastic style, 
but the following part of it is the most telling.465 
'"'They ask you about Durl-Qamain [Alexander the Great]. Say, 'I will tell you something 
about him. "'466 ••• from the extreme east to the extreme west the banners of Islam have not 
shaded a ruler like Sultan 'Ala al-Din Kay Qubadh b. Kay Khusraw b. K1h9 Arslan b. 
Mas'ud b. K1h9 Arslan b. Sulayman b. Kutalmt~ b. Arslan Isra'Il b. Seljuq. "Truly, the 
banner of Islam shaded no other Sultan, who was better suited through personal 
achievement, and through inheritance and who was better in matters of religion and sincere 
in strong faith, with wider knowledge, with immeasurable wealth, with greater power ... 
more sublime in kingship and rule, more severe with sword and lance, who was a greater 
protector of Islam and its followers and a greater opponent of polytheism and its professors 
than him"467 • His rank had risen to such heights that the Kings of the lands of the Believers 
and Unbelievers, from the farthest Abhaz to the Regions of the Hijaz ... from the Steppes of 
the Qipchaq to the Lands of Iraq, especially the Kings of Syria, regarded themselves as his 
chessmen and acknowledged his name in the khutba and on their coins."468 
464 lbn BTbT thereby follows the example ofNizam al-Mulk who composed for the Great Seljuq sultan 
Malik Shah the Siyasatnama where he credited his master with all the qualities expected of a Muslim 
sovereign. See Rosenthal, Political Thought, 82. 
465 See lbn BTbT, Duda, 98-101. For the original version of the author cf. lbn BTbT, Oztiirk, I, 239-247. 
466 Quran, 18, 82. 
467 Ibn BTbT writes that he has taken this quote from al-UtbT (d. I 036 or 1 040). 
468 lbn BTbT, Duda, 98-99. 
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Ibn BThi continues his panegyric by praising the justice of Kay Qubadh and 
then adds a eulogy given by the emir Jalal al-Din Karatay which will be discussed 
below. According to Ibn BThi, Karatay ends making the absurdly grandiose claim 
that the Prophet Mul)ammad was the seal of prophecy and Kay Qubadh the seal of 
kings. 469 Hence lbn BThi not only compares Kay Qubadh to Alexander the Great and 
claims that he was the greatest ruler of Islam but also indicates that no great ruler 
will follow him. Despite the exaggerations of the Rum Seljuq author it seems safe to 
suggest that Kay Qubadh was remembered as an exemplary ruler, as the Christian 
author Bar Hebraeus states: 
"was one by himself among the kings of his generation. He was alert in appearance, and 
perfect in mind, and pure in body. For he was exalted above all the foul passions wherewith 
the kings of the Arabs are accustomed to pollute themselves. He was fierce towards 
offenders, and in judgements just. He brought into subjection to his dominion many cities 
and fortified towns (or, citadels), and he made his power to spread abroad."470 
This is especially noteworthy since Bar Hebraeus praises no other Seljuq 
sultan in this way. However, it is important to see which ideological concepts Ibn 
BThi threads into this picture drawn in retrospect. First, the author highlights the 
noble lineage of the sultan by listing his descent down to Seljuq, the founder of the 
dynasty and stating that he was king also by right of inheritance. Second, Kay 
Qubadh is presented as the greatest protector of Islam and the Muslims and this 
claim is strengthened through the description of his exemplary piety. Third, Kay 
Qubadh is described as the supreme king who has subjugated all neighbouring rulers, 
Muslim and Christian. 
In fact it should be remembered that Kay Qubadh owed his power to the great 
emirs of the sultanate and the great success of his policies to the fact that the 
foundations for them had already been laid down before his reign. The course of 
action taken by the high-ranking officials of the sultanate following the death of Kay 
Kawfis reveals clearly that they were running the affairs of the sultanate. Kay Kawiis 
does not seem to have made any arrangements for his succession. He was still young 
469 lbn BTbi, Duda, 101. 
470 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 402. 
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when he died and left behind only minor sons the decision of the succession lay with 
the emirs alone.
471 
Ibn Bibi writes that immediately after the death of the sultan, 
"the emirs of the state such as [chashnigir] Sayf al-DTn Ajbe (Ay-aba), Sharaf al-DTn 
Mu}J.ammad Parwana, Mubariz al-DTn Chawly, [emir-i majlis] Mubariz al-DTn Bahram 
Shah, and [emir-i ahur] Zayn al-DTn Bishara concealed the death of the sultan and they 
conferred with Sa}J.ib Majd al-DTn Ant72 •.. They also conferred with the following 
personages as to whom they should put on the throne: Shams al-DTn I:Iamza b. al-Murajjad 
al-Tugra'i
473 
••• who in the art of circumspect writing and composition of poems had reached 
great heights ... and with the king of the noble lords Ni?am al-DTn A}J.mad, the AmTr-i 
rAri9
474
, known under the name son of the vizier Ma}J.mud, who was a second FirdausT in the 
composition of matnawfs ... and with Sa}J.ib Shams al-DTn-i Isfahani ... ',475 
That the death of a ruler was kept secret was an ancient strategy employed by 
the nobility within a state to ensure the succession favourable for them and also to 
forestall internal strife. The speed with which the emirs acted in order not to leak the 
information of the death of the sultan until they had their candidate recognised is 
striking. The continuity of the administration of the Rum Seljuq state was a factor 
which strengthened the notables, as the same personages who were already serving 
under Kay Khusraw are mentioned here. These emirs continued to act as powerful 
semi-independent local rulers jealous to keep that power. It is also important to 
observe that the civil and the military administration of the Rum Seljuq state 
conferred before a decision was reached, as some of the emirs mentioned were civil 
administrators serving in Konya. lbn BThi writes that some of the emirs suggested 
that Kay Farldun who was held captive in Koylu Hisar and was the youngest brother 
of Kay Kawiis should be the next sultan. It seems, however, that the deciding vote 
471 Bar Hebraeus writes that the Rum Seljuq emirs took Kay Qubadh from his captivity in the fortress 
Masara and made him king over themselves. He also notes however that Kay Kawiis might have 
designated his brother as his heir. "Some say that SUltan rizZ AD-DIN himself before he died sent 
and brought him out of prison and made the nobles swear fealty to him, because he had no son who 
was of any use of the kingdom." Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 375. Turan writes that there were rumours that 
Kay Kawiis had wished that his brother should succeed him and gives as reference Bar Hebraeus but 
does not elaborate this point. He only adds without specifying which, that some Arab sources state 
that the succession of Kay Qubadh was disputed by his uncle Tugrul Shah but that this without any 
doubt is a confusion of the latter's involvement in the previous succession dispute. Turan, Sel9uklular, 
326, note 4. Neither of these questions can be resolved as there are no indications of such a testament 
by Kay Kawiis or any proof for the involvement of Tugrul Shah. 
472 Sal)ib is the title by which the vizier was designated. See Uzunyar~Ih, Osmanh devleti te~kilatma 
medhal, istanbul 1941, 95-96. 
473 The tugra'i was the head of the chancery. See Uzunyar~Ili, Osmanh devleti te~kilatma medhal, 105-
106. 
474 The amTr-i •aric;l was the army commander. See Uzunyar~Ili, Osmanh devleti te~kilatrna medhal, 
105. 
475 Ibn BThT, Duda, 90-92; See also lbn BTbT, Ozttirk, I, 218-220. 
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lay with the two emtrs Mubariz al-Din Bahram Shah and Sayf al-Din Ajbe 
(Ayaba),
476 
and especially the latter asserted influence on the other emirs, and he 
nominated Kay Qubadh, even though he had fallen out with him previously. Ayaba 
told the other emirs that he wanted to bring Kay Qubadh the good news of his 
election as sultan and to use this as an opportunity to be reconciled with him, because 
during the succession dispute between Kay Kawiis and Kay Qubadh he had taken the 
side of the former. Some of the emirs who had served Kay Qubadh when he was the 
governor ofTokat objected to his election. Ibn Bibi states that Sal)ib Majd al-Din and 
Sharaf al-Din Mul)ammad Parwana protested that Kay Qubadh was malicious, 
furious, jealous, and coarse.477 Ibn Bib I implies that the election of the new sultan by 
the emirs was the right procedure as the emirs were competent long-serving men who 
knew how to run state affairs. Moreover, he even praises those emirs among them 
who were members of his own class and civil administrators as distinguished men of 
learning. 
The power of the local governors and towns can also be inferred from the 
account lbn Bibi gives of the itinerary of Kay Qubadh following his liberation from 
captivity and proclamation as sultan. He describes in some detail the elaborate 
receptions and proclamation ceremonies that took place at several stops. In Sivas the 
dignitaries and imams came to kiss the sultan's hand and then they all went to the 
mosque where they took the oath of alliance to him478 . He was first brought to Sivas 
where he was inaugurated, then he went to Kayseri where the subashi of the town, 
Sayf al-Din (Abu Bakr the son of Hoqabaz had prepared the reception and finally 
Konya.479 
Moreover, the frontier provinces (uc) dominated by Ti.irkmen played a 
significant role in the period of Kay Qubadh. lbn Bibi informs us that following his 
accession to the throne in Sivas the sultan set out for Konya. On his way to the 
capital he sent Mubariz al-Din, the emir-i majlis, back to Sivas with the instruction to 
put the affairs of the uc in order.480 Moreover already one day after his entry into 
Konya, Kay Qubadh called the high-ranking emirs to his private chamber and said: 
476 Cf. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 92-93. 
477 lbn Bibi, Duda, 92. 
478 See Ibn Bibi, Duda, 95. 
479 See Ibn Bibi, Duda, 95-96. 
480 See lbn Bibi, Duda, 95-98. 
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"It is necessary to send to the emirs of the frontier regions forceful orders and to notify them 
about the entry of our banner and rule in Konya, about the ascendancy of our royal dignity to 
the throne, and with a friendly and encouraging order for them to come quickly to the seat of 
the sultanate."481 · 
On the one hand, this indicates that the sultan depended on the military power 
of the Ti.irkmen and on the other hand, it indicates that the Turkish element still 
played a role. 
The topos of world dominion was part of the Iranian model of kingship, 
hence Ibn Bibi claims that Kay Qubadh aimed to conquer the world. A great part of 
his report of the reign of Kay Qubadh is made up of an enumeration of military 
campaigns, led by the sultan or his emirs. He writes that the sultan began the 
conquest of the world with the conquest of Kalon-Oros CAla'iyya). The real reason 
behind the conquest of this fortress was however that it was next to Antalya and that 
its possession for the Rum Seljuq sultanate was therefore important. It is revealing 
that Ibn Bibi first states that the sultan said one day that "in accordance with the law 
of rulership warfare should be started." He then remarks however that the great 
emirs, the Kondestabl Asad al-Din482, known under the name Ajas-i Majnun and 
Mubariz al-Din Ertoku~, governor of Antalya, suggested that Kalon-Oros should be 
conquered.483 As the governor of Antalya Ertoku~ was aware of the importance of 
controlling the whole region and drawing the sultan's attention to the town initiated 
the campaign. Moreover, the fortress was only taken after two months of 
unsuccessful siege following an agreement between Kir Farid484, the Greek lord of 
the town, and the sultan. The negotiations were led by Ertoku~ who in the past 
maintained friendly relations with Kir Farid. Kir Farid gave up the town in exchange 
for an iqta allotted to him by the sultan in 620 (1223).485 To underline the sultan's 
superiority Ibn Bibi writes that Kir Farid requested this in a letter giving the alleged 
481 Ibn BTbi, Duda, 98; See also lbn BTbT, Oztiirk, I, 238. 
4s2 The Kondestabl was in charge of foreign mercenaries of the Seljuq army. 
4s3 The names of the emirs are not given by the muhtasar but appear in the original. See lbn BTbT, 
Oztiirk, 254. 
484 Kir (xup) is a Greek title meaning master or lord but the name Farid according to Vryonis might 
come from the Armenian Vartan or Byzantine Bardas. Vryonis, Decline, 232, n 533; lbn BTbi, Duda, 
106, n a. 
485 According to lbn BThT, Kir Farid was appointed emir of Ak~ehir near Konya and allotted also the 
income of several villages there. See lbn 8Th I, Duda, 1 08; Vryonis, Decline, 230. 
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statement that the town had never been conquered in the time of Darius, Hosheng, 
Alexander, and Caesar.486 
The main motive behind the campaign was to secure economic interests. That 
the protection of trade was at the heart of the expansion policy is shown by the 
subsequent conquest of the fortress of Alara and the building of the tersane 
(shipyard) in Alanya as well as the Alara Han by Kay Qubadh near Alanya on the 
Antalya- Konya road.487 Moreover, the fortifications of Alanya were extended and a 
citadel built. According to Ibn Bibi, Kay Qubadh built the citadel to demonstrate his 
gratitude to God for granting him the conquest and established with an honourable 
connection to himself he gave it his laqab (honorific name ~Ala'iyya from ~Ala' ai-
D- ) 488 Ill . 
Generally, the protocol for Kay Qubadh given in the inscriptions mirrors the 
ideological concepts employed by Ibn Bibi. Among these the inscription inserted on 
the Ktztl Kale (Red Tower) of Ala'iyya (Alanya) dated Rabr 623/April 1226 is of 
special interest: 
"[Ala al-Dunya wa'l-Din] the shadow of God in the lands, the splendour of the victorious 
empire, the helper of the flourishing community ... 489 the enlivener of justice in the two 
world, the sultan of the land and the two seas, the holder of the two horizons, the crown of 
the house of Seljuq, the master of king and sultans, Abu '1-Fath Kay Qubadh b. Kay Khusraw 
b. K1h9 Arslan, the proof of the Commander of the Faithful- may God make his reign last 
eternally ... "490 
One title appears here for the first time which designates Kay Qubadh as "the 
crown of the house of Seljuq." This affirms the noble lineage of the sultan and at the 
same time puts him above all members of that house, including their Great Seljuq 
rivals. The expansionist ambitions expressed under Kay Kawils are exaggerated 
further and seem to have no limits. We may infer that Kay Qubadh who maintained 
cordial relations with the caliph, as will be discussed below, claimed to derive his 
power directly from God. What is surprising is that jihad epithets are missing in this 
486 See lbn BTbi, Duda, I 08. 
487 Descriptions of the tersane of Alanya and the Alara Han are given by Schottler, Rumseldschuken, 
79,229. 
488 Ibn Bib I, Duda, I 09. 
489 This phrase is indecipherable. 
490 RCEA, X, 240-24I (inscription no 3957); R.M. Riefstahl, Turkish Architecture in Southwestern 
Anatolia, Cambridge I93I, 96. 
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inscription. As not all inscriptions are preserved we cannot be sure if there existed 
any with jihad epithets but it should be noted that even though the town was taken 
from Christians Ibn BibT does not describe it as part of jihad. The ideological concept 
of jihad was employed by other Muslim rulers as the inscription of Mawdiid b. 
Mal)miid (r. 619-2911222-1232) the Artuqid ruler of Amid shows.491 
Kay Qubadh maintained friendly relations with the Abbasid caliph and 
several envoys were exchanged as we are informed. What is interesting to note is that 
probably the caliph took the first step and within a short period of time sent two 
envoys to Anatolia and seems to have been anxious to maintain good relations with 
the sultan. This was probably the reason why he sent his 'chief propagandist' the 
shaykh al-Suhrawardf92 in order to win over the sultan and dignitaries in Anatolia. 
Ibn BibT writes that when the news of the accession of Kay Qubadh reached the 
caliph he sent with al-SuhrawardT the sultan the diploma for the lands of Rum and the 
insignia of rule. 493 The relationship between Kay Qubadh and the Abbasid caliph al-
Na~ir must be seen against the background of the Mongol invasions. In 61811221122 
shortly after the accession of Kay Qubadh, the Mongols were launching an attack on 
Iraq but they changed their direction and Baghdad was saved for the time being. The 
caliph sent a second envoy to Anatolia asking Kay Qubadh for military support 
against the Mongols. In a private audience with the sultan the envoy presented the 
caliph's message that the Mongols had defeated the Khwarazmshah and were 
advancing towards Baghdad.494 Kay Qubadh replied that he would send the troops 
the caliph asked for. However after the envoy left he called his emirs together and 
said: 
491 RCEA, X, 205-206 (inscription no 3900). 
492 The renowned Sufi of Sunni Islam, al-Suhrawardi (539-632/ 1145-1234), designated as the sheikh 
of sheikhs, was a very influential personality who played an important role in propagating the 
futulvlva of the caliph al-Na~ir. See Hartmann, an-Nii$ir li-Din Alliih, 240-254; El2, al-Suhrawardi 
(Hartmann). 
493 Cf. lbn Bib I, Duda, 1 0 1. 
494 For the relationship between the caliph al-Na~ir and the Mongols see Hartmann, an-Nii$ir li-Din 
Alliih, 83-85. Hartmann does not mention the envoy sent to Anatolia and only evaluates the 
relationship of the caliph with the Mongols in connection with the conflict between the 
Khwarazmshah Mengiibirti and the caliph. 
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"Truly we expected the Commander of the Faithful to have better insight. An army with new 
strength and luck which is like a waterfall which pulls down dams and which is like a sea of 
fire that rages and blazes one can only approach with servility."495 
For this reason the sultan thought it would have been better if the caliph had 
ordered all lands to send their best envoys, together with gifts to the Mongols, to seek 
their friendship. Yet if one did not send the troops to the caliph he would regard this 
as a sign of weakness and refusal of support. Therefore, not a thousand soldiers as 
had been requested, but five thousand soldiers with provisions for a year should be 
sent to the caliph.496 As there is no information about in other sources it is not 
possible to confirm what Ibn Bibi writes here. Nevertheless, his report reveals 
significant aspects of the relationship between the sultan and the caliph on one hand 
and use of envoys to propagate ideology on the other hand. The author indirectly 
indicates that the relationship between the caliph and Kay Qubadh was not based 
entirely on mutual friendship and understanding. The sultan criticises the caliph's 
policy regarding the Mongols and despite this he wants to send an even larger 
contingent than he had asked for. The way in which according to Kay Qubadh the 
Mongols should be approached contradicts the image of the strong supreme ruler. It 
seems that the sultan regarded the Mongols as invincible and was happy to submit to 
them. 
The detailed orders the sultan gave as to which troops should be sent and how 
they should be equipped are a good example of how the sultan wanted to 
demonstrate his power to his Muslim neighbours and the caliph. According to Ibn 
Bibi the well equipped army had the desired effect on the neighbours of the sultan: 
"When the princes of the regions, Harput, Amid, Mardin, and Mosul saw that splendour, the 
greatness of the sultan filled their hearts with respect, and they presented gifts and received 
them with great hospitality."497 
As for Ibn Bibi, Kay Qubadh is the ideal Persian king, it is only 
understandable that he accords to him also the qualities of being a great builder. 
Moreover, he claims that the sultan was an architect himself, as he determined the 
form of the buildings and gave detailed instructions to the architects. Hence Ibn Bibi 
495 Ibn BibT, Duda, 113; lbn BibT, Ozttirk, I, 278. 
496 Cf. Ibn BibT, Duda, 113-114; lbn BibT, Ozttirk, I, 278-279. 
497 Ibn BibT, Duda, 114. 
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gives detailed reports of his building activity but it is difficult to assess the extent of 
the sultan's knowledge of architecture and involvement as it is not attested in the 
extant inscriptions though we should bear in mind that not all inscriptions have been 
preserved. It has to be recognised however that Kay Qubadh, in contrast to his 
predecessors, did have a substantial building project which comprised fortifications 
and religious as well as secular foundations. After his report of the conquests of the 
fortresses Kalon-Oros CAla'iyya) and Alara, Ibn Bibi inserts in his narrative that 
Kay Qubadh one day while he was riding outside Konya said that it was an error that 
such a famous and beautiful town should not have securing walls around it. He 
decided that Konya and Sivas should be fortified and commanded that master 
builders and planners should brought to him. Then Ibn Bibi writes, that the sultan 
rode together with his emirs around the town and gave instructions where the towers, 
gates, and curtain walls should be placed. He then ordered that four gates and parts of 
the walls should be paid for by the treasury and the rest of the expenses should be 
divided among the emirs and that a farmiin should be sent to the emir-i majlis in 
Sivas saying that with the support of the emirs of that region Sivas should be 
fortified. 498 
The building of fortifications is not peculiar to Kay Qubadh, as his brother 
and father before him had commissioned the building of fortifications in Sinop and 
Antalya. Moreover, Kay Qubadh, like his predecessors, burdened the emirs with 
expenses of the fortifications. The inscriptions inserted on the city walls erected 
during this period and the report of Ibn Bibi concerning the fortification of Konya 
and Si vas is evidence for this.499 In theory fortifications were the responsibility of the 
state and hence the sultan was directly responsible, but in practice it was the Rum 
Seljuq emirs who had to pay and oversee the erection of fortifications. It is thus 
surprising that Ibn Bib I notes that Kay Qubadh ordered that the building of four gates 
and parts of the walls should be paid for by the treasury to underline the sultan's 
generosity when it was his duty in the first place. Moreover, the fortification of 
Konya and Sivas, two towns in the centre of the sultanate, seems somewhat 
surprising. While the towns fortified under the Seljuqs in Anatolia before were Sinop 
498 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 110-111; lbn BTbi, Oztiirk, I, 271-273. 
499 Cf. Rogers, Patronage in Seljuk Anatolia, 1200-1300, unpubl. PhD thesis University of Oxford 
1972,310. 
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and Antalya two sea ports which were open to attack these towns ·were situated in 
inner Anatolia. However, the reason behind the fortification building was not the 
sultan's special interest in building, but the desire to have a defence system against 
the Mongol threat. 500 
We can only speculate on how far Kay Qubadh embodied the qualities of the 
Persian king but it is certain that he was the only Seljuq sultan who took an active 
part in the building of a town and palace named after him, Kayqubadiyya, built near 
Kayseri. This palace became one of his favourite residences besides Antalya and 
Alanya. He received here the submission of the Mengiiciik ruler of Erzincan, Dawild 
Shah, in 625/1228 and he died there in 634/1237. His son Kay K.husraw II was 
proclaimed sultan there. 501 While his predecessors up to the time of his father 
followed a lifestyle not very different from the lifestyle of a nomadic leader, Kay 
Qubadh seems to have had a sedentary lifestyle. 
Ibn BThi adds to his portrait an eye-witness account by Jalal al-Din Karatay to 
demonstrate that Kay Qubadh was very knowledgeable. He first writes that Karatay 
"was the pole of the religious nobles and the example for the pious. "502 According to 
Karatay, Kay Qubadh studied historical works about the kings and the exemplary 
way of past rulers. From among the sultans of Islam he especially regarded as models 
the Ghaznavid ruler Mal)miid b. Sebiiktigin503 and Qabiis b. Wushmgir. 504 He always 
read the book 'Kimiya as-satada505 and the book 'The life of Kings' by Ni?am al-
Mulk. 
500 Turan remarks that at the time when Kay Qubadh ascended the throne the Mongol assaults had 
Asia and Eastern Europe and that thus it was only natural that a ruler as great and capable as him 
would begin his operations by taking political and military pre-cautions. Kay Qubadh sought friendly 
relations with the Ayyubids who after the seizure of Artukid territories had become his immediate 
neighbours. Turan also notes that the sultan begun his defence policies with the fortification of Konya 
but then goes on reproducing the narrative given by Ibn BTbi without any evaluation his remarks. 
Turan, Selr;uklular, 331. 
501 Cf. EI2, Kayfs.ubiidiyya (Busse) 
502 lbn Bib I, Duda, l 00. 
503 Ghaznavid ruler (388-4211 998-1 030). See Bosworth, New Islamic Dynasties, 296. 
504 Ziyarid ruler of Gurgan (367-371/978-997 and 387-402/997-1012). Cf. Bosworth, New Islamic 
Dynasties, 166. 
505 The Persian adaptation of the Ihja ulum al-Din written by al-Ghazali (d. 1111 ). 
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IV.3. Kay Khusraw 11 (634-644/ 1237-1246) 
During the reign of Kay Khusraw the Rum Seljuq sultanate ceased to be an 
independent state, as his army was defeated by the Mongol army at Kose Dag on 6 
Mul)arram 6411 26 June 1243. It is this crushing defeat by which Kay Khusraw is 
judged by the medieval sources and modem historians alike. He is described as a 
self-indulgent ruler who neglected his duties and under whom therefore the sultanate 
descended into internal strife and was ill prepared for the Mongol attack. Ibn BThi 
does not even honour Kay Khusraw with a portrait. While he dedicates a panegyric 
portrait to his father Kay Qubadh and presents him as the ideal king, he implies that 
Kay Khusraw was the opposite of that ideal. The most crucial shortcoming of the 
young sultan was that he did not pay attention to the long-serving and able notables 
of the state but was controlled by the evil emir Kopek. The latter is presented as a 
very ambitious and malicious character who managed to get the important emirs 
killed. The state thus deprived of its pillars, fell into chaos. It seems that Ibn BThi is 
anxious to put all the blame for the decline of the Rum Seljuq sultanate on the emir 
Kopek so that any suspicion of bad rulership is diverted from Kay Qubadh. Thereby 
the author also avoids direct criticism of Kay Khusraw, the son and successor of Kay 
Qubadh. 
Modem scholars, however, have not discussed the motives of Ibn BThi and, as 
in the case of Kay Qubadh, the account of the reign of Kay Khusraw given by Ibn 
BThi is taken over uncritically. Turan recognises that Kay Khusraw could have been 
only sixteen years old when he ascended the throne and that the emir Kopek had 
great influence over him.506 Nevertheless, in his account of Kay Khusraw's reign 
which closely follows Ibn BThi, he, like the medieval author regards the sultan as an 
under-age and inadequate ruler whose mistakes led to the disastrous defeat at Kose 
Dag which changed the course of the history of Turkey.507 Cahen does not even 
mention that Kay Khusraw was very young when he came to the throne and he 
begins his chapter of the reign of this sultan stating: "Kay-kubadh had three sons, 
~Izz al-Oin, Rukn al-Din and Kaykhusraw. The first two were the sons of his 
506 Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 404. 
507 Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 435. 
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Ayyubid wife, and it was to ~Izz al-Din that Kay Qubadh had caused an oath of 
allegiance to be sworn. But Kaykhusraw was the eldest, and it was to him that the 
great emirs rallied, since he was the most powerful."508 Cahen writes also that the 
policy of Kay Khusraw "was inspired by Kopek"509 but assumes that the young sultan 
made his own decisions and led the government. Cahen then enumerates briefly the 
events which took place during the reign of Kay Khusraw following closely the 
narrative of Ibn Bib I. 
This section aims to give a brief analysis of the information given in the 
sources about Kay Khusraw and concentrate on the question if and how the official 
ideology was changed as a result of the decisive political changes which took place 
in this period. 
According to Ibn BThi, Kay Qubadh assigned Erzincan again to Kay Khusraw 
and appointed the <;a~nigir Shams al-Din Altunaba as his atabeg. As his successor 
for the throne of Rum, however, he designated ~Izz al-Din Kthc; Arslan, one of his 
two sons from his Ayyubid wife, and that obliged all emirs to take the oath of 
allegiance in this son's name. The author notes that some of the emirs agreed 
willingly but others out of fear. 510 After the death of Kay Qubadh, however, his son 
Kay Khusraw who was informed of this immediately send messengers to the great 
emirs of the sultanate and making them great promises asked them to support him. 
The 9a$nigir Shams al-Din Altunaba, the Parwana Taj al-Din b. Qadi Sharaf al-
Din, the Ustad al-Dar Jamal al-Din Farruh, Sa~d al-Din Kopek, and Z:ahir al-Din, the 
son of the Georgian were willing to support him. 511 Kamal al-Din Kamyar, ijusam al-
Din Kaymeri and ijusam al-Din Kaytr Han who had not heard the news about the 
death of the sultan saw Kay Khusraw together with the emirs who had taken his side 
hurrying from the direction of Kayqubadiyya to Kayseri. Here Shams al-Din 
Altunaba and Jamal al-Din Farruh took Kay Khusraw by the hand and led him on the 
throne. ijusam al-Din Kaymeri and ijusam al-Din Kaytr Han stated that the rightful 
heir ~Izz al-Din who was in Kayqubadiyya and the army were with them and that 
they should keep their agreement with the deceased sultan Kay Qubadh and help him 
to the throne. Kamal al-Din Kamyar, however, was undecided and when he was sent 
508 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 133. 
509 lbid, 133. 
51° Cf. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 197; lbn Bibi, Oztiirk, I, 454. 
511 Cf. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 199; lbn Bibi, Ozttirk, 11, 23. 
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a letter from Kayseri stating that the question of succession was already clear he as 
well as Kaymeri and Kaytr Han decided to accept this and they kissed the hand of 
Kay Khusraw and took the oath of allegiance. 
The important points to be noted here are as follows. First, in contrast to the 
succession of the previous sultans, in this case the emirs did not confer to decide the 
succession. Ibn Bibi writes that it was Kay Khusraw, who took the initiative and 
asked the emirs to take his side, but taking into account his age at the time this seems 
quite unlikely. The author also remarks, however, that Kay Khusraw was informed of 
the death of his father without specifying who sent him the news. Thus it is more 
likely that his atabeg Altunaba wanted to put him on the throne and that he won over 
the other emirs. Among the emirs lbn Bibi names Altunaba, who seems to have been 
the longest-serving one and the at a beg of Kay Khusraw had probably power to assert 
some influence over the other emirs mentioned by lbn BTbi as the group of emirs 
attached to this prince. Second, it can be inferred from this succession account that 
there were dissensions among the Rum Seljuq emirs. lbn BTbi does not include in this 
account, like he did for his other accounts of succession, how the emirs assembled or 
planned together a strategy to bring their candidate to the throne. He does not directly 
state that there was a division between the Khwarazmians and the other emirs, but 
names I:Iusam al-Din Kaymeri as the main opponent of Kay Khusraw. Kaytr Han 
was the leader of the Khwarazmian army who had been appointed by Kay Qubadh as 
emir and whose troops were included in the Rum Seljuq army and settled in Rum 
following his victory over the Khwarazmshah Mengi.ibirti. It may well be that the 
Khwarazmians were not accepted by the already established Rum Seljuq officials 
and that therefore rivalries existed between them. lbn BTbi states that Kopek regarded 
Kaytr Han as a rival and he continues his narrative stating that the former denounced 
the latter to the sultan to get rid of him. 
Without giving any explanation as to how Kopek managed to gain great 
influence over the young sultan, lbn BTbi starts his account stating that Kopek out of 
bad character and bad mind began to do mischief. It is not possible to determine how 
Kopek, who was not a very powerful emir until the accession of Kay Khusraw, 
managed to become the right hand man of the young sultan, as the chronicle of lbn 
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BTbi gives us the only information available on him.512 Usually it was the atabeg of a 
Seljuq prince who was closest to him and thus could exert the greatest influence on 
him and thus on the other emirs. It seems that this was not the case here and that 
Kopek was able to push aside Shams al-DTn Altunaba, the atabeg of Kay Khusraw, 
as well as the other emirs, and to gain the sultan's favour. Yet, the influence Kopek 
was able to assert on the young sultan alone does not explain the fact that he was able 
to push aside all other emirs to become then the de facto 'ruler' of the sultanate. One 
plausible explanation for this is that the emirs did not work as well together as they 
did before. As it has been shown in previous chapters usually the great emirs 
assembled and conferred when important decisions on the succession to the throne or 
military campaigns had to be reached. At the time when Kay Khusraw ascended the 
throne, however, the rivalries among the great emirs were such that they did not 
cooperate but worked against each other. 
Kopek denounced first Kaytr Han telling the sultan that the latter would leave 
the sultan's service and that he would use then his knowledge of the Rum Seljuq 
army to incite the enemies of the sultan against him. Kaytr Han was imprisoned and 
the Khwarazmian contingent fled stating that they did not feel safe because of this. 
The fact that Kopek then managed to put even Shams al-D'in Altunaba aside shows 
that he had a free rein. However, when Kopek continued his attacks against the emirs 
and had also Kamyar killed, Kay Khusraw "either of his own volition or at the 
suggestion of some disquieted emirs, decided that enough was enough."513 Cahen's 
second explanation seems more likely and it seems that finally a group of emirs were 
able to come together to stop Kopek who then himself was put to death. It is not 
possible to prove why the cooperation among the Rum Seljuq emirs broke down. 
Important to note here is that until the time of Kay Qubadh the Rum Seljuq state 
functioned as a confederation of provinces governed by emirs who for most of the 
time supported each other so that the central government in Konya and hence the 
sultan was not able to reduce their power. This co-operative system of the emirs 
512 Aksarayi's account on Kay K.husraw is very brief and thus it is not surprising that Kopek is not 
mentioned and the account for the reign of Kay K.husraw given in the anonymous chronicle 
concentrates on the Mongol invasion and does not contain information for the first years of the reign. 
However, it is surprising that Bar Hebraeus does not mention Kopek at all even though he informs us 
of events taking place in the first years of the reign of Kay Khusraw. Cf. Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 130; 
Anonymous, Uzluk, 31-32; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 403. 
513 Cahen, Formation, 67. 
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broke down during the reign of Kay Khusraw and weakened the Rum Seljuq state as 
a whole. 
At the same time the Rum Seljuq state was weakened by a revolt of 
disaffected Turkmen led by the popular preacher Baba Isl)aq. According to Ibn BTbi 
the revolt was the result of the propaganda of this misguided preacher who called 
himself prophet. As we depend for our information for these events almost entirely 
on Ibn BTbi it is not possible to infer the factors leading to the revolt.514 Most 
probably a range of factors, such as the influx of nomadic Turkmen fleeing the 
Mongol invasions, the settlement of Khwarazmians within the Rum Seljuq realm, 
economic reasons coupled with religious reasons were behind it. Important to note 
here is that the Rum Seljuq government suppressed the revolt only with great 
difficulty (ea. 638-64111240-1243) which exhausted the Rum Seljuq army. 
Thus when the Mongols under Baiju attacked the Rum Seljuq state and took 
Erzurum, Kay Khusraw at the head of the Rum Seljuq army reinforced by 
contingents from his allies and former enemies went out against the Mongols. The 
Rum Seljuq army was decisively defeated at Kosedag near Erzincan and the Rum 
Seljuq sultanate lost its independence. Kay Khusraw fled to Ankara, while his vizier 
Muhadhdhab al-Din started negotiations with the Mongols and persuaded them not to 
seize the whole sultanate and take it under their direct control but to make it a vassal 
state. Ibn BTbi criticises Kay Khusraw and indicates that the vizier saved the 
sultanate.515 He writes that when the Mongols reached Kayseri after their victory over 
the Rum Seljuq army he suggested that one has to go to the Mongols and ask for 
peace to put the affairs of the sultanate right after the disaster caused by the sultan's 
youth and ignorance. 516 However, while Ibn BTbi makes clear that Kay Khusraw was 
not fit for rule the inscriptions commissioned during his reign present hitn as an ideal 
ruler just as his predecessors had been presented: 
The foundation inscription over the entrance of the Stn;ah Medrese in Konya 
dated 640/1242 declares: 
514 Cf. Cahen, ?re-Ottoman Turkey, 136-137. 
515 Cf. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 231-233. 
516 Cf. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 231. 
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"The building of this blessed madrasa was ordered during the reign of the greatest sultan, the 
shadow of God on Earth, Ghiyath al-Dunya wa'l-DTn, the height of Islam and the Muslims, 
the victorious Kay Khusraw b. Kay Qubadh, the eo-regent of the Commander of the Faithful 
,5)7 
Kay Khusraw is not only allotted the same titles as his predecessors but an 
inscription on the city walls of Antalya dated 64211244 and hence after his defeat at 
Kosedag praises him as follows: 
The construction of this blessed tower was ordered by the great sultan the great king of 
kings, the possessor of the necks of the nations, the sultan of the sultans of the world, the one 
who is close to the kings of the Arabs and the Persians, the guardian of the horizons, Ghiyath 
al-Dunya wa'l-DTn, the height of Islam and the Muslims, the shadow of God in the lands, 
Abu'l-Fath Kay Khusraw b. Kay Qubadh, the eo-regent of the Commander of the Faithful 
,5)8 
The titles claimed for Kay Khusraw in this inscription formulated after the 
independence of the Rum Seljuqs was lost reveals that more ambitious titles were 
assumed with the loss of actual power as if to compensate for it. 
However, the most important aspect for the purpose of the present study 
revealed in the account Ibn BThi gives for the reign of Kay Khusraw is that the Seljuq 
dynasty was regarded as the only legitimate rulers in Anatolia. The author underlines 
that only a member of the Seljuq family was able to claim the sultanate. This is 
evident in two episodes described by the author. The first is that the emir Kopek was 
not content with being the right hand of the sultan but aspired to become sultan 
himself. He therefore claimed to be the illegitimate son of Kay Qubadh.519 In the 
second instance the vizier Muhadhdhiab al-Din convinces the Mongols not to take 
Anatolia under their direct control but to leave the Rum Seljuq sultans on the throne 
stating that: 
"The rule of Rum can only be connected to the sultans from the House of Seljuq, and only 
the obedience to them calms the hearts of the subjects."520 
517 RCEA, XI, 140-141 (inscription no 4211); Loytved, Konia, 43. 
518 RCEA, XI, 158-159 (inscription no 4238). 
519 Cf. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 205. 
520 Ibn Bibi, Duda, 232. 
175 
It is not possible to ascertain how far the population at large accepted the 
Seljuqs as their rulers. This statement might be the actual statement of the vizier, or 
what would be more probable is that it was made by Ibn BibT himself. In either case 
the important aspect revealed in this statement is that the class of the Persian men of 
the pen who first formulated the ideology of the Great Seljuqs were successful in 
thus shaping the idea of the 'House of Seljuq' as the legitimate dynasty to rule over 
Muslim territory. It is true that faced with the prospect of the rule of the Mongols the 
rule of the established dynasty of the Seljuqs was preferable. Yet, it seems safe to 
suggest that ideology was an important factor in the foundation and continued 
existence of the Seljuq states. 
Conclusion 
To conclude the study of the Rum Seljuq dynasty from the perspective of the 'history 
of mentality' has revealed several important points. First, the history of the early 
Great Seljuqs, who entered the Islamic world as chiefs of nomads and their 
presentation as ideal Muslim rulers with a matching 'tradition of origin', is 
significant for the subsequent history of the Rum Seljuqs. The Rum Seljuqs were 
able to formulate their official state ideology based on the dynastic connection to the 
Great Seljuqs available to them. 
A close scrutiny of the source material on the first Seljuq leaders in Anatolia 
ruling from 4 73-500/1081-1107 conformed to traditional patterns of nomadic rule. 
Hence Sulayman and Kthc; Arslan, regarded as the first Rum Seljuq sultans, were in 
reality not different from nomadic chiefs and represented the rebellious branch of the 
Seljuq family. This branch of the Seljuq family in a sense started all over again as 
chiefs of nomadic Turkmen bands in Anatolia and their Arabic and Persian advisers 
coming from the same class of religious scholars and bureaucrats from Khurasan 
formulated an official ideology for them based on the Perso-Islamic ideology their 
predecessors had formulated for the Great Seljuqs. However, it has been shown that 
this ideology was not unchangeable but was re-formulated and extended with time. 
Thus, while the rule of the Great Seljuqs was legitimised by claiming that they were 
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champions of Sunni Islam against the rival Shi 'i caliphs in Cairo, the rule of the Rum 
Seljuqs was legitimised bt presenting them too as champions of Sunni Islam but the 
rivals had changed. 
It has been argued here that the Rum Seljuq ideology evolved over four 
distinctive phases. The first phase is marked by the traditional Turkish ideas of the 
first Seljuq leaders in Anatolia who rebelled against their Great Seljuq cousins 
claiming supreme leadership based on nomadic Turkish traditions of leadership. This 
phase is also marked by a period of transition during which the Seljuq principality 
started to concentrate their efforts on establishing territorial rule in Anatolia rather 
than overthrowing the Great Seljuqs. The second phase is defined by the period of 
interregnum and transition (500-55111107-1156) during which the Seljuqs tn 
Anatolia were dominated by the rival Turkish Danishmendid principality. 
It was only during the third phase comprising the period from 50011156 to 
600/1204 that the Rum Seljuq principality in Anatolia was transformed into the Rum 
Seljuq sultanate. The study of this period has shown how the Rum Seljuq ideology 
was developed as defence against rival ideological claims of the 'Counter 
Crusaders', Niir al-Din and Saladin, who employed the ideology of jihad to 
legitimise their rule. The last phase covers the apogee of the dynasty under the rule 
ofKay Kawiis I (608-61611211-1220) and Kay Qubadh I (616-634/1220-1237) and it 
has been argued that these two Seljuq sultans could justifiably be viewed as model 
Perso-Islamic rulers. It has been pointed out that, although elements from their 
Turkish nomadic past remained, these rulers followed a sedentary way of life 
imitating the example of the ideal of Iranian kings. Hence this period marks the final 
step in the development of the Perso-Islamic concept of rule which was to remain the 
dominant concept under the Seljuq successor states. 
To the research of the ideology and mentality of the Rum Seljuqs an appendix 
discussing the crucial relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and their Byzantine 
neighbours during the period (473-57611081-1180) has been added. Here it has been 
argued that a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq 
sultans and the Comneni emperors during these years. 
It has been shown that ideology and mentality rather than mere military 
success helped to shape this important dynasty into a fully-fledged sultanate. 
177 
However, this thesis is only a modest attempt at producing a study of the Rum Seljuq 
dynasty. There is still much work to be done in the area of the 'history of mentality', 
as well as in the areas of political, economic, and religious history of Anatolia in 
general during this period of Seljuq rule. 
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Appendix 
The Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium ( 4 73-576/1 081-1180) 
As already stated in the introduction to the present work, in this appendix the 
relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and their powerful Byzantine neighbours 
during the period (473-57611081-1180) will be analysed, as this relationship was 
important for the development of the Rum Seljuq state. It will be argued here that 
during this period a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the 
Seljuq sultans and the Comneni emperors which was crucial for the survival of both 
states. However this appendix presents only a first step and will form the basis of 
future research of the author. 
Two crushing defeats of the Byzantines by the Seljuqs are fixed as the corner 
stones of the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations. The defeat of the Byzantine 
emperor Roman os Diogenes by the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan in 46311071 at 
Manzikert is marked as the starting point of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. The 
defeat of Manuel I Comnenus by the Rum Seljuq Sultan K1h9 Arslan 11 on the other 
hand is marked as the finalisation of this conquest. The medieval chroniclers and 
following them the modem scholars thus present the relationship between the Rum 
Seljuqs and the Byzantines as a constant struggle of conquest and reconquest 
between the Muslim Rum Seljuq rulers and the Christian Byzantine rulers.521 Some 
more recent western scholarship has recognised that the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines 
despite more or less continues frontier warfare accepted each other's right to exist 
521 Vryonis concentrates in his work on the reasons for the Turcification and Islamisation of Asia 
Minor and interprets the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations as a struggle for Asia Minor. S. Vryonis, 
The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamisation from the Eleventh 
through the Fifteenth Century, Los Angeles/ London, 1971, (hereafter cited as Vryonis, Decline); 
idem., Byzantium: its internal histOJ)' and relations with the Muslim world, London 1971; idem, 
Studies on Byzantium Seljuks, and Ottomans, Malibu 1981. In his monographic treatment of Rum 
Seljuq history Cahen does not devote much space to the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and 
Byzantium. He also presents the relations as the struggle for Asia Minor. C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman 
Turkey, London 1968, (hereafter cited as Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey); idem. Formation. The works 
of Vryonis and Cahen present the background for consecutive western historian dealing with 
Byzantine history and or Turkish history. The most important Turkish work on Rum Seljuq history is 
the work of Turan, which still serves as the background work for Turkish historians. 0. Turan, 
Selr;:uklular Zamanrnda Tiirkiye, Istanbul 1971, (hereafter cited as Turan, Sel<;uklular). 
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and maintained a relationship of coexistence and cultural and economic exchange. 522 
Yet, western scholarship has concentrated on the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine 
Empire has been regarded as the superior power because it is generally assumed, that 
the culturally advanced ancient Byzantine Empire with its sophisticated state 
apparatus must have been the dominant side in the relations between Rum Seljuqs 
and Byzantines. 
A close examination of the sources reveals, however, that this is a vtew 
resulting from the ideological pretensions of the medieval sources and that there is a 
substantial gap between the ideological presentation and the real political practices. 
The following chapters will therefore analyse the personal relations between the Rum 
Seljuq sultans and the Byzantine emperors and the personal relations between the 
Rum Seljuq and Byzantine aristocracy considering their respective ideologies. The 
most important period is the period from 1081 to 1185, because during this period 
the pattern of the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium was established 
by the emperors of the Comnenian dynasty and the first 'sultans' of the Rum Seljuq 
dynasty. For this reason, the personal relations between sultan and emperor will be 
discussed, as will the personal encounters at times of conflict and at times of peace. 
The concentration on the Byzantine side when discussing the Rum Seljuq and 
Byzantine relations is also the result of the nature of the source material. We have 
only very little information in the Rum Seljuq and Muslim sources in general on the 
Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines. The period of the Comnenian Dynasty, on the other 
hand, is well reported by three Byzantine historians Ann a Comnena, John Kinnamus 
and Nicetas Choniates, all three of which contain valuable information on Rum 
Seljuq and Byzantine relations.523 Thus when we analyse these Byzantine sources by 
keeping in mind the ideological views of the authors there are several clues we can 
find which can help us reconstruct a picture of the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine 
relations. 
522 Cf. Lilie, 'Twelfth-Century Byzantine and Turkish States', in: Byzantinische Forschungen 16 
(1991 ), 38; M. Balivet, 'Entre Byzance et Konya: L'intercirculation des idees et des hommes au temps 
des Seldjoukides', in: G. Leiser (ed.), Les Seljoukides d'Anatolie, Paris 2005, 170-207. 
523 These works will be used here in the following translations: The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, tr. by 
E.R.A. Sewter, Harmondsworth 1969, (hereafter cited as Anna, Sewter); Deeds of John and Manuel 
Comnenus by John Kinnamos, trans. by C.M. Brand, New York 1976, (hereafter cited as Kinnamos, 
Brand); 0 City of Byzantium Annals of Nicetas Choniates, tr. H.J. Magoulias, Detroit 1984, (hereafter 
cited as Choniates, Magoulias ). 
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The Rum Seljuq Ideology 
After the descendants of Sulayman b. Kutalm1~ had firmly established 
themselves as rulers in Anatolia, an official ideology to legitimise this rule was 
formulated for them. This ideology claimed that their cousins, the Great Seljuq 
sultans, officially assigned these lands to them. Thus they were linked to the Great 
Seljuq Empire and took over its Perso-Islamic concept of rule. Consequently they 
were heirs to the Muslim imperial ideology and thus they could not recognise the 
authority of the Byzantines.524 However, there was an important difference between 
their state and the Great Seljuq Empire, which is expressed in its name, the Rum 
Seljuq State. Rum was the term used by Muslims to describe Byzantium or Rome.525 
The Seljuqs in Asia Minor, it seems certain, used the epithet Rum to describe 
themselves and their sultanate. We do not have any formal documents to prove this 
but the Rum Seljuq sources as well as other Muslim sources refer to the Seljuqs of 
Anatolia as the Saldjiikiyan-i Riim.526 They were also regarded as such by the other 
Muslim powers and are described as the Seljuqs of Rum in Arabic and Persian 
Muslim sources. 527 The Rum Seljuqs were thus, as Bosworth states, "in some 
measure conceiving of themselves as heirs to the Byzantines in south-central 
Anatolia."528 At the same time, following the Muslim Arab tradition,529 the Rum 
Seljuqs accepted Byzantium's claim to be heirs of the Roman Empire. Rum Seljuq 
524 This is expressed in later inscriptions, for example on the doors of •Ala al-Din Kay Kubadh's 
(1220-1237) mosque, Klhc; Arslan II is described as: "The great sultan, greatest Shah of the Shahs, 
lord of the Arab and Persian sultans ... the Pillar of Islam and of the Muslims ... destroyer of the 
infidel and idol worshipers ... Sultan of the lands of Rum, Armenia, the Franks and Syria". J.H.D. 
Loytved, Konia Inschriften der Seldschukischen Bauten, Berlin 1907, 23. 
525 For the usage of Rum in Arabic literature see EI2, Riim (Bosworthl El Cheikh); N.M. El Cheikh, 
Byzantium Viewed by the Arabs, Harvard 2004, 22ff. See also: J. Laurent, Byzance et les origines du 
Soultanat Roum, Melanges Diehl I, Paris 1930, 177ff.; P. Wittek, 'Deux chapitres de I 'histoire des 
Turcs de Roum', in: Byzantion 2 (1936), 285ff.; idem, 'Le Sultan de Rum', in: Annuaire de /'Institute 
de philologique et d'historique orientales et slaves 6 (1938), 361 ff.; Cahen, 'La premiere penetration 
turque en Asie Mineure', in: Byzantion 18 (1948), 5ff. 
526 lbn Bibi writes for example in the introduction to his work that Ata Malik commissioned him to 
write the history of the Seljuqs of Rum and throughout his work he describes the Seljuq state as the 
Rum Seljuq state, lbn Bibi, Duda, 120, 211 and to the Rum Seljuq officials as emirs of Rum, 249 or 
beglerbeg of Rum, 245. 
527 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, Crusading Period, 114 as Ruler of Anatolia; Nishapiiri, Luther, 46 as 
Sultans of Rum; Rawandi in his Ral)at al-~udiir emphasises several times that the Seljuqs subjected 
Rum to their rule, Rawandi, Ate~, 11, 14, 18, 25, 54, 11. 
528 £12, Riim (Bosworth), 606. 
529 Cf. El Cheikh, Byzantium, 22. 
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sources as well as other Muslim sources, refer to the Byzantine Emperor as the 
Roman Emperor or Basileus530 and to the Christians within the Rum Seljuq realm as 
Romans.531 
The Byzantine Ideology 
The Byzantines did not refer to the Seljuq Turks and their followers in Asia 
Minor as the Rum Seljuqs or as Turks but as Persians, Saracens, Agarenes or 
barbarians532 • They make, however, a distinction between the Seljuq dynasty and 
their nomadic followers, though the term barbarian is sometimes applied to the 
Seljuq sultans, their noble descent is recognised but their Tiirkmen followers are 
always described as barbarians. 533 Byzantine Imperial ideology demanded that the 
Byzantine Empire was the only rightful heir to the Roman Empire and thus the term 
Roman could not be applied to any other power. 
53° Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, description of the emperor as basileus (faslius) 27, 28, 30; Rawandi, Ate~, 134, 
146, 167, 291; and as emperor (Malik ar-Rum), 58, 92, 282, 283, 284; Rawandi , Ate~, 117 ;The 
anonymous history of the Rum Seljuqs describes Manuel I Komnenos as the Roman Emperor Kir 
Manuel, Anonymous, Genc;osman, 25; Later the Rum Seljuqs regarded the emperors ofNicaea as the 
rightful heirs of Byzantium and described them as malik, qaysar or fasilius like the emperors of 
Constantinople. The emperors of Trebizond, in contrast, are described as takwur (Armenian title for 
king), like the King of Cilician Armenia. See for this D. Korobeinikov, Byzantium and the Turks in 
the Thirteenth Centwy, (unpubl. thesis), Oxford 2004, 78-79, (hereafter cited as: Korobeinikov, 
Byzantium); Ibn BTbi, Duda, 64-68, Ibn Bibi describes here the first emperor of Trebizond Alexios I 
Komnenos as Kir Aleks, the Tekvur the Ganit (the lord Alexios, takwur of the Pontos). 
531 Cf. Ibn BTbi, Duda, 28, 49, 62, 114, 119. 
532 All Greek Sources use one or more of these terms to describe the Rum Seljuq sultans and Great 
Scljuq sultans, however the term mainly used is Persian, which shows that the Byzantines regarded 
the Seljuqs as heirs of the Persian Empire. Hereby, transferring the Byzantine and Iranian idea of the 
family of rulers on the Muslim rulers, the Great Seljuqs are regarded as of higher rank than the Rum 
Seljuqs. Great Seljuqs as Persians: Anna, Sewter, 31; Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shah as Persian 
Sultan: Anna, Sewter, 207 and Malik Shah as great sultan: Anna, Sweter, 199; Great Seljuq realm as 
Persia: Anna, Sewter, 33, 208; Rum Seljuq sultan K.lhc; Arslan II as the Persians' sultan: Kinnamos, 
Brand, 134; For the titles of the Seljuq rulers in Byzantine sources see also G. Moravcsik, 
Byzantinoturcica 11 Sprachreste der Tiirkvolker in den Byzantinischen Quellen, Berlin 1958, 286-287, 
(hereafter cited as Byzantinoturcica II). In some cases the term Ismaelites is used to refer to the Turks: 
Anna, Sewter, 307,309,310,429, 439; Choniates, Magoulias, 211,228,229,238,291. 
533 This distinction is also expressed by the application of the term Turcomans to the Seljuq followers. 
Cf. Anna, Sewter, 456; Kinnamos, Brand, 158. 
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The Byzantines described their country as Romania and the inhabitants as 
Romaioi or just as Christians. 534 According to Byzantine imperial ideology, their 
Empire was the sole legitimate Empire and heir to the Roman Empire, which 
continued in Constantinople, the New Rome perfected through Christianity535 • The 
model, to which the Byzantine imperial ideology was tailored, was that of the Empire 
of Constantine, Theodosius, and Justinian.536 This ideal, however, did not even then 
correspond with political reality and even less since the seventh century, when the 
empire lost most of its territories in Egypt, Africa, Syria, Palestine, the northern 
Balkans, and northern Italy. In the 11th century with the coming of the Normans 
from the west and the Seljuq Turks from the east not only was the ideal of Byzantine 
authority but its very existence threatened externally. The first emperor of the 
Comnenian dynasty, Alexius Comnenus saved the empire and, despite the substantial 
reduction of the empire's real political authority, the imperial ideology was 
continued. The claim of Byzantine supremacy was continued through the fiction that 
the Byzantine Emperor still held the position of the overlord. Thus, the enforcement 
of the formal recognition of their imperial authority became an important element of 
Comnenian foreign policy. 
Alexius started the revival of the emptre, the imperial ideology stayed in 
place and his descendants followed his example and the claim to be the sole 
legitimate empire and supreme to all other powers remained. Hence, Rum Seljuqs 
and all other people including Latin Christians were regarded as barbarians and 
inferior to the Byzantines or better 'Romans' and this meant that, "it was the 
barbarians who had to conform."537 The formula of dealing with barbarians was 
traditional: moral virtue, of the kind that all men respect, and gold, which barbarians 
can never resist."538 The Byzantine State had developed an extensive ceremonial as a 
534 Cf. C. Mango, Byzantium. The Empire of Nelv Rome, London 1980, 1, (hereafter cited as Mango, 
Byzantium). The term Byzantium is not a self-description and came into use from the Renaissance 
onwards. 
535 For the Byzantine Imperial Ideology see H. Ahrweiler, L 'Ideologie politique de !'empire byzantin, 
Paris 1975; A.P.Kazhdan/ G. Constable: People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern 
Byzantine Studies, Washington 1982; S. Vryonis, 'Byzantine Imperial Authority: Theory and Practice 
in the Eleventh Century', in: G. Makdisi/ D. Sourdel/ J. Sourdel-Thmine (eds.), La notion d'autorite 
au Moyen Age Islam, Byzance, Occident, Paris 1982, 141-161. 
536 According to Mango, this was the main reason for the backward-looking nature of Byzantine 
civilisation. Mango, Byzantium, 4-5. 
537 P. Magdalino, Manuel, 33; see also Harris, Byzantium and the Cn1sades, 29-30. 
538 Magdalino, Manuel, 28. 
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way to communicate its ideology to the inner and wider circles of the empire. The 
Games, triumph processions, receptions of envoys, literary works and art were part 
of this extensive ceremonial. In the Muses written for his son and successor John, 
Alexius aimed to leave his son advice on how to handle his imperial position. 
However in this treatise Alexius does not give his son practical advice on how to deal 
with intruders like the Rum Seljuqs but displays the traditional idea of meeting them 
with moral virtue and gold: 
"One thing and one alone can save: Virtue ... If you have this as your breastplate, helmet, 
and great protecting shield, this is the armour which the Celt fears; this is the armour on 
seeing which the Norman sails away trembling; at this the Persian, the population of the 
Scyths, the Arabian peoples, the Abasgian, the Celtiberian, the Indian race and the 
Maurousian army all take fright. "539 
Alexius describes here the Seljuq Turks as Persians and the Petchenegs as 
Scyths and implies thereby that their real character is not important and they are all 
just barbarians. Moreover, he lists the Indians among the peoples the empire had to 
deal with which is far from the truth but it claims that the power of the Byzantine 
empire was still universal. Alexius advised his son to keep the treasury in 
Constantinople filled at all times, "so that with these you may satisfy the greed of the 
nations, should these once more, as formerly, be on the move, gaping horribly and 
trying to devour, in their great numbers, this coveted city. "540 This statement by 
Alexius is a good description of the Byzantine policy of gold. Alexius also reveals 
here the special position of Constantinople as the "coveted city. Constantinople was 
for the Byzantines the identification of the Byzantine Empire and its security was 
thus the most important aim of Byzantine foreign policy. 541 
539 Ed. P. Maas as Die Musen des Kaisers Alexios I, in: BZ, 22 (1913), 351-52 as translated by 
Magdalino, Manuel, 27. 
540 Magdalino, Manuel, 28. 
541 Cf. Harris, Byzantium and the Cn1sades, 12 and 31. 
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V.l. Sulayman I and Alexius I Comnenus 
The first involvement of Sulayman with the Comneni was during the revolt of 
Nicepheros Botaniates against the emperor Michael Ducas. The future emperor 
Nicephoros Botaniates had hired Sulayman's services when he rebelled against 
Michael VII Doukas (r. 1071-1078) in 1077/78. On his way to Constantinople 
Nicephoros Botaniates asked Sulayman to leave Turkish garrisons on the route in 
western Anatolia so that places were secured for him.542 However, Sulayman seized 
this opportunity to take these places for himself, and shortly after Botaniates had 
reached Constantinople Sulayman made Nicaea his residence.543 The first encounter 
between the Comneni and the Seljuqs in Anatolia took place, when they, like other 
Byzantine throne pretenders sought Turkish help. Here we can see that Alexius' 
attitude towards the Turks differed in real praxis from his attitude towards 
"barbarian" as it was described by his muses. 
"John was rather fortunate at this stage, for as he set out he met some Turks who had 
recently crossed the River Euros. He reined in his horse and asked from where they 
journeyed and what was their destination. He also promised to give them much money and 
grant them all sorts of favours if they would join him on the march to Comnenus. The Turks 
agreed there and then, and John, wishing to confirm the arrangement, required their leaders 
to take an oath. At once they swore an oath, after their own fashion, to fight with great 
enthusiasm on the side of Alexius. Thus John went on his way accompanied by these 
Turks. 544" 
According to Anna, it just so happened that her uncle, John, met these Turks 
on his way but more credible is that he asked the Turks to send him re-inforcements. 
Alexius did no disregard the Turkish "barbarians" but welcomed their military 
support during his revolt to gain the imperial throne. "My father, most of all, could 
not contain himself for joy."545 Anna's first record about Sulayman after the 
accession of Alexius reveals important aspects of the relations between the two sides: 
542 Cf. Vryonis, Decline, 113: Angold, Byzantine Empire, 95-96; B.G. Spiridonakis, Grecs, 
Occidentaux et Tu res de 1054 a 1453 Quatre siecles d'histoire de relations internationales, 
Thessaloniki 1990, 193. 
543 Cf. Vryonis, Decline, 105-1 06; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 96 and 102. 
544 Anna, Sewter, 89. 
545 Anna, Sewter, 89. 
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"Alexius made preparations to deal with the immediate and pressing danger which 
threatened him from the east. Meanwhile he remained in the capital, examining every means 
of counteracting the enemies before his very eyes. As I have said in a previous chapter, the 
godless Turks were in sight, living in the Propontis area, and Sulayman, who cornrrianded all 
the east, was actually encamped in the vicinity of Nicaea. His sultanate was in that city (we 
would call it his palace). The whole countryside of Bithynia and Thynia was increasingly 
exposed to Sulayman's foragers; marauding parties on horseback and on foot were raiding as 
far as the town now called Damalis on the Bosphorus itself; they carried of much booty and 
all but tried to leap over the very sea."546 
Anna emphasises that Sulayman and his Turkish bands had reached Nicaea, 
which had become his capital. Yet, she does not mention how the Turks had come as 
far as Nicaea though usually she goes back to past events to explain the present 
situation. In this case, she prefers to omit the fact that support for the rebels 
Nicepheros Botaniates and then Nicepheros Melisenus had enabled Sulayman to take 
western Anatolian towns. The position of Sulayman in western Anatolia was not 
secure enough to attempt the conquest of Constantinople.547 Thus, Anna's remark 
that the Turks threatened to "leap over the very sea" is one of her exaggerations. 
Sulayman's residence Nicaea was only a hundred kilometres away from the imperial 
city thus it was easy for his bands to raid as far as the Bosphorus but he did not 
possess a fleet to threaten it seriously. Moreover, Sulayman had reached the status of 
a territorial ruler by chance and had not yet the administrative structure to establish a 
state. Still, Anna describes Sulayman as sultan and exaggerates the power held by 
him stating that he "commanded all the east". Sulayman belonged to a branch of the 
Great Seljuq dynasty but he was in no position to assume the sultan title. His Great 
Seljuq cousin, sultan Malik Shah, was too powerful to accept anyone contesting his 
claim of sole leadership548. Besides, the Abbasid caliph, the only power which could 
have granted Sulayman such a title was at the time under the control of Malik 
Shah. 549 Sulayman had the advantage of being a member of the ruling dynasty and 
546 Anna, Sewter, 129. 
547 Cahen states that: "Siileyman must nevertheless have realized that to keep his new-found power he 
was too much at risk in the west, and must maintain his relations with the Turcomans of western 
Anatolia." Cahen, Formation, 9. 
548 According to Bar Hebraeus Malik Shah even sent an army to Anatolia and an envoy to 
Constantinople to return of Kutlumush 's sons Sulayman and Mansiir to the Great Seljuq realm. Bar 
Hebraeus, Budge, 227; Turan, Selr;uklular, 58; Cahen, Formation, 9. 
549 Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 75-76. There is also no evidence that Sulayman assumed the title 
sultan. There are no coins, existent from his time and the Muslim sources describe him as malik and 
amir not as sultan. For the coins see, K. (:etin, Selr;uklu Miiesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, Erzurum 
1992, 34. 
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was thus able to command the respect of some Turkish bands but not of all of them 
and his real power did not extend that of the other Turkish chiefs operating in Asia 
Minor. Most of these Turkish chiefs did not recognise any overlord and were acting 
for their own benefit and therefore Sulayman did not command the whole of Asia 
Minor as Anna writes. 
However Anna reveals here an important Byzatnine policy towards the Rum 
Seljuqs which the first Comnenian ruler Alexius established and which his 
successors continued to apply after him. The Byzantines elevated Sulayman 's status 
for two reasons. Firstly, they wanted to build him up as the sole leader of the Turks 
in Asia Minor, as it seemed easier to put an end to the raids and incursions of the 
Turkish bands when they were brought under the control of one leader.550 Secondly, 
Alexius was prepared to build up Sulayman as a rival sultan ruling over the Turks in 
Anatolia in order to establish a balance of power against the more dangerous Great 
Seljuq sultan further east. Alexius, it seems, supported consciously the establishment 
of a Seljuq state within Asia Minor. The memory of the battle of Manzikert, where 
Malik Shah's father, Alp Arslan, had defeated the emperor Roman os IV Diogenes, 
no doubt played a role here. Thus, in real praxis Alexius' aim was not the expulsion 
of the Turks from Asia Minor. Despite propagandistic claims voiced in Alexius' 
muses and in Anna' s work, Alexius did not regard the Seljuqs as just barbarians with 
whom it was easy to deal. Therefore, his real aim was to keep the Seljuqs and the 
Turkish bands in general away from Constantinople and the economically important 
coastal regions: 
"Comnenus not only drove the enemy far away form the Bosphorus and the places by the 
sea, but chased them from the districts of Bithynia and Thynia altogether, not to mention the 
borders of Nicomedia, and the sultan was constrained to make the most urgent pleas for an 
armistice. Alexius gladly accepted the offer of negotiations. He had reliable information 
from many sources about Robert's unlimited ambitions and he knew that enormous forces 
had been gathered; Robert was already hurrying to the Lombardy coast. ... By various means 
he had driven the Turks from Damalis and the coastal districts near it; at the same time he 
had won their friendship with gifts; he had compelled them to accept a treaty of peace. The 
River Drakon was now made the border between them, with the proviso that the Turks were 
absolutely forbidden to cross it and under no circumstances to invade the frontiers of 
Bithynia."551 
55° Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 77; Cahen, Formation, 9. 
551 Anna, Sewter, 130. 
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Ann a emphasises here Alexius' success in driving the Turks away from the 
coastal regions and presents Sulayman as the weaker party, who made "the most 
urgent pleas for an armistice." The emperor consented only because he had 
information that the N ormans were launching an expedition against the empire. Anna 
is anxious to present the emperor as the superior party in his dealings with the Turks 
and does not reveal the exact course of the warfare between Sulayman and Alexius 
preceding the treaty. However, Alexius was not in a superior position. He was under 
threat of internal enemies, Byzantine aristocrats who were waiting for an opportunity 
to seize the imperial throne, external enemies, Normans and Petchenegs in the west 
and Seljuqs and other Turkish chiefs in the east, who used every opportunity to raid 
Byzantine territory. Moreover, the whole situation was worsened by the empire's 
chronic lack of manpower. Thus a war on two fronts was impossible and weighing 
up the threat posed by the Seljuqs in the east and the Normans in the west the 
emperor decided to deal with the latter as they had the power to take the imperial 
city. A peace treaty with Sulayman not only enabled him to withdraw his troops from 
the east but it meant also that he would gain an ally, whom he could ask for 
reenforcements against the Normans.552 We can not be certain of Alexius' attitude 
towards Sulayman as Anna omits the articles of the treaty. She reveals, however, that 
the River Drakon553 was set as the boundary between the two realms.554 That Alexius 
was prepared for a boundary to be set seems to prove that he accepted the loss of 
Asia Minor and recognised Sulayman as a territorial ruler and sought to win him as 
an ally. Anna tries to uphold the Byzantine claim of superiority stating that the 
emperor set the terms of the treaty and won the Turks "friendship with gifts." 
The lack of contemporary Rum Seljuq sources makes it difficult to determine 
Sulayman' s attitude towards the emperor. However, the fact that he consented to the 
552 Anna writes: "Alexius saw the magnitude of his task and was afraid. He knew that his own forces 
were vastly outnumbered by the Latins and decided that he must call on the Turks from the east. There 
and then he made his views known to the sultan. He also asked the Venetians for help, with promises 
and bribes." Anna, Sewter, 137; see also Angold, Byzantine Empire, 112. 
553 The location of the River Drakon has not been established. Ramsay located it at the stream called 
in modem Turkish Ktrkgec;:it. W. Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, 205; Chalandon, 
Alexis, 72, 75; Turan thought that with Drakon the hill called Orhan and and a stream there must have 
been meant following the suggestion of Michael the Syrian that Izmit was also under Seljuq control, 
Turan, Selr;uklular, 62, n. 50. 
554 Cf. Dolger, Regesten, 11, 24; J. Laurent, Byzance et les origines du Sultana! de Roum, Paris 1930, 
181-182, (hereafter cited as Laurent, Sultana! de Roum ); idem., Byzance et les Tu res Seldjoucides, 
Nancy 1913, 8, 11, 94, (hereafter cited as Laurent, Seldjoucides); Vryonis, Decline, 114; 
SevirnNiicel, Tiirkiye Tarihi, 102. 
188 
treaty at Drakon suggests that he had no intention to continue his expansions towards 
the west. He had taken several places during the Byzantine internal strife but had not 
consolidated his power in Anatolia yet. There were other Turkish chiefs in Anatolia 
contesting his power. They did not recognise him or anyone for that matter as their 
overlord. Moreover, the Great Seljuq Sultan Malik Shah regarded his cousin 
Sulayman as a threat and interfered several times in his and his successor's affairs to 
prevent the establishment of a rival Seljuq state in Asia Minor. Sulayman agreed to 
conclude a treaty with the Byzantine emperor because he won thus a powerful ally in 
the west and could then concentrate his efforts on consolidating his power towards 
eastern Anatolia. 
Thus, both rulers, Sulayman as well as Alexius, concluded the treaty of 
Drakon out of similar considerations. They both had to free their hands to defend 
their position. Thus, in real political praxis the Byzantine emperor Alexius could not 
demand to have a higher rank than the Rum Seljuq 'sultan' Sulayman. Anna's 
attempt to excuse the emperor's decision to conclude the Drakon treaty reveals this: 
" ... Robert was already hurrying to the Lombardy coast. After all, if Hercules could not fight 
two opponents at once, as the proverb says, how much more was it true of a young general 
who had but recently acquired a corrupted empire, slowly perishing over a long period and 
now at its last gasp, without armies and without money?"555 
Anna admits that the Byzantine Empire had lost its former greatness and that 
it was at "its last gasp." Thus, Alexius confronted with the prospect to lose 
Constantinople to the Norman ruler Robert had to conclude peace with Sulayman to 
defend Constantinople. 556 The defence of the imperial city was paramount, as for the 
Byzantines the city was synonymous with the empire. Yet, according to imperial 
ideology, the Treaty of Drakon could not be regarded as an agreement reached 
between two parties equal in rank. Hence in theory, Sulayman must have been 
regarded as a subordinate of the emperor to whom he had delegated the rule of the 
territories held by him. 557 However, we have no evidence, which reveals how the 
555 Anna, Sewter, 130. 
556 Anna states that Robert Guiscard's attack on Dyrrachium "was merely the first round" in his aim to 
take "the throne of the Roman Empire." Anna, Sewter, 136. 
557 Cf. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 357. Similarly to the situation with the Serbs in the first half of 
the eleventh century were the fiction was maintained according to which the emperor allowed the 
Serbs to be ruled by their own princes. See also Harris, Byzantium confronts the West, 24. 
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relation between Alexius and Sulayman were formally regulated, though two 
incidents seem to support the conclusion that Sulayman became a subordinate of the 
Byzantine emperor. Firstly, the fact that Abu'l Qasim, whom Sulayman had left in 
Nicaea as his deputy was invited to Constantinople and received the title 
"sebastos"
558 
implies that Sulayman might have received a similar title.559 
Secondly, Sulayman 's conquest of Antioch. After the conclusion of the treaty of 
Dracon, Sulayman turned towards the east and in 1 086 reached Syria where he took 
Antioch without difficulty from Philaretus. 560 Philaretus, an Armenian who had been 
in Byzantine service, had during the turmoil after the battle of Manzikert, seized 
control over Antioch in 1 078 and established a principality in northern Syria. Anna 
writes that Philaretus "organized a rebellion and seized power for himself in 
Antioch"561 and then continues: 
"As the Turks plundered the area round the city every day and there was not respite at all, 
Philaretos decided to join them and offered himself for circumcision, according to their 
custom. His son violently opposed this ridiculous impulse, but his good advice went 
unheeded. After a journey of eight days, he arrived in a state of extreme distress at Nicaea 
and approached the Emir Sulayman, who had just been promoted to the rank of sultan. He 
urged him to besiege Antioch and prosecute the war against his father. Sulayman agreed and 
as he was about to leave for Antioch appointed Abul-Kasim governor of Nicaea with 
overriding authority over all other military commanders. After a march of twelve nights 
(with rest by day) Sulayman and Philaretos' son reached Antioch without been seen and took 
it at the first assault. "562 
Anna presents the conquest of Antioch by Sulayman in an unusually 
descriptive way without lamenting the fact that the town came under Turkish Muslim 
558 Anna reports: "When the fortress was finished and his aim achieved, Alexius presented the Turk 
with more gifts, honoured him with the title sebastos, confirmed their agreement in greater detail and 
sent him with every sign of courtesy back over the sea." Anna, Sewter, 204. 
559 Western scholars conclude that Sulayman was a vassal of Alexius. Cf. Laurent, Sultana! de Roum, 
181-182; idem., Seldjoucides, 96-98; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 357; Cahen shares this view 
stating that, Sulayman "turned back to the east, there also aided by his more or less clear new position 
as deputy for the Byzantines". Cahen, Formation, 9. Turkish scholars on the other hand reject this 
view regarding it as a result of western orientalism. According to Turan and subsequent Turkish 
historians the incursion of the Turks into Asia Minor and the establishment of the Rum Seljuq state 
were part of a grand Seljuq or Turkish plan of conquest and pre-planned. Turan, Selr;uklular, 62-66. 
560 The collapse of Byzantine administration in Asia Minor following the battle of Manzikert, left 
especially the eastern Anatolian borders and regions unguarded. The Armenian chiefs making use of 
this situation established principalities in these regions. Philaretus was an Armenian with Byzantine 
religious affiliation and had served as governor in eastern Anatolia during the reign of Romanos 
Diogenes. Cf. Angold, Byzantine Empire, 100-1 01; Vryonis, Decline, 108-1 09; Runciman, Cn1sades, 
I, 73. 
561 Anna, Sewter, 198. 
562 Anna, Sewter, 198-199. 
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control. That she connects the two events in her narrative implies that she regarded 
Sulayman 's conquest as a necessary outcome caused by Philaretus himself. It was 
certainly in the interest of Alexius that Sulayman was engaged in the east rather than 
in the west and that Philaretus, who had in the past supported his rivals, was 
defeated. However, we cannot discern if an agreement between Alexius and 
Sulayman existed which appointed the latter to take Antioch563 . The Comneni, like 
their predecessors, regarded local Greek as well as Armenian leaders as a threat to 
the imperial central authority and Turkish chiefs were regarded as allies to fight 
those, though it is surprising that Alexius would have left such an important city like 
Antioch to the Turks. More so, since Alexius and his successors later, when the city 
was taken by the armies of the First Crusade, insisted vehemently on bringing it back 
under the empire's control. 
The information of the Muslim sources on the conquest of Antioch is not 
conclusive either. On the one hand, it implies, that Sulayman might have been 
regarded as a Byzantine deputy, on the other hand it implies that he regarded himself 
as the subordinate of the Great Seljuq sultan: 
" ... Sharaf al-Dawla Muslim ibn Quraysh sent to him demanding the tribute that Philarates 
used to pay him and portraying the dread results of rebelling against the sultan. He replied, 
'Obedience to the sultan is my watchword and my cloak. His name is in the khutbah and on 
the coinage in my lands. I have already written to him to announce which lands and infidel 
territory God has conquered at my hand and through his felicity. As for the tribute that the 
lord of Antioch paid previously, well, he was an infidel and paid his and his men's poll-tax. 
I, praise be to God, am a believer and I shall deliver nothing."564 
According to Ibn al-Athir, the emir of Aleppo demanded from Sulayman the 
tribute paid by Philaretus and threatened to call for the Great Seljuq sultan Malik 
Shah, "portraying the dread results of rebelling against the sultan". Sulayman 
answered that he was obedient towards the sultan and that as a Muslim he did not 
have to pay the poll-tax. This supposed statement of Sulayman is anachronistic and 
certainly the words of the author himself. Still it reflects the later Rum Seljuq 
ideology that the Great Seljuq sultan formally bestowed on them the rule of Asia 
Minor and that they were Perso-Islamic rulers. The Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shah 
563 Cf. Cahen, Formation, 9; idem., Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 77. 
564 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, 218. 
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and his brother Tutu~ to whom he had given the rule over Syria, certainly did not 
regard Sulayman as an obedient vassal but as a threat and he was killed in war and 
his sons were sent as captives to Malik Shah.565 However, even if the Great Seljuq 
sultan did not regard Sulayman as his vassal, he was still regarded as a Muslim ruler 
and as such he could not be the vassal of the Christian Byzantine emperor. Moreover, 
according to the Islamic State ideology a Muslim ruler could not be at peace with its 
Christian neighbour for a long period of time. 566 
To conclude, the treaty of Drakon and the conquest of Antioch reveal the 
following elements which make up a pattern of the relations between sultan and 
emperor. Sultan and emperor regarded each other as allies. Both sides came to 
accept each other's existence and did not aim to destroy the other side. Moreover, the 
emperor built up Sulayman as anti-sultan against the Great Seljuq sultan. 567 The 
emperor's aim was thus to keep a balance of power and not to expel the Turks from 
Anatolia. The main concern of the sultan was the consolidation of his power in the 
east and the main concern of the emperor was the defence of Constantinople and the 
coastal areas. 
V.2. Kthc; Arslan I and Alexius I Comnenus 
The first atm of K1h9 Arslan I, like that of his father Sulayman was to 
establish his powerbase in eastern Anatolia. Anna describes in the following passage 
how he and his brother escaped Great Seljuq captivity and came to Nicaea and took 
over his father's realm568. 
" ... the Sultan of Chorasan who was murdered by Chasioi had previously held the two sons 
of the great Sulayman; after his death they ran away from Chorasan and soon arrived in 
565 Cf. Anna, Sewter, 199. 
566 Kinnamos reports for example that Kt he; Arslan in 1173 explained his break of the alliance with the 
emperor as follows: "The other said ... that their caliph, the high priest among them, was angry at him 
for having agreed to such an extent of friendship with the Romans." Kinnamos, Brand, 216. 
567 Anna reports that after the death of Sulayman Malik Shah wrote to Alexius offering him to hand 
him over all Anatolian territories held by the Turks if he agreed to a marriage alliance between his son 
and a Byzantine princess. Alexius, however, supported Sulayman's deputy Abu'l Kasim against Malik 
Shah's general. Anna, Sewter, 207. 
568 Cf. I. Demirkent, Tiirkiye Selfuklu I-!iikiimdan Sultan I. KII19 Arslan, Ankara 1996, 15. 
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Nicaea. At the sight of them the people of Nicaea ran riot with joy and Poulchases gladly 
handed over the city to them, as if it were a family inheritance. The elder son, Kilij by name, 
received the title sultan. He sent for the wives and children of the soldiers present in Nicaea 
and they set up home there; the city became what one might call the official residence of the 
sultans. After arranging the affairs of Nicaea thus, Kilij Arslan forced Poulchases to resign 
his governorship, promoted Muhammad archisatrap, left him behind in the vicinity of Nicaea 
and himself went of to attack Melitene."569 
Kth~ Arslan's interest in Malatya (Melitene) signals his intention to secure 
important routes570 in eastern Anatolia leading to Upper Mesopotamia, Syria and the 
Great Seljuq Empire. Thus, like his father Sulayman before him, Kth~ Arslan 
showed no intention to attack Constantinople. The ambitious Turkish chief <;aka 
acquired a fleet and aspired, the conquest of Constantinople but this was an 
independent enterprise. K1l19 Arslan married <;aka's daughter after he returned to 
Nicaea probably in order to gain the alliance of this important Turkish leader but 
there is no indication that the latter accepted the former as an overlord. 571 Anna gives 
us the only information about <;aka's life and quoting him writes: 
"Tzachas, addressing Dalassenus by name, began the conversation: 'Let me introduce 
myself. I am the young man who in the old days made incursions into Asia. I fought with 
great spirit, but because of my inexperience I was deceived and captured by the famous 
Alexander Kabalika. He offered me as a prisoner of war to the Emperor Nicephorus 
Botaniates. I was at once honoured with the title of protonobilissimus and after being 
rewarded with liberal gifts I promised obedience to him. "572 
According to this statement, <;aka was one of the Turkish chiefs who led 
raids into Anatolia and was taken captive by the Byzantines and brought to 
Constantinople. He therefore not only knew the Byzantine admiral by name but was 
also able to speak to him in Greek addressing him personally. Moreover, he claims 
during this conversation that he had received the title protonobilissin1us from the 
569 Anna, Sewter, 21 0; Bar Hebraeus confirms Kth9 Arslan 's attack on Melitene and dates it to 1095 
writes: "Kelej Arslan, the son of SUlaiman, the SUltan of !conium, came and encamped against 
Melitene, and made war upon it." Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 233. 
57° For this it was important to hold the cities on the major routes: "the Royal Road that ran from 
Symma and Sardis, by way of Ancyra and Caesarea, to Melitene; the road connecting Constantinople 
to Ancyra by way of Dorylaeum; and the southern road that extended from Ephesus to Laodicea, 
Antioch in Pisidia, !conium, Tyana and through the Cilician Gates, to Tarsus and Antioch in Syria." 
Mango, Byzantium, 17. 
571 C£ Turan, Selr;uklular, 97; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 81. 
572 Anna, Sewter, 236. According to Angold the title protonobilissimus was one of the composite 
Byzantine titles, invented during the inflation of titles in the 11th century. Cf. Angold, Byzantine 
Empire, 72. 
193 
emperor Nicephorus Botaniates (r. I 078-1081) and in exchange promised obedience. 
It is surprising that <::aka was immediately honoured with a Byzantine title after he 
was handed over to the emperor and indicates that he might have already been 
familiar with Greek and Byzantine internal structures. Anna does not inform us when 
exactly he was taken captive but it seems improbable that he should have gathered so 
much insight and knowledge about Byzantium during the short reign of Nicephorus 
Botaniates, who had employed him573 • According to Anna <::aka even claimed to 
have knowledge of Greek classics: "Tzachas gave the in1pression that he was quoting 
Homer's line, 'Night is already upon us: it is good to heed the night."574 Be that as it 
may, it is certain that <::aka realised that he needed a fleet to challenge Byzantium 
seriously. After Alexius acceded to the throne <::aka who probably was then in 
Constantinople and was not, it seems, honoured by the new emperor as his 
predecessor had done and thus he left and became an enemy of the new emperor. 
"But ever since Alexius Comnenus seized power, everything has gone wrong for me. 
That is why I have come now in person to explain the reason for my enmity. "575 
Probably because the new emperor did not honour <::aka and he left Constantinople 
and then took Smyma, where he took residence and established a maritime 
principality: 576 
"At this moment Tzachas, being informed of the emperor's manifold difficulties in the west 
and of his frequent encounters with the Patzinaks, decided that he must have a fleet - the 
omens were propitious. He met a certain man from Smyma who had considerable experience 
in such matters and to him he entrusted the business of constructing pirate vessels. 
Somewhere near Smyma a large fleet was equipped. In addition to the pirate vessels there 
were forty decked ships and on the crews of efficient sailors. "577 
573 Turan writes that <;aka "making use of his Byzantine experience and his relations with Romans 
prepared a fleet with the craftsmen he got hold of." Turan, Selr;uklular, 89. However, he does not give 
any references as to sources and names; Sevim and Yi.icel write that <;aka left Constantinople after 
Alexius came to power and went to Smyrna which he conquered easily and that he then "thanks to the 
experience he won in Byzantium brought together a strong fleet". Sevirn!Yiicel, Tiirh:iye Tarihi, 217; 
Ostrogorsky just acknowledges that. "He had once been a prisoner at the court of Nicephorus 
Botanciates, and being familiar with the tactics of Byzantine warfare he rightly recognised that the 
decisive blow against the imperial city must come from the sea." Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 360; 
Magadalino writes in passing that "he had spent time in Byzantine service." in: Mango (ed.), Oxford 
Histmy of Byzantium, Oxford 2002, 185. Cahen and Vryonis do not elaborate on this. Cf. Cahen, Pre-
Ouoman Turkey, 81185; Vryonis, Decline, 115. 
574 Anna, Sewter, 237. 
575 Anna, Sewter, 236. 
576 At the peak of his power <;aka controlled the Aegean towns of Smyrna, Clazomenae, Phocaea, 
Mitylene and the Aegean islands Samos and Chios. Cf. Vryonis, Decline, 115. 
577 Anna, Sewter, 233. 
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It is surprising that <;aka, the former war pnsoner, was able to find the 
financial and constructive aid to acquire such a strong fleet. Anna writes that "a 
certain man" helped <;aka but does not specify who that person was and how he was 
paid. Obviously, Anna does not want to admit that Greeks supported <;aka in his 
enterprise but it is quite obvious that they did. <;aka's ambitions seemed limitless as 
he aimed for the itnperial city itself and was not even daunted by setbacks. He tried 
to reach his goal by an alliance with the Pechenegs, whom he asked to take Gallipoli 
so that he could attack Constantinople. 578 Anna informs us about the great danger 
posed by the Petchenegs (Scyths) and <;aka: 
"But the unchecked violence of the Scyths had such an overwhelming effect that would-be 
pilgrims dared not even open the gates of Byzantium because of these frequent assaults. 
Such were the terrible disasters which fell upon the emperor in the west; on the sea, too, 
there was no freedom from trouble, for Tzachas had acquired a new fleet and was 
overrunning all the coastline. The situation was extremely dangerous, and these blows 
coming from all directions caused Alexius deep concern. He was vexed and harassed 
everywhere. The news came that Tzachas' fleet, recruited from the maritime districts, was 
bigger than ever; the rest of the islands previously taken by him had been sacked; he planned 
to attack the western provinces and his envoys advised the Scyths to occupy the Chersonese. 
Worse still, he would not let the mercenary force (the Turks from the east who had come to 
the emperor's aid) keep their treaty with Alexius inviolate. To make them desert him and 
come over to his own side, Tzachas promised fine rewards once he had his hands on the 
loot. ,579 
It might also be that <;aka approached Abu '1 Qasim for an alliance in order to have 
support from that direction as well and thus to encircle the imperial city. Anna does 
not mention any alliance between him and Abu 1 'Kasim, who was at that time an ally 
of the emperor. She states, however, that <;aka approached the Turkish mercenaries, 
most probably sent by Abu 'I Qasim to desert to him. However, Anna does not give 
us any information about, what happened then between the Petchenegs and <;aka but 
the alliance led to nothing and Alexius defeated the former with the help of the 
Cumans. Hence, <;aka did not give up his plans: 
sn For the alliance with the Petchenegs cf. Angold, Byzantine Empire, 11 0; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine 
State, 360. For the alliance with Abu'l Qasim see Sevim/Yiicel, Tiirkiye Tarihi, 218, who state that 
<;aka started, around the same time of his alliance with the Pechenegs, negotiations with Abu I 'Kasim 
and then that: "Byzantium was thus pressed and threatened by the Pechenegs in Thrace, by the Seljuqs 
of Turkey form the Sea of Marmara, and by <;aka in izmir (Smyrna) and its surroundings." 
Unfortunately, the authors do not give any references and information about the nature of this alliance 
between Abu' I Qasim and <;aka. 
579 Anna, Sewter, 251-52. 
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"Soon after he had come back news arrived of Tzachas. It was reported that defeat by land 
and sea had not diverted him from his previous intentions: he was wearing the imperial 
insignia, calling himself emperor and living at Smyma as though it were an imperial 
residence. A fleet was being equipped to ravage the island afresh, for Tzachas hoped to reach 
Byzantium itself and attain supreme power, if that were possible"580• 
Despite a setback and the defeat of his Petcheneg allies c;aka did not lose 
heart and, overbearing as ever, assumed "imperial insignia", aimed to "attain 
supreme power" and copied the life of the Byzantine emperor at his residence in 
Smyrna
581
• c;aka's aim was thus not to take Constantinople and convert it into a 
Muslim imperial city and to become a Muslim "emperor" but to become an emperor 
in the Byzantine tradition. Sulayman and Kthc; Arslan in contrast regarded 
themselves as rightful members of the Great Seljuq dynasty and their ultimate goal 
was, it seems, to become rulers of that "empire". Kt he; Arslan did not support his 
father-in-law c;aka in his plans against Byzantium and Alexius managed to alienate 
c;aka and Kthc; Arslan with the following words: 
"It would also be expedient, Alexius thought, to stir up trouble for him with the sultan. A 
letter was therefore sent, reading as follows: 'Most Illustrious Sultan Kilij Arslan, you know 
that the dignity of sultan is yours by right of inheritance. But your kinsman Tzachas, 
although apparently preparing for war against the Roman Empire (for he calls himself 
emperor) is in reality using this as a pretext - an obvious pretext, for he is a man of 
experience and he knows perfectly well that the Roman Empire is not for him: it would be 
absolutely beyond his power to seize a throne so exalted. The whole mischievous plan is 
directed against you. If you are wise, therefore, you will not endure this. There is no need for 
despair however, but rather for vigilance; otherwise you will be driven from your sultanate. 
For my part, I will with God's help expel him from Roman territory and as I care for your 
interests, I would advise you to consider your own authority and power, and quickly bring 
him to heel, by peaceful means or, if he refuses, by the sword. "582 
We can see here that Alexius continued his policy of elevating the status of 
the Seljuq ruler by addressing him as "Most illustrious Sultan". The emperor alluded 
to the noble birth of the Seljuq Kt he; Arslan I, setting it in contrast to the descent of 
his lowbom kinsman, c;aka by indicating, "the dignity of sultan is yours by right of 
inheritance". Obviously, Alexius wanted to flatter Kthc; Arslan to win him over. On 
580 Anna, Sewter, 269. 
581 Cf. Chalandon, Alexis, 125-127, 147, 195-196; A. Kurat, (:aka ortazamanda hmir ve yakrmndaki 
Turk hakimi, Istanbul 1936; Vryonis, Decline, 115. 
582 Anna, Sewter, 274-5. 
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the other hand, Anna makes throughout her work a distinction between the Seljuq 
dynasty and its nomadic following. It thus seems certain that the emperor recognised 
the sultan's noble lineage and thus his right for leadership over the Turks. The idea 
of noble birth did indeed compile with Turkish tradition and also with the Byzantine 
concept of the 12th century where the imperial family "for the first time, became an 
effective 'blood royal'. 583 
Alexius exaggerates the power of his "Roman Empire" and clain1s 
propagandistically that it is "absolutely beyond his power to seize a throne so 
exalted" even though <;aka had been able to threaten the empire seriously several 
times. The emperor wanted to demonstrate his power to the Seljuq ruler and make 
him suspicious of <;aka's motives, claiming that the latter was after the realm of the 
'sultan'. Kthv Arslan must have been aware of the emperor's empty propaganda, but 
on the other hand, he had reason to be suspicious of <;aka's intentions since he could 
have become a rival. Therefore, Kthv Arslan regarded <;aka, his kinsman and father-
in-law, as a far more dangerous enemy than Alexius, as the former could threaten his 
position. Hence, according to Anna, Ktlw Arslan invited <;aka to a banquet where he 
killed him himself and "then made overtures to the emperor for peace in the future 
and his proposals met with success, for Alexius consented and a treaty was 
concluded in the normal way. Thus peace was restored to the maritime provinces."584 
Again, Anna omits the terms of the treaty reached and claims that Kthv Arslan I 
sought the peace and Alexius consented, even though the latter was in no position to 
make demands. Nevertheless, Alexius and the new Rum Seljuq leader Kthv Arslan I 
became allies. 
K1h9 Arslan I, Alexius I Comnenus and the First Crusade 
Yet, in 1095 Alexius is believed to have sent an embassy to pope Urban II to 
appeal for help against the Turks. Turkmen raids into Byzantine coastal regions had 
not ceased with the death of <;aka, as other Turkish chiefs took his place.585 
However, none of those was a great danger to the Byzantine Empire, as Anna states 
510 Magdalino, Mam1el, 312. 
584 Anna, Sewter, 275; Dolger, Regesten II, p. 41 no. 1169. 
585 Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 81. 
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in the above quoted passage, and the "maritime provinces" were at peace. Moreover, 
Kthy Arslan himself had left Nicaea for the east where he had laid siege on Malatya. 
He seems to have had no interest in the maritime provinces of the Byzantine state or 
Constantinople. Even though such Byzantine appeals for military support to the west 
were not new it is not clear why Alexius sent one at this time as his situation was not 
hopeless any more. 586 
He had forced the Normans out of the Balkans tn 1083 and defeated the 
Petchenegs in 1091 and <;aka had been killed the following year, so that by 1095 the 
Empire was not under threat any more. 587 The questions as to why Alexius sent out 
an appeal despite his improved situation, and why he alluded to the religious 
sentiments of the Western Christians in this appeal have been widely discussed by 
modem scholars. 588 They have reached the assumption that Alexius, despite his 
improved situation, still asked for help, because he was in need of manpower for an 
expedition of reconquest directed against the Seljuqs. 589 It is believed that he alluded 
to the Holy Land and Holy Sepulchre because he thought this would mobilise the 
western leaders to supply him with mercenaries.590 
While it is right that the Byzantine Empire suffered a shortage of manpower, 
the suggestion that he was planning an expedition against the Seljuqs cannot be 
supported. In this context, modem scholars have not paid enough attention to the 
nature of the relations between Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines. As has been shown 
above, Alexius accepted the presence of the Turks in Anatolia, as long the coastal 
regions and Constantinople were secure. Thus, what he needed were mercenaries to 
support the defence of these not to launch an offensive against the Rum Seljuq 
leader, who at that time was his ally. Besides, Alexius might have used religious 
586 Cf. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 361; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 137; Vasiliev, HistOl)l of the 
Byzantine Empire, 25. 
5
!!
7 Cf. J. Shephard, 'Cross-purposes: Alexius Cornnenus and the First Crusade', in: J.Philipps (ed.), 
The First C11Jsade, Manchester 1997, 114. 
ss!! The centre of discussions are a letter which Ale xi us seems to have sent in 1091 or 1092 to Robert 
of Flanders, who had a few years passed through Constantinople on his way back from the Holy Land 
and the envoy he sent in 1095 to the council of Piacenza to ask the Western Christian leaders for help 
against the Turks. In the letter to Roberty of Flanders Alexius describes the situation "of the most 
Holy Empire of the Greek Christians which is oppressed by the Patzinaks and Turks." as quoted by 
Vasiliev, HistOI)l of the Byzantine Empire, 26. See for the discussion of the authenticity of the letter 
ibid., 27-28. 
5!!9 CfVasiliev, Histmy ofthe Byzantine Empire, 47; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 361; C. Mango, 
The Oxford HistOl)l of Byzantium, Oxford 2002, 190; Harris, Byzantium confronts the West, 47. 
59° Cf. J. Shephard, Cross-pwposes, 118; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 137; Runciman, Crusades I, 104. 
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terms in his appeal but the Byzantines regarded the struggle against the Seljuq Turks 
not as a religious struggle, and neither did the latter. 
There are no contemporary Rum Seljuq sources extant which deal with the 
First Crusade. The Rum Seljuq chroniclers writing later, Aksarayi as well as the 
anonymous author, totally ignore the First Crusade. The Danishmendnama, the epic 
work written for the rivals of the Rum Seljuqs, the Danishmendids, mentions briefly 
wars fought by the Muslims against Christians in Asia Minor but it does not 
differentiate and relates to Christians in general not specifically the Crusaders. 591 The 
Syrian historian Ibn al-Qalanisi mentions the Rum Seljuqs briefly, but his statements 
cannot be used to recreate the attitude of the Rum Seljuqs towards the Crusades. He 
had no connection to the Rum Seljuqs and his work reflects a retrospective Muslim 
view on the Crusades, written around 1160, at a time when the Crusader States had 
been established. 592 Yet, the indifference of the Rum Seljuq sources towards the First 
Crusade suggests that the Rum Seljuqs did not regard the appearance of the Crusader 
armies as something out of the ordinary and a special movement with a religious 
mission targeted at them. As far as Kthc; Arslan was concerned he was at peace with 
Byzantium and did not expect any attack from the west. 
Among Byzantine authors, only John Zonaras and Anna Comnena write 
about the First Crusade. The work of Zonaras, however, "is so brief as to be almost 
useless, and contains demonstrable errors."593 Anna Comnena's record on the First 
Crusade is, despite its faults, very useful as it reflects the attitudes and views of the 
Byzantines on the First Crusade. 594 According to Anna, the emperor too was 
surprised by the appearance of the Crusader armies. He was building a defence 
against the Tiirkmen raids on the coastal region of Bithynia, when the news reached 
him: 
"'After a brief rest from his many labours the emperor discovered that the Turks were 
engaged in general plunder, overrunning the interior ofBithynia. On the other side the affairs 
of the west claimed his attention, but he was more concerned with the Turks (the trouble 
there was more urgent). To deal with them he conceived a project of really major 
importance, worthy of his genius: the plan was to protect Bithynia against their incursions by 
591 Cf. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 84. 
592 The chronicles of lbn al-Qalanisi and al-Azimi, also written around 1160 are the oldest surviving 
Muslim works on the First Crusade. Cf. C. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 32. 
593 J. Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, London/New York 2003, 55. 
594 Ibid., 56. 
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a canal ... Naturally Alexius wished to check such raids and prevent the devastation; above 
all he wanted to ensure the safety of Nicomedia . . . It was typical of Alexius: he thought 
deeply about a project and then worked with tremendous energy to complete it. Such were 
the events of the emperor's reign up to the ... indiction of ... year. He had no time to relax 
before he heard a rumour that countless Frankish armies were approaching. "595 
The attacks of the Turkish raiders were troublesome but not threatening as 
she describes them as "general plunder" and not an attempt of conquest. The reaction 
of the emperor was to secure Bithynia and especially Nicomedia from the 
devastation caused by the raids. Alexius wanted to "check such raids" and he put 
much energy in the construction of a canal to achieve this but there is nothing which 
suggests that he was planning an expedition for the reconquest of Asia Minor. 
Alexius' first and foremost aim and duty was the defence of Bithynia and thus 
Constantinople, and as his troops were insufficient, he needed mercenaries. Anna 
writes from a later point of view but it seems certain that almost immediately the 
Byzantines viewed the Crusaders, or Franks, with suspicion and did not regard them 
as the allies they had asked to come to their rescue: 
"The simpler folk were in very truth led on by a desire to worship at Our Lord's tomb and 
visit the holy places, but the more villaimous characters (in particular Bohemond and his 
like) had an ulterior purpose, for they hoped on their journey to seize the capital itself, 
looking upon its capture as a natural consequence of the expedition"596. 
At no stage does Anna mention any Byzantine appeal for help against the 
Turks. Moreover, according to her, the expedition of the Franks was initiated by the 
preachings of Peter the Hermit and from the start directed towards the liberation of 
Jerusalem, not the liberation of Byzantium from the Turks.597 Alexius' conduct 
595 Anna, Sewter, 307-308. 
596 Anna, Sewter, 311 and see also 319, where she repeats this claim. Fulcher of Chartres, the Frankish 
historian of the First Crusade who accompanied one of the Crusaders armies confirms Anna's claim 
and writes which precautions were taken by the emperor: "But we did not try to enter the city because 
it was not agreeable to the emperor (for he feared that we would plot some harm to him). Therefore it 
was necessary for us to buy our daily supplies outside the walls. These supplies the citizens brought to 
us by order of the emperor. We were not allowed to enter the city except at the rate of five or six each 
hour." Fulcher of Chartres, tr. F.R. Ryan, A History of the expedition to JenJsalem, Knoxville 1969, 
78, (hereafter cited as Fulcher, Ryan). 
597 "He decided to preach in all the Latin countries ... that all should depart from their homes, set out 
to worship at the Holy Shrine and with all their soul and might strive to liberate Jerusalem from the 
Agarenes". Anna, Sewter, 309. Fulcher's account of Urban's speech at Clermont contradicts this. 
According to this, the purpose of the expedition was the liberation of the Byzantines from the Turks: 
"For the Turks, a Persian people, have attacked them, as many of you already know, and have 
advanced as far into Roman territory as that part of the Mediterranean which is called the Arm of St. 
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during the course of the First Crusade proves that his appeal had been sent to attract 
mercenaries to push the Turks away from the capital and not to launch a great 
expedition. Alexius viewed the Crusader armies as mercenaries and sought to 
employ their military strength to regain some territory for his empire. He seems to 
have had no interst in an enterprise of 'Holy War' against the Turks: 
"He had sent many Romans to help them against the Turks, for two reasons: first, to save 
them from massacre at the hands of their enemies (for he was concerned for their welfare as 
Christians) and secondly, that they, being organised by us, might destroy the cities of the 
Ishmaelites or force them to make terms with the Roman sovereigns and thus extend the 
bounds of Roman territory. "598 
In this assessment of the emperor's actions during the First Crusade, Anna 
wants to justify the Byzantine position. She writes that the safety of the Crusaders 
was the emperor's first concern as they were Christians but she makes a clear 
distinction between the Byzantines and the Crusaders, referring to the latter as 
"them" and "they". The view and the motives of the emperor are clearly revealed. He 
did not share in the Crusaders goal, they had appeared in his realm without his asking 
but once there he wanted to organise them to force the Turks "to make terms" with 
him and "thus extend the bounds of Roman territory". Therefore directed by Alexius, 
Nicaea became the first target for the Crusaders599. He stayed in Pelekanum which 
lay between Constantinople and Nicaea in order to stay in control over 
Constantinople and at the same time, interfere in the progress of the Crusade. Again, 
it is clear that Alexius's main concern was the safety of Constantinople. He wanted 
to make use of the Crusader's manpower against the Rum Seljuqs but regarded the 
former as the bigger threat. 600 Therefore, Alexius was anxious that the town was 
taken over by his officials not the Crusaders. 
George. They have seized more and more of the Lands of the Christians, have already defeated them 
in seven times as many battles, killed or captured many people, have destroyed churches, and have 
devastated the kingdom of God". Fulcher, Ryan, 66. Fulcher does not mention that Alexius sent an 
a~peal to Piacenza but Urban's speech implies that he must have received an appeal. 
5 8 Anna, Sewter, 439. 
599 Nicaea could have been bypassed even though it was on the old Byzantine military road as "there 
was an alternative route passing a little further to the east." Runciman, Cn1sades I, 175. 
600 Anna states that: "Alexius would have liked to share in the expedition against the barbarians, too, 
but he feared the enormous numbers of the Kelts." Anna, Sewter, 330. 
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"When a favourable opportunity arose, he planned to capture Nicaea himself; that would be 
preferable to receiving it from the Kelts (according to the agreement already made with 
them). Nevertheless the kept the idea to himself. Whatever dispositions he made, and the 
reasons for them, were known to himself alone, although he did entrust this task to 
Boutoumites (his sole confidant). Boutoumites was instructed to suborn the barbarians in 
Nicaea by all kinds of guarantees and the promise of a complete amnesty, but also by 
holding over them the prospect of this or that retribution- even massacre- if the Kelts took 
the city."601 
With the attack on the Rum Seljuq residence the peace between Alexius and 
K1h9 Arslan, who at that time was at Malatya, was broken off. 602 Yet, both sides 
would rather have dealt with each than with the Crusaders. Therefore, a line of 
communication, between Alexius and K1h9 Arslan, was maintained. The latter 
hearing about the attack on Nicaea had come to its rescue but recognising the 
strength of the siege, he left the city to its fate. This decision was probably made 
easier for him because, "He already knew that they preferred to deliver up the city to 
Alexius than to become prisoners of the Kelts. "603 Anna does not write what was 
exchanged between Alexius and K1h9 Arslan but she admits that the former betrayed 
the Crusaders: 
"With confidence in the emperor's promises the inhabitants allowed Boutoumites to enter 
the city. At once he sent a message to Taticius: 'The quarry is now in our hands. Preparations 
must be made for an assault on the walls. The Kelts must be given that task too, but leave 
nothing to them except the wall-fighting round the ramparts. Invest the city at all points, as 
necessary, and make the attempt at sunrise.' This was in fact a trick to make the Kelts 
believe that the city had been captured by Boutoumites in fighting; the drama of betrayal 
carefully planned by Alexius was to be concealed, for it was his wish that the negotiations 
conducted by Boutoumites should not be divulged to the Kelts. "604 
Thus, the First Crusade brought about territorial changes in Asia Minor but 
did not change the relation between K1h9 Arslan and Alexius considerably. The loss 
ofNicaea and western Anatolian territories to the Byzantines was not very important 
for the Rum Seljuqs. That the Crusaders took Edessa and Antioch did not concern 
KI119 Arslan I much as they were under the suzerainty of the Great Seljuqs. Later, a 
601 Anna, Sewter, 330-31. 
602 Matthew of Edessa has a different version of events but informs us that K.lh9 Arslan was at 
Malatya: "Assaulting Nicaea, they captured the town by the sword and slaughtered all the infidels 
[within its walls]. After this the Muslims, heavy with grief, went to the sultan Kilij Arslan, who at that 
time was besieging the city of Melitene, and informed him of all this". Matthew of Edessa, 
Dostourian, 167-68; see also Runciman, C111sades I, 177. 
603 Anna, Sewter, 335. 
604 Anna, Sewter, 337. 
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half-hearted claim of defence of Muslim compatriots was made but this was mainly 
just ideological propaganda in order to exploit the change of attitude of the Muslims 
towards the Crusaders for their political ends. 
The attitude of the Byzantines and Rutn Seljuqs towards each other was not 
altered by the First Crusade. They regarded each other as allies and it can be said that 
the First Crusade brought them only closer together. As before the First Crusade, the 
religious aspect did not play a great role in Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations. 
Moreover, the Byzantines did not regard the Crusaders as their co-religionists but as 
the "Latin" enemy, who to them was a far more dangerous enemy than the Rum 
Seljuqs. After the First Crusade, sultan and emperor resumed their friendly relations 
and the latter asked the former for help against Bohemond. Bohemond, one of the 
leaders of the First Crusade, had returned to the west and was mounting an 
expedition against Alexius: 
"The emperor sent to Qilij ArsHin ibn Sulayman, the ruler of Konya, Aqsaray and other 
lands, asking for his aid. He provided a detachment of his army. This strengthened the 
emperor, who marched against Bohemond."605 
The Byzantines did not regard the Muslim Rum Seljuqs but the Latin 
Christians as their rivals. On the other hand, the Rum Seljuqs did not regard the 
Christian Byzantines but their Muslim Danishmendid kinsmen as rivals. An alliance 
between the Rum Seljuqs and the Danishmendids for the battle of Dorylaeum against 
the Crusaders was only short lived. 
V.3. Shahanshah and Alexius I Comnenus 
K1h9 Arslan used the death of Danishmend in 49711104 as an opportunity to 
attack Melitene and from there he went further east to interfere in the Great Seljuq 
Empire. The pretext for K1h9 Arslan I to do so was an appeal of the amirs of the 
Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad but he was killed in the ensuing battle in 1107 and 
his son Shahanshah was taken captive. 606 Alexius on the other hand was first 
605 Ibn al-Athir, Richards, C111sading Period, 114. 
606 Cf. Cahen, Formation, 13. 
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occupied in the west against Bohemond and then in the east against the Crusader 
State of Antioch.
607 
According to Anna, during this time the new Rum Seljuq 'sultan' 
Shahanshah "had once more come from the east and was already threatening 
Philadelphia and the maritime provinces. "608 Shahanshah and some Turkish chiefs 
under his directive used the emperor's absence for raids into Byzantine territory.609 
This led to confrontation between sultan and emperor and, according to Anna, both 
sides launched large expeditions against each other: 
"The Sultan Sulayman planned to ravage Asia once more. In order to put up a brave 
resistance against the emperor forces were summoned from Chorasan and Chalep. Alexius 
had already been fully informed of the enemy's plan and decided to march himself as far as 
!conium (on the borders ofKilij Arslan's sultanate) and launch a full scale war."610 
This statement suggests that animosity had grown between Rum Seljuqs and 
Byzantines and that both sides were seeking a definite solution. However, this was 
not the case. The Rum Seljuq ruler Shahanshah did not want to risk a decisive battle 
and met Alexius halfway to reach an agreement and the latter was happy to receive 
him. What is remarkable here is that Anna gives us the first description of a personal 
meeting between a Rum Seljuq sultan and a Byzantine emperor: 
"The sultan then approached with his subordinate satraps, led by Manalugh (who in age, 
experience and bravery surpassed all the Turks in Asia). He met the emperor on the plain 
between Augustopolis and Akronion. The satraps, seeing Alexius some way off, dismounted 
and made obeisance normally reserved for kins, but although the sultan made several 
attempts to dismount the emperor would not let him. Nevertheless he quickly leapt to the 
ground and kissed Alexius' foot. The latter gave him his hand, bidding him mount one of the 
nobles' horses. On horseback again he rode close beside Alexius, when suddenly the 
emperor loosed the cloak he was wearing and threw it round the Turk's shoulders. Then, 
after a brief pause, he made a speech, explaining his decision in full. 'If you are willing,' he 
said, 'to yield to the authority of Rome and to put an end to your raids on the Christians, you 
will enjoy favours and honour, living in freedom for the rest of your lives on lands set aside 
for you. I refer to the lands where you used to dwell before Romanus Diogenes became 
emperor and before he met the sultan in battle - an unfortunate and notorious clash which 
607 Alexius had hired mercenaries from Kthc; Arslan to fight Bohemond in the Balkans whom he 
defeated thanks to the superiority of his navy and enforced the treaty of Devol on him. Cf. Runciman, 
Cn1sades, 11, 46-51. 
608 Anna, Sewter, 445. Anna's record of the Rum Seljuq actions during this period is confused and she 
does not seem to have had information on the last years of Kthc; Arslan's reign and the succession 
after his death. She names the successor of Kt he; Arslan on this page Saisan (Shahanshah) and later in 
her narrative Sulayman, Kthc; Arslan and Malik Shah. 
609 Cf. Anna, Sewter, 453-458; Cahen, Formation, 16. 
610 Anna, Sewter, 471. Anna confuses here Shahanshah with his grandfather Sulayman and by Chalep, 
she means Aleppo. 
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ended in the Roman's defeat and capture. It would be wise, therefore, to choose peace rather 
than war, to refrain from crossing the frontiers of the Empire and to be content with your 
own territories. The advice I give is in your interest and if you listen to it you will never be 
sorry; in fact, you will receive liberal gifts. On the other hand, if you reject it, you can be 
sure of this: I will exterminate your race.' The sultan and his satraps rapidly accepted these 
terms. 'We would not have come here of our own free will,' they said 'if we had not chosen 
to welcome peace with your Majesty.' . . . At the appointed time, then, the treaty was 
concluded with the sultan (whose name was Saisan) in the usual way. Huge sums of money 
were presented to him and the satraps were also rewarded generously. They departed well 
pleased."611 
The propaganda purpose of Ann a's report is obvious. She claims that 
Shahanshah and his officials were servile towards the emperor. Shahanshah not only 
dismounted and was raised back by the emperor according to custom but also "kissed 
Alexius' foot". The emperor is thus presented as the overlord and the Seljuq leader as 
a submissive 'vassal'. On the other hand however, the emperor showed Shahanshah 
respect as Anna herself writes he, "loosed the cloak he was wearing and threw it 
around the Turk's shoulders." Thus, it can be said that there was mutual respect 
between emperor and sultan and that the emperor did not have a superior status.612 
Despite this, however, it was Alexius, according to Anna, who set the terms and 
conditions for peace. Yet, he was not in a position to demand unrealisable terms 
asking Shahanshah to retreat from Byzantine territory back behind the frontier as it 
existed before the battle of Manzikert. This was not only impossible to ask, because 
it denied actually the existence of the Rum Seljuq state, but also because the Seljuqs 
were not the only Turkish rulers in Asia Minor and Shahanshah did not have the 
position to control other Turkish rulers most importantly the Danishmendids. 
Alexius, who had required great military effort to fight someone like <::aka, and who 
knew about the growing power of the Danishmendids, was well aware of this. Yet, 
during this conversation he addressed Shahanshah as the sole Turkish leader in 
Anatolia, asking him to withdraw. 
What Alexius in reality wanted was to build up the Seljuq ruler as sole 
Turkish leader and thus with his help to divert the Turkish bands from the western 
611 Anna, Sewter, 487-88. 
612 Cahen writes that, "Shahanshah came with Monolykes and to pay some kind of homage to Alexis." 
Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 92; and "not only did his 'satraps' and Monolykes 'worship' the 
emperor, but also Shahanshah himself leapt from his steed as a sign of respect". Cahen, Formation, 
17. However, even though Anna writes that the sa traps "dismounted and made obeisance" this was not 
an extraordinary act of reverence towards an emperor. Anna presents it as such in order to 
demonstrate the Byzantine emperor's supremacy. 
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part of Anatolia especially the coastal towns. Anna does not record the terms on 
which both sides agreed and how the relationship between the two rulers was defined 
formally. She only remarks that the treaty was concluded "in the usual way" and 
western scholars follow Anna's remarks and conclude then that Shahanshah "became 
a federate of the Byzantine emperor."613 However, we cannot say with certainty that 
Shahanshah regarded the emperor as his overlord. There are no other sources, which 
confirm the information as presented by Anna, and more importantly no 
contemporary Rum Seljuq sources of these events exist. Hence, we do not have the 
point of view of Shahanshah but modern scholars have reached their conclusion 
without paying much attention to this fact. 614 
It seems that Shahanshah and his satraps wanted an audience with the 
emperor and even though Anna exaggerates, it might be right that they received the 
emperor with respect, but this was not necessarily because they regarded him as their 
suzerain. If we look at the circumstances in which this event was set and subsequent 
events then we can at least partly reconstruct the Rum Seljuq view. First of all, 
Shahanshah and his satraps could have approached the emperor for peace 
negotiations not out of military and ideological inferiority. An analysis of the 
political circumstances reveals that they could have had other reasons than to pay 
homage to the emperor. Anna gives us actually an important clue continuing her 
record with the following incident: 
"Meanwhile news arrived that the bastard brother of Malik-Shah, Mas'ud, jealous of his 
power, had plotted to murder him at the instigation of certain sa traps - the kind of things that 
usually happens. Alexius advised the sultan to wait a little until he had more definite 
information about the plot; thus he would leave in full possession of the facts and on his 
guard. But Malik-Shah disregarded this advice; filled with self-confidence he clung to his 
original scheme. The emperor naturally did not wish to give the impression that he was 
forcibly detaining the sultan (who had come to him voluntarily) and thereby incur reproach. 
He bowed to the Turk's wishes. 'It would be well,' he said, 'to wait a little, but since you 
have decided to go, you must do the next best thing, as they say, and take with you a 
reasonable number of our heavily-armed soldiers to escort you in safety as far as I conium.' 
The barbarian would not even agree to this; it was typical of his race, for the Turks are an 
613 Angold, Byzantine Empire, 143. 
614 Cf. Dolger, Regesten, 11, 55. Dolger writes here that a peace treaty was concluded and that the 
sultan recognised the frontiers of both states as they were at the time before the battle of Mantzikert in 
exchange of abundant gifts. Dolger, quoting Chalandon, notes that this was an exaggeration of Anna 
as already at the begining of John Komnenos' reign the Turks attacked Laodicia on the Maeander. 
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arrogant people, with their heads almost in the clouds. Anyway he took his leave of the 
emperor and set out on his homeward path with his great sums ofmoney."615 
According to this statement, Shahanshah received news that his brother 
Mas~ud was rebelling, after the treaty was concluded with the emperor. It is also 
possible, that Shahanshah heard about the rebellion and therefore asked the emperor 
for peace. The sequence of events cannot be reconstructed with any certainty, yet 
modern scholars have derived definite conclusions. Turan determines that 
Shahanshah first heard the news about his brother's rebellion and therefore offered 
the emperor peace despite being in a victorious situation.616 Turan does not discuss 
the treaty and the question of suzerainty. He concludes following Anna's and 
Michael the Syrian's records that Mas~ud with the help of his father-in-law Amir 
Ghazi, the son and successor of Danishmend, rebelled against his brother 
Shahanshah.617 Cahen, on the other hand, writes that Shahanshah first asked the 
emperor for peace and that then the rebellion by Mas~ud followed as a reaction to 
this. He concludes that the Turkmens were against the agreement with which 
Shahanshah accepted Byzantine suzerainty and peace and therefore, during 
"Shahanshah's absence a revolt brought his brother Mas~ud to power.618 This 
conclusion, however, follows the presupposition that the emperor could demand 
superiority. Yet, as has been shown above, the emperor was in no position to make 
demands. Both sides wanted to stop the conflict and Byzantine claims of superiority 
are verbal propaganda and do not correspond with the political realities. 
If we look beyond the ideological claims and consider the internal political 
situation of both states, then we can see that both sultan and emperor wanted to 
resume friendly relations. The division within the Seljuq State was imminent before 
the expedition of Shahanshah against Alexius. Both Seljuq brothers were young and 
not in a situation to demand authority and achieve unity. On the other hand, the 
Danishmendid ruler had accumulated power and tried now to extend his powerbase 
into Seljuq territory. He allied with Shahanshah's brother Mas~ud by marrying him to 
615 Anna, Sewter, 488-489. 
616 Turan, Selr;uklular, 158. Turan writes here that it seems strange that Shahanshah offered peace to 
Alexius at a time when the latter was in a difficult situation. "But if Sultan Mas'iid's move to gain the 
throne of Konya would be considered than the reason for this attempt would become self-evident." 
See also SevirnNucel, Tiirkiye Tarihi, 120. 
617 Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 158-159. 
618 Cf. Cahen, Formation, 17; idem., Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 92; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 143. 
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his daughter. The absence of Shahanshah was an opportunity for Amir Ghazi to bring 
his candidate, Mas~ild, to the Rum Seljuq throne. Anna mentions in passing that 
during the encounter between Shahanshah and Alexius, "another invasion from the 
more northerly regions was on its way and the rumour spread rapidly throughout 
Asia."619 She does not specify, who was invading from the northerly regions, but we 
can be sure that she means the Danishmendids. This indicates that Alexius as well as 
Shahanshah were aware of Danishmendid movement before their agreement. It 
would certainly explain why Shahanshah somewhat suddenly asked for peace. 
Alexius, on the other hand, was more than happy to accept a treaty but he was 
in no position to make demands. Military as well as political considerations forced 
the emperor to stop the conflict with the sultan, rather than to seek a decisive battle. 
The emperor had a professional army, which was better structured and equipped than 
the nomadic Tlirkmen bands of the sultan but his army was still no match for the 
sultan's army, as Anna claims. Two factors in particular are important. Firstly, 
Byzantiums lack of manpower and thus employment of large numbers of 
mercenaries, whose loyalty to the emperor was vague. Secondly its lack of archers 
to combat the excellent Turkish archery. Anna includes in her record of the conflict 
between emperor and sultan a detailed account to describe a new battle-formation 
invented by the emperor especially against the Turks. 620 Moreover, Anna admits that 
the emperor was reluctant to meet the sultan in a pitched battle: "We are courageous 
in war against men whom we can beat; against men too strong for us, being unable to 
make a frontal assault we change our tactics and seek to conquer without 
bloodshed. "621 
Anna herself points out that the emperor was under the threat of internal 
enemies during the conflict with the sultan. She states, that the presence of the 
empress was required during the campaign because "he feared the domestic enemies 
in his entourage"622 as those eagerly awaited his failure so that they could assume 
power. 
619 Anna, Sewter, 481. 
620 Anna, Sewter, 477-80. 
621 Anna, Sewter, 4 77. 
622 Anna, Sewter, 473. Anna continues here that "Her loving care and watchful eye were both 
required." The emperor wanted his wife to be present because he feared attacks on his life and she was 
also able to keep together the family connections, which were important for the Comnenian rule. 
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"his enemies were rejoicing over the emperor's failure to achieve his object. There were 
reproaches and soft whispers everywhere that after such grand preparations against the Turks 
and the concentration of such huge forces he had won no great success, but had retired to 
Nicomedia. These things, moreover, were being muttered not only in dark corners, but quite 
brazenly in squares, on highways and at cross-roads. "623 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the emperor's original plan was to lead his 
campaign as far as Konya as Anna claims and then tries to justify why he changed 
this plan. She states that the emperor decided to confront the Seljuq army led by 
Manalugh at Philomelion after an inquiry to God.624 Anna's explanation for the 
emperor's change of plan is somewhat peculiar and another indication that Alexius' 
intention was not an expedition of reconquest. Anna's account of the warfare 
between the armies of Alexius and Manalugh reflects that both sides shunned a 
decisive pitched battle, engaging only in small-scale encounters. 625 Anna claims, 
however, that a pitched battle was not undertaken because the Rum Seljuq general 
Manalugh feared Alexius: 
"At this stage the Sultan Malik-Shah himself arrived. He was astouned at the excellent 
discipline of the Roman army, but in a young man's way poked fun at old Manalugh because 
he deferred the struggle with the emperor. 'I have put off coming to grips with him up till 
now, because I am old- or cowardly,' said Manalugh, 'but if you have the courage, here's 
your chance: try it yourself. You'll learn by experience.' The other made an immediate 
attack on our rearguard, while other satraps were to make a frontal assault; others again were 
ordered to charge against either flank."626 
However, this account of the dialogue between the sultan and his general 
Manalugh reveals that both sides, Alexius and Manalugh, hesitated to bring about a 
military decision. The emperor and his experienced counterpart, the Rum Seljuq 
general, knew not to seek direct combat. The sultan "made an immediate attack" 
Alexius sent her back to Constantinople once warfare was resumed so that his enemies would not be 
able to take advantage of his absence. 
623 Anna, Sewter, 476. Anna explains the emperor's intentions: "hoping that the enemy would imagine 
the danger was past and return to their old homes; thereafter with renewed courage they would 
disperse for plunder, in the usual Turkish way, and the sultan himself would resume his former plan." 
624 Anna writes that he emperor "decided to do something, which was both prudent and daring- to 
inquire of God whether he should follow the road to !conium, or attack the enemy in the area of 
Philomelion. He wrote his questions on two pieces of paper and placed them on the Holy Altar .... At 
dawn the priest went in; taking up one of the papers from the Altar he opened it in the presence of all 
and read aloud that Alexius should choose rather the road to Philomelion." Anna, Sewter, 481-82. 
625 Anna describes how deserters went from one side to the other. Cf. Anna, Sewter, 486. 
626 Anna, Sewter, 485. 
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because of his youth and inexperience. 627 Thus even though Anna continues to claim 
that the emperor was the stronger party this was not the case: 
"A terrible and bitter fight awaited them there, for the sultan, drawing together his forces 
again and surrounding our army, attacked fiercely from all sides. Nevertheless he was not 
strong enoug to disrupt the tight formation of the Romans and after assailing what appeared 
to be walls of steel, he was repulsed with nothing achieved. That night (a sleepless one) he 
spent in gloomy thought. At last in desperation he took counsel with Manalugh and the other 
satraps, and with their unanimous approval at dawn he asked the emperor for terms of peace. 
The emperor did not reject him- far from it. The call to halt was sounded at once, but the 
whole army was instructed to stay where it was ... The emperor had his reasons for this: he 
was obviating confusion, with the subsequent break-up of the column, in which case they 
would probably all be captured; he was also afraid of the Turks, who greatly outnumbered 
his own men and whose attacks were coming from all quarters. "628 
Anna claims that Shahanshah in "desperation" sought his official's advice 
and then asked "the emperor for terms of peace" but reveals at the same time that 
Alexius was "afraid of the Turks" and thus accepted. It seems safe to suggest that 
neither side followed a plan to destroy the other. The peace between sultan and 
emperor was restored and even though both rulers died not long after this the peace 
was broken, though Turkmen raids continued. 
V.4. Mastud I and John II Comnenus and Manuel Comnenus 
On his way back to his lands, Shahanshah was killed in 51011116. However, 
as stated before, this was not the result of Shahanshah's peace treaty with Alexius, 
but the result of the Danishmendid expansionist policy. Amir Ghazi brought his son-
in-low Mas(ud to the Rum Seljuq throne and thus gained influence over the Rum 
Seljuq realm. A little later Alexius died and his son John ascended the throne. Thus, 
two new rulers confronted each other. However, the pattern of friendly relations, 
established under the first Comnenian emperor Alexius and the first Rum Seljuq 
ruler Sulayman, was continued. Furthermore, the policy of alliance intensified, as 
627 According to Turan, a conversation between Shahanshah and Manalugh, reported by lbn al-Athir, 
shows that the former was very young. Shahanshah was only eleven years old when his father died 
and twenty-one years old when he died not long after he concluded the treaty with Alexius. Turan, 
Selr;uklular, 160. 
628 Anna, Sewter, 487. 
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two developments show. Firstly, the fact that Mas(ild fled to Constantinople seeking 
the help of John after he fell out with his father-in-law Amir Ghazi. Secondly, the 
fact that John supported the Seljuq ruler against the Danishmendids even though this 
helped the Rum Seljuqs to expand their power and was contrary to the traditional 
Byzantine policy of divide and rule. 629 
The situation under the new rulers was not different from the situation under 
their predecessors. John's main concerns were internal affairs and the west and the 
main concerns of Mas(ild were internal affairs and the east.630 Mas(ild, Amir Ghazi, 
and various other Turkish chiefs as well as the rulers of the Cruasader states, were 
engaged in a struggle of power over eastern Anatolia and Syria. The Tiirkmen bands 
resumed their raids into Byzantine territory but they were not under the command of 
Mas(ild, who stayed in the east even after John attacked several fortresses held by the 
Turks and succeeded in taking three of them. "The emperor, seeing that the Turks 
were violating their treaties with his father in great numbers overrunning the cities 
throughout Phrygia and along the Maeander, with the coming of spring marched 
against them. "631 The real motive behind John's action against the Turks was to 
divert them from the Byzantine borders. John's aim was not to continue his father's 
plan of war against the Turks632 . As has been shown above, Alexius himself did not 
show any determination to pursue his alleged plan to attack Konya. John was merely 
seeking to secure important places such as Laodecia and Sozopolis on the Maeander 
valley in order to secure the safety of the capital. Choniates regards the Turkish raids 
as a breach of the treaty but this does not mean that Mas(ild ordered these raids as 
Turkmens never felt bound by any treaty and acted according to their own will. 
Mas(ild did not even react after John took over Turkish fortresses because 
matters in the east were more important to him, he did not seek further conquests 
629 Cf. Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, 28. 
63° For John's campaigns see Choniates, Magoulias, 11-12; Kinnamos, Brand, 16-19; Ostrogorsky, 
Byzantine State, 377-78; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 153-54. For the eastern campaigns ofMas'iid and 
AmTr GhazT see Turan, Sel9uklular, 161-167. 
631 Choniates, Magoulias, 9. According to Choniates John took Laodikeia from its Turkish governor 
Alp-qara in 1119 and one year later Sozopolis and many other fortresses; Kinnamos does not mention 
the treaty but confirms the events as narrated by Choniates. Kinnamos, Brand, 14ff.; Bar Hebraeus 
writes that John "took three fortresses from the Turks". Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 249. 
632 Turan and Angold claim that John was pursuing his father's plan when attacking these places. 
Turan, Sel9uklular, 160; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 153. 
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towards the west.633 Thus, both rulers kept their friendly relations intact. Mas~iid took 
Malatya from his brother, Tugrul Arslan and handed it over to Amir Ghazi. Malik 
~Arab, another brother of Mas~ud, who ruled over Ankara and Kastamonu, used this 
as a pretext to revolt against him. According to Turan, the former was taking 
advantage of the fact that the latter's protector, Amir Ghazi b. Danishmend was at 
war with the Artuqids. Mas~ud was defeated and fled to Constantinople to ask John 
for support. 
634 
The anonymous history of the Rum Seljuqs does not mention the 
Danishmendids but writes that, "the Emirs started mischief and Malik ~Arab rebelled 
[against his brothers Mas~ud] and asked the Roman Emperor for troops and that he 
gave them to him. "635 Bar Hebraeus gives further information on the reaction of 
John: 
"And Malik 'Arab collected an army and attacked his brother Mas'ud, the Sultan oflconium, 
because he had made agreement with Danishmand. Then Mas'ud fled to Constantinople, and 
he was received joyfully by 'I wan!, the king of the Greeks. And he gave him an army, and 
much gold, and he went forth and came to Ghazi, and the two of them attacked Malik 'Arab. 
Then 'Arab fled to Toros (Theodorus?), the Armenian, the governor ofCilicia."636 
The most notable aspect here is that the sultan, confronted by internal 
opposition, seeks the help of the emperor, who on the other hand, receives the sultan 
"joyfully" and gives him the means to regain his throne. Choniates and Kinnamos do 
not mention Mas~ud's refuge in Constantinople, thus we can not be sure of the 
emperor's motives. Yet, it is clear that John continued his father's policy of alliance 
with the sultan. The sultan, on the other hand, regarded the emperor as a friend he 
sought help from against his own brother. This is the first example of the flight of a 
633 Turan regards the Turkmen raids as part of Seljuq/Turkish policy of conquest. Cf. Turan, 
Selr;uklular, 160. Yet, the Turkmen raids were in most cases, not ordered by the Seljuqs, as many of 
the Tiirkmen groups did not accept their authority. Cahen sees them also as part of the Seljuq policy 
and states that Mas'iid did not react to John's counter-attack as he "like his predecessors, avoided 
clashes with armed forces." However, as has been shown above, the Byzantines were not much less 
than the Scljuqs avoiding decisive clashes. Cahen, Formation, 17. 
634 Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 168-169. Turan suggests that Malik Arab was either angry with Mas•ud 
because he gave up a town which had belonged to his father or used this just as a pretext. See also 
SevirnNlicel, Tiirkiye Tarihi, 123. Cahen shares this view and writes that "Mas•ud's brother, 'Arab 
accused him oftreason to their family, and revolted against him." Cahen, Formation, 18. 
635 Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. Aksarayi's record about the reign of Mas•ud is very brief and does not 
even mention that he had brothers. Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 126. 
636 Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 252. Choniates and Kinnamos' narratives on the reign of John II is kept 
short as they state themselves in their introductions, yet it is surprising that they do not mention that 
Mas•ud fled to Constantinople and asked for help. 
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sultan to Constantinople, several others followed. On the other hand, there were also 
Byzantine royals who sought refuge in Konya as will be discussed below. Hence, 
there was not a division between Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines but interdependence. 
The sultans often regarded family members and other Muslim rulers, as more 
dangerous enemies than the emperors and vice versa. Therefore, John, like his father 
Alexius, was not following a policy of reconquest. He did not confront the Rum 
Seljuqs as long as the coastal areas and the routes leading to Constantinople were 
secure. John's campaign to take Kastamonu from the Danishmendids was part of this 
defensive policy, even though it was celebrated as a great offensive against the 
Turks, John taking advantage of the Turkish internal struggles merely tried to secure 
this important town, since from here the Danishmendids were able to reach out to the 
coastal towns of the Black Sea. 637 In the same way John tried to take advantage of 
the dispute ensuing between Mas 'ud and Mu}Jammad, who after the death of his 
father Amir Ghazi became Danishmendid ruler: 
"When the emperor arrived there, he found that Danishmend had departed from the world of 
men and that a certain Muhammad, an enemy of Mas'lid, the ruler of Ikonion, was now in 
control of Kastamonu. Taking advantage of the opportunity to promote his own cause, the 
emperor made peace with Mas'lid [end of 1134]; he entered into an alliance with him and 
marched against Muhammad. The latter, realizing that he was unable to combat a double-
edged attack by both armies, secretly contacted his fellow countryman Mas 'lid and proposed 
in his letters, among other things, that they should set aside their enmity, contending that if 
they should not be reconciled and Mas'lid defect to the emperor of the Romans, the cause of 
the Turks would be seriously damaged. He convinced the Ikonion M as 'lid to break with the 
emperor, to join forces with him and dissolve the alliance. Not long after this event, the 
Turkish troops dispatched by the sultan to fight as allies of the emperor, departed by night, 
and henceforth the Romans met with little success in this campaign. "638 
According to Choniates, John approached Mas ~ ud for an alliance against 
Mu}Jammad "to promote his own cause." In retrospect it seems surprising that John 
did not realise that this would actually make his cause more difficult, as the defeat of 
637 Kinnamos writes that the Turks in Kastamonu, "used to raid the adjacent area, which was subject 
to the emperor, and continually maltered the Romans there. Stunning them by the magnitude of his 
preparation for war, he constrained them to yield the city and themselves to the Romans." These 
remarks indicate that the Turks were expanding their raids towards the sea and that the town fell 
without great difficulty to the emperor. Kinnamos, Brand, 20; Bar Hebraeus who is not reliable event 
states that John took Kastamonu "from the Turks peaceably." Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 257. See for this 
also, Turan, Selr;uklular, 169. 
638 Choniates, Magoulias, 13. Dolger confuses the parties of this agreement enlisting it under the end 
of 1134/ beginning 1135 as an agreement between John and Muhammad of Kastamonu against 
Mas'ud.; Dolger, Regesten II, p. 60, no. 1308. 
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the Danishmendid Mu}Jammad would increase the power of Mas~iid. It might be that 
John regarded the Danishmendids at that point as more dangerous and thus sought 
the alliance with the Rum Seljuq sultan only as a temporary solution. 639 The fact that 
he put much energy in the recovery of Kastamonu, the Danishmendid stronghold, 
seems to confirm this assumption. Be that as it may, what this again proves is that the 
defence of the coastal regions was important to the emperors. The Danishmendids 
were more powerful at this stage and already threatened the coastal regions and were 
therefore regarded as the greater threat to the empire. The emperor and sultan 
regarded each other as allies, even though Choniates claims that the sultan broke the 
alliance with the emperor out of patriotic feelings towards his kinsman 
Mu}Jammad.640 
As mentioned above, the sultan had previously sought the emperor's alliance 
against his own brother. It is more likely, therefore, that this interpretation of 
Mas~iid's change of heart is the personal interpretation of Choniates, as he himself 
reveals that Mu}Jammad was led by strategic motives, because he knew that "he was 
unable to combat a double-edged attack" by Mas~iid and the empcror.641 It is more 
likely, however that Mas 'iid changed sides because Muhammad made concessions to 
him and because he did not want the emperor to gain a foothold in Asia Minor. He 
acted out self-interest and not because he wanted to support a common 'Turkish 
cause,' as Choniates and Kinnamos suggest. 
Mas~iid used the leadership contest, following the death of the Danishmendid 
ruler Mu}Jammad in 53611142, to extend his power. Mu}Jammad's realm was divided 
639 Angold argues that John viewed the Danishmendids as a threat, because "In recognition of their 
success the caliph of Baghdad was in the process of granting the title of Malik or king to their chief 
Gtimlishtegin. This was a direct challenge to the rights of overlordship claimed by the Byzantines 
emperor over the lands of Anatolia." Angold, Byzantine Empire, 155. This is however somewhat 
contradictory as the Rum Seljuq leader had as sultan a higher rank, which the Byzantines themselves 
recognised. Moreover, the sultan did not recognise the Byzantine claim of over lordship and must have 
been then the target of John's enmity. Besides, we have no evidence that at this stage John knew about 
the caliph's grant of the title Malik to Gtimlishtegin. 
640 We do not have any confirmation for Choniates' statement on the reasons as to why the two 
Turkish rulers agreed since Aksarayi and the Anonymous Rum Seljuq history do not mention this 
event at all. Chalandon, Alexis, 89-90; Turan states that after the death of Amir Ghazi "thanks to an 
agreement with Mas'iid the Byzantines attacked <;anlan (Gangra)". Turan, Selfuklular, 173. Cahen 
also comments briefly: "At one point he even won over Mas'iid, whose followers however abandoned 
him." Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 95. 
641 Kinnamos confirms this when he writes that Muhammad "perceived that he was not equal in battle 
to the emperor and knew that he had to win over the sultan, who likewise related to him by descent." 
Kinnamos, Brand, 21. Naturally the Comnenian partisan Kinnamos states that the emperor's power 
alone threatened the Danishmendid Muhammad. 
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between his son, Dhu'l-Nun and his brothers Yagtbasan and Ayn al-Dawla.642 
Mas~ild sought the alliance with one or the other of the Danishmendids to take over 
their territories, especially Malatya.643 At this stage, Mas~ud wanted to extend his 
power in Asia Minor by incorporating the Danishmendid territories into his realm. It 
seems that the alliance between John and Mas~ild stayed intact and therefore 
probably the latter did not protest against Manuel 's intrusion of his territory. Manuel 
after the death of his father John during the expedition to Cilicia was in such a hurry 
to get back to Constantinople to secure the imperial throne that he did not ask 
Mas~ild for permission.644 On the way Manuel's brother and the latter's son-in-law 
were captured by some Turkmen and taken to Mas~ad. He freed them not 
immediately but later "without paying ransom."645 This friendly gesture of Mas~ild 
indicates that he was anxious to keep the peace with the new emperor Manuel 
Comnenus. 
Mas~ild and Manuel had no interest in breaking up friendly relations. Both 
had other interests. The former's aim was to take the Danishmendid territories under 
his control and the latter's first and foremost interest was the submission of Antioch 
to his authority.646 In 1146, Manuel mounted an expedition against Mas~ild but this 
was not "a systematic war of reconquest" but a "small-scale, punitive expedition in 
retaliation for repeated frontier violations."647 Manuel himself states in a letter 
preserved by Kinnamos the reason for his attack on Mas~ild: 
642 Dhu'l-Niin resided in Kayseri (Caesarea), the capital of his father Muhammad. Yag1basan, who 
ruled over Sivas (Sebastea), married Muhammad's widow and assumed leadership proclaiming 
himself Amir. Ayn al-Dawla on the other hand secured Melitene and Albistan. Bar Hebraeus names 
Yag1basan as Ya'kiib Arslan. See also, Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 253; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 267; 
Turan, Sel<;uklular, 178; Vryonis, Decline, 119-120; Cahen, Formation, 21. 
MJ Cf. Cahen, Formation, 20. 
644 Manuel was proclaimed emperor by the army at Cilicia but his elder brother Isaac was in 
Constantinople and the acclamation in the capital was crucial for the succession of a Byzantine 
emperor. Vryonis, Byzantine Imperial Authority, 141-161; Angold, Byzantine Empire, 161. 
MS Choniates, Magoulias, 30. Turan states that Manuel was braver than his father to enter Rum Seljuq 
territory without permission and that he anxious to reach Constantinople did not even stop when his 
relatives were taken captive. However, he does not mention that they were freed without ransom and 
concludes without further explanation that, "M as 'iid regarding this situation as opportune thought it 
better to return to the east to profit from Danishmendid inheritance [dissesnsion]." Turan, Seh;uklular, 
179; Cahen, Formation, 21. 
646 After the Turkmen chief Zengi took Edessa at the end of 1144 an attack on Antioch became 
imminent and thus Raymond was forced to ask Manuel for help. Angold, Byzantine Empire, 162. 
M? Magdalino, Manuel, 42. 
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"The Turks, who had meanwhile prepared a great expedition, fell upon the Thrakesians' land 
... When the emperor heard of this, he was unable to restrain himself. After he had quickly 
made ready, he set out at full speed for Ikonion, once he had informed the sultan [Mas'iid] of 
this by letter. The letter ran thus: "We wish you to know that you have undertaken things 
which provoke our attack on you. You yourself have robbed us of Prakana, which did not 
belong to you, and you lately assailed the Romans' land. You also did not desist from 
fighting in some fashion with Yaghi-Basan [ibn Danishmend], who is the Romans' ally, and 
with many other chieftains there. You who are an intelligent man must understand that the 
Romans would never permit themselves to overlook this, and it remains, with God's aid, that 
you should pay the penalty for this many times over. Either abstain from irrationalities, or be 
ready to resist the Romans at once". In such terms was the letter. After he [the sultan] had 
read the letter when it was brought to him, he responded thus: "We have received your letter, 
mighty emperor. And we have prepared as you commanded. Then you should order your 
advance, not delay us by lengthy communications. The rest, as to how matters go, will be 
God's concern, and ours. Let this Philomilion [Philomelion, modem Ak~ehir] be the place 
for our encounter, where we are presently encamped."648 
Manuel explained in this letter the reason for his expedition against Mas~iid 
stating that the latter had attacked Byzantine territories and the territories of his allies 
the Danishmendids as well as other Turkish chiefs. What is remarkable here is the 
fact that Manuel switched alliances. Whereas up to then the sultan was the traditional 
ally for the emperor now the Danishmendids are regarded as such. Yet, this is not a 
drastic change of Byzantine policy Manuel merely tried to put the balance of power 
in Anatolia right. Interesting to note is that the Byzantine emperor poses here as the 
defender of the rights of the Turkish chiefs. 
The most important aspect revealed in this letters, however, is the attitude of 
the rulers towards each other. We can see here that sultan and emperor regarded each 
other as equals. The emperor threatened the sultan in his letter but addresses him 
with due respect and Kinnamos describes him as sultan. The sultan confidently not 
only mocked the emperor but also challenged him to a direct combat. This was a war 
of words and the claims made here did not correspond to reality. Mas~iid had not the 
power to meet the Byzantine army in a pitched battle, and Manuel did not have the 
power to attack Konya. Nonetheless, we can see that the third Rum Seljuq leader had 
enough confidence to challenge the Byzantine emperor. It is therefore not likely that 
the sultan would have accepted the Byzantine claim of superiority. Despite this 
Kinnamos is anxious to present Mas~iid as the weaker side: 
648 Kinnamos, Brand, 39-40. 
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"In such terms the sultan very vulgarly responded to the emperor; he [the sultan] remained 
with the greatest part of the Turks' army there at Philomilion where he had first been 
camped, but detaching a portion of them, he sent them to intercept the advancing Romans. 
Near the city Akrounos ... they suffered a severe defeat and returned as fugitives to the 
sultan ... The other [the sultan], stricken in spirit at the disaster, did not remain in the place 
to prepare anything nor attend to anything necessary, but departed in flight form there. 
Learning of these things, the emperor intended to mock him for both his previous rashness 
and immoderate trepidation thereafter, and wrote him as follows: "You noble sir, must 
understand this well, that however shameful cowardice is, it becomes more shameful when 
bravado preceded it; nor should it be uncorrected by others in battle. Since, as if entirely 
forgetful of your earlier pride, and making no account of what you recently wrote to our 
empire [Byzantine form for Majesty], you fled I know not where, behold, we offer you a 
reminder thereof. If you will not await our coming at Philomilion, as you formerly 
announced to us, it yet remains that your noble and generous self should quickly overcome 
your base cowardice. "649 
Manuel in his next letter threw Mas(ud's pride as empty in his face and 
claimed the moral high ground for himself, keeping thus the rule of moral virtue as 
described by his grandfather Alexius in his muses. On the other hand he describes 
Mast ud as coward but still keeps a respectful tone towards him addressing him as 
"noble sir" and "noble and generous self." Still, Kinnamos claims that Mas(ud fled 
and "coming in disorder to Ikonion, he rushed within his walls" and that he "did not 
at all dare remain within, lest, being shut up by the besieging Romans. "650 At the 
same time Kinnamos recognises that there was some good strategic thinking behind 
the sultan's next step of dividing his army, leaving one part in Ikonion and taking the 
other outside to fortify himself in a place "protected by the mountain which extend 
between Ikonion and the fortress Kaballa."651 Manuel had been able to defeat some 
of Mas(ud's forces and therefore advanced as far as Konya but his army was not 
much stronger than the army of Mas(ud. We can glean from some passages given by 
Kinnamos that the emperor was experiencing some difficulties on his campaign 
against the Seljuqs. He writes that the emperor held the following speech to motivate 
his army: 
"Romans, do not let barbarian trickery turn your shrewdness to fear: while there is a lack of 
standards in the army visible in front of us, you should not imagine that they are elsewhere 
649 Kinnamos, Brand, 40. 
65° Kinnamos, Brand, 41. 
651 Kinnamos, Brand, 41. For Kaballa see Ramsay, Historical Geography, 359 and Cahen, Formation, 
22 according to whom it is the modem c;igil. 
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with another force ... Be not astonished at the barbarian for his number, but rather despise 
his weakness. "652 
This illustrates that the Byzantine army was not superior to the Seljuq army 
but scared by its sheer multitude. Manuel was not able to overcome Mas(ud and had 
to resort to trickery to keep his forces together, which Kinnamos in the fashion of 
Anna Comnena praises as a leadership quality: 
"He summoned one of the soldiers ... and ordered him to remove the helmet from his head 
and with his hand to wave it around in every direction in theair, to proclaim the sultan's 
seeming capture to the army. When this was done the Roman [force] at once recovered 
courage and thrust back the foe who were strongly pressing them."653 
Kinnamos conceals the outcome of this battle and tries to justify the 
emperor's actions, stating: 
"As night then came swiftly on, they camped there; setting out from there at dawn, he 
camped at Ikonion. Making a circuit around it, he [Manuel] perceived that it was 
inaccessible. Also there increased daily a rumor which warned that the nations to the west, 
rebelling by ancestral custom, would invade the Romans' land in full force. So he gave up 
the siege, thinking he required more time and greater preparation than [he had] at that 
moment. "654 
This indicates that this enterprise was not aimed at Konya from the start and 
that only success on the way had brought the emperor so far. 655 
"The emperor reached the outskirts of Ikonion and surrounded the walls with his troops ... 
he turned back without further ado. As he withdrew, the enemy, which had set up 
ambuscades and occupied the heavily wooded terrain, engaged him in greater battles than 
had heretofore erupted. Fighting his way through with difficulty, Manuel returned to the 
queen of cities [1146]."656 
Choniates admits that the Seljuq army engaged Manuel in "greater battles" 
and that he made his way back out of Rum Seljuq territory only with difficulty. 
652 Kinnamos, Brand, 42. 
653 Kinnamos, Brand, 43. 
654 Kinnamos, Brand, 43. 
655 Vryonis states that it was Manuel 's aim to "attack I conium itself' but gives no references for this. 
Vryonis, Decline, 120; Angold on the other hand states, that "borne along by success Manuel pressed 
on to Konya (!conium)". Angold, Byzantine Empire, 162. 
656 Choniates, Magoulias, 31-32. 
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Kinnamos still claims, however, that Manuel threatened Mas~ud sending him a 
message, with one of the Turks chasing him, after he had reached safe ground: 
"Report this to your sultan. 'The great emperor communicates this through me. We have 
come up to Ikonion itself. We have scoured your land since we particularly desired to 
prosecute your crime against our empire [i.e., Our Majesty]. You, however, fled continually, 
like runaway slaves, shifting from one place to another and heretofore not remaining to 
oppose us face to face. Therefore we are departing to our own land, but you must get ready, 
knowing well that when spring comes we shall again return to you with greater preparation"' 
... When the sultan heard this, he dispatched envoys a little later to ask about peace. "657 
Even though the emperor was forced to retreat, because he had not come 
prepared and as cited above rumours about an invasion from the west became loud 
Kinnamos claims that it was the sultan who made an offer for peace. It seems strange 
that Manuel, who as Kinnamos and Choniates reveal, was frightened by the army of 
Mas~iid and only escaped with difficulty should now threaten the latter. It seems also 
strange that, Mas~ud, who had challenged Manuel and must have realised the latter's 
weakness, now asked for peace. This does not necessarily mean that Mas ~ud had 
changed his attitude. Turan suggests that because of the approach of the Second 
Crusade Mas ~ud might have thought that it would be better to have Manuel as an 
ally.658 According to Kinnamos, the sultan sent an embassy and a treaty was 
concluded between emperor and sultan: 
"The purpose of the embassy was as follows: they restored Prakana to the emperor and 
whatever else had previously been taken from the Romans. So they agreed there would be 
peace in the future between Turks and Romans. Accepting these [terms], the emperor 
concluded the war and returned to Byzantion. "659 
Mas(iid wanted to restore peace with Manuel and for this was prepared to 
give up Prakana and other places, which Kinnamos does not specify. Manuel, on the 
other hand, was more than happy to accept the terms, which seem to have been set by 
the sultan. The prospect of the invasion from the west brought sultan and emperor 
together. Even the Crusaders regarded emperor and sultan as allies who were united 
657 Kinnamos, Brand, 52-53. 
658 Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 182. 




The Byzantines regarded the Second Crusade like the First Crusade 
not as a religious enterprise but as an enterprise directed against Constantinople. 
Manuel thus followed the example of his grandfather Alexius and demanded that the 
leaders of the Second Crusade recognised his imperial authority. However, the 
leaders of the Second Crusade were not just Frankish nobles but the French King 
Louis and more importantly the German Emperor Conrad, who contested the 
Byzantine claim of sole imperial sovereignty and resisted to pay homage to 
Manuel.
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The German Emperor was a far more formidable enemy than the Rum 
Seljuq Sultan as the former was a threat to the Byzantine ideological claim to be the 
sole and superior empire of Christendom. It seems that for Manuel the prospect that 
the German Emperor could become the protector of the Crusader States was a greater 
threat than the continued existence of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. 
However, it has been argued that Manuel followed a different policy than his 
predeccsors had followed. In the course of his reign, friendly relations with the 
western Christians "Latins" became paramount, which led to a change of Byzantine 
foreign policy. In parallel, it might be assumed that the development of an ideology 
of jihad and 'Counter Crusade' under Nur al-Din and Saladin led Mas\id to take a 
different direction in his foreign policy. Consequently, the relation between the Rum 
Seljuqs and Byzantium must have changed. Yet, the established pattern of friendly 
relations between emperor and sultan were maintained. Moreover, during the last 
years of the reign of Mas(iid, emperor and sultan probably were allied against 
Thoros, the Armenian prince of Cilicia. 662 
660 The Crusaders were suspicious of the emperor who contrary to their expectations was not at war 
with the Seljuqs but had concluded peace with them. They blamed the emperor for the hardship they 
endured in Anatolia and claimed that the emperor had incited the Turks to fight against them. Cf. 
Magdalino, Manuel, 51-52. 
661 Manuel had reason to believe that Conrad had taken the Cross, to enhance his imperial status. In 
the letters exchanged between Manuel and Conrad regarding the marriage between the former and the 
German princess, Bertha von Sulzbach, Conrad had addressed Manuel as king of the Greeks and 
described himself as August Emperor of the Romans. Cf. Magdalino, Manuel, 48; Angold, Byzantine 
Empire, 164; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 384. 
662 In 1154 the emperor probably bribed Mas•ud to attack Thoros and the sultan thus invaded Cilicia 
together with his son Kthc; Arslan. Cf. Magdalino, Manuel, 67; Cahen, Formation, 24; Turan, 
Selr;uklular, 191; Kinnamos and Bar Hebraeus do not mention such and alliance between sultan and 
emperor against Toros but Gregory's account of these events implies such an alliance. Kinnamos, 
Brand, 96; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 281. This incident resembles Sulayman's attack on the Armenian 
Philaretus in Antioch and shows again that the Byzantine emperor's preferred the rule of the Rum 
Seljuqs to that of the Armenians, regarding them as their allies. 
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V.5. Kth9 Arslan 11 and Manuel Comnenus 
The campaign Mas~iid led against Cilicia was unsuccessful and he had to 
retreat and died shortly after that in 55111156. He had left his throne in Konya to his 
son K1h9 Arslan II, but in traditional Turkish fashion had divided his realm among 
all his sons and other relatives including the Danishmendids. 663 This led to internal 
strife in the Rum Seljuq sultanate which Manuel saw as an opportunity to intervene 
to put the power balance in Asia Minor right by limiting Rum Seljuq power. Manuel 
conspired with Shahanshah and the Danishmendid Yagtbasan to put a halt to the 
expansion of power of K1h9 Arslan. 664 
"Presently, the sultan of Ikonion jealously eyed the toparch of Cappadocia and plotted a 
pernicious and violent deed against him, while the latter, in his turn, cast a deadly glance at 
the sultan. They did not keep secret and in the dark these wicked schemes against one 
another but revealed them to the emperor. Manuel, elated desired that they should not merely 
reach a point of disaffection, alienation, and he parting of the ways, but that they should 
suffer utter destruction by taking up arms in opposing camps, so that while he reposed in 
tranquility he might exult in the evil works of these impious foreigners. Secretly sending 
envoys to both sides, he led them into war. Manuel presented Yaghi-Basan with gifts, 
making it evident that he supported him in the hostility .... Trusting in the emperor, Yaghi-
Basan made war on the sultan. The latter, in turn, marched out against him, and they clashed 
in battle frequently [ 1155-60]. After much blood was shed by both armies, victory smiled on 
Yaghi-Basan, and both adversaries laid down their arms for time being [1161]. Yaghi-Basan 
remained in his province, but the sultan went directly to the imperial city when he returned 
from the western regions and appealed to the emperor for help [spring 1162]. Receiving him 
graciously, the emperor heaped honours upon him so that he was gladdened at the 
lavishmess ofhospitality."665 
The intervention of Manuel was part of the defensive Comnenian policy 
towards the Rum Seljuqs and according to Choniates, the internal opponents of K1h9 
Arslan asked the emperor for support. Like his father Mas~iid, K1h9 Arslan, when 
faced with internal opposition, sought help from the Byzantine Emperor. Manuel had 
instigated his internal opponents against him and allied with the Danishmendid 
Yagtbasan in order to re-establish a balance of power in Anatolia. K1l19 Arslan, 
663 Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 66. 
664 Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 21 0; Cahen, Formation, 25. 
665 Choniates, Magoulias, 67; Kinnamos writes: "The sultan learned of this, and since he was 
incapable of opposing either of those who had been roused against him by the emperor, he yielded his 
claim to many cities, especially ones recently acquired by him with great effort, in favor of those who 
lived near his own land. He wrote to the emperor and requested pardon." Kinnamos, Brand, 151-152; 
See also, Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 287. 
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opposed from two sides, was not able to resist and was defeated in 1160 and in 1161 
by the Byzantine army. He therefore decided to go to Constantinople.666 
"About this time [ 1162], also, the sultan Kilidj Arslan [II] voluntarily came to Byzantion to 
petition the emperor regarding matters beneficial to him, something tremendous and 
wonderfully extraordinary, such as I know never happened to the Romans before. Of the 
very magnificent [emperors], who is not outdone, that a man who rules so much land and 
lords it over so many tribes should appear at the emperor of the Romans' court in the guise 
of a servant?"667 
Kinnamos claims that Kth9 Arslan came to "the emperor of the Romans' 
court in the guise of a servant." On the other hand, he states that this was 
extraordinary, as Kth9 Arslan himself was ruler "over so much land and lords." 
Kinnamos exaggerates the status then held by Kth9 Arslan in order to evaluate the 
status of the emperor at whose court he appeared as servant. He knew that Kth9 
Arslan had to share the rule in Anatolia with his brothers and the Danishmendids and 
was not lord over them but threatened by them. Kth9 Arslan thus appeared in person 
before the emperor but he was not servile towards him. This was a visit to seek an 
alliance with the emperor, not to submit to him, and it was thus a clever tactical 
move. Kth9 Arslan hoped probably that an alliance with the emperor would 
neutralise the main conspirator, and that he thus would get a free hand against his 
internal enemies. Manuel on the other hand received the sultan "graciously" thinking 
that an agreement with him would be of advantage for the empire. "Manuel had high 
hopes of satisfactorily disposing of the issues in the East, thanks to the sultan's 
presence, and of charming the money-loving barbarian with gratifying entertainment, 
but he also believed that this circumstance would bring glory to the empire. "668 The 
visit of Kth9 Arslan was used by Manuel to demonstrate his power and might to the 
Seljuq. Kinnamos describes the lavish reception for which a special throne for the 
emperor was prepared: 
666 Turan writes that K1h9 Arslan decided to go to Constantinople to break the alliance built against 
him, and that he was lavishly entertained by the emperor for eighty days, and returned after he reached 
his goal concluding an agreement with the emperor. Cf. Turan, Sel9uklular, 201-202; Vryonis writes 
in the same manner that Klh9 Arlsan went to Constantinople and "succeeded in putting an end to the 
Byzantine diplomatic intrigues." Vryonis, Decline, 122; Sevim/Yiicel, Tiirkiye Tarihi, 131; Cahen, 
Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 101. However, neither of these historians discusses the relationship between the 
two rulers. 
667 Kinnamos, Brand, 156. 
668 Choniates, Magoulias, 67. 
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"The whole was made of gold, but a great quantity of ruby and sapphire stones were 
fastened on at slight intervals: they were perfectly englobed, and gleamed whiter than snow. 
The throne abounded in such brilliances. . . . A purple robe, a wonderful thing, enveloped 
him. From top to bottom it was afire with rubies and illuminated with pearls ... I deem it 
excessive to write about the adornment on his head .... When Kilidj Arslan reached their 
midst, he was full of astonishment. Although the emperor urged him to be seated, he at first 
very firmly declined, but because he saw the emperor still pressed him to be seated, he sat 
down on a low stool, very humble alongside the lofty throne."669 
According to Kinnamos, Kthc; Arslan was so overwhelmed by the reception 
that he stood astonished before the emperor. He was then seated beside the emperor 
on a "low stool" "and very humble" In order to demonstrate his magnitude the 
emperor intended to hold a triumph procession: 
"Glorying in the magnitude of his success, the emperor made preparation for a triumphal 
procession from the citadel itself to the famed church of Hagia Sophia, so as to march in 
proeccession with him; yet he did not accomplish what he had intended. For [the patriarch] 
Loukas' who was then in charge of ecclesiastical matters was opposed to the action, saying 
that impious men must not pass by consecrated furnishings and priestly adornments. The 
Byzantines, deeming that Loukas' counsels had be transgressed, declared that the 
undertaking was contrary to God's will. For men naturally pay attention to matters close at 
hand, without inquiring about anything more remote."670 
He wanted to demonstrate to his people that he had gained a great victory in 
Asia Minor and that he had submited an important enemy. In reality, he had just 
intervened successfully in Turkish affairs and thus been able to encircle Kthc; Arslan 
together with the latter's internal enemies. As stated above, the formal recognition of 
the emperor's authority had become the main goal for Comnenian foreign policy. 
The extensive imperial ceremonial was for the Comnenian rulers the solution to 
demonstrate the revival of Byzantine imperial authority and to hold on to their claim 
of supremacy.671 Magdalino therefore concludes that the formal recognition of 
669 Kinnamos, Brand, 156-157. 
67° Kinnamos, Brand, 157; Choniates describes this incident similar to Kinnamos: "But as the 
emperor, with members of the bodyguard, the nobility, the imperial retinue, and the sultan, was about 
to make his appearance before the citizens to receive their applause, God annulled the splendours of 
that day. The earth shook and many splendid dwelling collapsed ... " Choniates, Magoulias, 67. 
671 Manuel 's father John celebrated his victory over the Danishmendids at Kastamonu with a splendid 
triumph even though, it was just a minor success. "John proclaimed a triumph in celebration of the 
enemy's defeat [1133] and gave instructions that a silverplated chariot be constructed; and the chariot, 
adorned with semi-precious jewels, was a wonder to behold. When the day designated for the 
procession had arrived, all manner of gold-embroidered purple clothes decorated the streets ... The 
emperor did not himself mount the chariot but instead mounted upon it the icon of the Mother of God, 
in whom he exulted and entrusted his sould. To her as the unconquerable fellow general he attributed 
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imperial supremacy was so important to Manuel that he not only regarded it just as a 
"formal prelude" but also "as the substance of his political victory."672 Despite the 
opposition of Patriarch and people, who did not want the 'infidel' sultan to take part 
in the Christian procession the emperor did not cancel it. Thus, an earthquake during 
the triumph was regarded as a sign of God against it. Choniates concludes therefore 
that, "the triumph was thoughtlessly conceived, and neither did the emperor himself 
pay adequate attention to it, nor was proper regard paid to custom."673 Nevertheless, 
the emperor remained anxious to impress the sultan: 
"Conducting him to the palace south [sic] of the city, the emperor received him with 
magnificient banquets and entertained him in entire amity. Then he charmed him with 
horseraces, and according to custom set alight some boats and skiffs with liquid fire, and 
absolutely gorged the man with spectacles in the hipodrome ... "674 
At the same time Manuel offered Kthy Arslan rich gifts using the established 
Byzantine policy of gold to demonstrate to the "barbarian", his empires, and his 
capitals special status. 675 
"Manuel, who knew that no barbarian is able to resist the temptation of gain, wished to 
magnify himself and to astound Kilij Arslan with the immense riches of the treasuries which 
overflowed on all sides of the Roman empire, and thus he displayed all the gifts which he 
proposed to offer the sultan in one of the palace's splendid men's apartments. These 
consisted of gold and silver coins, luxuriant raiment, silver beakers, golden Theriklean 
[Therikles was a famous Corinthian potter] vessels, linens of the finest weave, and other 
choice ornaments which were easily procured by the Romans but rare among the barbarians 
and hardly ever seen by them. On entering the men's apartments to which he had summoned 
the sultan, the inquired if he wished to receive as gifts the contents of the treasury at hand. 
When the sultan replied that the would take whatever the emperor offered him, the emperor 
posed a second question, asking if any of the enemies of the Romans could possibly 
withstand their assault should he pour such treasures on mercenary and native troops. Seized 
with wonder, and answering that were he the master of such vast sum of money he would 
have subjugated his enemies long ago ... The sultan was delighted and astonished at the 
his victories ... " Choniates, Magoulias, 12; Kinnamos writes, evoking the golden age of Byzantine 
imperial supremacy: "something I think they had not previously witnessed since the Herakleians and 
Justinians guided the Romans' realm." Kinnamos, Brand, 20. 
672 Magdalino, Manuel, 69. The ceremonial followed at Manuel's reconciliation with Reynald and his 
triumphal entry into Antioch which Kinnamos states was celebrated "in the way in which he usually 
did one at Byzantion" are examples underlying this thesis. Kinnamos, Brand, 142-143. The 
Byzantines following the example of Constantine VII (913-959) thought that, "through ceremonies the 
power of the empire was made manifest and that the sight of it would incline foreigners to better 
behaviour." Harris, Byzantium and the Cn1sades, 28. 
673 Choniates, Magoulias, 67. 
674 Kinnamos, Brand, 157; According to Bar Hebraeus Klhc; Arslan stayed eighty days in Cons-
tantinople, Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 287. 
675 Cf. Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, 26. 
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outpouring of money and, blinded by the desire of gain, promised to hand over Sebasteia and 
its lands to the emperor."676 
Manuel employed the 'policy of gold' to demonstrate his power to the sultan 
and to threaten him, implying that with such wealth at his disposal he could defeat 
any enemy. Choniates concludes that the sultan, as it was typical for "barbarian," 
"blinded by the desire of gain, promised to hand over Sebasteia" and agreed to a 
treaty: 
"After he had passed sufficient time in Byzantion and had confirmed his prior agreements 
with additional oaths, he returned to his own land. The terms of the agreement went thus: 
throughout his life to be hostile to those who cherished enmity against the emperor, but to be 
friendly to those who, on the contrary, were settled in his favor. Of the cities which he had 
won, he would give the greater and more notable to the emperor. It was not allowed for him 
to make peace with any of the enemy unless the emperor directed. He would fight as ally 
with the Romans on request, and come with his entire force whether the conflict was an 
eastern or western one. Nor would he allow those who lay beneath his authority, but who are 
clever at living by thefts and customarily are called Turkomans, to do any harm whatsoever 
to the Romans' land, unpunished. He agreed to these things, those of the grandees who 
attended him [pledged] that, should he be unmindful of them, with all their strength they 
would hinder the attempt. "677 
It has been argued that Kth<; Arslan's visit to Constantinople and the 
ratification of this treaty show that he accepted the emperor as his overlord. 678 The 
terms of the treaty seem to indicate that Kth<; Arslan became a vassal of the emperor 
as he practically agreed to take no step without the emperor's consent. However, as 
Magdalino concludes the "narrative sources, including Kinnamos, present the treaty 
of 1161 in terms of alliance."679 Kinnamos' report reveals that Manuel continued the 
policies established by his grandfather and regarded the Rum Seljuq sultan as an ally. 
676 Choniates, Magoulias, 68-69; Bar Hebraeus confirms that the sultan and his companions received 
gifts: "And on the last day, when the king and the Sultan reclined at the same table, all the vessels and 
the table decorations were given to the Sultan, together with the other gifts which were given to him 
and to the one thousand Turks who were with him." Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 287. 
677 Kinnamos, Brand, 157-158 and for the prior agreement see idem., 152-153. 
678 Angold writes that the sultan was "brought firmly within the Byzantine orbit." Angold, Byzantine 
Empire, 191; Korobeinikov states that "the Emperor Manuel I Komnenos ( 1143-1180) constrained the 
Sultan Kilic Arslan II ( 1156-1192) to sign the peace treaty by which the Sultanate became 
subordinated to the Empire". Korobeinikov, Byzantium, 124; Gregory writes in his continuation of 
Matthew of Edessa that K.lh9 Arslan agreed with the treaty to be Manuel's suzerain until his own 
death: "In this same year the sultan Kilij Arslan went to the Greek emperor Manuel, accompanied by 
the emir Miran, the brother of Niir ad-Din. After having received many gifts from the emperor and 
having concluded a treaty with him whereby he promised to remain subject to Manuel until his own 
death ... " Matthew ofEdessa, Dostourian, 279. 
679 Magdalino, Manuel, 77. 
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Thus, as before, the status of the Rum Seljuq ruler was elevated, as he was addressed 
as leader of all Turks in Asia Minor. Manuel hoped that a strong sultan would be able 
to put an end to the Turkmen raids and that the sultan would support him to take the 
possessions of the Danishmendids. Secondly, Manuel, like his predecessors, was in 
need of manpower and hoped that the sultan would furnish his army with troops he 
could employ against his other enemies. 
There is also another factor which should be considered in connection with 
this treaty between emperor and sultan and their agreement prior to it. As cited above 
one of the conditions asked by the emperor in the treaty was that the sultan had to 
"fight as ally with the Romans", "whether the conflict was an eastern or western 
one." In the agreement, before the sultan came to Constantinople, he had promised 
that "he would hinder any treachery from whatsoever source it arose."680 Thus, 
Manuel might have sought the alliance with the sultan as an assurance against a 
possible attack from the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa.681 The rumours of 
a German attack were false but, as Kinnamos remarks682, the break between the two 
emperors was imminent in 1161 683 and thus Manuel 's situation was not better than 
the sultan's. Hence, Manuel was in no position to demand from Kthv Arslan to 
submit to his authority though such a claim is made by the Greek sources: 
"Kilij Arslan had become very powerful. He showed no deference to the emperor, and 
forgetting the court he had paid when he had been assailed by difficulties, he now required 
the emperor to pay court to him. Changing with the season in the fashion of barbarians, when 
in need he was inordinately humble but he was high-flying whenever Fortune tipped the 
68° Kinnamos, Brand, 152. 
681 Dolger remarks that the treaty between Manuel and Kthc; Arslan concluded before the later came to 
Constantinople was possibly connected to a letter Manuel's, which he according to the German 
imperial notary Buchard sent to the kings of Turkey, Babylon, Persia and Comania. In this letter 
Manuel allegedly claimed that Frederick I intended to his lands and then theirs after he had taken 
Milan. Cf. Dolger, Regesten, 11, p.75, no. 1443 and p. 76, no. 1444. According to Magdalino 
Buchard's statement and the statement of Kinnamos, that "a rumor was current that Frederick, king of 
the Germans, was setting his whole nation in motion to attack the Romans' land" indicate that the 
Byzantines feared that Frederick planned a great eastern crusade. Kinnamos, Brand, 154 and see also 
Magdalino, Manuel, 64. 
682 Cf. Kinnamos, Brand, 154. 
683 It is not clear when exactly the 'cold war' between the two emperors started but Manuel viewed 
Frederick's expansionist policy in Italy with suspicion. Both emperors also supported different 
candidates in the papal schism ensuing after the death of Pope Hadrian IV in 1159 and in 1160 
Manuel 's German wife Eirene, who was the "strongest effective bond" between the two empires died. 
Morover, Frederick contested Manuel's claim to be the sole emperor of Christendom, addressing him 
not as Roman Emperor but as the King of the Greeks. For this see Magdalino, Manuel, 64-65; Angold, 
Byzantine Empire, 178-181. 
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scales in his favor. At times, he resorted to unctuous flattery to mollify the emperor and 
rendered him the esteem due a father; then the emperor, instead of treating him as if he were 
a wild beast in need of surveillance, honored him by adopting him as a son. In the letters 
which they exchanged, the emperor was addressed as father and the sultan as son."684 
In this letter Manuel described Kthc; Arslan as "child of our empire", which 
implies that the emperor regarded the sultan as member of the hypothetical 
Byzantine family of rulers. Within this family of rulers, the Byzantine emperor had 
the highest rank as the overlord or 'father', who delegated power to other rulers, his 
subordinates, or 'sons' 685 . Kinnamos also suggests that already Mas'iid had become 
Manuel' s subordinate as he addressed him as son in a letter sent to his wife: "We 
wish you to know that the child of our empire, the sultan, lives and still survives, 
since he has fled the forces of war."686 According to Magdalino, an encomium 
composed for the visit of Kt he; Arslan confirms that the sultan became a subordinate 
of the emperor, stating "that the sultan swore to serve the emperor, who made him 
his adopted son and enrolled him among the imperial retainers (oikeioi, oiketai)."687 
It seems strange, however, that these sources suggest that the Christian emperor 
adopted the Muslim sultan. The lack of documentary sources in this period makes it 
impossible to give definite answers. There is also no evidence in the Rum Seljuq 
sources, which supports this claim688 though it has to be taken into account that in 
theory the Muslim sultan could not be presented as the vassal of the Chritian 
emperor. Moreover, the following passage in the work of Choniates indicates that 
Byzantine ceremonial and wealth failed to lead the sultan to submit to the emperor: 
"The sultan remarked to his intimates sarcastically that the more injuries he inflicted on the 
Romans, the more treasures he received from the emperor. "It is customary," he said, "for 
684 Choniates, Magoulias, 70. 
685 For the Byzantine idea of the family of rulers, see Vryonis, Byzantine Imperial Authority, 142; 
Mango Byzantium, 220; Dolger, ·oie Familie der Konige im Mittelalter', in: Byzanz und die 
europiiische Staatenwelt, Ettal 1953, 34-69; Ostrogorsky, ·oie byzantinische Staatenhierarchie', in: 
Seminan1m Kondakovianum, VIII ( 1936), 41-61. 
686 Kinnamos, Brand, 44. 
687 Magdalino, Manuel, 77. 
688 Magdalino states that, "To some extent, this followed the precedent of Yag1basan, the 
Danishmendid emir of Sivas (Sebasteia), who in 1143-6 issued seals displaying on the obverse the 
bust of Christ Emmanuel, and on the reverse a Greek inscription describing himself as the emperor's 
doulos". Magdalino, Manuel, 77. However, there are no inscriptions on Rum Seljuq coins, which use 
any such description. For the Rum Seljuq coins see K. <;etin, Selr;uklu Miiesseseleri ve Medeniyeti 
Tarihi, Erzurum 1992, 34ff; S.N. Aykut, Tiirkiye Ser;uklu Sikkeleri, I, istanbul, 2000, 187ff.; Cahen, 
Formation, 97-98. 
227 
gifts to be gladly given to conquerors so that they should not desire to advance their 
conquests, just as festering diseases require numerous treatments so that they should not 
spread and increase further."689 
This statement by Choniates is one of the occassions where he criticises the 
Comenian rulers, who did not realise that the 'policy of gold' was not effective any 
more. 690 The analogy between the combat of conquerors and diseases shows that 
these are the words of the author and not K1h9 Arslan. Still this is a further indication 
that K1h9 Arslan was aware of the weakness of Manuel and did not recognise his 
claim of supremacy. Therefore, it seems more probable that K1h9 Arslan agreed to 
the treaty because he received in return rich subsidies from Manuel and the assurance 
of peace on his western frontiers. 691 K1h9 Arslan and Manuel renewed the policy of 
alliance to turn their attention towards the east and west respectively. Manuel 's main 
concerns during this time were the defence of the Byzantine territories in the west 
and the contest with the German Emperor Frederick over supreme authority. K1h9 
Arslan's main concern was to consolidate his power in eastern Anatolia and to 
include territories held by other Turkish rulers, especially the Danishmendids, into 
his realm692 and to defend his power against his eastern neighbours, especially Nur 
al-Din. 
Sultan and emperor had accepted each other's right to exist and their main 
concern was not the conflict against each other but against other enemies. As has 
been shown above, neither had the sultans launched great expeditions of conquest 
against Constantinople nor had the emperors, launched great expeditions of 
reconquest against Konya. However, this pattern of generally friendly co-existence 
seems to have been ended by Manuel and K1h9 Arslan with the conflict, which 
started in 1174 and ended in 1176 with the overwhelming defeat of the Byzantine 
army at Myriokephalon. Moreover, modem scholarship regards the battle of 
Myriokephalon as the second decisive turning point of Seljuq and Byzantine 
6119 Choniates, Magoulias, 70-71. 
690 On another occasion Choniates states, that the Byzantine ceremonial demonstration of wealth did 
not impress the Germans. "The Germans have neither need of such spectacles, nor do they wish to 
become worshipers of ornaments and garments . . . The time has now come to take off effeminate 
garments and brooches and to put on iron instead of gold." Choniates, Magoulias, 262. 
691 Cf. Cahen, Formation, 26. 
692 Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 69; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 289; Turan, Selr;uklular, 203; Cahen, 
Foramtion, 28-30; Vryonis, Decline, 122-123. 
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relations. The conclusion has been reached that the battle of Manzikert in 1071 
opened the Turkish conquest of Anatolia and that the battle of Myriokephalon in 
1176 sealed it, thus, putting an end to any Byzantine hopes ofreconquest693 . Indeed, 
according Choniates, Manuel himself compared his defeat to the defeat of Romanos 
Diogenes at Manzikert. 694 Hence, it is generally assumed that Myriokephalon was the 
culmination of the ongoing Rum Seljuq and Byzantine conflict of conquest and 
reconquest. Yet, as has been stated, sultan and emperor had come to accept each 
other's right to exist and regarded each other as allies and thus, Myriokephalon 
presents an exception in their relations. Thus, the battle of Myriokepha1on must be 
examined with the following questions in mind. Was the battle of Myriokephalon the 
expression of a change in Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations and if so what caused 
this change and did it result in a dramatic change of their attitude towards each other? 
First of all, we should look at the Rum Seljuq perspective. A look into the 
Rum Seljuq sources reveals that the battle of Myriokephalon was not recognised as 
an important or extraordinary event. The only Rum Seljuq source to mention the 
battle is the anonymous history of the Rum Seljuqs and here the events are described 
as follows. 695 
"In 572/1177 the sultan received at Caesarea news that the Rmnan emperor Manuel wanted 
to attack the Muslim lands and that he was approaching him with his army at a distance of 
only a day from him. And that he had an infantry of 70 thousand archers, who had opened 
trenches at every stage and meeting no resistance took the way of ten miles and came to 
!conium. The sultan selected 1700 cavalryman and beating the war drums in the first night 
attacked the enemy. The infidels were routed till the morning and the sultan cut off the 
retreat route for the enemy. Manuel hopeless sent Michacl for intercession to the sultan and 
asked for mercy. Manuel left for his land after he obliged himself to a tribute of 100 
thousand gold, 100 thousand silver dirhams, horses, broadcloth and et cetera."696 
693 Sec Turan, Scl9uklular, 207; R.-J. Lilie, 'Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176) Auswirkungen 
auf das Byzantinische Rcich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert', in: Revue des Etudes Byzantines, 35 
( 1977), 268, (hereafter cited as Lilie, Myriokephalon). 
694 "Messengers were sent on ahead by the emperor to relate the events that had taken place to the 
Constantinopolitans describing the emperor as one who had suffered the same fate as Romanos 
Diogenes." Choniates, Magoulias, 108. 
695 It is interesting to note that lbn BibT starts his narrative at the end of Klh9 Arslan 11 in 1192 does 
not start it earlier to include this victory in his account. This suggests that the victory at 
Myriokephalon left no lasting memory. Aksarayi, who does cover the reign of Klh9 Arslan, informs 
us about the latter set his heart on taking the Danishmendid lands but does not mention any conflict 
with Manucl. Cf. Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 126-127. 
696 Anonymous, Uzluk, 25. 
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According to this information, the Byzantine emperor was the aggressor of 
the conflict leading to Myriokephalon and the Rum Seljuq Sultan only defended 
himself. The passage does not include any details of the warfare but states that the 
sultan made the emperor his tributary after he had routed his army and left him no 
way to escape. The anonymous author uses terms such as infidel and Muslim lands 
but the religious aspect is not emphasised. The author points out that the emperor 
became a tributary of the sultan but he fails to explain why the latter did not exploit 
his victory further and does not inform us of the terms that were reached. It might be 
that the event is not presented as a very important conflict because in retrospect it 
was clear that the sultan failed to make use of his great victory. However, it is clear 
that at the time the sultan was not surprised by the emperor's attack and was quick to 
gather his troops for war because he was aware that his expansionist policy in the 
east would provoke some kind of reaction by the emperor. The author does not 
connect the two events with each other but his report on Myriokephalon is preceded 
by his report of the sultan's fortification of Aksaray and the conquest of the 
Danishmendid town Caesarea. 
Yet, it seems certain that the sultan had not been planning a large enterprise 
against the emperor, as he was quick to accept peace rather than to exploit his victory 
and then turned his attention to the east again. Choniates remarks that the sultan 
"regretted setting the prey that was in hand. "697 The anonymous author continues his 
narrative stating that in 1178 the sultan went off to attack Malatya. All in all this 
extract does not suffice to establish with certainty the sultan's exact policy and 
attitude towards the emperor at the time. Nonetheless, considering also subsequent 
events we can state with some certainty that his policy and attitude towards the 
emperor had not changed. 
In contrast to the Rum Seljuq sources the Greek sources Kinnamos and 
Choniates devote several pages to the battle of Myriokephalon and the events leading 
up to it. 698 The narratives of these two authors confirm that Manuel was the aggressor 
in this conflict and that he had planned the enterprise against K1h9 Arslan 
beforehand. "Because Manuel wanted to rebuild Dorylaion, he provoked the 
697 Choniates, Magoulias, 108. 
698 Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 99-1 08; Kinnamos, Brand, 218-224. The history of Kinnamos breaks off 
with Manuel's departure for siege oflconium. 
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barbarian to give battle."699 Both historians state that Manuel's aim was not only to 
set K1h9 Arslan boundaries but to take Konya itself and destroy his sultanate: 
"Numbering his troops in the tens of thousands, he set out intent on destroying the Turkish 
nation, and on taking by storm Ikonion and her walls, and on holding captive the sultan 
whose neck he would trample as a footstool when he prostrated himself ... The emperor set 
out from the queen of cities [summer 1176]."700 
Choniates describes the intention of Manuel with an extreme choice of words 
and states that he intended to destroy "the Turkish nation" and to hold captive the 
sultan "whose neck he would trample as a footstool". This signals a radical change in 
Manuel's policy and attitude towards K1h9 Arslan. Up to then the emperor had 
regarded the sultan as his ally and he had honoured him by enrolling him among his 
retainers but now he seems to have developed a personal animosity towards him. 
However, Kinnamos' report does not support the hatred expressed by Choniates and 
it also does not lay great emphasis on the expulsion of the Rum Seljuqs or Turks 
from Anatolia. Kinnamos confirms the conquest of Konya as the aim of the 
expedition: "Thus the emperor journeyed through Laodekeia and the regions 
adjoining the Maeander, having in mind to settle down with his whole force for the 
siege of Ikonion."701 Manuel's departure from the established Comnenian policy 
towards the Rum Seljuq Sultans is puzzling because "direct gains that the Byzantines 
might expect from the conquest of Konya were small."702 Moreover, the experienced 
advisers of the emperor did not share his change of policy and attitude towards the 
sultan and cautioned him to accept the sultan's offer for peace: 
"Because of these events, the sultan gave heed to war and drew upon substantial numbers of 
allied troops from Mesopotamia and from among the barbarians of the same race from the 
north. He also dispatched an embassy to the emperor to ask for a peace treaty . . . All those 
who were experienced in warfare, especially in Turkish combat, and who were advanced in 
age, entreated Manuel to receive the embassy with open arms rather than to place all hopes 
on the die of battle. They begged him to keep in view how prodigious the contest would be, 
that the temain was not easily passable but beset with ambuscades, and that he should 
neither overlook the excellent Turkish horse at peak strength nor ignore the sickness that 
afflicted the army. Manuel paid not heed whatsoever to the words of the older men but 
699 Choniates, Magoulias, 99. 
700 Choniates, Magoulias, 100. 
701 Kinnamos, Brand, 224. 
702 Angold, Byzantine Empire, 193. 
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instead gave ear to his blood relations, especially those who had never heard the sound of the 
war trumpet ... "703 
The sultan had received troops from his allies and had all advantages on his 
side, despite this he asked the emperor for peace. Angold's argument that "Both sides 
were eager for war and they were not willing to use any diplomatic means to prevent 
it" is therefore not right. 704 The sultan's policy and attitude towards the emperor had 
not changed. On the other hand, that the emperor's advisers urged him not to pursue 
to "die of battle" warning him "how prodigious the contest would be" indicates that 
normal Byzantine policy was to keep the status quo with the Rum Seljuqs. They did 
not think that the Byzantine army was stronger than the Rum Seljuq army and 
especially respected the strength of its archery. Why then did the emperor insist on a 
decisive battle and aimed to destroy the Rum Seljuq state? Choniates gives the 
following explanation: 
"The emperor charged the sultan with ingratitude towards his benefactor and with 
unmindfulness of the emperor's previous acts of kindness, of his manifold assistance in 
establishing the sultan in his rule over his own people; the sultan blamed the emperor for his 
offhanded breaking of faith, for forsaking friendship, for abruptly violating the established 
articles of peace ... "705 
According to this, sultan and emperor accused each other with the breach of 
the treaty of 1161. The emperor also charged the sultan "with ingratitude towards his 
benefactor" and it is clear that he was angered by the fact that his policy to support 
the sultan against the Danishmendids had the reverse effect of what he had desired. 
Manuel had hoped to regain some territory in Asia Minor by taking the side of the 
sultan. The death of the ruler of Aleppo, Nur al-Din in 1174, however, deprived the 
Danishmendids of their protector, and one of them, Dhu'l-Nun together with K1l19 
Arslan' s brother Shahanshah, fled to Constantinople. 706 Thus, Kdw Arslan, 
encountering no resistance, took several Danishmendid towns in Cappadocia. 707 
Consequently, the balance of power in eastern Anatolia was upset in favour of K1h<; 
703 Choniates, Magoulias, 1 01. 
704 Angold, Byzantine Empire, 191. 
705 Choniates, Magoulias, 100. 
706 Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 69-70; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 357. 
707 According to Aksarayi, K1h9 Arslan took the towns ofNeocaesarea (Niksar), and Sebastea (Sivas). 
Aksarayi, Gen9osman, 126. According to Michael the Syrian he also took Comana and other towns 
and fortresses. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 357. 
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Arslan, who became the strongest Turkish power in Anatolia. The emperor 
demanded that the sultan handed over to him the towns he had taken as he had 
promised to do in the treaty of 1161 but the sultan failed to do so708. Kinnamos states 
that following this violation of their agreement the emperor prepared the enterprise 
against the sultan: 
"Neither did he render to the emperor any of the cities of which he had become possessed, 
nor did he desire to fulfill any of the other things to which he had previously agreed. . .. 
Considering this, the emperor was at first angered and indignant at the matter; but as he was 
drawn away from this things by western affairs, he did not at all wish to stir up those of Asia. 
When no other war from anywhere in the west appeared in the future, since he had been 
successful in everything, he assembled a sufficient army and determined to cross over."709 
No doubt, Manuel was displeased that Kthy Arslan seized Danishmendid 
towns and refused to reinstate the Danishmendids or to deliver the towns to the 
emperor. Yet, Kthy Arslan neither had the means nor showed any intention to break 
through to the coastal regions. Thus, he did not pose a great threat to the empire. 
Hence, the breach of the treaty and Kthy Arslan's rise in power does not explain why 
Manuel risked a decisive battle when there was not much to be gained but all could 
be lost. Angold writes that Manuel thought that: "Now there was nothing to prevent 
Kilidj Arslan from seeking to emancipate himself from his tutelage to the Byzantine 
emperor."710 However, as has been shown above, the sultan did not necessarily 
accept the emperor's overlordship but to the outside world, the Byzantine 
propaganda machine still continued propagating the emperor as the supreme 
authority. 
It is right that the recognition of Byzantine imperial authority was the leading 
factor of the Byzantine foreign policy. The only ruler who contested the en1peror's 
claim to the title and heritage of the Roman Empire was the German emperor. 
Therefore, Magdalino's assumption that the reason for Manuel's expedition against 
Kthy Arslan was closely connected to events in the Crusader states and in the 
German Empire explains Manuel's policy better: "Thus, in 1175, Manuel faced the 
prospect that Frederick Barbarossa would become the effective protector of the 
crusader states, and this at a time when the German emperor was not only recovering 
708 Cf. Kinnamos, Brand, 218-219, 222; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 369. 
709 Kinnamos, Brand, 218. 
710 Angold, Byzantine Empire, 191. 
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his power in Italy, but also establishing diplomatic contact with Saladin, and also, 
perhaps with Kilic Arslan."711 The German Emperor, if successful, could have 
displaced the Byzantine Emperor as the sole rightful emperor and protector of 
Christendom. Magdalino states that Manuel responded by organizing a Crusade 
against the Rum Seljuqs.712 However, that Manuel propagated the expedition against 
Kth9 Arslan as a crusade does not mean that Byzantium embrased the idea of the 
'Holy War'. As already stated the warfare between emperor and sultan are hardly 
ever presented as a religious struggle. The histories of Choniates and Kinnamos do 
not reflect the idea of 'Holy War' and crusade in the connection with the fortification 
of Dorylaion and Soublaion or Myriokephalon. Manuel's Crusade propaganda was 
directed towards the west and Latin east. Manuel did not aim to reconquer Asia 
Minor or lead a 'Holy War' against the infidel sultan. He wanted to re-establish the 
land route leading through Asia Minor to the Holy Land and bring the Crusader 
States under his authority. It seems therefore safe to suggest that the enterprise 
leading to Myriokephalon was part of the ideological warfare between the two 
Christian emperors and did not necessarily aim to eliminate the Rum Seljuq 
sultanate. Thus, Myriokephalon does not represent a change of the emperor's policy 
or attitude towards the sultan. 
On the other hand, that Ktlw Arslan failed to exploit his great victory over 
Manuel indicates that his policy towards the emperor did not change. Kth9 Arslan 's 
main enemy was not the emperor and his main concern not conquest or war against 
the infidel emperor but the consolidation of his power in eastern Anatolia. 713 He was 
content with the re-establishment of the status quo and only demanded from the 
emperor to demolish the fortresses Dorylaion and Soublaion. Moreover, Kth9 Arslan 
sent an envoy with gifts to conclude a peace treaty. 
"The sultan dispatched Gabras, the most honored and esteemed of his officials, to the 
emperor. Henceforth, the Turks, by command and esteemed of his officials, to the emperor. 
711 Magdalino, Manuel, 95. See also Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 79; Brand, Byzantium 
confronts the West, 18; Lilie, Myriokephalon, 258. 
712 Magdalino states that, "Byzantine texts which celebrate the rebuilding of Dorylaion and Soublaion 
show that Manuel advertised this as the start of holy war of reconquest in which he declared himself 
willing to lay down his life." Magdalino, Manuel, 96; Lilie gives a similar argument and writes 
"Manuel proposed a crusade and declared publicly that he intended to come to the aid of the 
crusaders". Lilie, Twelfth-Centwy, 40. 
713 Cf. Lilie, Twelfth-Centwy, 41; Cahen, Formation, 31. 
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Henceforth, the Turks, by command, ceased their attacks from all sides, and the Romans 
ended their sallies. On being received by the emperor, Gabras rendered a profound obeisance 
in the barbarian fashion, and at the same time presented as a gift from the sultan a Nisaean 
horse with silver-mounted bridle from among those horses kept at rack and manger for use in 
solemn processions, and he also presented a long two-edged sword .... Time would not 
permit certain articles to be spelled out precisely, but it was stipulated that the fortresses of 
Dorylaion and Souvleon were to be demolished."714 
Choniates seems to hesitate to reveal the terms of this treaty, which indicates 
that the terms were not all in favour of Manuel.715 Manuel razed Souvleon but not 
Dorylaion thus Kth<; Arslan sent him an embassy and when the former still resisted, 
he dispatched a force to invade the Byzantine frontiers along the Maeander, which 
however was defeated by the force Manuel had sent against it.716 In 1179-80, Manuel 
undertook a campaign into Rum Seljuq territory to relieve the fortress of 
Claudiopolis, which Choniates hails as a great success.717 He thus gives no details of 
the warfare and does not mention that a peace treaty was concluded between emperor 
and sultan.718 However, it is clear that emperor and sultan wanted to go back to the 
status quo. Thus, Myriokephalon had not been a great disaster for Byzantium and the 
boundaries in Asia Minor remained nearly the same as before the battle. Except these 
attacks and counterattacks to secure their position they did not undertake any great 
expeditions against each other. The status quo was maintained and sultan and 
emperor returned to friendly relations, turning their attention to their enemies in the 
west and the east. Choniates' following statement shows that Manuel had undertaken 
the expedition in Anatolia to defend his status against the German emperor. 
" ... he contended that it was permissible to lead on the barbarians in the East, to buy their 
friendship with money and to convince them by feats of arms not to pour over his borders. 
But the Western nations which were scattered over many places he viewed with suspicion, 
for these men were boastful, undaunted in spirit, lacking all humility, and trained to be ever 
bloodthirsty .... they also nurtured an unsleeping hostility against the Romans, a perpetual, 
raving, hatred as they looked askance at them ... Time and again he armed the Italians 
against Frederick, the king of Germany .... Frederick attempted several times to enter the 
714 Choniates, Brand, 106-107. 
715 Turan suggests that an article regarding indemnity must have been included as Manuel sent gifts 
and gold to Kthy Arslan. Cf. Turan, Selr;uklular, 209. 
716 Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 108-112. 
717 Choniates exaggerates the effect of this expedition on the sultan's forces: "The barbarians 
positioned about Claudiopolis caught sith of him as he approached, first aware of his arrival from the 
military standards of his divisions and the radiant splendor of their arms, and forthwith took flight." 
Choniates, Magoulias, 112. 
718 Cf. Magdalino, Manuel, 100. 
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elder Rome to be crowned, but Manuel thwarted the move by writing to the pope [ 1167-
68]."719 
The emperor had accepted the loss of Anatolia as long as the Turks did not 
"pour over his borders." Choniates does not mention that the emperor claimed 
overlordship. He continues to use the term "barbarians" to refer to the sultan but at 
the same time reveals that the emperor was content to buy the sultan's friendship. 
The author continues his narrative with the Western nations and reveals clearly that 
Manuel' s main concern was to influence the Italians and the Pope and prevent the 
coronation of Frederick as emperor. Furthermore, the "Western nations" and 
especially the "king of Germany" were not only rivals. According to Choniates they 
fostered "hostility" and "perpetual, raving, hatred against" the Byzantines. Choniates 
describes here, actually, how the Byzantines felt about the "Western nations" or 
Latins. The animosity between Byzantines and Latins was mutual. Choniates and 
other Byzantine authors make similar statements repeatedly. 720 The Rum Seljuqs in 
contrast are never described with hatred though such cliches as barbarian and infidel 
are employed. 721 The nomadic ways of the Turkmen bands are described with 
contempt, but even they are not described with such intense hatred. The expedition 
leading to Myriokephalon was first and foremost aimed at the west and Frederick not 
against the east and K1119 Arslan and in this context it was not an exception to the 
pattern of Rum Seljuq- Byzantine relations. Hence, Manuel 's crushing defeat did not 
change the status quo between sultan and emperor substantially but between emperor 
and the west. Moreover, the antagonism between Byzantium and the west increased 
after Manuel died and in the end, the armies of the Fourth Crusade, who took 
Constantinople in 1204 and deposed the Byzantine emperor. To conclude, the 
relations between the Rum Seljuq sultans and the Comnenian emperors were not 
characterised by antagonism or strong animosity but by mutual respect and co-
existence, and this was not only so because they had no other choice. 722 
719 Choniates, Magoulias, 113. 
72° Cf. Lilie, Twelfth-Century, 36. 
721 Choniates laments for example: "0 Lord of of vengeance, thy taking revenge? How long shall 
these calamities follow one another and the descendants of the bondwoman Agar continue to 
subjugate those of us who are free and destroy and kill thy holy nation which above every name called 
u.gon thine?" Choniates, Magoulias, 66. 
1-
2 Lilie 's following conclusion therefore is more a reflection of the Greek-Turkish antagonism of the 
19th century than of Rum Seljuq-Byzantine relations: "This is not to say that in principle the emperors 
were no longer interested in retrieving all of Asia Minor, and that the Seljuqs would not have thrown 
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It seems thus safe to suggest that it was this pattern of friendly co-existence 
established under the Rum Seljuq rulers and the Comnenian rulers until the death of 
Manuel Comnenus in 1180 that was continued during the period of upheaval 
following the disaster of 1204. Moreover this was also this pattern of friendly 
relations wich was continued between the Nicaean empire in exile and the Rum 
Seljuqs. 
For the purpose of this study it was not necessary to cover this period which 
has been now analysed by Dimitri Korobeinikov in his PhD thesis which was 
completed during the composition of the present work. However, Korobeinikov 
argues that the Rum Seljuq sultans were regarded by the Comnenian emperors as 
subordinate vassals and that this was the reason why the Nicaean empire in exile 
managed to survive and even dominate them during the second half of the 13th 
century.723 
the Greeks into th e sea, had they been able to do so. But as long as this was impossible, each had to 
come to terms with the other." Lilie, Twelfth-Centwy, 50. 
723 Cf. D. Korobeinikov, Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century), unpubl. PhD thesis, 
Oxford 2004. especially 21-22, 24. 
237 
Bibliography 























Atatiirk Kultiir Merkezi 
Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
Byzantinische Zeitschrift 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 
Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition). 
islam Ansiklopedisi 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 
Journal of Near Eastern Studies (Per . .492Heb) 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Per 9 Roy) 
Repertoire chronologique d' epigraphie arabe 
Revue des etudes byzantines 
Revue des Etudes Islamiques 
Selvuklu Ara~tlrmalan Dergisi 
Studia Islamica 
Tarih-i Osman1 Encumeni Mecmuast 
Turk Tarihi Enjumeni Mecmuast 
Turk Tarih Kurumu yaytnlan 
Ural-Altaische Jahrbucher 
Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes 
Zeitschrift der Deutschen MorgenHindischen Gesellschaft 
Primary Sources 
Muslim Sources 
Abii'l-Fida, al-Mukhta$ar fi akhbiir al-bashar, Receuil des Historiens des Croisades, 
Historiens Orientaux, IV, Paris 1898; partial tr. P .M. Holt as The Memoirs of a 
Syrian Prince- Abu '1-Fida, Sultan of Ham a, Wiesbaden 1983. 
Atlaki, Shams al-Din Ahmad, Manaqib a!- 'iirifin, ed. T. Yaztct, Ankara1959; French 
tr. Clement Huart as Les saints des derviches tourneurs, vol. I-11, Paris 1918-1922; 
Turkish tr. T. Yaztct as Ahmed Ejldkf Mandkibiiel-Arifin, two vol., Ankara 1959-61; 
tr. John O'Kane as The feast of the knowers of God, Leiden 2002. 
238 
Aksarayi, Musamarat al-akhbiir wa musiiyarat al-akhyar, ed. 0. Turan, Miisameret 
iil-Ahbar Mogollar zamanznda Tiirkiye Selr;uklularz Tarihi, Ankara 1944; facsimile 
reproduction and Turkish tr. N. Genc;osman/ F. N. Uzluk as Selr;ukf Devletleri Tarihi, 
Ankara 1943; partial tr. F. I~1ltan as Die Seltschuken-Geschichte des Akseriiyz, 
Leipzig 1943; Turkish tr. M. Oztiirk as Kerfmiiddin Mahmud-i Aksarayf 
Miisameretii '1-Ahbiir, Ankara 2000. 
Anonymous, Ta 'rzkh-i iil-i Saljiiq dar Anatulyii, facsimile reproduction and Turkish 
tr. F. N. Uzluk as Anadolu Selr;uklularz Devleti Tarihi. Ill. Histoire des Seldjoucides 
d'Asie Mineure par un anonyme, Ankara 1952; ed. N. Jalali, Tiirix-e Al-e Saljuq dar 
Aniitoli, Tehran 1999. 
Astarabadi, Bazm-u razm, Turkish tr. M. Oztiirk as Bezm u Rezm (Eglence ve Sava$), 
Ankara 1990. 
Al-(A?Imi, Ta'rzkh, C. Cahen 'La chronique abregee d'al-( A?Imi', in: Journal 
Asiatique 230 (1938); Turkish tr. A. Sevim as Azin1i Tarihi, Ankara 1988. 
Bayhaqi, Ta 'rzkh-i Mas 'iidi, ed. ( A.A. Fayyad, Mashhad 1350/1971. 
Baybars al-Mansurl, Kitiib al-tuhfa al-n1uliikiyya fi '1-dawla al-turkiyya, ed. A.S. 
Hamdan, Cairo 1987. 
Baybars al-Mansurl, Zubdat al-fikra fi ta 'rzkh al-hijra, ed. D.S. Richards, Beirut 
1998. 
Al-Bundarl, Zubdat al-nu$ra wa nukhat al-usra, ed. M.T. Houtsma, Leiden 1889; 
Trans. K. Burslan as lrak ve Horasan Selr;uklularz Tarihi. !mad ad-Dzn al-
Jsfahiinf'nin al-Bondiirf tarafindan ihtisar edilen Zubdat al-Nu$ra va Nuhmbat 
a! 'Usra adlz Kitabznzn terciimesi, Istanbul 1943. 
239 
Al-BundarT, Sana al-barq al-shami, ed. F. al-Nabarawi, Cairo 1979; partial trans. R. 
Se~en as ~Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahanl'nin Eserlerindeki Anadolu Tarihiyle Ilgili 
Bahisler, in: SAD 3 ( 1971 ), 262-344. 
Danishmendnama, ed. tr. I. Melikoff as La Geste de Melik Diini$mend Etude critique 
du Diini$mendniime, 2 vols., Paris 1960. 
FirdawsT, Shiih-niima, tr. R. Levy as The Epic of the Kings. Shiihniima. The National 
Epic of Persia by Ferdowsi, Chicago, London and Toronto 1967. 
Al-GhazalT: Nasfhat al-Muliik, trans. F.R.C. Bagley as Ghaziilf's Book of Counsel for 
Kings, London/ New York 1964. 
Al-GhazalT, Kitab al-Mustazhiri, partial. ed. by I. Goldziher, in: Streitschrift des 
Gazali gegen die Batinijje-Sekte, Leiden 1916. 
Al-GhazalT, al-Munqidh min al-daliil, ed. F. Jabre, Beirut 1959; tr. R.J. McCarthy as 
Freedom and Fullfilment an annoted Translation, Boston 1980. 
Al-HusaynT Sa<;lr al-DTn, Akhbiir 'ud-Dawlat 'is- Saljuqiyya, ed. M. lqbal, Lahore 
1933; Turkish tr. N. Lligal as Ahbar ud-devlet is-Seh;ukiyye, Ankara 1943; tr. QTbla 
Ayaz as An unexploited source for the Histo1y of the Saljiiqs: A translation of and 
critical commenta1y on the Akhbiir Al-Dawlat Al-Sajiiqiyya, 2 vols, unpubl. Diss. 
Edinburgh 1985. 
Al-MaqrTzT, Kitiib al-Suliik Ii-ma 'rifat duwal al-muliik, ed. M.M. Ziyada/ S.A.F. 
Ashur, 4 vols., Cairo 1934-73; tr. R.J.C. Broadhurst as History of the Ayyubid 
Sultans, Boston 1980. 
Al-Mustawfi al-QazwTnT, Ta 'rfkh-i guzfda, ed. E.G. Browne/ R.A. Nicholson, 
Leidedn/London 1911-14; partial tr. C. Defremery as Histoire des Seldjoukides, in: 
Journal Asiatique, (April-May 1848), 417-62, 259-79; (October 1848), 334-70. 
240 
Ibn al-Adim, Zubdat al-halab fi tarlkh Ha/ab, ed. S. al-Dahhan, 3 vols., Damascus, 
1951-68; partial Turkish tr. A. Sevim as Kamal al-Dm ibn a/- ~A dim, Bugyat at-Talab 
fi tarlh Ha/ab, Seh;uklularla ilgili halterciimeleri, Ankara 1976. 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi'l-ta 'rlkh, ed. C.J. Tomberg, 14 vols., Leiden 1851-76; 
corrected repr. 13 vols., Beirut 1965-67; Turkish tr. Ozaydin, A. as Ibnii 'I Esir el-
Kamilfi 't-Tarih Terciimesi, 10 vols., Istanbul 1987; partial tr. D.S. Richards as The 
Annals of the Saljuq Turks, London 2002; partial tr. As The Chronicle of lbn al-Athir 
for the Crusading Period from al-Kiimilfi'l-ta 'rlkh. Part 1: The years 491-54111097-
1146: The Coming of the Franks and the Muslim Response, Aldershot 2006. Part 2: 
The Years 541-589/1146-1193 The Age ofNur al-Din and Saladin, Aldershot 2007. 
Ibn BThi, Al-awiimir al- ~ala 'iyya fi '1-umur al- ~ala 'iyya, published as His to ire des 
Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineure d'apres lbn Blbl, (Recueil de texts relatives a I 'his to ire 
des Seldjoucides), Ill, ed. M.Th. Houtsma, Leiden 1902; facsimile reproduction of 
the Ayasofya transcript, AS. Erzi, Ankara 1956; trans. H.W. Duda as Die 
Seltschukengeschichte des lbn Blbl, Kopenhagen 1959; Turkish trans. M. Oztlirk as 
El Evamirii '!-Ala 'iye fi '1-Umuri '!-Ala 'iye (Seh;uk Name), 2 vols., Ankara 1996. 
Ibn Fadlan, Risala, ed. and tr. A.Z.V. Togan as Ibn Fadlans Reisebericht, tn: 
Abhandlungenfor die Kunde des Morgenlandes 2413, Leipzig 1939. 
Ibn Hassiil, Tafdil al-atriik, ed. Abbas Azzawi and Turkish tr. ~· Yaltkaya as Ibni 
Hassul 'fin Tiirkler hakktnda bir eseri, in: Bell et en 4 ( 1940), Arabic text 1-51 and 
trans. 235-66. 
Sibt lbn al-Jawzi, Mi 'rat al-zamiin fi ta 'rlkh al-a 'yan, partial trans. Ali Sevim as 
Mir 'A tu 'z-Zeman fi Tarihi '1-Ayan, Ankara 1968. 
Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, tr. F. Rosenthal as The Muqaddima. An Introduction to 
History, 3 vols., New York 1958,2 d rev ed. by N.J. Dawood, Princeton 1967. 
241 
Ibn Khallikan, Kitiib Wafoyiit al-a 'yiin wa anbii' abnii' al-zamiin, ed. I.· Abbas, 8 
vols. (Beirut 1968-72; reprint Beirut 1997), tr. Baron W .M. de Slane as Jbn 
Khallikan 's Biographical Dictionary, 4 vols. (Paris 1843-71; reprint Beirut 1970). 
Ibn al-QalanisT, Dhayl ta 'rzkh Dimashq, ed. H.F. Amedroz, Leiden 1908; tr. H.A.R. 
Gibb as The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, London 1932. 
Ibn Sa'Id, Kitiib al-Jughriifiyii, Beirut 1970; partial tr. C. Cahen as 'Ibn Sa'Id sur 
1' Asie Mineure Seldjuqide', in: Turcobyzantina et Oriens Christianus, London 1974, 
VR, N XI. 
Ibn Shaddad, al-Nawiirfir al-sultiiniyya wa 'I ma/:liisin al-yiisufiyya, ed. El-Shayyal, 
Cairo 1964; trans. D.S. Richards as The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 
Aldershot 200 1. 
Ibn al-ZakT, Rawzat '1-kuttiib wa hadikatu '1-elbiib, ed. M. V. Seyyid Yunusi, Turkish 
trans. A. Sevim as Abii Bakr ibn al-Zakz Ravzat al-kuttiib va hadikat al-Albiib, 
Ankara 1972. 
tlmad al-DTn al-IsfahanT, Nu~rat al-fatra, Paris Ms. (Arabic) 2145; partial Turkish tr. 
R. ~e~en as imad Al-Din Al-Katib Al-isfahani'nin Eserlerindeki Anadolu Tarihiyle 
ilgili Bahiseler, in: SAD, 3 (1971), 249-369. 
JuwaynT 'Ala al-DTn Ata Malik, Ta 'rzkh-i Jahiin-Gushii, ed. M. Muhammad 
QazwTnT, 3 vols, (Gibb Memorial Series, xvi, 1-3), Leiden/ London 1912-37; tr. J.A. 
Boyle as The History of the World-Conqueror from the text of Mirza Muhammad 
Qazwini, Manchester 1997; Turkish tr. M. Oztiirk as Tarih-i Cihangu$a, Ankara 
1985. 
Kai Kawus ibn Iskandar, Qiibiisniima, ed. R. Levy, London 1951; tr. R. Levy as A 
Mirror for Princes, London 19 51. 
242 
KashgharT, Dzwan Lughat a!-Turk, printed Arabic text ed. Kthsh Muallim Rtfat 
Bilge, (3 vols.), istanbul 1915-1917; facsimile ed. and Turkish tr. B. Atalay, (6 
vols.), Ankara 1939-57; ed. and trans. R. Dankoff/ J. Kelly as Compendium of the 
Turkish Dialects, (3 vols.), Harvard 1982-85. 
MarwazT, Taba 'I al-hayawan, part. tr. V. Minorsky as Sharaf al-Zaman Tahir 
Marvazl on China, the Turks and India, London 1942. 
MTrkhwand, Rawdat al-$afo' fi si rat al-anbiya' wa '1-muluk wa '1-khulafo ', Tehran 
1853-54, tr. J. A. Vullers as Mirchond's Geschichte der Seldschuken, Giessen 183 7. 
NTshapurT, The Saljuqnama of Zahir al-Dzn Nzshiipurz, ed. A.H. Morton, 
Chippenham 2004. 
Pseudo-NishapurT, Saljiiqniima ed. I. Afshar, Tehran 1332/1953; tr. K.A. Luther as 
The History of the Seljuq Turks. From the Jami al-Tawarzkh. An Ilkhanid Adaptation 
of the Saljuq-nama of Zahlr al-Dzn Nzshapurl, Curzon Richmond Surrey 2001. 
Nizam al-Mulk, Siyastniima (Siyar al-muluk), ed. M. QazwTnT and M. ChahardihT, 
Tehran 1334 I 1956; tr. K.E. Schabinger von Schowingen as Nizii1nulmulk Das Buch 
der Staatskunst Siyasatniima, Zurich 1959; tr. H. Darke as The Book of Government 
or Rules for Kings, London 1960. 
Orkhon Inscriptions, tr. Talat Tekin as A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic, Indiana 
University Uralic and Altaic Series vol. 69, Bloomington, Indiana 1968; Orhun 
Yazttlan, Ankara 1988. 
QazwTnT, The Tarzkh-i Guzlda, or Selected History ed. and tr. E.G.Browne, Leiden 
1913; trans. of the sections on the Seljuqs, C. Defremery, 'Histoire des 
Seldjoukides', in: Journal Asiatique (1848), 417-62,259-79, 334-70. 
243 
Rash Id al-Din, Jiimi' al-tawiirTkh, ed. B. Karimi, 2 vols, Tehran 1959; section on the 
Seljuqs ed. Ahmed Ate~ as Cami' al-tavarih (Metin), 11 Cild, 5. Cuz, Selyuklular 
tarihi, Ankara 1960; Turkish tr. Z.V. Togan as Oguz Destanz, Istanbul 1972; tr. K. 
Jahn as Die Geschichte der Oguzen des RashTd ad-DTn, Wien 1969. 
Rawandi, Riihat al-sudiir, ed. M. Iqbal, London 1921; Turkish tr. A. Ate~ as Rahat-
Os- Sudur Ve Ayet - Os - Siirur (Goniillerin Rahatz Ve Sevinr; Alameti), 2 vols., 
Ankara 1957 and 1960. 
Usama b. Munqidh, Kitiib al-i 'tibiir, ed. H. Zayd, Beirut 1988; tr. P .K. Hitti as 
Memoirs of an Arab Syrian Gentleman, Beirut 1964. 
Yusuf Kha~~ I:IajTh, Kutadgu Bilig, ed. R.R. Arat, 3 vols., Ankara 194 7, 3rd.ed. 
Ankara 1991; tr. Robert Dankoff as Wisdom of Royal Glory, Chicago 1983 
Western Christian Sources 
Ansbert, Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris, ed. J. Fiedler: Codex 
Strahoviensis Kreuzzug Kaiser Friedrich's I., Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, Scriptores 
V. Band, Wien 1863. 
Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, tr. F .R. Ryan as Fulcher of Chartres 
A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095-1127, Knoxville 1969; tr. M.E. 
McGinty, in: The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other 
Source Materials, ed. E. Peters (2nd edn, Philadelphia, 1998. 
Gesta Francorum Anonymi, ed. B.A. Lees, Oxford, 1924; tr. R. Hill as The Deeds of 
the Franks and the other Pilgrims to Jerusalem, Oxford 1979. 
Odo of Deuil: De profectinone Ludovici VII in orientem, ed. and English trans. V.G. 
Berry, New York 1948. 
244 
Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici I Imperatoris, tr. C.C. Mierow as The Deeds of 
Frederick Barbarossa, New York 1953. 
Villehardouin Geoffrey of, Chronicle of the Fourth Crusade and the Conquest of 
Constantinople, tr. Sir F. Marzials, London 1908, repr. ed., Harmondsworth 1963. 
William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum a tempore 
successorum Mahumeth usque ad Annum Domini MCLXXXIV; tr. E.A. Babcock/ 
A. C. Krey as A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, 2 vols., New York 1943. 
The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with part of the Eracles 
or Acre text, Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century. Trans. by J. Shirley, 
Aldershot 1999. 
Eastern Christian Sources 
Akropolites, Opera, eds. A. Heisenberg/ P. Wirth, 2 vols., Stuttgart 1978; tr. R. 
Macrides, Os ford 2007. 
Attaliates, Historia, ed. I. Bekker, CB, Bonn 1853. 
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, partial tr. A. S. Tritton as The First and Second 
Crusade from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, in: JRAS (1933), 69-101; 273-305. 
Bar Hebraeus, The chronography of Grego1y Abu '1 Faraj, the Hebrew physician, 
commonly known as Bar Hebraeus, facsimile ed. and tr. by E. A. Wallis Budge, (2 
vols.), London 1932. 
Choniates, Historia, ed. I. Bekker, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Bonn 
1835, ed. Jan-Louis van Dieten, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, vol. 11, pts. 1 
245 
and 2, Series Berolinesis, Berlin 1975; Latin trans. Hieronymus Wolf, Base! 155; tr. 
Franz Grabler, Byzantinische Geschichtschreiber, vols. 7-9, Graz 1959; tr. H. J. 
Magoulias as 0 City of Byzantium Annals of Niketas Choniates, Detroit 1984. 
Choniates/ Akropolites/ Pachymeres: tr. B. Lehmann as Die Nachrichten des Niketas 
Choniates, Georgios Akropolites und Pachymeres iiber die Selcuqen in der Zeit von 
1180 his 1280 n.Chr., Grafenhainchen 1939. 
Comnena, Anna, Alexiade, ed. Bemard Leib, with tr. (Bude), 3 vols., Paris, 1937-45; 
tr. E.A.S. Dawes, London 1929; tr. E.R.A. Sewter as The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, 
Harmondsworth 1969; tr. D.R. Reinsch as Anna Komnene Alexias, Bonn 1996. 
Kinnamos, Historia, ed. Augustus Meinecke, Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexia 
Comnenis gestarum, Corpus scriptorum historiae byzanine, Bonn 1836; (repr., 
Athens, n.d.); tr. C.M. Brand as Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by John 
Kinnamos, New York 1976. 
Matthew of Edessa, Patmut 'iwn, ed. E. Dulaurier, Chronique, Paris 1858, tr. A.E. 
Dostourian as Armenia and the Crusades. Tenth to Twelfth Centuries. The Chronicle 
of Matthew of Edessa, New York/ London 1993. 
Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michelle Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche 
(1166-1199), facsimile ed. and tr. J.-B. Chabot as Chronique de Michel le Syrien, 
Paris 1899-1914, vol Ill. 
Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. A. Failler, tr. A. Failler/ V. Laurent, 2 vols in 
5 parts, Paris 1984-2000. 
246 
Secondary Sources 
Abercrombie, N./ Hill, S./ Turner, B.l. (eds.): The Dominant Ideology Thesis, 
London 1980. 
Agadzanov, S.G.: Selgukiden und Turkmenien im 11.- 12. Jahrhundert, Hamburg 
1989. 
Agadzanov, S.G.: Der Staat der Seldschukiden und Mittelasien im 11.-12. 
Jahrhundert, Berlin 1994. 
Akyiiz, Yahya: Turk egitim tarihi ba~langu;tan 1982 ye kadar, Ankara 1982. 
Al-Azmeh, Aziz: Muslim Kingship Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian, and 
Pagan Polities, London/ New York 1997. 
Alptekin, Co~kun: Seh;uklu Paralarz, Ankara 1971. 
Alptekin, C.: The reign of Zengi (521-541/ 1127-1146), unpubl. PhD Thesis, 
University of London 1972. 
Alptekin, C.: Dima~k atabegligi: Tog-Teginliler, istanbul 1985. 
Amstrong, P.: 'Seljuks before the Seljuks: nomads and frontiers inside Byzantium', 
in: Eastern Approaches to Byzantium, ed. A. Eastmond, Aldershot 2001, 277-86. 
Angold, Michael: The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204. A political history, London/ 
New York 1984. 
Angold, M.: A Byzantine Government in Exile. Government and Society under the 
Laskaris ofNicaea (1204-1261), Oxford 1975. 
247 
An, A.: 'Anadolu Selc;uklu devletinde sultan', in: Nihal Atszz ve Nejded Sanr;ar 
Armaganz, I. Aka/ T. Akkoyun/ M. Turan (eds.), Afyon 1995,24-37. 
Ank, F.~.: 'Tiirkiye Selc;uklu devletinde Miisadere', in: Be$inci millet/er arasz 
Tiikoloji Kongresi Istanbul 23-28 Eylii/1985, Istanbul 1986, 47-63. 
Asimov, M.; Bosworth C.E. (ed.): History of Civilizations of Central Asia, IV, The 
Age of Achievement: A.D. 750 to the End of the Fifteenth Century, Part 1, The 
Historical, Social and Economic Settings, UNESCO, Paris 1998; Part 2, The 
Achievements, UNESCO, Paris 2000. 
Aslanapa, Oktay: Turkish art and architecture, New York, 1971. 
Aykut, ~evki N.: Tiirkiye Selr;uklu Sikkeleri vo/.1 I. Mesud'dan I. Keykubad'a kadar 
(510-616/ 1116-1220), Istanbul2000. 
Babinger, Franz: 'Der Islam in Kleinasien. Neue Wege der Islamforschung', In: 
ZDMG 76/77 (1922/23), 126-152. 
Balivet, Michel: 'Entre Byzance et Konya: 1 'intercirculation des idees et des hommes 
au temps des Seldjoukides', in: Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, G. Leiser (ed.), Paris 
2005, 171-207. 
Balog, P.: The Coinage of the Ayyubids, Royal Nun1isn1atic Society, Special 
Publication, no.12, London 1980. 
Barthold, W.: 'Caliph and Sultan', in: Islamic Quarterly vii (1963), 117-135. 
Barthold, W.: 'Die alttiirkischen Inschriften und die arabischen Quell en', in: W. 
Radloff, Die alttiirkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Zweite Folge, St. Petersburg 
1899. 
248 
Barthold, W.: Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion, [1st Russ. ed. St. Petersburg 
1900; 1st Engl. ed. London 1928], 3rd rev. ed., London 1968. 
Barthold, W.: 'Studien iiber Kalifund Sultan', in: Der Islam I (1916), 350-412. 
Barthold, W.: Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, vol. Ill., Mir 'Alf-Shfr A 
History of the Turkman People, trans. V. and T. Minorsky, Leiden 1962. 
Barthold, W.: 12 Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Tiirken Mittelasiens, 
Deutsche Bearbeitung von Theodor Menzel, Berlin 1935. 
Bausani, A.: 'Religion in the Saljuq Period', in: Cambridge Histo1y of Iran, vol. V, 
The Saljuq and Mongol periods, Cambridge 1968, 283-302. 
Baykara, Tuncer: Anadolu 'nun Seh;uklular devrindeki sosyal ve iktisadi tarihi 
iizerinde ara$tzrmalar, izmir 1990. 
Baykara, T.: 'Tiirkiye Sel<;uklulannda Halktn ~ehzadeler Miicadelesindeki Tutumu', 
in: Altaica Berolinensia. The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World, B. Kellner-
Heinkele (ed.), Wiesbaden 1993, 23-30. 
Baykara, T.: Tiirkiye Seh;uklularznzn sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi, Istanbul2004. 
Bayram, Mikail: 'State formation among the Seljuks of Anatolia', tn: Les 
Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, G. Leiser (ed.), Paris 2005, 137-155. 
Beck, M.: A'lexios Komnenos zwischen Normanen und Tiirken', in: Akten des XI 
lnternationalen Byzanistenkongresses 1958, Miinchen 1960, 43-47. 
Becker, A.: Papst Urban If (1088-1099): Der Papst die griechische Christenheit und 
der Kreuzzug, Stuttgart 1988. 
249 
Seeker, C.H.: 'Barthold's Studien iiber Khalif und Sultan', in: Der Islam VI (1976), 
350-412. 
Bees, N.: Die Inschriftaufzeichnung des Kodex Sinaiticus graecus 508 (976) und die 
Marie Spiliiotissa Klosterkirche bei Stille (Lykaonien) mit Exkursen zur Geschichte 
der Seldschukidenturken, Berlin 1922. 
Belke, Klaus: 'Phrygia between Byzantines and Seljuks', in: BF 16 (1991). 
Berchem, Max van: Inschriften aus Syrien, Mesopotamien und Kleinasien: 
gesammelt im Jahre 1899, Leipzig 1909. 
Beveridge, A./Manz, B.F.: Mirkhwand, EI2. 
Binder, Leonard: 'Al-Ghazalfs Theory of Islamic Government', in: Muslim World 
14 (1955), 229-41. 
Bombaci, A.: 'The army ofthe Saljuqs of Rum', in: AIUON38. N.S. 18 (1978), 343-
69. 
Borgolte, Michael: ~selbstversUindnis und Mentalitaten. BewuBtsein, Verhalten und 
Handeln mittelalterlicher Menschen im Verstandnis modemer Historiker', in: Archiv 
for Kulturgeschichte 79 (1997), 189-210. 
Borgolte, M.: ~Mittelalterforschung und Postmodeme. Aspekte etner 
Herausforderung', in: Zeitschrift for Geschichtswissenschaft 43, 2 (1999), 615-27. 
Bosworth, C. Edmund: The transition from Ghaznavid to Seljuq rule in the Islamic 
East, unpubl. PhD thesis, Edinburgh 1961. 
Bosworth, C. E.: The Ghaznavids Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 
994-1040, Edinburgh 1963. 
250 
Bosworth, C.E.: 'The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (AD. 1000-
1217)', in: Cambridge History of Iran, vol.v, Cambridge 1968, 1-202. 
Bosworth, C.E.: 'Barbarian Invasion: The coming to the Turks into the Islamic 
World', in: Islamic Civilisation, ed. D.S. Richards, Oxford 1973, 1-16. 
Bosworth, C.E.: The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, 
[Collected studies series], London, Variorum 1977. 
Bosworth, C.E.: The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical 
Manual, [1st ed. Edinburgh 1967], rev. ed. Edinburgh 1996. 
Bosworth, C.E.: 'Nizam al-Mulk and the zenith of the Great Seljuq Empire', in: 
Cambridge History of Iran, vol v., 1968. 
Bosworth, C.E.: 'The Heritage of Rulership in Early Islamic Iran and Search for 
Dynastic Connections with the Past', in: Iran 11 ( 1973 ), 51-62. 
Bosworth, C.E.: 'The Titulature of the Early Ghaznavids', in: Oriens 15 (1962), 210-
233. 
Bosworth, C.E.: 'The Imperial Policy of the Early Ghaznawids', in: Islamic Studies 1 
( 1962), 49-82. 
Bosworth, C.E. (ed.): The Turks in the Early Islamic World, Aldershot 2007. 
Bosworth, C.E.: Rum, EI2. 
Bosworth, C.E.: Nasll)at al-Muliik, EI2. 
Bosworth, C.E., R. Hillenbrand, J.M. Rogers and F.C. de Blois: Saldjiikids, EI2. 
251 
Bourdan, Raymound: The Analysis of Ideology, Oxford 1989. 
Bowen, Harold: 'Notes on some early Seljuqid viziers', in: BSOAS, 20 (1975), 105-
110. 
Bowen, H./ Bosworth C.E.: Nizam al-Mulk, EI2. 
Brand, Charles M.: 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents ofthe Third 
Crusade', in: Speculum 37 (1962), 167-181. 
Brand, C. M.: Byzantium confronts the west 1180-1204, Cambridge, Mass. 1968. 
Brand, C.M.: 'The Turkish element in Byzantium, eleventh-twelfth centuries', in: 
DOP, 43 (1989), 1-25. 
Brandenburg, D./ Brusehoff, K.: Die Seldschuken. Baukunst des Islam in Persie und 
Turlanenien, Graz 1980. 
Brice, William C.:' The Turkish Colonization of Anatolia', in: BJRL 38 (1955), 18-
44. 
Brice, W.C.: An Historical Atlas of Islam, Leiden 1981. 
Broadbridge, Anne F.: Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds, 
Cambridge 2008. 
Brockelmann, Carl: Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, [Original ed. 2 vols., 
Weimar 1898-1902; 3 Suppl. vols., Leiden 1937-42], rev. ed. of vol. I-ll, Leiden 
1943-1949. 
252 
Browne, E.G.: 'An Account of a Rare Manuscript History of the Seljuqs', in: JRAS 
( 1902), 567-610, 849-87. 
Bryer, Anthony: 'A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades, c. 979-c.1653 ', in: University 
of Birmingham Historical Journal, 12 (1970), 164-187. 
Bulliet, Richard: 'Numismatic Evidence for the Relationship between Tughril Beg 
and Chaghrl Beg, in: Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and 
History: Studies in Honor ofGeorge C. Miles, D. K. Kouymijian, (ed.), Beirut 1974. 
Busse, Heribert: Chalif und Grosskonig. Die Buyiden im Iraq (945-1055), Beirut 
1969. 
Busse, H.: 'The Revival of Persian Kingship under the Buyids', In: Islamic 
Civilisation 950-1150, ed. D.S. Richards, Oxford 1973, 47-69. 
Cahen, Claude: La Syrie du Nord a I 'epoque des Croisades et la Principaute franque 
d'Antioche, Paris 1940. 
Cahen, C.: 'La Tugra Seljukide', in: JA ccxxxiv (1943-45), 167-172. 
Cahen, C.: 'La premiere penetration turque en Asie Mineure', In: Byzantion 18 
(1948). 
Cahen, C.: 'Les tribus turques d' Asie occidentale pandant la period Seljukide', in: 
WZKM, 51 (1948-52) 
Cahen, C.: 'Le Malik-Nameh et l'histoire des ongines Seljukides', In: Oriens 2 
( 1949), 31-65. 
Cahen, C.: Le commerce anatolien au debut du XIIIe siecle, in: Melanges d'histoire 
du Moyen Age dedif!s a la memo ire de Louis Halphen, Paris 1951, 91-101. 
253 
Cahen, C.: ,Seljukides de Rum, Byzantins et Francs d'apres le Seljukname 
anonyme', in: Annuaire de I 'institut philologique et historique orientales et slaves 11 
(1951). 
Cahen, C.: 'The Turkish invasion, The Selchiikids', in: A History of the Crusades, 
M.W. Baldwin (ed.), vol. 1, The First Hundred Years, Philadelphia 1955, 135-176. 
Cahen, C.: 'Qutlumush et ses Fils avant l'Asie Mineure', in: Der Islam 39 (1964), 
14-27. 
Cahen, C.: 'Zur Geschichte der sHidtischen Gesellschaft im islamischen Orient des 
Mittelalters', in: Saeculum 9 (1958), 59-76. 
Cahen, C.: 'Selgukides, Turcomans et Allemands au temps de la troisieme croisade', 
in: WZKM, 56 (1960), 21-31. 
Cahen, C.: 'The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period', in: Historians of the Middle 
East, ed. Lewis and Holt, London 1962, 59-78. 
Cahen, C.: 'The Turks in Iran and Anatolia before the Mongol Invasion', in: Later 
Crusades, eds. W olff and Hazard, 661-692. 
Cahen, C.: 'Une Famille byzantine au service des Seldjuquides d' Asie Mineure', in: 
Polychronion: Festschrift Franz Dolger zum 75 Geburtstag, ed. Peter Wirth, 
Heidelberg 1966, 145-49. 
Cahen, C.: Pre-Otto1nan Turkey A general survey of the material and spiritual 
culture and history c. 1071-1330, (Trans. J. Jones-Williams from an unpublished 
draft), London 1968. 
254 
Cahen, C.: 'Tribes, Cities, and Social Organization', in: Cambridge History of Iran, 
vol. IV, 305-328. 
Cahen, C.: 'Mouvement populaires et autonomisme urbain dans I' Asie musulmane 
du Moyen Age', in: Arabica V (1958), 225-250; vi (1959), 25-56; 233-265. 
Cahen, C.: La Turquie Pre-Ottomane, Paris/Istanbul 1988, trans. P.M. Holt as, The 
Formation of Turkey. The Seljukid Sultanate of Rum: Elewenth to Fourteenth 
Century, Harlow 2001. 
Cahen, C.: Ghuzz, EI2. 
Cahen, C.: Ikta, EI2. 
~ay, Abdulhaluk M.: 'Anadolu'nun Ti.irkle~mesi, (Selvuklu Donemi)', tn: Tiirk 
Kiiltiirii Dergisi 241 (1983), 270-279. 
~etin, Kenan: Seh;uklu Miiesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, Erzurum 1992. 
~etin, Osman: Seh;:uklu miiesseseleri ve Anadoluda jsfamiyetin yayzlz~z, Istanbul 
1981. 
Chalandon, Ferdinand: Essai sur le regne d' Alexis I Comnene (1 081-118), Paris 
1900. 
Chalandon, F.: Jean II Comnene (1118-1143) et Manuel I Comnene (1143-1180). 
Les Comnene: Etudes sur l 'empire byzantin au Xie et au X!Ie siecles, vol. 2. Paris 
1912; reprinted., New York 1960. 
Chalandon, F.: Essai sur le regne d'Alexis !er Comnene (1081-1118), Paris 1900. 
Claessen, J.M./ P.S. Skalnik, (eds.): The Study of the State, Leiden 1981. 
255 
Claessen, J.M./ J.G. Oosten, (eds.): Ideology and the formation of early states, 
Leiden/New York/ Koln 1996. 
Clauson, G.: An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Centu1y Turkish, Oxford 
1972. 
Combe, E./ Sauvaget, J./ Wiet, G. (eds.): Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie 
arabe, 16 vols, Cairo 1931-1964; vol. 8-10, Cairo 1936-39. 
Crane, Howard: 'Notes on Saldjuq architectural patronage in thirteenth-century 
Anatolia', in: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 36 (1992), I-
57. 
Demirkent, l~tn: Tiirkiye Selr;uklu hiikiimdarz Sultan I Kzlzr; Arslan, Ankara 1996. 
Dvit9ioglu, S.: Oguz 'dan Selr;ukluya (Boy, Konat ve Devlet), istanbul 1994. 
Dolger, Franz: Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Ostromischen Reiches van 565-
1453, 3 Teile in einem Band, reprint, first published 1924-1932, Hildesheim 1976. 
Duda, Herbert W.: 'Zur Geschichtsforschung lib er die Rum-Seldschuken', in: ZD MG 
89 (1935), 19*. 
Duda, H.W.: 'Die nationale tlirkische Geschichtsauffassung', in: (1937), 26-28. 
Duda, H.W.: Ibn BThi, EI2. 
Duran, Remzi: Selr;uklu Devri Konya Yapz Kitdbeleri jn$a veTa 'mir, Ankara 2001. 
Eagleton, Terry: Ideology: an introduction, London 1991. 
256 
Eastmond, A. ( ed. ): Eastern Approaches to Byzantium. Papers from the Thirty-third 
Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies. University of Warwick, Coventry, March 
1999, Aldershot 200 1. 
Edhem, H.: Diivel-i jsfamiyye, Istanbul 1927. 
Efe, Ahmet: Tarih-i-al-i Selr;uklu Sultanlarz ve Payitaht Konya, Konya 1998. 
El-Azhari, Taef Kamal: The Saljuqs of Syria During the Crusades 463-549 
A.H./1070-1154 A.D., Berlin 1997. 
El-Cheikh, Nadia M.: Byzantium viewed by the Arabs, Harvard 2004. 
Elisseeff, Nikita: Nur ad-Din: un grand prince musulmans de Syrie au temps de 
Croisades (511-569 A.H./1118-1174), Damascus 1967. 
Erdman, Kurt: Ibn Bfbf als kunsthistorische Quelle, Istanbul 1962. 
Erdman, Hanna/ Erdman, Kurt: Das anatolische Karavansaray des 13. Jahrhunderts, 
vol. I-III, (Istanbuler Forschungen 21 and 31), Berlin 1961-76. 
Erkiletlioglu, Halit/ Giiler, Oguz: Selr;uklu sultan/an ve sikkeleri, Kayseri 1996. 
Ertug, Ahmet: The Seljuks: a journey through Anatolian architecture concept and 
project, istanbul 1991. 
Fahmer, R.: 'Alaeddin Keykubad', in: Robert Boehringer eine Freundesgabe, (eds.) 
E. Boehringer/ W. Hoffmann, Tiibingen 1957. 
Frye, Richard N.: 'The Charisma of Kingship in Ancient Iran', in: Iranica Antiqua 4 
(1964), 36-54. 
257 
Gabain, Annemarie von: 'Steppe und Stadt im Leben der altesten Tiirken', in: Der 
Islam 29 ( 1950), 30-62. 
Gabriel, A.: Monuments Turcs d'Annatolie II, Paris 1934. 
Gabriel, A./ Sauvaget J.: Voyages archeologiques dans la Turquie orientale, Paris 
1940. 
Geertz, Clifford: Ideology as a Cultural System, in: The Interpretation of Cultures, 
New York 1973. 
Galib, Ismail: Takvzmi-i Meskukiit-z Selr;ukiyye, Konstantiniye 1309. 
Gibb, H.A.R.: 'Some considerations on the Sunni theory of the caliphate', in: Studies 
on the civilization of Islam, 141-50. 
Gibb, H.A.R.: The Life of Saladin Based on the Works of Baha' ad-Dzn 'In1ad ad-
Din al-Isfahani, London 2006, (first published Oxford 1973). 
Giesecke, Heinz Helmut: Das Werk des Azzz ibn Ardaszr Astariibiidi. Eine Quelle zur 
Geschichte des Spiitmittelalters in Kleinasien, Leipzig 1940. 
Glassen, Erika: Der mitt/ere Weg. Studien zur Religionspolitik und Religiositiit der 
spiiteren Abbasiden-Zeit, Frankfurt 1981. 
Gliick, Heinrich: Die Kunst der Seldschuken in Kleinasien und Armenien, Leipzig 
1923 
Goetz, Hans-Wemer: 'Vorstellungsgeschichte: Menschliche Vorstellungen und 
Meinungen als Dimension der Vergangenheit', in: Archiv for Kulturgeschichte 61 
(1979), 253-271. 
258 
Goetz, H.W.: Moderne Mediiivistik: Stand und Perspektiven der 
Mittelalterforschung, Darmstadt 1999. 
Golden, Peter B.: 'The Migration of the Oguz', in: Archivum Ottomanicum 4 (1972), 
45-84. 
Golden, P.B.: An Introduction to the History of the Turkic People, Wiesbaden 1992. 
Gordlevski, Vladimir: Gosudarstvo Selzhukidov Maloi Azii, Moscow 1941, Turkish 
trans. Azer Yaran as Anadolu Selc;uklu Devleti, Ankara 1988. 
Gottschalk, Hans L.: Al-Malik al-Kamil von Egypten und seine Zeit, Wiesbaden 
1958. 
Gottschalk, H.L.: Der Bericht des Ibn Nazif al-Hamawf uber die Schlact von 
Jasycimen (25.-28. Ramadan 627/7-10. August 1230), in: WZKM 56 (1960), 55-67. 
Grabar, Oleg: The Formation of Islamic Art, New Haven/ London 1973 (2nd rev. ed., 
1987). 
Gregory, Timothy E.: A History of Byzantium, Oxford 2005. 
Giilensoy, Tuncer:' Turk Kiiltiir Tarihinde Damgalar ve Ta~c;t i~aretleri ', tn: 
Selr;uklular Devrinde Kultur ve Medeniyet, (ed.) A.H. Koker, Kayseri 1991, 137-207. 
Giiler, Oguz: 'Anadolu Selc;uklu Hiikiimdarlanntn Tasvirli Sikkeleri ve Kayseri 
Selc;uklu Darphanesi', in: Selr;uklular Devrinde Kultur ve Medeniyet, (ed.) A.H. 
Koker, Kayseri 1991, 209-224. 
Giinaltay, ~em~ettin: 'islam diinyastntn inhitatl sebebi Selc;uk istilast mtdtr?', in: 
Belleten I (1938), 73-88. 
259 
Hakk1, Ismail: Kitabeler, Istantul 1827. 
Hamdani, V.A.: A critical study of the sources for the history of the Saljuqs of Iraq 
and Syria, (unpubl. PhD thesis, Oxford 1939. 
Hammer, Joseph von.: Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, V on der Griindung des 
osmanischen Reiches his zur Eroberung Constantinopels 1300-1453, Bnd.l. Pest 
1827. 
Harris, Jonathan: Byzantium and the Crusades, London/ New York 2003. 
Hartmann, Angelika: An Nasir li-D'in Allah (1180-1225) Politik, Religion und Kultur 
in der spaten 'Abbasidenzeit, Berlin/ New York 1975. 
Hasan, S.A.: 'Some Observations on the Problems Concerning the Origin of the 
Saljuqids ', in: Islamic Culture, 34 ( 1965-66), 
Hasluck, Frederick W.: 'Christianity and Islam under the Sultans of Konia', 1n: 
Annual of the British School of Athens, 19 (1912-1913), 191-197. 
Hasluck, F.W.: Levantine Coinage, London 1921. 
Heidemann, Stefan: Die Renaissance der Stadte in Nordsyrien und 
Nordmesopotamien, Leiden 2002. 
Hillenbrand, Carole: A Muslim Principality in Crusader Times: the early Artuqid 
State, Leiden 1990. 
Hillenbrand, C.: 'Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? Al-Ghazali's Views on 
Government', in: Iran 26 ( 1988), 81-94. 
260 
Hillenbrand, C.: 'Jihad Propaganda in Syria from the time of the First Crusade until 
the death of Zengi: the evidence of monumental inscriptions', in: The Frankish Wars 
and their Influence on Palestine, (eds.), K. Athaminal R. Heacock, Birzeit University 
Press 1994. 
Hillenbrand, C.: 'The power struggle between the Saljuqs and the Isma'ilis of 
Alamut, 487-51811095-1124: the Saljuq Perspective', in: Medievalisma 'ili History 
and Thought, (ed.), Farhad Daftary, Cambridge 1996, 205-20. 
Hillenbrand, C.: The Crusades Islamic Perspectives, Edinburgh 1999. 
Hillenbrand, C.: 'Seljuq women. The balance of truth', in: Essays in honour of 
Professor Geoffrey Lewis, (ed.), <;. Bahm-Harding and C. Imber, istanbul2000, 145-
163. 
Hillenbrand, C.: 'Some reflections on Seljuq historiography', in: Eastern Approaches 
to Byzantium, ed., Antony Eastmond, Hampshire 2001. 
Hillenbrand, C.: 'Ravandi, the Seljuk court at Konya and the Persianisation of 
Anatolian cities', in: Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, G. Leiser (ed.), Paris 2005, 157-
169. 
Hillenbrand, Robert (ed.): The Art of the Saljiiqs in Iran and Anatolia Proceedings of 
a Symposium held in Edinburgh in 1982, Costa Mesa, California 1994. 
Hillenbrand, R.: Islamic Architecture: form, function and meaning, Edinburgh 1994. 
Hilmi, H.: Sinop kitabeleri, Sinop 1925. 
Hinrichs, Johann-Christoph: 'Bildliche Darstellungen auf den Miinzen der 
Seltschuken Anatolians', in: Numismatische Nachrichtenblatt 2 (1988), 30-42. 
261 
Hinrichs, J-C.: 'Sultan und Kalif auf Miinzen der Seltschuken Anatoliens', in: Les 
Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, (ed.), G. Leiser, Paris 2005, 337-364. 
Holt, P.M.: The Age of the crusades: the Near East from the eleventh century to 
1517, London 1968. 
Holt, P .M.: 'The Sultan as ideal ruler: Ayyubid and Mamluk prototypes', in: 
Siileyman the Magnificent: Ottoman Empire in the early modern world, (eds.) I. M. 
Kunt/ C. Woodhead, London 1995. 
Horst, Heribert: Die Staatsverwaltung der Grosselguqen und Horazmsahs (1 038-
1231). Eine Untersuchung nach Urkundenformularen der Zeit, Wiesbaden 1964. 
Hourani, A. H., and S.M. Stem, ( eds.): The Islamic City: a Colloquium, Oxford 1970. 
Houtsma, M.T.: 'Zur Geschichte der Selguqen von Kerman', in: ZDA1G, 39 (1885), 
362-410. 
Huart, Cl.: Epigraphie arabe d'Asie Mineure, Paris 1895. 
Hunger, H. (ed.): Das byzantinische Herrscherbild, Darmstadt 1975. 
Humphreys, R. Stephen: Islamic History. A Framework for Inquily, London/New 
York 1991. 
Humphreys, R.S.: From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-
1260, New York 1977. 
Imber, Col in: 'What Does Ghazi Actually Mean?', in: The Balance and Truth. 
Essays in Honour of Professor Geoffrey Lewis, (eds.) <;. Bahm-Harding/ C. Imber, 
Istanbul 2000, 165-78. 
262 
Jahn, Karl (ed.): History of Iranian Literature, Leiden 
Kaegi, W. E.: 'The contribution of archery to the Turkish conquest of Anatolia', in: 
Speculum 39 (1964), 97-108. 
Kafesoglu, ibrahim: Seh;uklu Tarihi, Istanbul 1992, tr. G. Leiser, A History of the 
Seljuks: lbrahim Kafesoglu 's lnte1pretation and the Resulting Controversy, 
Carbondale Illinois 1988. 
Kafesoglu, i.: 'Dogu Anadolu'ya ilk Selvuklu aktnt (1015-1021) ve tarihi 
ehemmiyeti', in: Fuad Kopriilii Armaganz, istanbul 1953, 259-274; Trans. G. Leiser, 
The first Seljuk raid into eastern Anatolia (1 015-1021) and its historical significance, 
in: Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, (ed.), G. Leiser, Paris 2005, 27-47. 
Kafesoglu, i.: Sultan Melilcyah devrinde Biiyiik Selr;uklu jmparatorlugu, istanbul 
1953. 
Kafesoglu, i.: 'Biiyiik Selvuklu veziri Nizamii '1-Miilk'iin esen Siyasetname ve 
tiirkve terciimesi', in: Tiirkiyat Mecmuasz 2 (1955), 231-56. 
Kafesoglu, i.: Selr;uklu Ailesinin Men~ei Hakkznda, Istanbul 1955. 
Kafesoglu, i.: 'Selvuklu tarihinin meseleleri', in: Belleten 29 (1955), 463-489. 
Kafesoglu, i.: 'Prof. Osman Turan'tn tenkid yaztst dolaytstyla Selvuklu tarihi-
meselelrine toplu bir bakt~', in: Belleten 30 ( 1966), 467-4 79. 
Kafesoglu, i.: Eski Turk Dini, Ankara 1980. 
Kafesoglu, i.: 'Tiirkiyede Se1vuklu tarihviligi', in: Cumhuriyetin 50. yzlzna armagan, 
istanbul 1973, 83-92. 
263 
Kafesoglu, i.: Selc;uklular, iA. 
Kafesoglu, i.: Nizam-ul-Mulk, iA 
Kanem, Mahmout: 'The idea of Justice in Islamic philosophy', in: Diogenes lxxix 
(1972), 81-108. 
Kaymaz, Necat: 'Malazgirt Sava~1 ile Anadolu 'nun Fethi ve Turkle~mesine dair', in: 
Malazgirt Armaganz, Ankara 1972, 259-68. 
Kesik, Muharrem: Turkiye Selr;uklu Devleti tarihi Sultan I Mesud donemi (1116-
1155}, Ankara 2003. 
Khazanov, A.M.: Nomads and the outside world, Cambridge 1984. 
Khazdan, Alexander, (ed.): The Oxford Dictiona1y of Byzantium, 3 vols., New York, 
1991. 
Khoury, P./ Kastiner, J. (eds.): Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, 
Berkeley/ Oxford 1990. 
Khurt, A.: 'Usurpation, Conquest and Ceremonial: from Babylon to Perisa', in: 
Ritual and Royalty Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Society, D. Cannadine/ S. 
Price (eds.), Gabridge Uni Press 1987. 
Kienitz, F.K.: 'Die vorosmanischen Turken und ihre Bedeutung fur Geschichte und 
Kultur Anatoliens', in: Zeitschrift for Kulturaustausch, 12 ( 1962), 115-120. 
Kitapc;1, Zekeriya: Hz. Peygamberin hadislerinde Turk varlzgz: Selr;uklular, 
Mogollar, Osmanlzlar: Sahihi Muslum gibi ba$lz hadis koleksiyonlarzndaki Turklerle 
ilgili hadislerde Turk varlzgz, istanbul 1990. 
264 
Kitapc;t, Z.: Abbasi hilafetince Selr;uklu Hatunlarz ve Turk Sultanlarz, Konya 1994. 
Klever, Ulrich: Das Weltreich der Tiirken, Bergisch Gladbach 1981. 
Koca, Salim: Sultan I. Izzeddin Keykavus, Ankara 1997. 
Koch, G.: Auf dem Wege zum sacrum Imperium, Berlin 1972. 
Kohler, Michael A.: Allianzen und Vertriige zwischen friinkischen und islamischen 
Herrschern im Vorderen Orient Eine Studie iiber das zwischenstaatliche 
Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin/ New York 1991. 
Koker, Ahmet ( ed. ): Selr;uklu devrinde kiiltiir ve medeniyet, Kayseri 1992. 
Konyah, i. Hakkt: Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Konya Tarihi, Konya 1964. 
Kopriilii, Mehmed Fuad: 'Anadolu' da isUimiyet: Turk istiHistndan sonra Anadolu 
tarih-i dinisine bir nazar ve bu tarihin menbalan', in: Dariilfoniin Edebiyat Fakiiltesi 
Mecmuasz, 2 (1922), 281-311, 385-420, 457-86; Trans. Gary Leiser, as Islam in 
Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Proglemena), Salt Lake City Utah 1993. 
Kopriilii, M.F.: 'Ortazaman Turk hukuki muesseseleri: islam amme hukukundan aryt 
bir amme hukuku yokmudur?', in: Belleten 2 (1938), 39-72. 
Kopriilii, M.F.: Ortazaman Turk-is lam feodalizmi, in: Belleten 5 (1941 ), 319-50. 
Kopriili.i, M.F.: 'Anadolu Selc;uklulan tarihinin yerli kaynaklan', tn: Belleten 27 
( 1943), 3 79-522. 
Korobeinikov, Dimitri: Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century, unpubl. 
DPhil thesis, Oxford 2004. 
265 
Koymen, M.A.: 'Sel9uklu devri Turk tarihi ara~ttrmalan I', in: Bell et en 17 (1953), 
557-604. 
Koymen, M.A.: Buyuk Selr;uklu imparatorlugunun tarihi 11. ikinci imparatorluk 
devri, Ankara 1954. 
Koymen, M.A.: Selr;uklu Devri Turk Tarihi, Ankara 1963. 
Koymen, M.A.: 'Sel9uklu Devri ~iirlerine gore Turkler'in Kultiir Seviyesi', in: SAD 
3 (1971), 119-143. 
Koymen, M.A.: Anadolu'nun fethi ve Malazgirt meydan muharabesi, Malazgirt 
zaferi ve Alp Arslan, istanbul1972, 67-142. 
Koymen, M.A.: Alp Arslan ve zamanz, istanbul1972. 
Koymen, M.A.: 'Sel9uklu Devrinin Ozelikleri', in: Atszz Armaganz, istanbul 1976, 
151-59. 
Koymen, M.A.: Selr;uklular 'da devlet: Ill. Tarih ve siyasi bakzmlarzndan, Ankara 
1990. 
Koymen, M.A.: Tugul Bey ve zamanz, istanbul1976. 
Koymen, M.A.: 'Turkiye Sel9uklulan Devleti'nin Ekonomik Politikast', in: Belleten 
198 ( 1986), 613-620. 
Koymen, M.A.: Sel9uklu Hukumdan Buyiik Alaeddin Keykubad ve Anadolu 
Savunmast, in: Belleten 204 (1988), 1539-1545. 
Kramers, J.H.: Sultan, E/2. 
266 
Kretschmar, Marit: Pferd und Reiter im Orient: Untersuchungen zum Reiterkult 
Vorderasiens inder Seldschukenzeit, Hildesheim/New York 1994. 
Kucur, S.: 'Nizamlilmtilk'lin Siyaset-name'sine Selc;uklu devlet te~kilatt ac;tstnda bir 
bakt~: Emir-I Hares ve Emlr-i Dad Omegi', in: Turkluk Ara~tzrmalarz Dergisi 12 
(2002), 41-72. 
Klic;likdag, Y./ Arabact, C.: Selr;uklular ve Konya, Konya 1994. 
Kuran, Abdullah: Anadolu medreseleri, Ankara 1969. 
Ktirkman, G./ Diler, 6.: Aldzye Paralarz Coinage of 'Aldiye, Istanbul 1981. 
Kurpalidis, Georgij M.: 'The Seljuqids and the Sultan's Power', tn: Altaica 
Berolinensia The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World, (ed.), B. Kellner-
Heinkele, Wiesbaden 1993, 133-137. 
Lambton, Ann K. S.: Contributions to the Study of the Seljuq Institutions, London 
University PhD Thesis 1939. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: 'The administration of Sanjar's empire as illustrated in the ~Atabat 
al-kataba', in: BSOAS 20, (1957), 367-88. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: 'The Internal Structure of the Seljuq Empire', tn: Cambridge 
History of/ran, J.A. Boyle (ed.), vol. V., Cambridge 1968,203-282. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: 'Aspects of Sa1juq-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia', tn: Islamic 
Civilization (950-1 150}, (ed.), D.S. Richards, Oxford 1973, 105-125. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: Theo1y and Practice in Medieval Persian Government, London 
1980. 
267 
Lamb ton, A.K.S.: 'The Theory of Kingship in the Nasi hat al-Mulk of Ghazali', in: 
Islamic Quarterly 1 (1945), 47-55. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: State and Government in Medieval Islam. An introduction to the 
study of Islamic political theory: the jurists, Oxford 1981. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: 'The Dilemma of Government in Islamic Persia: the Siyasat-nama 
ofNizam al-Mulk', in: Iran 22 (1984), 55-66. 
Lambton, A.K.S.: 'Changing concept of justice and injustice from 5th I 11 th century 
of the 8 th I 14 th century Persia: the Saljuq Empire and Ilkhanate', in: Studia 
Is/arnica 68-70 (1988189), 27-60. 
Lane-Poole, Stanley: Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, I 0 vols, 
London 1875-90; The Coins of the Turkman Houses of Seljook, Urtuk, Zen gee in the 
British Museum, vol. Ill, London 1877. 
Langdon, J.S.: Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor. The Documenta1y 
Evidence for and the Hagiographical Lore about John Ill Dukas Vatatzes' Crusade 
against the Turks, 1222 or 1225 to 1231, New York 1992. 
Lange, Christian: 'Zum Verhaltnis zwischen Byzantinem und Kreuzfahrem zwischen 
1095-1204', in: Vom Shisma zu den Kreuzziigen 1095-1204, (eds.), Bruns, P./ 
Grener, G. Paderbom 2005, 179-204. 
Lapidus, Ira M. (ed.): Middle Eastern Cities: A Symposium on Ancient, Medieval, 
and Modern Middle Eastern Urbanism, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969. 
Larrain, Jorge: The Concept of Ideology, London 1979. 
Laurent, J.: Byzance et les Turcs seldjoucides en Asie Mineure. Leurs traites 
anterieurs a Alexius Comnene, in: Byzantion 2 (1911-1912), 101-126. 
268 
Laurent, J.: Byzance et Les Tu res Seljoucides dans I 'Asie occidentale jusqu 'en 1081, 
Paris 1913. 
Laurent, J.: 'Byzance et les origines du sultanat Roum', in: Melanges Gregoire: 
Annuaire de I 'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientales et slaves, vol. I, (1930), 
177 
Laurent, J.: 'Sur les Emirs Danishmendites', in: Meelanges Jorga, Paris 1933. 
Leder, Stefan (ed.): Feinde, Frmde, Freunde. Die Kreuzfahrer in der Sicht 
Orientalischer Quellen, Halle 2005. 
Leiser, Gary (ed.): Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie, (Mesogeios 25-26), Paris 2005. 
Lichtheim, George: 'The Concept of Ideology', in: History and Theory 4 (1965), 
164-195. 
Li1ie, Ralph-Johannes.: 'Die Schlact von Myriokephalon (1176). Auswirkungen auf 
das byzantinische Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert', in: REB 35 (1977), 257-
275. 
Li1ie, R-J.: Byzanz und die Kreuzfahrerstaaten. Studien zur Politik des 
Byzantinischen Reiches gegeniiber den Staaten der Kreuzfahrer in Syrien und 
Paliistina (1 096-1204), Munch en 1981; English trans. J .C. Morris/ Ridings, J .E. as 
Byzantium and the Crusader States 1096-1204, Oxford 1993. 
Lilie, R-J.: 'Twelfth-Century Byzantine and Turkish States', In: Byzantinische 
Forschungen 16 (1991), 35-51. 
Lindner, R.P.: Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, Bloomington 1983. 
269 
Loytved, J .H.: Konia. Inschriften der Seldschukischen Bauten, Berlin 1907. 
Luke, Harry: The Old Turkey and the New From Byzantium to Ankara, (new revised 
ed.), London 1955. 
Luther, Kenneth A.: The Political Transformation of the Seljuq Sultanate of Iraq and 
Western Iran 1152-1187, PhD thesis Princeton University 1964. 
Lyons, M.C./ Jackson, D.E.P.: Saladin. The Politics of the Holy War, Cambridge 
1982. 
Madelung, W.: 'The Assumption of the Title of Shahanshah by the Buyids and the 
reign ofDaylam, (Dawlat al-Daylam)', in: JNES 27 (1969), 84-108; 168-183. 
Magdalino, Paul: 'Isaac sebastokrator (Ill), John Axouch, and a case of mistaken 
identity', in: BMGS 11 (1987), 207-14. 
Magdalino, P.: The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143-1180, Cambridge 1993. 
Makdisi, G.: 'The Sunni Revival', in: Islamic Civilisation 950-1150, (ed.), D.S. 
Richards Oxford 1973, 156-168. 
Mango, Cyril: Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome, London 1980. 
Mannheim, Karl: Ideology and Utopia, London 1966. 
Martin, M.E.: 'Notes and Documents The Venetian-Seljuk treaty of 1220', tn: 
English Historical Review 95/1 ( 1980), 321-330. 
Mason, Herbert: Two Statesmen of Medieval Islam: Vizir Ibn Hubayra 499-
560AH/1105-1165AD and Caliph an-Nasir li Din Allah (553-622AH/1158-1225AD), 
The Hague 1972. 
270 
Mayer, H.E.: The Crusades, Oxford 1988. 
Meisami Scott, Julie: Persian Historiography. To the End of the Twelfth Century, 
Edinburgh 1999. 
Melville, Charles: 'The Early Persian Historiography of Anatolia', in: History and 
Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East (Studies in Honor 
of John E. Woods), J. Pfeiffer/ S.A. Quinn (eds.), Wiesbaden 2006. 
Mer9il, Erdogan: Kirman Selr;uklulan, Istanbul 1980. 
Mer9il, E.: Miisliiman-Turk Devletleri Tarihi, istanbul 1985. 
Mihin, Eren: 'Theodar I. Laskaris 1204-22. ve I. Giyseddin Keyhiisrev', in: SAD 3 
(1971), 593-610. 
Minorsky, Vladimir.: Sharaf ai-Zamiin Tiihir Marvazz on China, the Turks and India, 
London 1942. 
Minorsky, V.: Studies in Caucasian Histo1y, London 1953. 
Minorsky, V.: The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the Middle Ages, London 1978. 
Moravcsik, Gyula: Byzantino-Turcica, vol. 1, Die byzantinischen Quellen der 
Geschichte der Tiirkvolker,· vol. 2, Sprachreste der Tiirkvolker in den byzantinischen 
Quellen, (second revised edition), Berlin 1958. 
Naess, A.: Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity, Oslo 1956. 
271 
Neumann, Carl: Griechische Geschichtsschreiber und Geschichtsquellen im zwolften 
Jahrhundert: Studien zu Anna Comnene, Prodromus, Johanes Cinnamus, New York 
1971. 
Nicol, N.D.: 'Paul Balog's The coinage of the Ayyubids: additions and corrections, 
in: Numismatic Chronicle 146 ( 1986), 119-154. 
Nielsen, J.S.: 'Between Arab and Turk: Aleppo from the 11th till the 13th centuries,' 
in: Byzantinische Forschungen 16 (1991), 323-340. 
Oexle, Otto G.: ,Adliges SelbstversUindnis und setne Verknlipfung mit dem 
liturgischen Gedenken - das Beispiel der Welfen', in: Zeitschrift for die Geschichte 
des Oberrheins 134 NF 95 (1986), 47-76. 
Oexle, O.G.:' Das Bild der Modeme vom Mittelalter und die modeme 
Mittelalterforschung', in: Friihmittelalterliche Studien 24 ( 1990), 1-22. 
Oney, G.: Anadolu Selr;uklularz Mimarisinde Siisleme ve El Sanatlarz, Ankara 1938. 
Onkal, Hakkt: Anadolu Selr;uklu Tiirbeleri, Ankara 1996. 
Ostrogorsky, George: History of the Byzantine State, (Engl. trans. J. Hussey), 2nd. 
ed. Oxford 1968. 
Ostrogorsky, G.: 'The Byzantine Emperor and the Hierarchical World Order', in: 
Slavonic and East European Review 35 (1956-57), 1-14. 
Ozaydtn, Abdiilkerim: Selr;uklu Tarihi Sultan Muhammad Tapar Devri, (498-
51111105-118), Ankara 1990. 
Ozgiidenli, Osman G.: Turco- Iranica Ortar;ag Tiirk- jran Ara$tzrmlarz, (Kakniis 
Yayznlarz 250/ tarih serisi 17), Istanbul2006. 
272 
Paret, Rudi: Der Koran, Stuttgart 1979. 
Patton, Douglas L.: A History of the Atabegs of Mosul and their relations with the 
Ulama A.H. 521-660/ A.D. 1127-1262, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1986. 
Peacock, A.C.S.: 'Ahmad of Nigde's al- Walad al-Shafiq and the Seljuk past', in: 
Anatolian Studies 54 (2004): 95-107. 
Peacock, A.C.S: 'Nomadic society and the Seljuq campaigns in Caucasia;, in: Iran 
and the Caucasus 9/ii (2005), 205-230. 
Peacock, A.C.S: 'The Saljuq campaign against the Crimea and the expansionist 
policy of the early reign of'Ala' al-Din Kayqubad', in: JRAS 16/ii (2006), 133-149. 
Peacock, A.C.S: 'Georgia and the Anatolian Turks in the 12th and 13th centuries', 
in: Anatolian Studies 56 (2006), 127-146. 
Peacock, A.C.S: Mediaeval Islamic Historiography and Political Legitimacy: 
Bal'ami 's Tiirzkhniima, London 2007. 
Peacock, A.C.S: 'Utbi's al-Yamini: patronage, composition and reception', In: 
Arabica 54/iv (2007), 500-525. 
Peacock, A.C.S: 'Black Sea trade and the Islamic world down to the Mongol period', 
in: The Black Sea Region: Past, Present and Future, (eds.), G. Erkut/ S. Mitchell 
London/ Istanbul 2007, 65-72. 
Pritsak, 0.: 'Der Untergang des Reiches des Oguzischen Yabgu', in: Fuad Kopriilii 
Armaganz, istanbul 1953, 397-410. 
Pritsak, 0.: 'Stammesnamen und Titulaturen der altaischen Volker', In: UAJ 24 
(1954), 49-104. 
273 
Pritsak, 0.: 'Die Karachaniden', in: Islam 31 (1953-54), 17-68. 
Pritsak, 0.: 'Studie zur tiirkischen Rechtssymbolik', In: Zeki Velidi Togan 'a 
Armagan, Istanbul 1955. 
Ramsay, William M.: The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, London 1890. 
Redford, Scott: 'The Alaeddin Mosque in Konya reconsidered', in: Artibus Asiae 51 
(1991), 54-72. 
Redford, S.: 'Just landscape in Medieval Anatolia', in: Studies in the History of 
Gardens and Designed Landscapes 20 (2000), 313-324. 
Redford, S.: Landscape and the state in Medieval Anatolia: Seljuk gardens and 
pavilions of Alanya, Turkey, Oxford 2000. 
Redford, S.: 'A grammar of Rum Seljuk ornament', in: Seldjoukides, (ed.), Leiser, 
283- 310. 
Redford, S/ Leiser, G.: Victory Inscribed The Seljuk Fetibniime on the Citadel Walls 
of Antalya, Turkey, Antalya 2008. 
Reynolds, Susan: 'Social Mentalities and the Case of Medieval Scepticism', In: 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6,1 ( 1991 ), 21-41. 
Rice, Tamara T.: Die Seldschuken, Koln 1963. 
Richards, D.S., ( ed.): Islamic Civilisation 950-1150, Oxford 1973. 
274 
Richards, D.S.: 'lbn al-Athir and the later parts of the Kamil: a study of aims and 
methods', in: Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ( ed.), 
D.O. Morgan, London 1982,76-108. 
Richter-Bemburg, Lutz: ~Amir-Malik-Shahanshah, 'Adud al-Daula's Titulature re-
examined', in: Iran 28 (1980), 83-102. 
Richter-Bemburg, L.: Der syrische Blitz. Saladins Sekretiir zwischen Selbstdar-
stellung und Geschichtsschreibung, Beirut 1998. 
Riefstahl, Rudolph M.: Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia, Cambridge 
1931. 
Ritter, H./ Bausani, A.: Djalal al-Din Rumi EI2. 
Roemer, H.R.: ~Die Selguqische Eroberung Anatoliens tn tiirkischcr Sicht', tn: 
Festschriftfiir Wilhelm Eilers, Wiesbaden 1967,231-249. 
Roemer, H.R.: 'The Ttirkmen dynasties', in: The Cambridge Histo1y of Iran, vi, 147-
88. 
Rogers, J.M.: Patronage in Seljuk Anatolia, 1200-1300, unpubl. DPhil thesis, 
University of Oxford 1972. 
Rogers, M.: 'Waqf and patronage in Seljuk Anatolia: the epigraphic evidence', in: 
Anatol ian Studies 26 ( 197 6), 69-1 03. 
Rogers, J .M.: 'Royal caravansarays and royal inscriptions in Seljuk Anatolia', in: 
Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Ara$tzrma Dergisi, (In Memoriam Prof. A.L. Gabriel), Ozel sayt, 
1978. 
275 
Rosenthal, Erwin I.J.: Political Thought in Medieval Islam. An introducto1y outline, 
Cambridge 1958. 
Rosenthal, E.l.J.: The role of the State in Islam: theory and the medieval practice, in: 
Der Islam (1973), 1-28. 
Rosenthal, Franz: A History of Muslim Historiography, [1 st ed. Leiden 1952], 2d 
rev. ed., Leiden 1968. 
Rouse, J. P.: 'L'origine celeste de la souverainete dans le inscriptions paleo-turques 
de Mongolie et de Siberie,' in: The Sacral Kingship, 231-241. 
Runciman, Steven: A History ofthe Crusades, Volume 1: The First Crusade and the 
Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Cambridge 1951. 
Rypka, J .: History of Iranian Literature, Dordrecht/Holland 1968. 
Saat9i, Mustafa: 'Selvuklu iktisad1n1n Temeleri', in: Seh;uklular Devrinde Kiiltiir ve 
Medeniyet, (ed.), A.H. Koker, Kayseri 1991, 225-237. 
Sahin, M.N./ Keten, i./ <::ahk, S., (eds.): Sel9uklu ve Beyliklerde Vakjiye Tugralarz, 
Ankara 2005. 
Sacral Kingship The: Contributions to the Central Theme of the VIIIth International 
Congreass for the History of Religions, Rome April 1955. (Supplement to Numen: 
International Review for the History of Religions), Leiden 1959. 
Safi, Omid: The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam Negotiating Ideology and 
Religious Inquhy, Chapel Hill 2006. 
Sanaullah, Mawlawi Fadil: The decline of the Saljuqid Empire, (PhD Thesis 
University of London), Calcutta 1938. 
276 
Sarre, F.: Reise in Kleinasien- Sommer 1895- Forschungen zur Seldjukischen Kunst 
und Geographie des Landes, Berlin 1896. 
Savvides, Alexeis G.C.: Byzantium in the Near East: its relations with the Seljuk 
Sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armeniens of Cilicia and the Mongols A.Dc. 
1192-1237, Salonici 1981. 
Savvides, A.G.C.: 'A note on the terms Rum and Anatolia in Seljuk and early 
Ottoman times', in: Byzantinoturkika meletemaa 10 (1991), 171-178. 
Savvides, A.G.C.: 'Some maJor Seljuk, Persian and Ottoman sources regarding 
Byzantine-Seljuk relations (A bibliographical survey)', in: Seldjoukides, ( ed.) Leiser, 
9-25. 
Savvides, A.G.C.: Tekfur £12. 
Schaendlinger, A.C.: 'Amter und Funktionen im Reiche der Rumseltschuken nach 
der Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi', in: WZKM, CXI ( 1969), 172-192. 
Shimizu, Kosuke: Bibliography on Saljuq Studies, Tokyo 1979. 
Schmid, Karl: (Welfisches SelbstversHindnis: Gebetsgedenken und adliges 
Selbstverstandnis im Mittelalter', in: Karl Schmid: Ausgewiihlte Beitriige. Festgabe 
zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag, Sigmaringen 1983, 424-453. 
Schmid, K.: 'Zur Entstehung und Erforschung von GeschlechterbewuBtsein: Staufer, 
Welfen, Zahringer', in: Zeitschrift for die Geschichte des Oberrheins 134 NF 95 
(1986), 21-34. 
Schottler, Pitty: Die Rumseldschuken. Grunder der Turkei: Geschichte und Kultur, 
Freiburg in Bremen 1995. 
277 
Schowingen von Schabinger K.E.: Nizamulmulk, Reichskanzler der Saldschuquen 
1063-1092 n.Chr., Mtinchen 1960. 
Schulze, Hagen: ~MentaliUitsgeschichte- Chancen und Grenzen eine Paradigmas der 
franzosischen Geschichtswissenschaft', in: Geschichte in Wissenchaft und Untericht 
4 (1985), 247-270. 
Seljuque, Affan: 'Some notes on the Early History of the Saljuqid Period in Iran', in: 
Iqbal Review 7, 3 (1971), 91-99. 
Seljuque, A.: 'Seljuqid History and the Contemporary Poets', in: JPHS 20 (1972), 
65-73. 
Setton, Kenneth M.: A Histo1y of the Crusades, 2 vols., Wisconsin 1969. 
Setton, K.M.: The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1976-
78. 
Sevim, Ali: Suriye ve Filistin Selr;uklularz Tarihi, (TTK Yay1nlan, 14/7), Ankara 
1983. 
Sevim, Ali: 'Ttirklerin Anadolu'ya Geli~leri (Genel c;izgileriyle)', in: Turk Dili 440 
(1988), 57-64. 
Sevim, Ali and Yticel, Ya~ar: Turkiye Tarihi Fetih, Selr;uklu ve Beylikler Donemi, 
Ankara 1989. 
Sevim, Ali: Onlu Selr;uklu Komutanlarz Aftin, Atszz ve Aksungur, Ankara 1990. 
278 
Shaw, Stanford J.: History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume 1: 
Empire of the Gazis. The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1880, 
Cambridge 1976. 
Shils, Edward/ Johnson, Harry M.: 'Ideology', in: International Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, 7 (1968), 66-85. 
Shukurov, R.M.: 'Between Peace and Hostility: Trebizond and the Pontic Turkish 
Periphery in the Fourteenth Century', in: Mediterranean Historical Review 9, N 1 
(1994), 20-72. 
Shukurov, R.: 'Trebizond and the Seljuks (1204-1299)', tn: Seldjoukides, ( ed.), 
Leiser, 71-136. 
Sinor, Denis (ed.): The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, Cambridge 1990. 
Sinor, D.: 'The Legendary Origin of the Turks', in: Folklorica: Festschr(ft for Felix 
J. Onias, (eds.) E.V. Zygas/ P. Voorheis, Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series 
vol. 141, Bloomington, Indiana 1982, 223-45. 
Sinor, D.: 'Horse and pasture in Inner Asia', in: Oriens Extremis 19 (1972), 171-83. 
Sivan, Emmanuel: L 'Islam et la Croiade: ideologiec propande, dans les reactions 
musulmanes aux Croisades, 1968. 
Smith, Anthony D.: Nationalism: theory, ideology, histo1y, Cambridge 2001. 
Spiridonakis, Basile G.: Grecs, Occidentaux et Turcs de 1054 a 1453: Quatre Sii~cles 
D 'His to ire de Relations Internationales, Thessaloniki 1990. 
279 
Spuler, Bertold: Iran in Fruh-lslamischer Zeit. Politik, Kultur, Verwaltung und 
offentliches Leben zwischen der arabischen und der seldschukischen Eroberung 633 
bis 1055, Wiesbaden 1952. 
Spuler, B.; Jettmar, K.: Handbuch der Orientalistik, Geschichte Mittelasiens, Leiden 
1966. 
Stem, S.M.: Afrasiyab, £12. 
Strohmeier, Martin: Seldschukische Geschichte und turkische Geschichtswissen-
schaft: die Seldschuken im Urteil modern er turkischer Historiker, (Freiburg Diss. ), 
Berlin 1984. 
Sum er, Faruk: 'Anadolu 'ya yalntz goyebe Ttirkler mi geldi? ', in: Bell et en 24 ( 1960), 
567-94. 
Stimer, F.: 'Anadoluda Mogollar', in: SAD 1 (1969-70), 1-147. 
Stimer, F.: Oguzlar (Turkmenler): tarihleri, boy te$kilatz, destanlarz, Ankara 1972. 
Stimer, F.: 'Selyuklu Tarihinde igdi~ler', in: Turk Dunyasz Ara$fzrmalarz, 35 (1985), 
9-23. 
Stimer, F.: 'Selyuklular Devrinde Turk Beyler'i, in: Turk Dunyasz Ara$fzrmalarz, 43 
(1986), 133-144. 
Stimer, F.: Selr;uklular Devrinde Dogu Anadolu 'da Turk beylikleri, Ankara 1990. 
Stissheim, Karl: Das Geschenk aus der Seldschukengeschichte von dem Wesir 
Muhammad b. Muhammad b. 'Abdallah b. AI-Nit Am al-Husainf al-Jazdf, Leiden 
1909. 
280 
Si.isli.i, Ozden: Tasvirlere Gore Anadolu Selr;uklu Kiyafetleri, Ankara 1989. 
Tabbaa, Yasser: 'Monuments with a Message: Propagation of Jihad under Nur Al-
Din (1146-1174)', in: The Meeting of Two Worlds Cultural Exchange between East 
and West during the Period of the Crusades, ( ed. ), V .P. Go ss, Michigan 1986, 223-
240. 
Taeschner, Franz: Das Anatolische Karavansaray, 2 vois., Leipzig 1924-26. 
Taeschner, F.: 'The Turks and the Byzantine Empire to the End of the Thirteenth 
Century', in: The Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 4, Part 1, 737-52. 
Taneri, A.: Tiirkiye Selr;uklularz kiiltiir hayatz. Meniikibii-1-drifin 'in degerlendiril-
mesi, Konya 1977. 
Tanz, Sabine: 'Sinn der MentaliHitsgeschichte. Bilanz und Ausblick', in: 
Mittelaltelforschung nach der Wende, ed., M. Borgolte, (Historische Zeitschrift 
Beihefte Bd. 20), Mi.inchen 1995, 227-38. 
Tellenbach, Gerd: ~MentaliHit', in: idem. Ausgewiihlte Abhandlungen und Aufsiitze, 
Band 1, Stuttgart 1988, 82-104. 
Tetley, G.E.: The Ghaznavid and Seljuq Turks: Poet1y as a source of Iranian histo1y, 
London 2009. 
Tevhid, Ahmed: Meshkiikat-I kadfme-i is!amiyye katalogu, IV, Qunstantiniye 1321. 
Togan, Zeki V.: 'Re~ideddin'in Mektuplannda Anadolu'nun iktisadi ve Meden1 
Hayattna ait Kayttlar', in: jstanbul Universitesi jktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz, 15 
(1953-54), 33-50; English trans G. Leiser as References to Economic and Cultural 
Life in Anatolia in the Letters of Rashfd al-Dfn, in: History and Historiography of 
281 
Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East Studies in Honor of John E. Woods, 
J. Pfeiffer/ S.A. Quinn, (eds.), Wiesbaden 2006, 84-111. 
Treadgold, W.T.: A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford, CA, 1997. 
Turan, Osman: Oniki hayhanh Turk takvimi, Istanbul 1941. 
Turan, 0.: 'Selvuklu kervansaraylan', in: Belleten 10 (1946), 471-96. 
Turan, 0.: 'Tiirkiye Selvuklulannda Toprak hukuku. Miri topraklar ve hususi 
miilkiyet ~ekilleri', in: Belleten 12 (1948), 549-7 4. 
Turan, 0.: Selvuk Tiirkiyesin'de faizle para ikraz1na dair hukuki bir vesika, 1n: 
Belleten 16 (1952), 251-60. 
Turan, 0. (ed.): Fuad Kopriilii Armaganz, istanbul1953. 
Turan, 0.: 'Les sourverains Seldjoukides et leurs sujets non-musulmans', in: Studia 
Islamica 1-2, (1953-54), 5-100. 
Turan, 0.: 'izzedin Keykaviis'e ait bir temlik-name', in: Fuad Kopriilii Armaganz, 
istanbul, 531-64. 
Turan, 0.: 'Anatolia in the Period of the Seljuks and the Beyliks', in: The Ca1nbridge 
History of Islam, vol. 1, The Central Islamic Lands, (ed.), P.M. Holt Cambridge 
1970, 231-262. 
Turan, 0.: Tiirk cihiin hiikimiyeti mejkuresi tarihi, Istanbul 1990. 
Turan, 0.: 'The ideal of World Dominination among the medieval Turks', in: Studia 
Is/arnica 4 (1956), 77-90. 
282 
Turan, 0.: Tiirkiye Selr;uklulan hakkznda resmf vesikalar Metin, Terciime ve 
Ara$tlrmalar, ( 1 st ed. Ankara 1958), 2 d ed. Ankara 1988. 
Turan, 0.: Selr;uklular Tarihi ve Tiirk jsJam medeniyeti, istanbul 1965. 
Turan, 0.: Selr;uklular Zamanznda Tiirkiye. Siyasi Tarih Alp Arslan 'dan Osman 
Gazi'ye (1071-1318), Istanbul1971. 
Turan, 0.: Selr;uklular ve jsfamiyet, (1 st. ed. istanbul1971), 3 rd. ed. Istanbul1993. 
Turan, Refik: Tiirkiye Selr;uklularznda Hiikumet Mekanizmasz (Vezfr ve Divan), 
istanbul 1995. 
Turgal, H.F.: Anadolu Selr;ukkileri Miinecimba$zya gore, Istanbul 1939. 
Onsal, Behyet: Turkish Islamic Architecture in Seljuk and Ottoman times, 1071-
1923, London 1959. 
Uyumaz, Emine: Sultan I. Alaeddin Keykubad Devri. Tiirkiye Selr;uklu Devlet Siyasi 
Tarihi (1220-1237}, Ankara 2003. 
Uzunyar~th, ismail Hakkt: Osmanlz Tarihi, vol.1 (Anadolu Selyuklulan ve Anadolu 
Beylikleri hakktnda bir mukaddime ile Osmanh Devleti'nin kurulu~undan 
istanbul 'un fethine kadar ), Ankara 194 7. 
Uzunvar~th, i.H.: Osmanlz devleti te$kildtzna medhal, istanbul 1941. 
Vasiliev, A.A.: Histo1y of the Byzantine Empire 324-1453, vol. II, (second Engl. 
edition), Madison/ Wisconsin 1952. 
Vasiliev, A.A.: 'Das genaue Datum der Schlacht von Myriokephalon', in: BZ 27 
(1927), 
283 
Vryonis, S.: The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of 
Islamization from the evelventh through the fifteenth centwy, London 1971. 
Vryonis, S.: Byzantium: its internal history and relations with the Muslim world. 
Collected Studies, London 1971. 
Vryonis, S.: Studies on Byzantium Seljuks and Ottomans, repr. Malibu 1981. 
Vryonis, S.: 'Byzantine Imperial Authority: Theory and Practice in the Eleventh 
Centu', in: Makdisi,: La notion d'autorite au Moyen Age Islam, Byzance, Occident, 
141-161. G./ Sourdel, D./ Sourdel-Thmine, J. (eds.), Paris 1982. 
Vryonis, S.: 'The Muslim family in 13th-14th century Anatolia as reflected in the 
writings of the Malawi Dervish Eflaki', in: The Ottoman Emirate, 1300-1389, E. 
Zachariadou, ed., Crete 1993,213-223. 
Vryonis, S.: 'The political world of the Mevlevi Dervish Order in Asia Minor, (13th-
14th century) as reflected in the mystical wrtitings of Eflaki', in: Studies in honour of 
Robert Browning, C. Constantinides/ N. Panagiotakes/ E. Jeffreys/ A. Angelou, eds., 
Venice 1996. 
Vryonis, S.: 'The Byzantine Patriarchate and Turkish Islam', in: Byzantinoslavica 
5711 (1996), 69-111. 
Vryonis, S.: 'The battles of Manzikert (1071) and Myriocephalum (1176). Notes on 
food, water, archery, ethnic identity of foe and ally', in: Seldjoukides, Leiser (ed.), 
49-69. 
Waldman, Marilyn R.: Toward a Theo1y of Historical Narrative: a case study in 
Perso-lslamicate historiography, Columbus, Ohio 1980. 
284 
Watson, William (ed.): The Art of Iran and Anatolia 11th to the 13th Century AD., 
London 197 5. 
Watt, M.W.: Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh 1968. 
Watt, M.W.: 'Authority in the Thought of al-Ghazali', in: La notion d'autorite au 
Moyen Age Islam, Byzance, Occident, Makdisi, G./ Sourdel, D./ Sourdel-Thomine, J. 
(eds.), Paris 1982, 57-68. 
Weber, Max: 'Umbildung des Charisma', in: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Grundriss 
der verstehenden Soziologie, Voll, Tlibingen 1956, 758-778. 
Wenskus, Reinhard: Stammesbildung und Verfassung. Das Werden der friihmittel-
alterlichen gentes, Koln/Graz 1961. 
Widengren, G.: 'The Sacral Kingship of Iran', in: The Sacral Kingship, 242-258. 
Wiet, G.: 'Les inscriptions de Saladin', in: Syria, 3 (1922), 307-328. 
Wirth, P .: 'Kaiser Manuel I. Komnenos und die Ostgrenze. Rlickeroberung und 
Wiederaufbau der Festung Dorylaion', in: BZ, 55 (1962). 
Wittek, Paul: 'Tlirkentum und Islam', 1n: Archiv for Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik, 59 (1928), 489-525. 
Wittek, P.: 'Von der byzantinischen zur tlirkischen Toponymie', in: Byzantion 10 
(1935), 11-64. 
Wittek, P.: 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', in: Byzantion 2 (1936), 
285ff. 
285 
Wittek, P.: 'Le Sultan de Rilm', in: Annuaire de I 'Inst. de phi/of. et d 'hist. orientales 
et slaves 6 (1938), 361 ff. 
Wittek, P.: Das Fiirstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 
13.-15. Jh., [1st. published in: IstanbulerMitteilungen 2 (1934)], Amsterdam 1967. 
Wolper, Ethel S.: 'Understanding the public face of piety: philanthropy and 
architecture in late Seljuk Anatolia', in: Seldjoukides, Leiser ( ed.), 311-336. 
Wiistenfeld, F.; Mahler, E: Vergleichungs-Tabellen zur muslimischen und iranischen 
Zeitrechnung, 3d. rev. ed. J. Mayr and B. Spuler, Wiesbaden 1961. 
Ytnan9, Miikrimin Halil: Tiirkiye Tarihi. Seh;uklular Devri, Istanbul 1944. 
Zambauer, Eduard von: Die Miinzpragungen des Islam, zeitlich und ortlich geordnet, 
ed. P. Jaeckel, Wiesbaden 1968. 
286 
